

# CAIB – Eleven Years in Retrospect

By Philip Agee

*Editors' Note: This article was written expressly for this issue.*

It was January 1978 and a handful of U.S. activists were meeting in a Kingston, Jamaica hotel. Our purpose: to start a magazine dedicated to exposing U.S. covert interventions around the world, a new beginning, carrying on from *CounterSpy*, which had shut down due to serious differences among its staff.

Our backgrounds were as diverse as they were similar. Ellen Ray was a filmmaker and journalist originally from Nebraska, who had studied there and at Harvard and worked with Jim Garrison in his investigation into the JFK assassination. In the mid-70s she joined *CounterSpy* and endured the groundless attacks on the magazine following the assassination in Athens of the CIA's Chief of Station. Those attacks, from the CIA and corporate media as well as death threats from the right, contributed to the collapse of *CounterSpy*.

Ellen's husband, Bill Schaap, was a lawyer and editor of the *Military Law Reporter* who had studied at Cornell and the University of Chicago. For many years he and Ellen defended U.S. military personnel in trouble for resisting the Vietnam War. Their work took them abroad for extended stays in Okinawa, Italy, and West Germany.

Louis Wolf was a journalist and conscientious objector who had spent several years in Asia, first in Laos as a community development volunteer, and then in the Philippines. The destruction he saw from U.S. bombing in Laos led him to dedicate his life to opposing American intervention wherever it occurred. While living in London in the 1970s, Lou set up shop in the British Museum archives, and there he became the world's leading researcher on identification of CIA personnel through published State Department documents.

I had worked as a CIA operations officer in the 1950s and 60s, mostly in Latin America, but had resigned and decided to go public. Since 1975, when *Inside the Company* appeared, I had worked with journalists from many countries to investigate and expose CIA operations and personnel. Now, in early 1978, the U.S. government's reaction was fierce. During the previous year I had been deported under U.S. pressure from Great Britain and France, and deportation proceedings were under way in the Netherlands where I had resettled.

## Target CIA

Our principal target for the new magazine was, of course, the Central Intelligence Agency, the main government instrument for covert interventions. We realized we could not soon expect to change the U.S. policy of secret interventions abroad – a policy which had been continuous under Democrats and Republicans alike since World War II. But we could contribute to building public opposition and to weakening the instrument. We saw exposure as the best method, both of what the CIA does, and of the people who do it. Secrecy, after all,

was the necessary cloak under which Harry Truman and every President since him had sought to manipulate and control the lives of other peoples, their resources, and their markets.

The fundamental political agreement that brought us together in Jamaica was anti-imperialism and its corollaries: the need to achieve real democracy at home and to fight intervention abroad. We understood well that the human cost of CIA covert interventions was astronomical, that the Vietnam War, as only one example, began with secret U.S. programs, and that far too few Americans comprehended this.

This ideological identification, as much as the personal friendship among us, provided the glue that kept us together for more than a decade. When hard times did come, we rode them out, responded aggressively to the many attacks on our patriotism, and never thought of giving up. Our commitment from the beginning was permanent.

We had a considerable advantage in the avalanche of revelations of secret government operations during the previous three to four years, not only of those conducted by the CIA but by the FBI, military intelligence, and police departments as well. Those revelations, in part connected with the Watergate scandal and Nixon's resignation, bore the authentication stamp of the Congress. They thus obviated the efforts to discredit as disgruntled malcontents former CIA officers like myself, Victor Marchetti, John Stockwell, Joseph Smith and Frank Snepp – all of us with recently published exposés.

Yet for all the revelations and attendant scandals of the mid-70s, the few legislative initiatives to prohibit covert actions went nowhere. The prevailing conventional view was that "abuses" and "excesses" had occurred, that the "system" itself was still the best of all possible worlds, and that "corrective measures" such as congressional oversight of the security establishment would prevent future problems. The truth was that the CIA, FBI, and other services had been functioning exactly as they were supposed to, and the only abuse, excess, or malfunction was the revelation of what they were doing.

## Publication Plans

To get the magazine going, we put together such funds of our own as we could, supplemented by contributions of American benefactors who had supported our work in the past. The main editorial work would be done in Washington, D.C. by Ellen, Bill, and Lou. My contribution would be necessarily limited since I did not know where I would be living in the months ahead, or whether the NATO allies would force me back to the U.S. for a long trial and perhaps even prison.


Books were also a major component of our plans. Lou and I had put together a reader on CIA operations in Western Europe consisting of articles that had appeared in U.S. and European publications. Ellen and Bill edited the work and arranged for publication by Lyle Stuart, Inc., as *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe*.



Six months after our Jamaica meeting the *CovertAction Information Bulletin* was a reality, albeit a modest 24-page free "trial edition." It called for worldwide exposure of CIA operations and personnel, and had articles on terrorism by U.S.-based Cuban exiles and on undercover political canvassing in Jamaica. But the article that would create *CAIB*'s public identity was Lou's column: "Naming Names." With the career of the Agency's new Chief of Station in Jamaica, the magazine launched its most controversial activity—one that would provoke the most hysterical official wrath against a U.S. publication in this country's history.

The same outrage resulted from *Dirty Work*, which came out just as our first *CAIB* appeared. The book had the "official" biographies of more than 600 CIA officers and employees including the posts where they had served or were serving, and the covers they had used through the years.

Immediately the CIA and its friends in the media attacked us with the charge that we were publishing "hit lists," and were trying to get people killed. Our response was that we wanted



no one killed, that the people we named should return to the U.S. and should stay here. We made no secret that disruption was our purpose, and that CIA people, because of what they do, enjoyed no immunity from responsibility. In all this, no one accused us of falsely naming people who were not CIA, and in fact no one was threatened or attacked. But we did succeed in disruption—as the CIA later made amply clear.

In the coming year four more issues of *CAIB* appeared with articles on CIA recruitment methods and its operations in such countries as Cuba, Angola, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, and Spain. The "Naming Names" column uncovered dozens of CIA officers and stimulated wire stories and local headlines with each issue, prompting the Agency spokesperson to call the practice "incredible" and "unbelievable." Meanwhile, in the Senate Lloyd Bentsen (Dem.-Texas) introduced legislation to criminalize "naming names" by former government employees. Though immediately dubbed the anti-Agee bill, the CIA and its friends in Congress had to know that I had nothing to do with the lists—all the names were discovered through research of public documents in Washington.

Similarly, the Agency and U.S. media continually referred to *CAIB* as "Agee's publication," even though I performed no editing function and had only contributed a couple of articles. The technique, clearly, was to couple the magazine to my presumably discredited name and to allege that the names were of people I had known in the Agency. CIA Director Stansfield Turner, for his part, denounced *CAIB* bitterly and vowed that covert action operations would continue.

By mid-1979, we also had another book under way, to be entitled *Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa*, with identities and career postings of more than 700 CIA officers who had served, or were serving, in African countries. In early 1980 the Justice Department, on behalf of the CIA, sought a Federal Court injunction against publication of the book, only to learn that the book was already in bookstores and could not be suppressed.

### Pressures for Criminalization

Reaction to *Dirty Work 2* and to the *Bulletin*'s continuing revelations included the introduction of new bills to criminalize "naming names." These bills would not only make it a crime for former government employees like me to identify officers and agents, but also for any journalist. [Editors' Note: See the discussion of these bills in *From Our Editorials* in this issue.] Since the Intelligence Identities Protection Act was quite clearly aimed at stopping the "Naming Names" column and our *Dirty Work* series, the *Bulletin* staff (Ray, Schaap, and Wolf) requested, and were granted, an appearance before the House Intelligence Committee. Although they showed during the lengthy session that all names in the *Bulletins* and the books were culled from research from public documents, the Representatives were unmoved by "freedom of press" and First Amendment considerations.

Major media institutions like the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* editorialized against criminalizing the product of open research, but still called us "contemptible scoundrels." The *Washington Post* actually labeled us "terrorists of the pen"! Yet at the same time the major print and electronic media were in regular contact with the *Bulletin* seeking identities of CIA personnel in different countries—even in Iran after the Embassy staff were taken hostage, identifications the *Bulletin* refused to make.

None of the anti-*CAIB* legislation went beyond committee hearings, and by the time Ronald Reagan was elected in November 1980, *Bulletin* No. 10 was 60 pages in length. By now *CAIB* was by far the world's leading publication on secret government operations with subscriptions and newsstand sales passing 6000 with each edition. The quality and scope of articles had improved and widened. Among the more prominent were reports on CIA interference in the 1980 Jamaica elections, terrorism against the new revolutionary government in Grenada, a secret CIA manual on use of "deep cover," probable CIA operations against the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, technical collection operations, and CIA propaganda techniques with ties to private media.

It took the "Reagan revolution" to get the Intelligence Identities Protection Act passed. By summer 1982, when the law was approved, Reagan's anti-Soviet, New Cold War pro-



gun was in place. Anti-terrorism had replaced human rights as America's ostensible priority abroad, while anti-terrorism at home was replacing anti-communism as the justification for domestic political control. In anticipation of passage of the Identities Act, the Bulletin dropped the "Naming Names" column. Altogether, between CAIB and the Dirty Work series, more than 2000 identifications of CIA personnel had been made in less than four years.

#### The Reagan Doctrine Years

Central America, Grenada, Cuba, Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Ethiopia, Angola, Libya, and Lebanon were areas where the so-called Reagan Doctrine of Low Intensity Conflict was applied. Hardly "low intensity" for the hundreds of thousands who died as a result, but with noted exceptions they were foreigners not Americans, and Congress gave the necessary money—even voting openly to foment civil war in Nicaragua, a country with which the United States was formally at peace. CAIB published in-depth analyses on U.S., mainly CIA, intervention in each country and area.

Throughout the Reagan years, as the CIA budget soared, CAIB continued to present in-depth analyses and regular exposures of clandestine activities. Entire issues were devoted to the CIA and the media, the U.S. "religious right," drugs, and mercenaries. Major reports included a series on the CIA and assassination operations and an expose of the crude efforts to blame the Soviet Union for the shooting of Pope John Paul II. CIA connections with the Vatican, Opus Dei, and the Knights of Malta were also examined, as were increasing domestic surveillance and repression by the CIA, NSA, FBI, and other official agencies and by private groups as well.

The 1980s also brought writers of enormous talent and dedication to publish in the Bulletin. Ken Lawrence was one, with his column on "Sources and Methods." Another was Fred Landis, an astute analyst of CIA covert propaganda in Chile, Jamaica, and Nicaragua. Jonathan Bloch and Pat Fitzsimons, experts on British intelligence, wrote of British support for U.S. efforts to police the Caribbean.

Others followed: Philip Wheaton on propaganda against Grenada; William Preston, Jr. on government disinformation programs; Edward S. Herman on Central American election coverage; Sara Diamond on the Religious Right in the U.S.; Ward Churchill on *Soldier of Fortune* and mercenaries plus exposes on terrorist operations against the American Indian Movement; Sean Gervasi on CIA links with South Africa; Peter Dale Scott on the CIA's use and protection of Nazi war criminals; Noam Chomsky on U.S.-sponsored state terrorism; Peggy Rubin on Iranian arms dealers; Robert Lederer on chemical-biological warfare and the origin of AIDS; and many others, some under pseudonyms to protect their access.

Together, the 31 CAIBs published over nearly eleven years constitute an enormous fund of information for researchers, students, activists, and journalists, and constant sales of back issues reflect their current importance. To no one's surprise, CAIB's circulation long ago passed the 10,000 mark.

In 1986, William Vornberger joined the Washington staff as co-editor, and Dolores Neuman, Lou's wife, as photogra-

phy consultant. Ellen and Bill moved to New York, where they founded the Institute for Media Analysis, Inc. (IMA), and continued as CAIB co-editors.

#### Book Publications

Books remained a high priority. In 1981, in response to the Reagan-Haig "White Paper on El Salvador," Warner Poelchau, a Hamburg journalist, and I produced an analysis that reduced the "White Paper" to sensationalist trash. In the 19 "captured" documents on which the White Paper was based, we found translation errors, inaccuracies, embellishments, and fabrications—all of which exposed the false claim that the Soviet Union and Cuba were directing a world-wide arms support operation for the Salvadoran FMLN.

For publication of the "White Paper" analysis in book form, Ellen and Bill, along with New York attorney Michael Ratner, formed Sheridan Square Publications which brought out our work as *White Paper? White Wash: the CIA and El Salvador*.

Other books followed at Sheridan Square: Ralph McGeehee's account of his CIA career in Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines (*Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA*); Melvin Beck's description of his deep cover CIA career in Cuba and Mexico (*Secret Contenders: The Myth of Cold War Counterintelligence*); and, Edward Herman's and Frank Brodhead's exposure of the disinformation that communist countries were behind the plot to kill Pope John Paul II (*The Rise and Fall of the Bulgarian Connection*).

Most recently, in early 1989, Sheridan Square, now a division of IMA, published Judge Jim Garrison's account of his investigation of the John Kennedy assassination, *On the Trail of the Assassins*, clearly describing the conspirators from the CIA and FBI, and the hitmen and coverup artists from the Cuban exiles, the Mafia, the Secret Service, and the Dallas police. The motives, Garrison lucidly demonstrates, were to destroy Kennedy's plans to withdraw from Vietnam, for a rapprochement with Cuba and a relaxation of Cold War tensions.

#### Conclusion

Looking back, it seems that the most important contribution of CAIB during these eleven years has been to help keep alive the flame of resistance. On four long speaking tours of the U.S., I have found people everywhere who read CAIB and find it valuable, both for information and for inspiration.

With former CIA Director George Bush now in the White House, the need for CAIB's exposures remains as great as ever. CIA interventions continue in Afghanistan, Angola, Kampuchea, and Central America, preventing negotiated settlements of those conflicts. In El Salvador alone the death squads supported by the CIA killed nearly 2,000 people last year—added to the 70,000 or more killed since the U.S. counterinsurgency program began there nearly ten years ago.

CAIB begins its twelfth year just as it started, dedicated to raising consciousness and resistance among Americans and promoting solidarity with the victims of U.S. interventions. Liberation struggles abroad are our struggles, their victories are our victories. We are confident that CAIB will continue to help inspire domestic opposition to foreign adventures. ●







# Where Myths Lead To Murder

by Philip Agee

*Editors' Note: This article first appeared in CAIB Number 1, July 1978. It is a good illustration of how the CIA justifies or excuses, what are in many cases, blatantly illegal activities. It also reminds us that the individual members of the CIA — whose activities often lead to the loss of lives — must be held accountable for their actions.*

Today the whole world knows, as never before, how the U.S. government and U.S. corporations have been secretly intervening in country after country to corrupt politicians and to promote political repression. The avalanche of revelations in the mid-1970s, especially those concerning the CIA, shows a policy of secret intervention that is highly refined and consistently applied.

Former President Ford and leading government spokesmen countered by stressing constantly the need for the CIA to retain, and to use when necessary, the capability for executing the kinds of operations that brought to power the military regime in Chile. Ford even said in public that he believed events in Chile had been "in the best interests of the Chilean people." And even with President Carter's human rights campaign there has been no indication that the CIA has reduced or stopped its support of repressive dictatorships in Iran, Indonesia, South Korea, Brazil, and other bastions of "the free world."

The revelations, though, have not only exposed the operations of the CIA, but also the individual identities — the names, addresses, and secret histories — of many of the people who actually do the CIA's work. Yet, with all the newly available information, many people still seem to believe the myths used to justify this secret political police force. Some of the myths are, of course, actively spread by my former CIA colleagues; others come from their liberal critics. But whatever the source, until we lay the myths to rest, they will continue to confuse people and permit the CIA — literally — to get away with murder.

## **Myth Number One: The CIA is primarily engaged in gathering intelligence information against the Soviet Union.**

This is perhaps the CIA's longest-playing myth, going back to the creation of the Agency in 1947 and the choice of the name "Central Intelligence Agency." As the Agency's backers explained the idea to the American Congress, afraid even in those early days of getting dragged into unwanted foreign adventures, the CIA was needed to find out what a possible enemy was planning in order to protect the United States from a surprise attack. Americans at the time still shared a vivid

memory of the unexpected Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, and with the likelihood that the new enemy — the Soviet Union — would soon have atomic bombs, no one could really doubt the need to know if and when an attack might come.

The real success in watching the Soviets, however, came from technological breakthroughs like the U-2 spy plane and spy-in-the-sky satellites, and the job of strategic intelligence fell increasingly to the technically sophisticated U.S. National Security Agency. The CIA played a part, of course, and it also provided centralized processing of information and data storage. But in its operations the CIA tended to put its emphasis on covert action — financing friendly politicians, murdering suspected foes, and staging *coups d'état*.

This deeply involved the Agency in the internal politics of countries throughout Western Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, as well as in the Soviet bloc. And even where CIA officers and agents did act as spies, gathering intelligence information, they consistently used that information to further their programs of action.

The CIA's operatives will argue that the ultimate goal of discovering Soviet and other governments' intentions requires live spies at work in places like the Kremlin — that the Agency exists to recruit these spies and to keep them alive and working. A Penkovsky or two should be on the payroll at all times to keep America safe from Russian adventures. This argument may influence some people, because theoretically, spy satellites and other forms of monitoring only give a few minutes warning, whereas a person in the right place can report on decisions as soon as they are made, giving perhaps days or weeks of warning. Such a spy might also be of great value for the normal conduct of relations whether in negotiations, cooperation, or confrontation.

Nevertheless, the vast CIA effort to recruit officials of importance in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, KGB, and GRU has never had significant success. There have indeed been defections, but these, I was told in the CIA, had nothing to do with the elaborate traps and snares laid out by the CIA around the world. They resulted from varying motivations and psychological pressures operating on the official who defected. In this respect, the CIA's strengthening of repressive foreign security services, necessary for laying out the snares (telephone tapping, travel control, observation posts, surveillance teams, etc.), can scarcely be justified by the nil recruitment record.

Today, notwithstanding recent "reforms," the CIA remains primarily an action agency — doing and not just snooping. Theirs is the grey area of interventionist action between striped-pants diplomacy and invasion by the Marines, and



their targets in most countries remain largely the same: governments, political parties, the military, police, secret services, trade unions, youth and student organizations, cultural and professional societies, and the public information media. In each of these, the CIA continues to prop up its friends and beat down its enemies, while its goal remains the fortifying of U.S. hegemony so that American multinational companies can intensify their exploitation of the natural resources and labor of foreign lands.

Of course this has little to do with strategic intelligence or preventing another Pearl Harbor, while it has a lot to do with the power of certain privileged groups within the United States and their friends abroad. The CIA spreads the myth of



CIA Headquarters at Langley, Virginia.

"intelligence gathering" in order to obscure the meaning of what the Agency is really doing.

**Myth Number Two: The major problem is lack of control; that is, the CIA is a "rogue elephant."**

This myth comes not from the CIA, but from its liberal critics, many of whom seem to believe that all would be well if only Congress or the President would exercise tighter control. Yet, for all the recent horror stories, one finds little evidence that a majority in Congress want the responsibility for control, while the executive branch continues to insist—rightly—that the Agency's covert action operations have, with very few exceptions, followed the orders of successive presidents and their National Security Councils. As former Secretary of State Kissinger told Representative Otis Pike's Intelligence Investigating Committee, "Every operation is personally approved by the President."

For its part the Pike committee concluded in its official report, first published in "leaked" form by the *Village Voice*, that "all evidence in hand suggests that the CIA, far from being out of control has been utterly responsive to the instructions of the President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs."

So the problem is said to be with the presidents—Democratic and Republican—who, over the past 30 years, have given the green light to so many covert operations. But

why were the operations necessary? And why secret? The operations had to be secret, whether they involved political sabotage, funding of anticommunist journals, or fielding of small armies, because in every case they implied either government control of supposedly non-governmental institutions or violation of treaties and other agreements. In other words, hypocrisy and corruption. If the government was going to subvert free, democratic and liberal institutions, it would have to do so secretly.

There is, however, a more basic reason for the secrecy—and for the CIA. Successive administrations—together with American-based multinational corporations—have continually demanded the freest possible access to foreign markets, labor, agricultural products, and raw materials. To give muscle to this demand for the "open door," recent presidents have taken increasingly to using the CIA to strengthen those foreign groups who cooperate—and to destroy those who do not. This has been especially clear in countries such as Chile under Allende, of Iran 20 years earlier under Mosaddegh, where strong nationalist movements insisted on some form of socialism to ensure national control of economic resources.

The CIA's covert action operations abroad are not *sui generis*. They happen because they respond to internal U.S. requirements. We cannot wish them away through fantasies of some enlightened President or Congress who would end American subversion of foreign peoples and institutions by the wave of a wand. Not surprisingly, the U.S. Senate rejected by a very wide margin a legislative initiative that would have prohibited covert action programs by the CIA.

Only prior radical change within the U.S., change that will eliminate the process of accumulating the value of foreign labor and resources, will finally allow an end to secret intervention by the CIA and multinational corporations—not less. Increasingly important will be the repressive capabilities of the Agency's "sister" services abroad.

**Myth Number Three: Weakening the CIA opens wider the door for Soviet expansion and eventual world domination.**


This myth is peddled especially hard at times when liberation movements make serious gains. Former President Ford and Dr. Kissinger used it frequently during the CIA's ill-fated intervention in Angola, and we continue to hear it again as liberation movements seek Soviet and Cuban help in their struggle against the apartheid policies of the white Rhodesians and South Africans.

The problem for America, however, is not "Soviet expansionism," despite all the anticommunism with which we are indoctrinated practically from the cradle. The problem, rather, is that the American government, preeminently the CIA, continues to intervene on the side of "friends" whose property and privileges rest on the remnants of archaic social systems long since discredited. The political repression required to preserve the old order depends on American and other Western support which quite naturally is turning more and more people against the United States—more effectively, for sure, than anything the KGB could ever concoct.



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
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As Senator Frank Church explained in an interview on British television, "It's up to them [the Russians] to go to the house (side) better than we will choose nine times out of ten. After all, we're two hundred years away from our revolution; we're a very conservative country."

**Myth Number Four:** Those who attack the CIA, especially those who have worked in the intelligence community, are traitors, informants, or agents of the KGB.

This has been the Agency's chief attack on me personally, and I'm certain that the fear of being tarred with the same brush is keeping many CIA veterans from voicing their own opposition. But as with earlier efforts to find the "foreign hand" in the American antiwar movement, the CIA has failed to produce a shred of evidence that any of its major American (or European) critics are in the service of any foreign power.

Would the "reformers" of the CIA have also discovered how the Agency reacts to criticism. According to Representative Pike, the CIA's Special Counsel threatened to destroy Pike's political career. In a conversation with Pike's chief investigative staff person, the Special Counsel was quoted thus:

"Pike will pay for this [directing the vote to approve the committee report on the CIA]—you wait and see. I'm serious. There will be political retaliation. Any political ambitions in New York that Pike had are through. We will destroy him for this."

CIA veterans must not be intimidated by the Agency's false and unattributed slander. We have a special responsibility for weakening this organization. If put at the service of those we once oppressed, our knowledge of how the CIA really works could keep the CIA from ever really working again. And though the CIA will brand us as "traitors," people all over the world, including the United States, will respond, as they have already, with enthusiastic and effective support.

**Myth Number Five:** Naming individual CIA officers does little to change the Agency, and is done only to expose innocent individuals to the threat of assassination.

Nothing in the anti-CIA effort has stirred up more anger than the publishing of the names and addresses of CIA officials in foreign countries, especially since the killing of the CIA Station Chief in Athens, Richard Welch. CIA spokesmen—and journals such as the *Washington Post*—were quick to accuse me and the *CounterSpy* magazine of having "tingered" Welch for the "hit," charging that in publishing his name, we were issuing "an open invitation to kill him." The Agency also managed to exploit Welch's death to discredit and weaken those liberals in Congress who wanted only to curtail some of the Agency's more obvious abuses. Subsequent research, noted in *Dirty Work*, makes abundantly clear that *CounterSpy* had nothing to do with the Welch killing.

The result of the Agency's manipulations isn't hard to predict. The CIA, for all its sins, came out of the recent inves-

tigations strengthened by the Ford "reforms," while the Congress may attempt to pass an official secrets act that will attempt to make it a crime for any present or former government official ever again to blow the whistle by making public classified information. No more *Pentagon Papers*. No more Watergate revelations. No more *CIA Diaries*.

Nonetheless, the naming goes on. More and more CIA people can now be held personally accountable for what they and the Agency as an institution do—for the real harm they cause to real people. Their military coups, torture chambers, and terrorism cause untold pain, and their backing of multinational corporations and local elites helps push millions to the edge of starvation, and often beyond. They are the Gestapo and SS of our time, and as in the Nuremberg Trials and the war in Vietnam, they cannot shed their individual responsibility simply because they were following a superior's orders.

But apart from the question of personal responsibility, the CIA remains a secret political police, and the exposure of its

secret operations—and secret operatives—remains the most effective way to reduce the suffering they cause. Already a handful of journalists and former intelligence officers have managed to reveal the names and addresses of

hundreds of CIA people, and even the *Washington Post*—which condemns us for doing it—has admitted that our efforts added greatly to the CIA's growing demoralization. We also noticed from our own investigations that the Agency was forced to step up its security precautions and to transfer many of those named to other posts. All of this disrupts and destabilizes the CIA, and makes it harder for them to inflict harm on others.

Of course, some people will always raise the cry that we are "trying to get someone killed." But, as it happens, violence is not really needed. By removing the mask of anonymity from CIA officers, we make it difficult for them to remain at overseas posts. We hope that the CIA will have the good sense to shift these people to the increasingly smaller number of safe posts, preferably to a desk inside the CIA Headquarters at Langley, Virginia. In this way the CIA will protect the operatives named—and also the lives of their potential victims.

From the old song and dance of the "intelligence gathering" to the claim that "those who expose are the murderers," these five myths won't simply vanish. The CIA—and its allies—will continue to propagate them, and the CIA's critics will have to respond. We must increasingly expose these myths and the crimes they cover up.

Together, people of many nationalities and varying political beliefs can cooperate to weaken the CIA and its surrogate intelligence services, striking a blow at political repression and economic injustice. The CIA can be defeated. The proof can be seen from Vietnam to Angola, and in all the other countries where liberation movements are rapidly gaining strength.

We can all aid this struggle, together with the struggle for socialism in the United States itself. ●

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### The CIA spreads the myth of "intelligence gathering" in order to obscure the meaning of what the Agency is really doing.

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## The Biggest Eavesdropper of Them All:

# The National Security Agency

*Editors' Note: This exclusive interview was published in CAIB Number 11, December 1980. It goes without saying that under Ronald Reagan, the NSA increased its budget and expanded its activities. While several lawsuits have challenged the NSA's ultra-secrecy and illegal surveillance, none have successfully shed light on the enormous scope and breadth of NSA activities. This super-secret agency, which few Americans know anything about, intends to remain that way.*

NSA is hardly a household acronym, even today. Few know that its headquarters are at Fort Meade in Maryland. It is a standing joke at Fort Meade that NSA stands for "Never Say Anything." But the implications of the NSA's activity are anything but funny.

Established in 1952 by President Truman, in an executive order which has remained secret to this day, the prime mission of the NSA was supposed to be the protection of U.S. communications from foreign interception and the cracking of foreign codes. However, the existence today of genuinely unbreakable codes calls into question the very reason for the NSA to exist. The days of breaking Japanese naval codes are over. The NSA's mandate therefore must be larger than originally called for. It is clear that, from its inception, the NSA has been deeply involved in the interception of any communications thought by it to be of national security interest.

Until 1976, the government consistently denied that it was intercepting the private communications of American citizens. Then, in the aftermath of Watergate, Congressional investigations revealed the tip of the iceberg. In hearings before the Church Committee, the director of the NSA, Lt. Gen. Lew Allen, admitted that the NSA had been reading Americans' telegrams and listening to their phone calls. This was known as Operation Shamrock and while its alleged purpose was to search for evidence of foreign involvement in the anti-war movement, after extensive surveillance, no such evidence was found. [Similar to the findings in the FBI's CISPES probe of recent years.]

The NSA is a big operation. Its Fort Meade headquarters are said to be bigger than the CIA's building in Langley, Virginia, and more modern than the Pentagon. Its annual budget is estimated at between \$1.5 billion and \$15 billion. It has the most powerful computers in the world. Former *New York Times* foreign correspondent Harrison Salisbury has reported that the agency destroys 20 tons of paper a day, using the waste paper to heat its buildings. But it is the information that the NSA keeps which is truly frightening. It is not difficult to determine that the NSA monitors nearly all telephone calls and telegrams coming into and going out of the United States. Beyond this, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the NSA monitors a great deal of domestic telephone traffic.

### Exclusive Interview

The interview which follows was conducted with two experts on communications intelligence, one an NSA veteran. For obvious reasons, they cannot be identified here.

Q. You are experts in the interception of broad-band electronic communication. Could you explain briefly what this is?

A. The ordinary citizen regards wiretapping as a person operating a tape recorder, where the person makes a direct connection into the private line of the individual citizen. Decades ago this was the predominant technique used by intelligence and law enforcement people. It is still employed in some large measure.

Today, however, the bulk of interception and acquisition of information sent by citizens is being done by the intelligence community at select points in the long lines telecommunication system in this country and around the world. These are at places where there is a great concentration of circuits. We call them pinch points, or points of constriction.

Q. What kind of interception takes place at that point?

A. There are two kinds of interception operations. One would be a cooperative interception operation, where the communications common carrier, such as ATT in the U.S., is cooperating with the intelligence operation. The other is the covert operation, where the communications common carrier is *not* cooperating with the intercepting agency. Many covert operations involve interception of microwave multi-channel telecommunications circuits by a hidden antenna—in fact two antennas, one aimed at each link of microwave towers.

Q. The governments of the world can't listen to every word being transmitted. How do they narrow down what they analyze?

A. The intelligence agencies involved in communications intelligence (COMINT) use extremely sophisticated equipment to separate out targeted communications, and then subject these communications to further analysis. It is as if the communications pass through a series of sieves each having a finer mesh.

The first and second level of screening are done on a non-oral basis, on the header information. This is the beedle-de-beep one hears after dialing a long distance call. This information is used by NSA computers to screen phone calls and telex communications...and the computer decides immediately whether or not to drop a tape recording into the circuit.

It would be wrong to state that every telephone in this country is tapped. There is, however, reason to believe that a large percentage of domestic long distance telephone calls are being analyzed by non-oral means to retrieve messages of interest to the intelligence community.



analysis of the dialing information made. In the Wiretap Act of 1968, the word "interception" occurred over a hundred times. Its companion act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, does not use the word "interception" once. If they used the word "interception" they would have to define it. "Interception" is defined in the Wiretap Act and includes the temporary acquisition and analysis of information.

Now, the question is, are all international phone calls and



### NSA Headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland.

telexes being intercepted? Under the definition in the Wiretap Act of 1968, virtually all. Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, what is done is not defined as interception in most cases. But from the digital standpoint, the address information, virtually all international calls are analyzed.

Q: Is there a pre-determined formula to decide what will be recorded and read or listened to, or is this left in some degree to the judgment of the individual agent?

A. Both cases. There are lists of keywords and

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Q: You are saying that all traffic, where one or both parties are outside the U.S. is being intercepted?

A: You are using the word "intercepted." The NSA chooses to use the word "interception" when a computer analysis of the dialing information is done, but no recording is made. In the Wiretap Act of 1968, the word "interception" occurred over a hundred times. Its companion act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, does not use the word "interception" once. If they used the word "interception" they would have to define it. "Interception" is defined in the Wiretap Act and includes the temporary acquisition and analysis of information.

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NSA Headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland.

telexes being intercepted? Under the definition in the Wiretap Act of 1968, virtually all. Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, what is done is not defined as interception in most cases. But from the digital standpoint, the address information, virtually all international calls are analyzed.

Q: Is there a pre-determined formula to decide what will be recorded and read or listened to, or is this left in some degree to the judgment of the individual agent?

A: Both cases. There are lists of key words; hundreds and thousands of them. Quite often a phone number, or a combination of phone numbers is targeted, so that if A's phone calls B's phone, a recording is made of that conversation. Or, all calls from A's phone may be targeted; or all calls to A's phone, or both.

But, as sophisticated as the computer is, and as comprehensive as the guidelines may be, there is no substitute for the skill of the intelligence analyst.

Q: Are more calls recorded than listened to by human analysts?

A: Perhaps so, but I would say that of those conversations that are recorded, a greater portion are listened to. In the case of non-oral communications, even more sophisticated automatic analysis is done before the human looks at it. In the case of a telegram, it would be projected on a cathode ray

screen, and the analyst would quickly scan it to determine if it is of intelligence interest.

Q: Suppose a person that the NSA is interested in uses a pay phone?

A: The telephone company's telecommunications system computer is available to the NSA. That computer knows all the pay phones in the country. If a call is made between pay phones, the assumption is made that nefarious activity is more likely to be going on.

Now, suppose you are a person involved in political activity not to the liking of the NSA. They can develop a profile of your dialing habits — whom you talk to. As a result, if you have spoken to a person several times, they will know this and his telephone will be included in the octopus surrounding you and they may have surveillance on your friend's phone because of his association with you.

Q: If an agency has a tap on a phone, can they tell where an incoming call is dialed from?

A: Yes. An ordinary tap will not do this, but there are systems that will.

Q: How quickly?

A: Immediately. You should understand that with the TSPS system, where you dial 0 and then the long distance number, the operator has in front of him or her on an illuminated screen, both the number you are calling from and the number you are calling.

Q: Is there a computer technology to screen conversations on the basis of key words?

A: Yes, they can do voice key word analysis. However, this technique is not in widespread use on oral communications, because there are other processes that will allow them to zero in on conversations of interest. They can do it, but it requires a great deal of expense and computer time. This is because your pronunciation of the word "oil" will be different from mine, and my pronunciation will vary. O-I-L will be spelled the same way virtually all the time when transmitted over telephones. But there is variation in the inflection of the voice, and it is generally not cost-effective to screen oral communications by automatic electronic analysis.

Now, I must say again that these techniques have been developed and are being used, but not on as broad a scale as is popularly thought, on oral communications.

Q: Can you tell us about the one-way telephone connections between Hunters Stones and Menwith Hill in England?

A: In the British publication *New Statesman*, Duncan Campbell revealed the existence of an underground coaxial cable between the Hunters Stones microwave terminal, which is the central part of the backbone of the British long lines telecommunication system, and the NSA's British listening facility at Menwith Hill. Hunters Stones is a centroid of the British microwave long lines network. It is also the hub through which much of the national security information, radar, and other sensing devices pass. So it would be unfair to say that all activity passing from Hunters Stones to Menwith Hill is intercepted domestic or international telecommunications. However, the circuit capacity in existence is much beyond that necessary for non-communications inter-



ligence, that is signals intelligence.

Q: Does the same situation exist with the one-way lines going between the Naval Intelligence Support Center in Suitland and the NSA's facility at Fort Meade, and which backs up against ATTs long distance telephone microwave link in Waldorf, Maryland?

A: That is correct. The circuit capacity in these cases is much greater than is necessary for non-communications intelligence. It is in terms of tens of thousands of one-way parallel circuits. There is no need, generally speaking, for one-way circuits in ordinary communications. One can count on one's hand the very limited necessity for one-way circuits. One is broadcasting, another weather service, another news circuitry, and the stock ticker. But the capacity of the NSA to suck up communications far exceeds these needs, or signals intelligence, or the relatively few wiretaps they admit. So we see that a great vacuum cleaner exists.

With Duncan Campbell's material, there is yet another vacuum cleaner being serviced by extremely broad-banded multi-circuited channels going from Hunters Stones.

Q: Is the sole consumer the NSA and other U.S. agencies?

A: The NSA, often other U.S. agencies, and its hosts in some foreign countries.

Q: Does the CIA do this kind of broad-band interception also, or is it done exclusively by the NSA?

A: The CIA is engaged in this kind of activity. However, it is not the prime mover in this business. There is a cooperative effort between the CIA and the NSA. In those few cases where a friendly relationship cannot be effectuated between the NSA and the host country's officials, the CIA will install the equipment of the NSA in a totally covert operation.

Q: You have talked about the vast computer facilities of the NSA. Is it possible to describe, in numbers or in area, how much is involved.

A: As the years go by, more sophisticated computers are being developed, while the size of these computers is diminishing. If one were to travel to Fort Meade and look at the buildings, one would be impressed by the size of the facility, but not overly impressed. The reason is that their capability is dispersed around the world—in Texas, throughout the U.S., in England, and around the world. Their computers are dispersed around the world, but linked together by telecommunications. All of these computers are in effect one computer, a giant octopus that reaches around the world. The NSA is so intertwined with the computer industry that much of the development of modern computers was funded through the NSA: into IBM, into Univac, into Sperry Rand. And this is continuing.

Q: What is the historical practice of the NSA in giving the CIA intercepted information on U.S. citizens?

A: It's not just the CIA, it's the FBI and other agencies too. The problem is that there are channels and a proliferation of much of this intercepted information, which filters through to the Justice Department, the local police, and into regulatory agencies, even into licensing agencies, such as the American Bar Association, medical boards, and boards of educational certification.

## How the CIA uses Bugs

by Ken Lawrence

*Editors' Note: This article first appeared in CAIB Number 6, October 1979.*

According to Robert E. Lubow, the CIA uses insects for surveillance. In his book, *The War Animals*, Lubow told how the Agency used cockroaches to learn whether a certain man was visiting the Fifth Avenue apartment of a prominent New York socialite who was believed to be serving as a drop-off for a group of foreign agents.

The CIA's technique employed a pheromone, a chemical secreted by female cockroaches which sexually excites males. In closely confined quarters, male roaches exhibit severely agitated behavior in the presence of the female pheromone, even if only minute quantities are present.

A CIA agent followed the target onto a crowded subway car during rush hour and deposited a small smear of the pheromone on the man's jacket while crushed against him. Later, CIA agents surreptitiously entered the socialite's apartment with a cage of male cockroaches. When the roaches went wild, the CIA concluded the man had been there, as they had suspected all along.

This exotic method was also very costly. Lubow says it once took the U.S. Department of Agriculture nine months to extract 12.2 milligrams of pheromone from 10,000 virgin female roaches. This would have been enough, however, for the CIA to repeat its surveillance trick many times. But recently science has come to the rescue of the buggers. This year a team of chemists and biologists succeeded in synthesizing the pheromone and published their results (*Journal of the American Chemical Society*, April 25, 1979).

The first public reports of the synthesis suggested that the discovery might lead to a breakthrough in cockroach control. In a cover story, *Chemical and Engineering News* (April 30, 1979) speculated that the substance—called *periplanone B*—might be used to confuse the males and prevent them from mating. *Science News* (May 5, 1979) suggested the same thing. Although such research is continuing, W. Clark Still, the chemistry professor at Columbia University who solved the chemical mystery that made the synthesis possible, is much more cautious. He says *periplanone B* is only effective as an attractant over short distances.

Dr. Still was surprised to learn of the CIA's use of the pheromone. "It doesn't worry me too much," he said, when asked how his discovery might benefit the covert operators. Then he added, "I've given away a number of samples. As far as I know they're all to reputable pharmaceutical houses." Maybe so, but if the roaches in your kitchen seem like they're acting a little crazy, you might begin to wonder.



# The Executive Order

*Editors' Note: This article first appeared in CAIB Number 16, March 1982. E.O. 12333 was the first step that Ronald Reagan took to curtail political rights in the U.S. One example of unchecked intelligence power is the FBI's illegal CISPES investigation. (It is interesting to note that five FBI agents reprimanded in the CISPES probe have since been promoted.)*

From a civil liberties standpoint, the Carter Executive Order of 1978 was far from exemplary, and contained a number of unconstitutional authorizations. In brief, it allowed extensive spying on, and intrusions into the lives of people who were not suspected of engaging in, or attempting to engage in, any crime. But the Reagan Executive Order of December 4, 1981 (E.O. 12333) authorized much activity which was prohibited under the Carter version and, more importantly, set an entirely different tone and philosophy for intelligence activities.

For example, the old Order was "intended to achieve the proper balance between protection of *individual rights* and acquisition of essential information." The new Order says that "collection of such information is a priority objective," and calls for "the proper balance between the acquisition of essential information and protection of *individual interests*." The old Order allowed such activities "as *permitted* by this Order," while the new version allows activities "*consistent with*" the Order.

The Carter Order stated that senior officials must ensure that activities "are carried out in accordance with applicable law," a provision deleted from the new version. It also required reporting of activities "which raise *questions of legality or propriety*," while the new Order requires reporting of activities "they have reason to believe may be unlawful."

The Carter Order also required that collection of information "must be conducted in a manner that preserves and respects established concepts of privacy and civil liberties." While it can be shown that the spirit of this provision was often ignored, the Reagan Order eliminates it entirely.

These differences are subtle indeed compared to the substantive changes in Part 2 of the Reagan Order, "Conduct of Intelligence Activities." For example, while the Carter Order also allowed the CIA to engage in collection of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence within the U.S., the latter was "subject to the approval of the Attorney General." Under the new order, such collection is to be conducted "as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General." Thus specific CIA activities will not be subject to particularized scrutiny.

Most significantly the new Order allows the CIA for the first time to engage in covert operations in the U.S., so long as they are "not intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media." How this

qualification can ever be enforced is unclear.

The Carter Order allowed physical surveillance by the CIA of a U.S. person abroad only if the person "is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power, engaging in international terrorist activities, or engaging in narcotics production or trafficking." The Reagan Order allows such surveillance merely to obtain "significant" foreign intelligence. Since foreign intelligence is defined to include "information relating to the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons," it is obvious that virtually any American overseas, dealing with any foreigners, will be subject to such surveillance.

The Reagan Order now allows warrantless unconsented physical searches, mail surveillance, monitoring, and similar techniques, if "there is probable cause to believe that the technique is *directed against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power*." The former version of the Order required "probable cause to believe that the United States person is an agent of a foreign power." It is unclear what the Reagan administration means by a technique "directed against a foreign power." One cannot search, follow, or monitor a "foreign power." The new language would seem to authorize such intrusive techniques to be used against a person who is *not* suspected of being a foreign agent, merely if the person is in contact with foreigners.

The provisions relating to undisclosed participation in domestic organizations have also been substantially modified. The agency heads, rather than the Attorney General, may now approve such tactics, and they determine whether "lawful purposes" are to be achieved.

Finally, it has been reported that 30 pages of secret-guidelines are being prepared to implement the new Executive Order. It is likely that here, under cover of secrecy, the dangerous orientation of the new administration will be given effect.

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# Accuracy in Media Rewrites the News

By Louis Wolf

*Editors' Note: This article appeared in CAIB Number 21, Spring 1984. The original, lengthy article remains the definitive investigation of this notorious group.*

"We're not for hire," claims Accuracy in Media (AIM). A Washington-based organization which touts itself as "America's only citizen's watchdog of the news media," its chairman, Reed Irvine, has picked fights with nearly every major media outlet in the United States, claiming they have strayed from AIM's alleged cause of media "accuracy," "balance," and "fairness."

Irvine's rhetoric and tactics give his game away. He and his group work tirelessly to convince the public there is a creeping Red Menace in much of the U.S. media.

AIM's beginnings were modest. With a reported \$200 initial capital, AIM was formed in September 1969, and incorporated in June 1971, by John K. McLean, an investment broker and past publisher of *Underground Conservative*; Abraham H. Kalish, who worked from 1949-58 with the U.S. Information Agency and from 1958-71 at the U.S. Army's Defense Intelligence School; and Reed John Irvine, who served in the Marine Corps as a Japanese language officer in the Pacific, and later with the War Department as a member of the U.S. Occupation forces in Japan.

In its early years, AIM was run by Kalish, but in 1971, when he was not rehired at his Defense Intelligence School job, Irvine assumed a larger role in the group, while, at first, he still held his Federal Reserve job as an economist. Irvine's influence was seen as a positive change by foundation and corporate donors. AIM's 1971 tax return showed expenditures of only \$5,047. In 1972, it rose to \$51,430.

## AIM's Leading Lights

An examination of past and present officers, directors, and members of the national advisory board confirms AIM's sharp rightward tangent, belying its claim of nonpartisanship:

- **Murray Baron**, AIM associate and president since 1976, was a union official with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters in New Jersey, and then a labor and industrial relations consultant to various U.S. and overseas corporations. He was a trustee of Freedom House, a member of the CIA-funded Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba, and of the arch-conservative Committee of One Million, a defense appropriations lobby, and a co-founder of the CIA-sponsored Citizens Committee for Peace with Freedom in Vietnam.

- Vice-president **Wilson C. Lucom** is best known for his disinformation campaign during the early 1970s against the President of Chile, Salvador Allende. He collaborated close-

ly with rightwing New York public relations entrepreneur Marvin Liebman who received funds from Chile's United Nations mission to publish *Chile la Verdad* (Chile The Truth), an openly anti-Allende propaganda sheet distributed throughout the United States.

- AIM co-founder and communications director since 1974, **Bernard Yoh** was born in Shanghai, China, and emigrated to the U.S. in 1947. He was a personal advisor in counterinsurgency techniques to former South Vietnamese puppet president Ngo Dinh Diem, serving under the CIA's infamous General Edward Lansdale. Yoh participated in covert missions into North Vietnam, having set up the Sea Swallows, an elite paramilitary and intelligence-gathering unit. He was the conduit through which CIA funds to that program were passed. Though Yoh is now considered a has-been by Agency stalwarts, he still collaborates with Washington-area rightwing Vietnamese exiles.

- Board member **Elbridge Durbrow** joined the State Department in 1930 and served as U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam from 1957-61. Before retiring in 1968, he was an advisor to the commander of Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. In 1971 he was appointed director of the Freedom Studies Center of the American Security Council.

Other AIM advisory board members include:

- **Clare Boothe Luce**, at 80, the unchallenged duchess of rightwing philanthropy, supporting AIM financially since 1972.

- **Marx Lewis**, a former trade union official, at 85, fighting communism as chairman of the Council for the Defense of Freedom (formerly the Council Against Communist Aggression established in 1951). CDF publishes and distributes, jointly with AIM, the sensationalist *Washington Inquirer*.

- **Eugene Lyons**, a former senior editor of *Reader's Digest* who sits on the board of the extreme right Young Americans for Freedom and has served on the American Conservative Union board.

- **Frank Newton Trager**, formerly a National War College professor, since 1966 head of the National Strategy Information Center in New York and Washington.

- Retired Admiral **Thomas H. Moorer**, former Chief of Naval Operations and Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman during the Nixon administration, a superhawk.

- Retired Marine Corps General **Lewis W. Walt**.

- Retired Rear Admiral **William Chamberlain Mott**, former special assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, and now president of the conservative Capital Legal Foundation. Mott is also vice-president of Trager's National Strategy Information Center.



# The Ordeal of Leonard Peltier

by William M. Kunstler\*

*Editors' Note: This article appeared in CAIB Number 24, Summer 1985. Leonard Peltier remains in jail; his cause as a political prisoner, representative of many others in the U.S., is one which continues to gain widespread world support.*

On June 26, 1975, FBI Special Agents Jack R. Coler and Ronald A. Williams were shot to death during a fire fight with members of the American Indian Movement (AIM) on South Dakota's Pine Ridge Indian Reservation. Joseph Stuntz Killisnoo, a young Native American, was also killed. The four oldest Indian males said by the Bureau to have been at the scene — Robert E. Robideau, Darrell Dean Butler, James T. Eagle, and Leonard Peltier — were indicted for the murder of the agents. No one was ever charged with Stuntz's death.

In July of 1976, after a lengthy trial, Robideau and Butler were acquitted by a jury in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, where their case, and that of Peltier, had been transferred because of local anti-Indian prejudice in South Dakota. The Justice Department then decided to dismiss charges against Eagle, the youngest of the four, who had not been present at the shootout, "so that the full prosecutive weight of the Federal Government could be directed against Leonard Peltier," who was extradited from Canada on the basis of affidavits obtained by the FBI from one Myrtle Poor Bear who swore that she had seen him shooting the agents. The Government was later forced to admit that all these documents were false, a concession that led one federal appellate court to characterize their use as "a clear abuse of the investigative process by the FBI."

On April 18, 1977, Peltier was convicted of the murders of the agents by a jury in Fargo, North Dakota, where, much to the surprise of the Cedar Rapids judge, his case had been mysteriously shifted. He was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment. Upon appeal, his convictions were affirmed with the finding that, although "the evidence against [him] was primarily circumstantial," the "critical evidence" was the testimony of one Evan Hodge, a Washington-based FBI firearms identification specialist. Hodge told the jury that Government Exhibit 34-B, a .223 caliber shell casing found in the open trunk of Coler's car, just a few feet from his body, was extracted from 34-A, an AR-15 rifle attributable to Peltier, but that he could reach no conclusion as to whether the gun had actually fired the bullet from that casing because of damage to its firing pin and breech face surfaces. Since the pathologists had opined that the agents had each been killed by a high velocity, small caliber weapon, such as an AR-15, fired at close range, Hodge's testimony was extremely damag-

ing to Peltier and was characterized by the prosecutor in his summation as "the most important piece of evidence in this case."

## The Discrepancies Come to Light

Long years after the trial, Peltier obtained, through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), a number of documents relating to the FBI's ballistics examination. One, a teletype from Hodge to the FBI resident agency at Rapid City, South Dakota, stated that a comparison between the .223 casings found at the shootout scene, referred to in FBIese as RESMURS, and Peltier's AR-15 had revealed that the weapon in question contained "a different firing pin than that in [the] rifle used at [the] RESMURS scene." On the strength of this, an appellate court ordered Judge Paul Benson, who had presided at the Fargo trial, to conduct an evidentiary hearing as to "the meaning of the...teletype and its relation to the ballistics evidence introduced at Peltier's trial."

The hearing took place in Bismarck, North Dakota, on October 1-3, 1984. Hodge, the only government witness, testified that he had been able to examine only seven of the 136 or so casings submitted to him for comparison. In fact, he had not got around to looking at 34-B until more than a half-year after the Pine Ridge confrontation. However, he freely admitted that he was constantly being importuned by Rapid City to test every casing forwarded to him, and that any such casings found near the bodies should have been examined on a priority basis. His failure to do so promptly, he explained, was due to a number of factors: the large volume of work associated with the RESMURS investigation, his necessary absences from Washington in connection with other FBI business, and the fact that only he and one assistant were available for firearms identification purposes.

While Hodge was on the stand, Peltier's attorneys were given an opportunity, for the first time, to look at the handwritten notes of his RESMURS work. They noticed that his key report — the one stating that the extractor marks on 34-B matched Peltier's AR-15 — contained what looked like handwriting different from that of either Hodge or his assistant. He was asked whether a third person had worked on the RESMURS ballistics, and replied he was "sure" that none had.

The defense then asked Judge Benson for permission to have all of Hodge's notes examined by a handwriting expert. The court, with obvious reluctance, granted Peltier's motion. The judge then closed the hearing. An hour later, all counsel were suddenly asked to return to the courtroom. The government, claiming that it had "stubbed its toe," recalled Agent Hodge who testified that, after leaving the stand, he had shown the report in question to his assistant and had been informed

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by him that the handwriting was not his. Hodge said he did not know the identity of the person who had written the document. Judge Benson ordered the government to turn over to defense counsel copies of all of the RESMURS ballistics notes and to attempt to determine just who had written the report.

The Bureau later named one William Albrecht, Jr., as the laboratory trainee who wrote the key report about the matching of the crucial .223 casing and the AR-15 attributed to Pel-



Leonard Peltier.

tier. Albrecht's deposition was taken in Washington. Now an FBI special agent, he said that Hodge, his unit chief, had told him, shortly after returning from the Bismarck hearing, that "it was important to determine who had prepared" the note in question. Hodge had been "ecstatic" and "even hugged me" when Albrecht said he had written it.

RESMURS had been the first case he had worked on after being assigned to the laboratory as "an agent examiner trainee." He recalled that he had worked on this case with Hodge and "Mr. Hodge's technician." He admitted that the deaths of two FBI agents would have had "a high priority" in the firearms unit and would have been "of personal interest since it is a fellow agent." Such a case would have created "a very strong interest on the part of the office of origin" as well. However, a decision was made on the part of the laboratory not to compare ejector marks on the .223 RESMURS casings and the test firings from the Wichita AR-15, even though they could have had "some value...in the lab."

In February 1985, a motion for a new trial was submitted to Judge Benson. On May 24 the Judge decided that the new evidence would not have influenced a jury in any way and denied Peltier's motion for a new trial. [Editors' note: This decision was appealed and the appeal was denied; the Supreme Court then denied a petition for review.]

### The Frameup

From the moment Hodge testified at his trial, Peltier has strenuously contended that the ballistics evidence against him was fabricated to ensure a conviction. Knowing that the extradition affidavits had been falsified and that the 1979 nine-month federal prosecution of Dennis Banks and Russell Means, co-leaders of the AIM occupation of Wounded Knee

a year earlier, had been dismissed because of his "unbecom- ing conduct, he was understandably suspicious of the govern- ing testimony.

The intensity of the FBI's determination to make him accountable for the loss of its two agents can be seen in the Bureau's agonized frustration after the conviction of Peltier and Robideau. On July 19, 1976, three days after the Butler-Robideau trial, Director Charles W. Callahan called Rapid City and requested the field office to look into possible reasons why the jury found Peltier guilty. "The reply broadly hinted that the lowa trial was a number of his significant rulings, been particularly critical of the FBI's handling of the case."

Three weeks later, the first of a series of inter-agency level conferences took place at Bureau headquarters to discuss what can be done by the FBI to assist the government in [the] presentation of [the Peltier] case. On August 6, 1976, and the beginning of the defense's case in Fargo in late March of 1977, at least six similar conferences were held.

While it is patently impossible, given the small amount of existent documentation reluctantly released in response to Peltier's FOIA suit, to know exactly what was decided at these meetings, it is not difficult to make reasonable guesses. For example, one of the reasons cited by Rapid City for the Butler-Robideau acquittal was a statement of the jury's foreperson, as reported in the *Rapids Gazette* the day following the verdicts, that the government did not produce sufficient evidence of guilt. "Based on the interview, the Bureau came to the conclusion that the government apparently wanted the Government to show that Peltier and Butler actually pulled the trigger at close range."

What better way to supply the missing link in Peltier's case than to connect his weapon with a shell casing found in Coler's body, the bullet from which could have been responsible for his death? In this case, a little fabrication could have gone a long way to obtain the conviction the FBI so desperately sought, and an agency that had stooped to the withholding and doctoring of its files as well as the subornation of perjury in the Means-Banks prosecution was certainly not above such a ploy in this respect. In fact, in ordering the Bismarck evidentiary hearing, the appellate court emphasized that what was referred to as the "discrepancy" in the teletype, particularly as it related to "a different firing pin," raised questions about "the truth and accuracy of Hodge's testimony regarding his inability to reach a 'conclusion' on the firing pin analysis of his positive conclusion regarding the extractor markings."

On June 25, 1984, three months before the Bismarck hearing, four Soviet Nobel Prize winners signed an appeal to President Reagan on Peltier's behalf. They cited his case as a "typical example of politically motivated persecution of Americans who are fighting for human rights..." Putting aside their rhetoric, the laureates, on the face of the record of Peltier's prosecution, shared the appellate court's conviction with "the truth and accuracy of Hodge's testimony." If anything, the hearing, with its startling conclusion, raised the spectre of another tragic miscarriage of American justice.



# The CIA's Blueprint For Nicaragua

by Philip Agee

*Editors' Note: This article first appeared in CAIB Number 6, October 1979 and it foreshadowed the rise of the CIA's contra army. The CIA has used all of the tactics which Agee describes here, resulting in the loss of thousands of Nicaraguan lives. However, the Nicaraguan revolution remains triumphant.*

Months ago, when the Sandinistas showed that they could sustain their final offensive against Somoza's National Guard, an inter-agency working group was established within the National Security Council to monitor and evaluate developments in Nicaragua. Officers from the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA and NSA, and perhaps others from other agencies formed the working group. In the CIA, a Nicaragua task force was no doubt formed within the Directorate of Operations. These people had to predict the likely developments, the political consequences of a Sandinista victory, and the chances of success of various possible American diplomatic and military initiatives.

Since the Sandinista triumph in July, the work of these "Nicaragua-watchers" has surely increased in volume and importance, but now with the additional task of preparing for clandestine intervention to influence the course of the Nicaraguan revolution. One can easily anticipate probable secret U.S. operations in Nicaragua.

The overall U.S. goals surely are to prevent establishment of socialist institutions inside Nicaragua, radicalization of the revolution, and an anti-U.S. foreign stance with attendant military and geo-political problems, including any Nicaraguan support to revolutionary movements in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala.

For American policy to succeed, and to be prepared sufficiently for clandestine intervention, the CIA and other agencies need intimate knowledge of what is happening in Nicaragua. To supplement information from open sources and diplomatic contacts, intelligence must be collected through spies and other clandestine means.

## The CIA's Need To Know

The CIA needs to know the precise power structure within and between the elements of the Sandinista political organization, the Government of National Reconstruction, the military and security services, the revolutionary defense committees, and the mass organizations of workers, peasants, women, youth and students. The CIA and other agencies must seek to identify potential friends and foes within this power structure.

What exactly are foreign governments, particularly Cuba, doing to assist in the formation of new police, military and security services? What are the continuing developments in Nicaragua's relations with governments and political move-

ments that backed them against Somoza, including Costa Rica, Panama and Venezuela, and what are the potential problems in these relations? Who are the leaders of the other countries who could be enlisted secretly to denounce radical programs in Nicaragua? The list of requirements could go on and on, but without this kind of very detailed information the CIA will find clandestine intervention exceedingly difficult.

The CIA's programs for covert collection of information on Nicaragua continue, of course, from the period before the Sandinista victory. Besides the CIA Station in the U.S. Embassy in Managua, officers in many other Stations such as those in the Andean Pact countries, San Jose, Panama City, Mexico City, New York, Washington and Miami have special assignments for intelligence collection on Nicaragua. An active program to recruit spies within the revolutionary movement and government continues. The CIA could have installed bugs in key government offices in Managua during the final days of Somoza as well as in Nicaraguan Embassies in key countries — no problem, given the CIA's intimate relations with the Somocistas. (The CIA officer who replaced me in Montevideo in 1966 came on transfer from Managua where he had spent several years training the presidential bodyguards.)

Encoded Nicaraguan diplomatic communications will continue to be decrypted and read until new, secure systems are established. Diplomats from third countries collaborating with the CIA in Nicaragua and elsewhere can be assigned to collect data on the new Nicaraguan diplomatic service as its officials take over the Foreign Ministry and embassies around the world. All Nicaraguan government radio communications can be monitored from satellites and stations in the U.S. Embassy in Managua and in the United States.

Information on Nicaragua can also be collected through the CIA's long-running efforts to penetrate international political movements and national parties. The CIA can send its spies in these movements to Nicaragua for intelligence collection, or they can try to monitor what legitimate visitors say on their return. The reports of all important foreign visitors to Nicaragua, and of the Nicaraguans with whom they meet, are a continuing CIA need. And not least, military and police training programs in the U.S. and other countries allow for close evaluation and possible recruitment of visiting trainees. The CIA can also enlist the cooperation of "friendly" security services of other countries for this purpose if necessary, or its spies within those services can assist extra-officially.

## Destabilization Revisited

During the months ahead the CIA will have to prepare contingency plans for clandestine intervention for consideration



by the National Security Council. If the revolutionary leadership in Nicaragua embarks on radical programs deemed inconsistent with perceived U.S. interests, the options are likely to include elements of the destabilization programs already applied in the 1970s in Chile, Angola, Portugal and Jamaica.

The immediate political goal would be to split the Sandinista leadership, create an emotive international "cause," and isolate leading radicals, falsely painting them as allied with Cuba and Soviet interests while against traditional Western, liberal values. Money and propaganda support for "moderates" and others responsive to American wishes would serve to enhance the local and international stature of leaders opposed to radical policies. Propaganda through local and international media, falsified documents and other provocations, and exploitation of historical differences within the Sandinista movement can contribute to splitting the political leadership.

Strikes in key unions promoted through CIA-backed local and international unions can impede reconstruction and create a climate of tension. Tensions and disagreements can also be fostered between the Nicaraguan government and those that supported the revolution against Somoza.

As the "cause" is established, mainly through propaganda promoting simplistic, black-and-white impressions efforts can be made to foment popular disillusion with the revolution and radical policies. One obvious lever is restriction of relief and reconstruction aid.

Possible key issues in the "cause" would be an international clamoring for "free" elections and opposition political organizing. The neighborhood defense committees would be denounced as a political apparatus. In any election campaign, the CIA could make huge sums of money available to its favored candidates and parties.

Acts of violence such as bombings and assassinations would also contribute to the desired psychological climate. Perhaps the military forces of El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala—probably the CIA's closest allies in the region—could be strengthened in order to provoke border incidents and additional tension.

Eventually, if the scenario continued, the CIA could seek to provoke "moderates" in the political and military leadership to oust radicals from positions of power. If this were unrealistic, impossible or failed, U.S. diplomatic efforts could seek joint intervention through reviving the Inter-American Peace Force proposal rejected by the Organization of American States on the eve of the Sandinista victory in July.

#### A Team Effort

The CIA would not be the only U.S. government agency involved in intervention in Nicaragua, and participation by non-governmental organizations would be needed. U.S. representatives on international and commercial lending institutions, as well as the Export-Import Bank, would have instructions to impede credits. U.S. diplomats and military officers, in addition to the CIA, would try to influence leaders of other countries. U.S. businessmen engaged in Nicaragua could delay investments and other job-producing operations.

## Special Forces Camps

After news reports appeared describing numerous secret military commando units, CAIB asked a military training expert to investigate. His observations confirm the growing Pentagon participation in covert paramilitary planning and operations—a field which was previously considered the province of the CIA and its agents and secret armies.

As the *New York Times* explained (June 8, 1984), "Some of the units were created to fight terrorism but have acquired broadened mandates and training for missions against insurgencies in developing countries in Central America, Africa, and Asia....In a few instances, including operations in Central America, these new units have worked in conjunction with CIA covert activities...." While the degree of Pentagon-CIA cooperation varies from case to case, what emerges is a picture of deep U.S. military involvement in what have been thought to be purely mercenary or "indigenous" operations. At all three major Special Forces bases, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina; Ft. Benning, Georgia; and Ft. Lewis, Washington, civilian mercenaries and foreign forces are being trained to fight like soldiers, but, more remarkably, U.S. military personnel are also being trained to fight like mercenaries—and to look like them and act like them, too.

It is now clear that "private" mercenaries, like the team from Civilian-Military Assistance, are receiving some Ranger training. In addition, although it is well known that Salvadoran troops are being trained at Ft. Bragg, CAIB has learned from a high ranking soldier stationed at Ft. Bragg that the trainees include "death squad" members.

The implications of these developments are clear. Even if an open U.S. invasion is not "convenient" in the near future, an invasion is already taking place. Not only is the U.S. training, financing, and leading the *contras* and, it seems, the death squads, it is also infiltrating active duty troops into the mercenary battle field in unknown numbers. U.S. soldiers, CAIB has learned, are being killed and wounded. The bodies are being taken back to Honduras and families are told of "fatal traffic accidents" in Honduras. How long can the pretense be kept up that there is no direct U.S. troop involvement?

And American media organizations would be important participants in propaganda campaigns.

From a distance, one cannot know whether the CIA could find or create the "moderate" opposition that will serve the U.S. government's interests. But the CIA surely knows that in its pursuit of American policy goals, it has many potential allies in Nicaragua besides supporters of the old regime. As traditional, non-Somoza interests are effected by revolutionary programs, the CIA may discover a fertile field in which to plant the seeds of counter-revolution.



# New Spate of Terrorism

By William Schaap

*Editor's Note: This article appeared in CAIB Number 11, November 1980. It describes how, despite an alleged campaign in the U.S. against terrorism, rightwing terrorists were on the rampage.*

For years, the rhetoric of the western press has confused the public's image of terrorism. Progressive revolutionaries are referred to as "terrorists," and rightwing reactionaries are called "freedom fighters" or "rebels." But historically, when terrorism has applied to liberation struggles—notably the Irish Revolution of 1916-1921 and the Algerian Revolution of 1957-1961—it has been in the context of a colonized people fighting the colonial settlers and occupiers.

In recent times, however, nearly all the terrorism in the world has come from the right, from some of the most reactionary forces in existence. Yet the effect of decades of linguistic manipulation has been to create the impression that terrorism is a weapon of the left, and to obscure the real role that terrorism plays in rightist political movements. This confusion is serious, because of a massive increase in the use of terrorism by reactionaries, coupled with the inability of the western powers to stem this tide, at best—or outright complicity with it, at worst.

## Recent Events

Several recent events, both in the United States and elsewhere, demonstrate that terrorism of the right is on the rise, and that some of the most notorious and dangerous terrorists of recent years are being set free by western nations, despite the lip service given to efforts to convict and jail these wanton murderers.

In the past few months, there has been an anti-Semitic bombing in Paris, France; a neo-fascist bombing in Bologna, Italy; and a neo-Nazi bombing in Munich, Germany. Even the Peoples Republic of China has acknowledged a terrorism problem after the bombing of Peking's main railroad station October 29. A repressive military government seized power in Turkey; extreme rightwing terrorist elements are on the rampage in El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, and Argentina.

These are just some examples of the trend in the world. In the United States the situation is also disturbing. According to several recent reports, the Ku Klux Klan is engaged in paramilitary training in at least seven states, and Cuban and Nicaraguan exiles are openly training for combat in southern Florida. But three events in September underscore the dangers which may be expected. On September 11, [1980] Felix Garcia Rodriguez, a protocol officer at the Cuban Mission to the United Nations in New York was assassinated, the first time that a U.N. delegate has ever been killed. On September 15, the convictions of three assassins who killed former

Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier and his associate Ronni Karpen Moffitt were overturned by the District of Columbia federal Court of Appeals. And, on September 26, the Venezuelan War Council, a military court, threw out murder charges against the infamous Orlando Bosch and three others, who had repeatedly confessed to the 1976 bombing of a Cubana Airlines plane in which all 73 passengers and crew perished.

In March 1978, the newly-appointed Director of the FBI, William Webster, announced with considerable fanfare the intensification of the FBI's anti-terrorist training programs. His concern, though, was not so much for innocent people as for political and commercial leaders, given the kidnappings which were occurring in Europe at the time. But, in fact, such efforts as were mounted dealt almost exclusively with potential leftwing terrorism, indeed almost only with events such as kidnapping and takeovers of buildings. Rightwing murders and bombings were not even mentioned.

## The Cuban Exiles

Yet, the most visible, the most vocal, the most active terrorists in the United States have been a small group of Cuban exiles, based primarily in southern Florida and in New Jersey, operating under several names, and generally well-known to local authorities. They were all involved in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. They were all trained, supplied and encouraged by the CIA. The group, centered around Bosch, is implicated in the killing of exiled Chilean Gen. Carlos Prats and his wife in 1974; the attempted assassination of exiled Chilean politician Bernardo Leighton and his wife in 1975; the murder of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt in 1976; and the murder of South African economist Robert Smit and his wife in 1977.

They have also been linked to 85 bombings, one bazooka attack (for which Bosch served four years in prison in the U.S.), several shootings, four unsuccessful murder attempts, and two other murders in 1979, those of Carlos Muniz Barela, a member of the Antonio Maceo Brigade in Puerto Rico, and of Eulalio J. Negrin, a Cuban living in New Jersey, who supported the dialogue between the Cuban exile community and the Cuban government.

## U.S. Inaction

The United States authorities, local, state, and federal, have done virtually nothing to stop this avalanche of terrorism. These terrorists—sometimes known as CORU (the Commandos of United Revolutionary Organization), sometimes CNM (Cuban Nationalist Movement), sometimes Omega 7, sometimes Alpha 66, but always virtually the same group of people—must be taken seriously.

How the members of these groups, who regularly phone



newspapers and claim credit for dozens of bombings, shootings and killings, can not only walk the street, but appear at press conferences and thumb their noses at the authorities, remains a mystery.

#### Perfidy in Venezuela

The government of Venezuela has thrown out murder charges against Orlando Bosch and three accomplices who had repeatedly confessed to the Cubana airliner sabotage. The scenario was not complicated. In September 1976, Orlando Bosch, in Caracas, Venezuela, under a false passport, conspired with three Venezuelan terrorists — Freddy Lugo, Hernan Ricardo, and Luis Posada — to bomb a Cubana plane. [Posada was to figure prominently in the Iran/contras hearings.] On October 5, 1976, Lugo and Ricardo went to Port of Spain, Trinidad, while Posada remained in Caracas with Bosch. The next morning, Lugo and Ricardo took the first leg of the Cubana flight, from Trinidad to Barbados, under assumed names, and planted two bombs on the plane. When the plane landed in Barbados, Lugo and Ricardo disembarked and took a plane to Trinidad. Shortly thereafter, the Cubana plane took off, on its final leg to Havana. On board were 57 Cubans, 11 Guyanese, and 5 North Koreans. Minutes after takeoff, the bombs exploded. Everyone aboard was killed.

The next morning, Lugo and Ricardo were arrested in Trinidad. Ricardo confessed to the Trinidadian authorities, implicating Lugo, Posada, and Bosch. They were returned to Venezuela, and, along with Bosch and Posada, held for trial. The Venezuelan President at the time, Carlos Andres Perez, determined, based on the information made available to him, that there was sufficient information to charge and detain the four. A Venezuelan magistrate agreed. For four years various pretrial maneuvers were attempted by the defendants. President Andres Perez was replaced by Luis Herrera Campins and a Social Christian administration. On September 26, 1980, as the trial was to commence, the prosecutor announced that the government had determined there was insufficient evidence to proceed with the mass murder charges, and asked that they be dropped to which the court agreed.

Protests were sent to the Venezuelan government from many countries and scores of organizations. The Cuban government, whose relations with the Herrera Campins government were not good to begin with, recalled all of its diplomats from Caracas, and Fidel Castro denounced the action in a speech distributed at the U.N.

The magistrate who had been involved at the initial stages, Judge Estaba Moreno, broke her silence. She said, "When I ordered the arrest of those persons — there were well-founded indications of guilt. When the dossier left this court it contained sufficient evidence, and the arrest orders were confirmed by the military court. However, I have no idea what happened to the dossier after it left my hands."

#### The Letelier-Moffitt Assassins

Bosch and his cellmates are not the only terrorists being let out. On September 15, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the convictions of Guillermo Novo, his brother

Ignacio Novo, and Alvin Ross. Guillermo Novo and Ross had been found guilty of the murders of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt, and Ignacio Novo had been convicted of lying to a grand jury about the killings and failing to report certain information to authorities. They were convicted primarily on the testimony of Michael Townley, who had planned and helped execute the bombing, and who had been returned from Chile, pleaded guilty, and testified against the others in exchange for leniency.

The legal reasons for the reversals of the convictions were not entirely unexpected, and appeared to be the result of prosecutorial overzealousness. The government, unable to force the Chilean government to extradite to the U.S. the real mastermind of the Letelier killing, former DINA head Juan Contreras Sepulveda, and having already given Michael Townley the deal of a lifetime, decided to go all out against the three "footsoldiers" at the bottom of the totem pole.

In addition to Townley's testimony, the government secured further confessions by planting informers as cellmates of the defendants while they were awaiting trial. In between the trial and the appeal decision, however, the Supreme Court ruled that such tactics violated a prisoner's constitutional rights and that such testimony was inadmissible. In fact, there was probably no need for the use of the testimony of the cellmates, although of course, they had no reason to know that the Supreme Court was going to denounce such a practice.

#### The Killing of Felix Garcia

Felix Garcia Rodriguez, the protocol officer at the Cuban Mission to the United States, was described by a colleague to the *New York Times* as the "most widely known and most widely liked" person at the Mission. On September 11, 1980, he became the first diplomat in the history of the United States to be murdered on the streets of New York City. Omega 7 claimed credit for the murder and said that Raul Roa, the Ambassador, would be "next." The group had bombed the Cuban Mission last December and unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Roa in March. To date, not a single person has been charged with any involvement in several attacks on Cuban offices and personnel. Nor does any action seem likely.

#### Conclusion

When the U.S. talks about anti-terrorism measures, it refers almost exclusively to protection from kidnapping attempts of corporate executives, embassy personnel, and other government officials. It creates the impression that all terrorism comes from the left. Yet the evidence is mounting that there are several wide-spread terrorist networks active in the United States, all from the extreme right. Paramilitary groups like the Klan are openly training and drilling. The Omega 7 gang openly boasts of its accomplishments and sends its representatives to Florida political meetings. Brigade 2506 is actually a potent factor in Florida politics. Not only is no one being apprehended, but those who were are getting out. The U.S. government admits that it knows who most of these people are. That they cannot obtain an arrest, much less a conviction, is incredible.



# The 1981 Cuba Dengue Epidemic

By Bill Schaap

*Editor's Note: This article appeared in CAIB Number 17, Summer 1982. It was cited as an example of chemical/biological warfare when similar epidemics later broke out in Nicaragua.*

For more than 30 years Cuba has been the victim of unrelenting American attacks, including chemical and biological warfare — some of which has been proved, some of which has not. We believe the dengue fever epidemic of 1981 was only the latest outrageous and illegal CBW attack against Cuba.

## Why Dengue?

Dengue fever is an arbovirus, transmitted by the *Aedes aegypti* mosquito. There are several types, which all begin with the symptoms of a severe cold or flu, followed by incapacitating bone pain and tell-tale pain at the back of the eyes. All types can give rise to the hemorrhagic form, that is, accompanied by internal bleeding and shock. This is most dangerous, especially to children, for whom it is often fatal.

Arboviruses are ideal biological warfare weapons. Dengue, especially hemorrhagic dengue, is highly incapacitating; it can be transmitted easily through the introduction of infected mosquitoes; it spreads rapidly, especially in highly populated and damp areas. In favorable winds, *Aedes* mosquitoes can travel hundreds of miles before landing. And since dengue fever is found in nature in many parts of the world, a human role in its spread is hard to detect.

## The 1981 Epidemic

Although dengue fever is much more common in the Far East, there have been many outbreaks in the Caribbean and Central America during the past century. But except for a mild, non-hemorrhagic epidemic in 1977, the hemorrhagic dengue epidemic which hit Cuba in May 1981 was the first major dengue outbreak in Cuba since 1944, and, most importantly, the first in the Caribbean since the turn of the century to involve hemorrhagic shock on a massive scale.

From May to October 1981 there were over 300,000 cases, with 158 deaths, 101 involving children under 15. At the peak there were more than 10,000 cases a day; more than a third required hospitalization. By mid-October, after a massive campaign to eradicate *Aedes aegypti*, the epidemic was over.

The history of the war against Cuba and the virulence of this epidemic raise serious suspicion of a U.S. hand in it. But there is more support for those suspicions than a healthy distrust of American intentions regarding Cuba.

## The Clues

The epidemic began with the simultaneous discovery in May 1981 of three cases in three widely separated parts of Cuba. It is very unusual that an epidemic commences in three

different localities at once. None of the initial victims had traveled out of the country; none had recently been away from home. None had had recent contact with international travelers. A study of persons arriving in Cuba in May from known dengue areas found only a dozen such passengers (from Vietnam and Laos), all of whom were checked and found free of the disease. Somehow, infected mosquitoes had appeared in three places at the same time. Somehow, the fever spread at a rapid rate. There is no likely explanation but the artificial introduction of infected mosquitoes. Significantly, there were no epidemics taking place elsewhere in the Caribbean.

Another peculiarity is the unprecedented rainfall throughout much of Cuba during the preceding winter and spring. This led to an unusual accumulation of mosquito breeding areas. Statistics for the provinces in which the epidemic began show that rainfall was double the average.

Whether this was the result of artificial weather modification coordinated with the release of infected *Aedes* mosquitoes or merely a fortuitous coincidence taken advantage of by the planners of this action is not provable at this time. It is clear though that the increase in precipitation was dramatic, and it is well known that the U.S. has been involved in weather modification for many years, and has used it against Cuba.

Most important, perhaps, is U.S. familiarity with arbovirus transmission, with years of CBW research involving *Aedes* and other mosquitoes and dengue and other fevers. The U.S. military and its academic collaborators have been experimenting with dengue fever since at least 1959, primarily at Fort Detrick in Maryland and at Walter Reed Army Institute of Research in Washington. Dozens of projects, costing millions of dollars, have been funded by Defense Department.

## Conclusions

That the dengue epidemic *could* have been a covert U.S. operation is clear. It is a plausible hypothesis, consistent with past actions. Moreover, there is ample evidence that the U.S. has been investigating the biological warfare possibilities of dengue fever for many years. And it is U.S. experimental knowledge which has shown that *Aedes aegypti* mosquitoes (infected with dengue) could travel hundreds of miles, along the path of prevailing winds, from the place of release to the place of landing. A boat off Florida with the right winds could infest Cuba with no fear of infecting the mainland. Or a ship or plane based at Guantanamo could have been used.

That the epidemic *was* an American covert action is easily demonstrated, but, as shown here, there are many indications that this is true, and that the Cuban accusations are valid. And for those who have studied the recent history of the U.S., for those who know of what it is capable, there is no reason to give the U.S. the benefit of the doubt.



# Israeli Arms in Central America

by Clarence Lusane \*

*Editor's Note: This article first appeared in CAIB Number 30, Winter 1982. Israel has remained an important conduit for arms training and arms on behalf of the U.S. Israel was a crucial supplier of weapons to the Nicaraguan contras after Congress prohibited Reagan from sending military aid. They continued to supply the Guatemalan military as it wages a brutal counterinsurgency war against the Guatemalan people.*

The war drama are heating in Central America and Israel is an important player. The State of Israel has emerged as a major, and in some cases, principal, supplier of arms, advisers and training to the repressive forces in the region. Long denounced for its military ties to South Africa, Chile, and the Philippines, the Zionist regime has extended its role as surrogate for the U.S. to the front line of Central America. Although much of what is happening is held in strict secrecy, the vast extent of Israeli aid has begun to fray the cover under which Reagan administration policy objectives circumvent Congressional obstacles.

As this article will show, stopping U.S. military aid to Central America also requires stopping U.S. military aid to Israel. The information presented only scratches the surface of what is probably the key link in U.S. foreign policy under the Reagan administration. By the end of the 1960s Israel had emerged as an arms exporter, but only since the Reagan administration has it been able to reach its potential as a full partner to U.S. imperialism.

## The Israeli Arms Industry

Fourteen percent of Israel's industrial labor force is employed in its arms industry. If the armed forces are included, the number rises to 25%.

According to the latest CIA estimates, Israel is the fifth largest exporter of arms in the world. This is up from its seventh place ranking in 1980. Israel remains the largest supplier of arms to sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.

In 1977, Israel's arms exports were valued at \$285 million. Despite the loss of two reliable customers, Iran and Nicaragua, by 1981, military exports had risen to \$1.3 billion. Since 1973, Israel's military budget has consumed more than 30% of its national budget. Limited domestic use has made the export of arms essential to its economic survival. Latin American money has become indispensable to the Israeli arms industry.

It must be pointed out that Israel's goals are political as well as economic. Stability of the current and international politi-

cal order is a chief objective of Israeli foreign and military policy. In country after country, we can observe how Israeli arms sales meet these twin aims.

## Honduras

In 1982 Israel's then Defense Minister Ariel Sharon arrived in Honduras for a 38-hour visit. Sharon and the Hondurans agreed that Israel would send Honduras 12 Kfir planes, radar equipment, light weapons and spare parts and 50 advisers. Military training was also proposed. Incidentally, upon leaving Honduras, Sharon flew to the U.S. AEP, the French News Agency, observed the deal "could intensify the danger of unleashing an arms race in the region."

Less than six months later, the *New York Times* reported on its front page that Israel was sending weapons to Honduras. Much, if not all, of these arms were to go to U.S.-backed counterrevolutionaries seeking to overthrow the Nicaraguan government from bases in Honduras.

It was also reported that the Honduran Armed Forces Commander, Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, visited a CIA training facility in Virginia earlier this year to examine captured PLO weapons. Israel has stated that it would provide captured weapons to any Central American military government for only the cost of transporting them.

The estimated \$25 million in weapons promised to Honduras by Sharon is a continuation of past practice. However Honduras is now playing a new role in Central America, similar to the one Israel plays in the Middle East. It has become strategically important to U.S. interests and goals in the region. As a rear base for the contras attacking Nicaragua, and as a training ground for Guatemalan and Salvadoran fascists, Honduras must be armed. Determined not to be inhibited by congressional or public opinion, the Reagan administration has given the Israelis the go-ahead in Honduras. In addition to aid from the U.S. and Israel, Honduras has received military aid from Argentina and Chile, allowing it to increase its armed forces six-fold since 1970 (from 5,000 to over 30,000). The Honduran Air Force is the most powerful in Central America.

U.S. officials have admitted that Israeli assistance is important in achieving Reagan administration military and political goals. Worried about potential congressional locks on aid to the Nicaraguan contras, the administration wants to be sure supply lines are not disturbed. U.S. military aid to Honduras will go toward buying weapons from Israel which have themselves been produced with U.S. military aid.

It is the goal of the U.S., with the critical assistance of Israel, to make Honduras the chief gendarme of Central

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The second poorest nation in the region (behind El Salvador) will continue to buy arms from Israel at the expense of its own people. Like its neighbors in El Salvador and Honduras, Honduras increasingly violates the human rights of its citizens with the helping hand of Israel. There is one central objective in the U.S.-Honduras-Israel connection. If the conditions ripen to where U.S. policy makers launch an invasion of Nicaragua, it will duplicate the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, except that it will be launched from Honduran soil.

#### El Salvador

From his first days in office, Ronald Reagan pledged to draw the line against communism in El Salvador. The murderous and corrupt Salvadoran junta, a politically split U.S. Congress, and the superior fighting capacities of the FMLN guerrillas have turned out to be difficult obstacles.

In 1981 when the Administration was scrambling to find more aid to send El Salvador, Israel agreed to "lend" the U.S. \$21 million to give El Salvador. Money which came from previous U.S. aid to Israel. In other words, the U.S. cynically took out a loan on its original funds, thereby violating the expressed will of Congress.

The U.S. has only recently become a major supplier of military aid to El Salvador. Through all of the 1970s, Israel was the biggest seller of weapons and aircraft to the country. This arsenal made up more than 80% of El Salvador's military imports during the period. It has been supplemented by an estimated 100 Israeli advisers (almost twice the official number the U.S. claims to have). These advisers, like their U.S. counterparts, are training the Salvadoran military in counterinsurgency strategy and tactics at a secret base near Tegucigalpa.

In addition, Israeli pilots are believed to be flying Israeli made aircraft against the guerrillas. El Salvador has the infamous distinction of being the first Latin country to receive these advanced combat fighters.

Israel has also set up advanced computer systems to gather and analyze intelligence about the citizenry. Similar to the Israeli-installed computers in Guatemala, the network in El Salvador also monitors changes in water and electricity consumption.

All Israeli aid to El Salvador comes from American military and economic aid to Israel. It has been noted that some of the most vocal congressional critics of Reagan policy objectives in El Salvador are also unquestioning supporters of aid to Israel.

#### Somoza's Nicaragua

Until the very end, Israeli arms poured into Somoza's Nicaragua. After the cold-blooded killing of journalists by Somoza's National Guard in 1978, President Carter cut off all U.S. aid to Nicaragua. Israel, bolstered by U.S. aid to it, picked up the slack and until July 2, 1979, just two weeks before the Sandinistas won the final battle, provided 98% of Somoza's arms.

When questioned about selling arms to Somoza, Israeli

Prime Minister Menachem Begin responded, "We have a debt of gratitude with Somoza." In 1948, the U.N. General Assembly recommended the partition of Palestine and the creation of a Jewish state. The new State of Israel needed weapons and had almost nowhere to turn. Israel struck a deal with Somoza. Somoza appointed Yehuda Arazi as a Nicaraguan Ambassador to Europe where he could purchase weapons in the name of Nicaragua. Eventually, all the weapons ended up in Israel. All of this was accomplished for a mere \$200,000. Arazi, it turned out, was a member of the Jewish underground's clandestine army organization, Haganah.

#### Guatemala

The U.S. is not the primary supplier of arms to Guatemala. Since 1976, Israel has been the main provider of weapons, aircraft, and training to Guatemala. Between 1977 and 1981, after the U.S. cut off aid due to gross human rights violations, Israel was the only nation giving military aid to the regime.



Israel supplied Somoza's National Guard with military equipment and training.

Training of Guatemalan military strongmen by Israel has included education in the use of terror and interrogation techniques, modern intelligence methods and psychological warfare. Israeli advisers are the key link in Guatemalan counterinsurgency operations. From national planning to civilian rural cooperative programs to military maneuvers, Israel is centrally involved.

Israel's connection to the repressive forces of Guatemala are hardly secret. Israeli advisers have trained many of the officers of Guatemala's police intelligence (G-2). In reference to the guerrillas fighting the ever-changing military juntas which have come to power, the right wing openly calls for the "Palestinianization" of the rebelling Mayan Indians.

As with Somoza, Guatemala's relationship to the Zionist state goes back to 1948 when Israel was created. One of the three U.N. Commissioners overseeing the establishment of Israel was from Guatemala. Despite the numerous changes in power in Guatemala over the years, it has remained a consistent and staunch supporter of Israel.

Today, Guatemala-Israel relations are better than ever. Extensive trade and economic agreements have been signed recently. First and foremost, however, Israel's relations with



Guatemala are military. Some of Israel's most advanced electronic and computer technologies have been installed in Guatemala. Hit lists used by the death squads have been computerized. Technologically sophisticated murder is coordinated by a Regional Telecommunications Center (RTC) built and managed by Israeli Army experts. The RTC is also linked to the U.S. Army's Southern Command at Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone. The RTC is run by the generals from the fourth floor of the National Palace Annex.

The U.S. Agency for International Development has said that the RTC is Guatemala's principal presidential level security agency and works with a high level security network. AID claims that it links the key officials of the National Police, Treasury Police, Detective Corps, Ministry of Government, the Presidential Palace, and the Military Communications Center.

The Tel Aviv newspaper *Haolam Hazeh* and the London *Guardian* revealed in December 1982 that Israeli advisers work closely with Guatemala's G-2 police units in the use of interrogation and torture. In this activity, they work closely with Argentina and Chile.

Computerized death lists are a mainstay of government terror and inspired a "spy-on-thy-neighbor" campaign. By 1980, computers already listed 80% of the Guatemalan population.

In November 1981, the Israeli-sponsored Army Electronics and Transmission School was opened in Guatemala. Its purpose is to teach computer and electronic monitoring of the Guatemalan people. Equipment at the school is capable of doing everything from checks on potential apartment renters to detecting changes in electricity consumption that supposedly might indicate that an illegal printing press is in operation.

Israel has also been helpful in developing Guatemala's major military-civilian programs. The Guatemalan military has attempted to create Vietnam-style strategic hamlets. The means of implementing these counterinsurgency plans were couched in terms of establishing peasant cooperatives similar to the kibbutzim in Israel. Guatemalan and Israeli agricultural and military officials were exchanged and it soon became apparent that the goals of the program were to crush peasant support and participation in the armed struggle.

The U.S., becoming involved through AID, sent "experts" and provided credits and grants. These civic programs were to take place in the Ixcán area. This is the major base of support for the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), one of the major rebel forces fighting to overthrow a succession of repressive governments.

Under the recently overthrown Ríos Montt regime, the Israeli model was put into full operation. In August 1982, a "Plan of Assistance to Conflict Areas" (PAAC) program was begun. The PAAC program reproduced many of the tactics applied by the Israelis on the West Bank, such as finding mayors willing to accommodate to the status quo.

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Some of Israel's most advanced electronic and computer technologies have been installed in Guatemala. Hit lists used by the death squads have been computerized.

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border area.

At one point, Pastora claimed that he had to shut down his activities because he had run out of funds. He stated that because of his "anti-U.S." stance, he would not accept funds from the CIA. Within days he was fighting again, reportedly with an infusion of funds from Israel, as well as other countries. In fact, much of this was a propaganda charade, as Pastora has been receiving CIA aid all the time.

Although Costa Rica has no army, Israeli military trainers and arms are beginning to pour into the country. In 1982, President Luis Alberto Monge met with Menachem Begin in Washington. They discussed the possibility of Israeli military aid in building up Costa Rican security forces. The funds would come from Washington.

Israel has been chosen by AID to build a \$10 million settlement project along the Nicaragua-Costa Rica border. The military squeeze that the *contras* are currently operating from Honduras and Costa Rica would obviously be enhanced should the U.S. Congress fund this proposal.

### The U.S. Role

Has exposure of illegal arms transfers by Israel forced the U.S. to cut back on aid? Or has the fact that Israel has sent arms to countries which the U.S. Congress and others have designated as flagrant violators of basic human rights made the Reagan administration voice any criticism of Israel? The answer to both questions is no.

Relative to its size and needs, the immense scale of continued U.S. military and economic aid to Israel is obscene. Even after last summer's internationally condemned invasion of Lebanon, Israel remains the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid. It receives about one-third of all U.S. foreign aid, which in the last 10 years has amounted to about \$25 billion.

Even more shocking, since 1976 Israel has not spent a penny of its own for military imports. The average U.S. subsidy to Israel for military imports has been 129% of the actual cost of those imports.

In the current fiscal year, Israel will receive \$785 million in economic assistance and \$1.7 billion in military aid. It will receive the same amounts in the fiscal year which began October 1, 1983. Israel's Defense Minister, Moshe Arens, was in Washington in late July to discuss more military aid and the right to use U.S. aid to develop weapon systems that are currently only available in the U.S.

The above figures shed light on the important and central role that Israel plays in U.S. foreign policy goals. No amount of struggle against U.S. aid to repressive dictatorships and juntas will be complete, or even marginally successful, unless Israel is also taken to task.

### Costa Rica

Costa Rica's northern border has become an operational base for attacks by *contras* on Nicaragua. Former Sandinista, Eden Pastora, leads a small army estimated at 5,000 from this



# Libya in U.S. Demonology

by Noam Chomsky \*

*Editors' Note: This article first appeared in CAIB Number 20 Summer 1986. It is interesting to note that several years after the La Belle disco bombing and the Athens and Rome airport attacks, all attributed in some form to Libya, the U.S. has never produced a shred of evidence to support these charges.*

The term "terrorism" came into use at the end of the 18th century, primarily to designate violent acts of governments intended to ensure popular submission. That concept, plainly, is of little benefit to the practitioners of state terrorism, who, holding power, are in a position to control the system of thought and expression. The original sense has therefore been abandoned, and the term "terrorism" has come to be applied mainly to "retail terrorism" by individuals or groups.<sup>1</sup>

Extricating ourselves from the system of indoctrination, we will use the term "terrorism" to refer to the threat or use of violence to intimidate or coerce (generally for political ends).

In the true sense of the term, Libya is a terrorist state; the latest Amnesty International Report lists the killings, through 1985, of 14 Libyan citizens by this terrorist state, four abroad, as the major acts of terrorism plausibly attributed to Libya.

Amnesty International reports that Libya's terrorist killings began in early 1980, at the time when Jimmy Carter launched the terrorist war in El Salvador with José Napoleon Duarte serving as a cover to ensure that arms would flow to the killers. While Libya was killing 14 of its own citizens, along with a handful of others, the U.S. client regime of El Salvador killed some 50,000 of its citizens in the course of what Bishop Rivera y Damas, who succeeded the assassinated Archbishop Romero, described in October 1980 as "a war of extermination and genocide against a defenseless civilian population."

U. S. international terrorism in El Salvador is hailed as a magnificent achievement across the mainstream political spectrum in the United States because it laid the basis for what is called "democracy" in western parlance: namely, the rule of elite groups serving the needs of the Global Enforcer with the public occasionally mobilized to ratify elite decisions. In El Salvador, the United States organized what Herman and Brodhead call "demonstration elections" to pacify the home front, carried out in an atmosphere of "terror and despair, macabre rumor and grisly reality," in the words of the observers of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group.<sup>2</sup>

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1. "Origins and Fundamental Causes of International Terrorism," U.N. Secretariat, reprinted in M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., *International Terrorism and Political Crimes* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles Thomas, 1975).

2. Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, *Demonstration Elections* (Boston: South End Press, 1984).

Guatemala is also considered a success, for similar reasons. When half the population was marched to the polls after it had been properly traumatized by U.S.-backed violence, enraptured American humanists were overjoyed at this renewed demonstration of our love for democracy. They were, of course, untainted by the rise in death squad killings after the elections (including at least 94 deaths and 35 disappearances in the weeks following President Vinicio Cerezo's January inauguration), the admission by Cerezo that he can do nothing because the actual power is in the military and the oligarchy, and that the reaction in the United States helps convene the elections into a means for the U.S. to participate more fully in state terror and repression, as in El Salvador.

In short, Libya is indeed a terrorist state, but in the world of international terrorism, it is hardly even a bit player.

## "Their Side" Is Terrorist

An act of terrorism enters the canon only if it is committed by "their side," not ours. Consider, for example, the public relations campaign about "international terrorism" launched in early 1981 by the Reagan administration. The major text was Claire Sterling's *The Terror Network* which offered an ingenious proof that international terrorism is a "Soviet-inspired" instrument "aimed at the destabilization of western democratic society." The proof is that the major terrorist actions are confined to the western democratic states, and are not "directed against the Soviet Union or any of its satellites or client states."

Since only acts committed by "their side" count as terrorism, it follows that Sterling is necessarily correct, whatever the facts. In the real world, the story is quite different. The majority of the victims of international terrorism in the several decades prior to the Sterling pronouncements were Cuban and Palestinian, but none of this counts, by definition.<sup>3</sup> When Israel bombs Palestinian refugee camps killing many civilians — often without even a pretense of reprisal — or sends its troops into Lebanese villages in "counterterror" operations where they murder and destroy, or hijacks ships and places thousands of hostages in prison camps under horrifying conditions, this is not "terrorism."

Similarly, it is not terrorism when paramilitary forces operating from U.S. bases and trained by the CIA bombard Cuban hotels, sink fishing boats and attack Russian ships in Cuban harbors, poison crops and livestock, attempt to assassinate Castro, and so on, in missions that were running almost weekly at their peak.<sup>4</sup>

3. I exclude here outright aggression, as in the case of the U.S. attack against South Vietnam, then all of Indochina.

4. See Warren Hinckle and William Turner, *The Fish is Red* (New York: Harper & Row, 1981).



that only in "terrorism" defined for ideological serviceability, but standards of evidence are also conveniently minimized. To demonstrate Libya's role as a state terrorist, the thinnest evidence, or none at all, will suffice. The headline of a *New York Times* editorial justifying the terrorist attack that killed some 100 people in Libya reads "To Save the Next *Natalie Simpson*," referring to the 11-year-old American girl who was one of the victims of the terrorist attacks in the Rome and Vienna air terminals on December 27, 1985. These victims entitle us to bomb Libyan cities "to discourage state-supported terrorism," the editors solemnly inform us.

It is only a minor defect that no evidence has been presented to implicate Libya in these actions. The Italian and Austrian governments stated that the terrorists [who committed the bombings] were trained in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon and had come via Damascus, a conclusion reiterated by Israeli Defense Minister Rabin. Four months later, in response to U.S. claims about Libyan involvement in the Vienna attack, the Austrian Minister of Interior stated that "there is not the slightest evidence to implicate Libya," again citing Syria as the connection and adding that Washington had never presented the evidence of Libyan complicity it had promised to provide to the Austrian authorities.

He also added the correct but — in the U.S. — inexpressible comment that the problem of Lebanese-based terrorism lies largely in the failure to solve the Palestine problem, which has caused desperate people to turn to violence, exactly the result intended by U.S.-Israeli terrorism.

#### The Reagan Agenda

What the President calls "the evil scourge of terrorism" (in the specific western sense) was placed in the central focus of attention by the Reagan administration as it came into office in 1981. The reasons were transparent, though inexpressible within the doctrinal system. The administration was committed to three related policies, all achieved with some success: (1) transfer of resources from the poor to the rich; (2) a massive increase in the state sector of the economy in the traditional American way, through the Pentagon system — a device to force the public to invest in high technology industry by means the state-guaranteed market for the production of high technology waste (armaments), and thus to contribute to the general program of public subsidy, private profit, called "free enterprise"; and (3) a substantial increase in the U.S. role in intervention, subversion, and international terrorism (in the true sense of the expression).

Such policies cannot be presented to the public in the terms in which they are intended. They can be implemented only if the general population is properly frightened by monsters against whom we must defend ourselves. The standard device is an appeal to the threat of Reagan's "Evil Empire," what President Kennedy called "the monolithic and ruthless conspiracy" bent on world conquest, as he launched a rather similar program. But confrontation with the Evil Empire can be a dangerous affair, so it is preferable to do battle with safer enemies designated as the Evil Empire's proxies, a choice that conforms well to the third plank in the Reagan agenda, pur-

sued for quite independent reasons: to ensure "stability" and "order" in our global domains.

#### Qaddafi as Scapegoat

Libya fits the need perfectly. Qaddafi is easy to hate and Libya is weak and defenseless, so that martial flourishes and, when needed, murder of Libyans can be conducted with impunity. In August 1981, the anti-Qaddafi message "was reinforced by the trap laid for Libya in the Gulf of Sidra," a trap "elaborately planned on the U.S. side" with the intent of a confrontation in which Libyan jets could be shot down, as they were, Edward Haley observes in his bitterly anti-Qaddafi study of U.S. relations with Libya. One specific purpose, Haley plausibly argues, was to "exploit the 'Libyan menace' in



#### The La Belle Disco bombing: Who was responsible?

order to win support for steps [the administration] wished to take in pursuit of Secretary Haig's 'strategic consensus' against the Soviet Union, and as an element in the arrangements necessary for the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force," targeted primarily at the Middle East.

The events of March-April 1986 fit the familiar pattern to perfection. The Gulf of Sidra operation in March was plainly timed to stir up jingoist hysteria just prior to the crucial Senate vote on *contra* aid, coinciding with a fabricated Nicaraguan "invasion" of Honduras as Nicaragua exercised its legal right of hot pursuit to expel from its territory U.S. proxy forces dispatched by their master from their Honduras bases to sow terror in Nicaragua prior to the Senate vote. The public relations campaign succeeded brilliantly as demonstrated by the enraged reaction of congressional doves, the media, and the Senate vote. The Libyan provocation too was a success, enabling U.S. forces to sink several Libyan boats, killing more than 50 Libyans, and, it was hoped, to incite Qaddafi to acts of terror against Americans, as was subsequently claimed.

The extent of the provocation in the Gulf of Sidra was made clear by Pentagon spokesman Robert Sims, who "said that U.S. policy is to shoot at any Libyan boat that enters interna-



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...waters in the Gulf of Sidra for as long as the U.S. naval exercise in that region continues — no matter how far away the boat might be from U.S. ships." In short, the U.S. maintains the right of "self-defense" against any Libyan

The April 14 attack was the first bombing in history staged for prime time television...the raids were carefully timed so that they would begin precisely at 7 pm Eastern Standard Time...

#### Foreign Reactions

Beyond the borders, discipline does not reign. In Germany, a week after Washington had stated its certain knowledge ten days earlier of Libyan responsibility for the [La Belle] disco bombing, *Der*

*Spiegel* reported that the famed telephone intercepts apparently do not exist and that West Berlin intelligence has only suspicions about Libyan involvement, also suspecting "rival groups of drug dealers" among other possibilities, including neo-Nazi groups.

In an interview on April 28 with a reporter for the U.S. Army journal *Stars and Stripes*, Manfred Ganschow, chief of the Berlin *Staatschutz* and head of the 100-man team investigating the disco bombing, stated that "I have no more evidence that Libya was connected to the bombing than I had when you first called me two days after the act. Which is none." He agreed that it was "a highly political case" and hinted at considerable skepticism about what "the politicians" were saying and would say about it.

The reaction to the bombing of Libya at home and abroad was sharply different. Expecting the worst, the 12-member European Economic Community called upon the U.S. to avoid "further escalation of military tension in the region with all the inherent dangers." A few hours later, U.S. warplanes struck, as West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher was on his way to Washington to explain the EEC position. His spokesman stated that "We want to do everything we can to avoid a military escalation."

The bombing aroused extensive protest throughout most of Europe, including large-scale demonstrations, and evoked editorial condemnation in most of the world. Spain's major journal, the independent *El Pais*, condemned the raid, writing that "The military action of the United States is not only an offense against international law and a grave threat to peace in the Mediterranean, but a mockery of its European allies, who did not find motives for economic sanctions against Libya in a meeting Monday despite being previously and without success pressured to adopt sanctions." The conservative *South China Morning Post* in Hong Kong wrote that "President Reagan's cure for 'the mad dog of the Middle East' may prove more lethal than the disease," and his action "may also have lit the fuse to a wider conflagration" in the Middle East. In Mexico City, *El Universal* wrote that the U.S. "has no right to set itself up as the defender of world freedom," urging recourse to legal means through the United Nations. There were many similar reactions.

The U.S. press, in contrast, was overwhelmingly favorable. The *New York Times* wrote that "even the most scrupulous citizen can only approve and applaud the American attacks on Libya," describing this as a just sentence: "the United States has prosecuted [Qaddafi] carefully, proportionately — and justly." The evidence for Libyan responsibility for the disco bombing has been "now laid out clearly to the public"; "Then came the jury, the European governments to which the

...approaches its naval armada off the Libyan coast, ...that Libya does not have a right of self-defense in airspace comparable to that claimed by the U.S.

There is more to the story. David Blundy interviewed British engineers in Tripoli who were repairing the Soviet-installed radar system. One, who says he was monitoring the incident throughout on the radar screens (which, contrary to Pentagon claims, were not rendered inoperative), reports that "he saw American warplanes cross not only into the 12 miles of Libyan territorial waters, but over Libyan land as well." "I watched the planes fly approximately eight miles into Libyan airspace," he said. "I don't think the Libyans had any choice but to hit back. In my opinion they were reluctant to do so." The engineer added that "American warplanes made their approach using a normal civil airline traffic route and followed in the wake of a Libyan airliner, so that its radar blip would mask them on the Libyan radar screen."<sup>5</sup>

One likely consequence of the Gulf of Sidra operation was to elicit acts of Libyan terrorism in retaliation. These would then have the effect of inducing a state of terror in the United States and, with some luck, in Europe as well, setting the stage for the next escalation. The bombing of the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin on April 5, with one American and one Turk killed, was immediately blamed on Libya, and was then used as the pretext for the April 14 bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi, with about 100 Libyans killed, neatly timed the day before the expected House vote on *contra* aid. In case the audience missed the point, Reagan's speech writers made it explicit. Addressing the American Business Conference on April 15, he said, "And I would remind the House voting this week that this arch-terrorist has sent \$400 million and an arsenal of weapons and advisers into Nicaragua to bring his war home to the United States. He has bragged that he is helping the Nicaraguans because they fight America on its own ground."<sup>6</sup>

The April 14 attack was the first bombing in history staged for prime time television. As the subsequently published record shows, the bombing raids were carefully timed so that they would begin precisely at 7 pm Eastern Standard Time; that is, precisely at the moment when all three national television channels broadcast their national news, which was of course preempted as agitated anchor men switched to Tripoli for direct eyewitness reports of the exciting events. As soon as the raids ended, the White House had Larry Speakes address a press conference, followed by other dignitaries, ensuring total domination of the propaganda system during the crucial early hours.

5. London *Sunday Times*, April 6, 1986.

6. New York *Times*, April 16, 1986.



United States went out of its way to send emissaries to share evidence and urge concerted action against the Libyan leader." It is irrelevant, apparently, that the jury was hardly convinced by the evidence, and issued a "judgment" calling on the executioner to refrain from any action.

The U.S. bombing of Libya had nothing to do with "terrorism," even in the hypocritical western sense of the word. In fact, it was clear enough that the Gulf of Sidra operation and the bombing of Libyan cities would if anything incite such retail terrorism, one major reason why the likely targets in Europe pleaded with the U.S. to refrain from such action. This is hardly the first time that violent actions have been executed with the expectation that they would incite retail terrorism. Consider the U.S.-backed Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, undertaken against the background of persistent U.S.-Israeli refusal to permit a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

After the Israeli-initiated exchange across the Israel-Lebanon border in June 1981 with some 450 Arabs and six Jews killed, the border was "quiet" in the racist terms of American discourse, meaning that there was no PLO response to the many Israeli provocations (including bombing of civilian areas with many killed) undertaken in an effort to elicit a "terrorist act" that could be exploited to justify the planned invasion. Finally, Israel invaded on a pretext in June 1982, destroyed the civilian base of the PLO in Lebanon and demolished much of what remained of Lebanese society.

#### U.S. Escalation Strategy

The real reasons for the U.S. attack on Libya have nothing to do with self-defense against "terrorist attacks" or "self-defense against future attack" in accord with the astonishing doctrine proclaimed by the Reagan administration to much domestic acclaim. Libya's terrorism is a minor irritant, but Qaddafi has stood in the way of U.S. plans in North Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere: supporting Polisario and anti-U.S. groups in the Sudan, forging a union with Morocco, intervening in Chad, and in general interfering with U.S. efforts to forge a "strategic consensus" in the region, and to impose its will elsewhere. These are real crimes, which must be punished. Furthermore, the Libyan attack had the purpose, and the effect, of preparing opinion at home and abroad for further acts of U.S. violence. The immediate response might be negative, but once absorbed, the level of expectation is heightened and the U.S. can proceed to further escalation.

There are two major areas where such escalation is likely. The first is Central America. While the U.S. proxy army has succeeded in its major task of "forcing [the Sandinistas] to divert scarce resources to the war and away from social programs," as explained in a rare moment of candor by administration officials,<sup>7</sup> it is unlikely that it can "cut out the cancer"; hence the threat of successful independent development in terms that might be meaningful to the suffering population of U.S. client states will remain.

The obvious means are threats to Soviet and Cuban shipping. Nicaragua would not be able to respond, but the

7. Julia Preston, *Boston Globe*, February 9, 1986.

U.S.S.R. and Cuba might. If they do, the U.S. propaganda system can be counted on to react with outrage over this new proof of Communist aggression, allowing the administration to construct an international crisis in which, it may be assumed, the U.S.S.R. will back down, so that Nicaragua will be effectively blockaded. If they do not respond, the same result will be achieved. Of course, the world may go up in smoke, but that is a minor consideration in comparison with the need to



Credit: Department of Defense

Libyan ship burns in the Gulf of Sidra after U.S. attack.

excise the cancer. U.S. and European opinion must be prepared for these eventualities. The bombing of Libya turns the ratchet another notch.

The second area where world opinion must be prepared for eventual escalation is the Middle East. The U.S. has blocked political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict at least since 1971, when President Sadat of Egypt made his first proposal for a full peace treaty (offering nothing to the Palestinians, and in almost precise accord with official U.S. policy as well as the international consensus).

Meanwhile, the U.S. government surely wants to leave its options open. It would make sense for an Israeli strike against Syria to be accompanied by U.S. bombing, the former presented as a "pre-emptive strike" in "self-defense against future attack," the latter packaged for western consumption as "self-defense" against Syrian-inspired terrorism. The purpose of direct U.S. participation would be to warn the Soviet Union that a global war will result from any attempt on their part to support their Syrian ally. European and U.S. opinion must be prepared for such possible moves. The attack on Libya, and the subsequent propaganda campaigns, help set the stage, leaving the U.S. more free to consider these options if they are later deemed necessary. Again, the likelihood of a nuclear war is not small, but the U.S. has shown repeatedly that it is prepared to face this danger to achieve its ends in the Middle East, as elsewhere.



Vernon Walters:

# Crypto-diplomat and Terrorist

by Ellen Ray and William Schaap

*Editors' Note: This article first ran in CAIB Number 26, Summer 1986. Vernon Walters, who over the years has been involved in one covert action after another, was also a member of the "Murder Board," the Reagan administration's core Central American policy group. (Other members of this group include, Robert McFarlane, Alexander Haig, Lawrence Eagleburger, and William Casey.) Walters brandished this issue of CAIB, which had his picture on the cover, at a UN press conference expressing shock that he was labeled a terrorist.*

## The Military Background

Vernon Walters enlisted as a private in the U.S. Army shortly before Pearl Harbor.<sup>1</sup> After the U.S. entered the war, he attended infantry school and graduated as a Second Lieutenant in 1942, and attended the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Richie, Maryland. In October 1942 he "took part in the assault landing at Safi, Morocco." (This appears to be the extent of Walters's combat experience.) He then taught "Prisoner of War Interrogation" at Camp Richie. Although not mentioned in his official biography, Walters later trained Brazilian troops at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he became close friends with a young officer, Humberto Castelo Branco, who, more than 20 years later, was to take power in the coup which overthrew President João Goulart. Walters was aide de camp to General Mark W. Clark in Italy and then, until the end of the War, combat liaison officer with the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division in Italy. All the above mentioned countries are ones with which Walters was later to have significant ties.

Walters spent more than 25 years in a succession of military assignments, usually as military attaché or interpreter, and generally under the aegis of the Defense Intelligence Agency. He was in Brazil in 1945 with Secretary of State Marshall and President Truman, and attended the 1947 Pan American Conference in Bogotá, Colombia. This was his first brush with revolution and counterrevolution; the massive protests against the Conference were met with bloody retaliation which left more than 2,000 dead. Curiously, Walters received a medal for his service during this incident, leading to speculation about his role in the events.<sup>2</sup>

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Walters was all over the globe, most significantly, as we will see below, in Iran, Italy, Brazil, France, and Vietnam. He spent three years in secret negotiations with the Chinese, and, in the words of his official

biography, "smuggled Henry Kissinger into Paris on 15 different occasions to conduct such negotiations."

His military promotions were unprecedented, considering his beginnings as a private. His Brazilian escapades in 1964 earned the Colonel a promotion to Brigadier General; his one month in Vietnam three years later got him his second star, as Major General; and when, in April 1972, he was appointed Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, he became a Lieutenant General. He retired in July 1976 and spent the Carter years in an action-packed civilian career. Then, shortly after President Reagan entered office, Walters returned through the revolving door and began four years' State Department service as Ambassador-at-Large, before becoming U.N. Ambassador.

Prior to examining his post-military career, it is enlightening to review Walters's far-flung operations in the coup-filled years from 1953 to 1973.

Walters admits, and associates confirm, that he was involved in the 1953 putsch which overthrew the government of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran and reinstalled the young Shah.<sup>3</sup> In the early 1960s he was military attaché in Rome, actively blocking the Kennedy administration's "opening" towards the Italian left.<sup>4</sup>

## Brazil

In 1962 Walters was posted to Brazil as military attaché. Although Walters insists he was nothing more than a "well-informed observer" of the events that followed,<sup>5</sup> it is obvious that he was up to his neck in the plotting which culminated in the bloody coup of 1964. He was, according to Jan Knippers Black, the "linchpin, the one person all the officers would talk to while they were still afraid to talk with one another."<sup>6</sup> Indeed, he was such a good "observer" that he told Washington one week in advance the exact day the coup was to take place.<sup>7</sup>

In fact, various government documents suggest that Walters played an extremely crucial role both in fomenting and in accomplishing the coup. In the year preceding the March 31, 1964 start of the coup, a series of CIA documents describe a meticulous investigation into the attitude of the Brazilian military regarding the Goulart government. During this period, the person best situated to sway the hesitant rightist military leaders was Colonel Vernon Walters, who, as it hap-

3. Claudia Wright, "Brass Knuckles for America," in *New Statesman*, February 8, 1985, p. 20.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Michael Massing, "America's Top Messenger Boy," *New Republic*, September 16, 1985, p. 22.

6. Jan Knippers Black, *United States Penetration of Brazil* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977).

7. Massing, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 22.

1. The underlying data are from the State Department biography of August 1981.

2. Ramón Jimeno and Marcela Caldas, "Vernon Anthony Walters: El Agente Secreto de la Diplomacia Silenciosa," in *Zona* (Bogotá, Colombia), April 23, 1986, p. 46.



pens, was promoted to Brigadier General within a year of the coup.<sup>8</sup>

Walters's friendship with Nixon, led to his appointment, in April 1972, as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, a post he filled under four Directors, Richard Helms, James Schlesinger, William Colby, and George Bush. John Dean testified during the Watergate trials that he had been told Walters "was a good friend of the White House and the White House had put him in the Deputy Director position so they could have some influence over the Agency."<sup>9</sup> Walters served from 1972 to 1976.

Credit: © 1985, Brian Alpert, Keystone Press Agency



Vernon Walters: Diplo-spook.

### The Great Watergate Myth

Part of the Walters mythology is his allegedly firm, moral, indignant refusal to be a part of any cover-up of what came to be known as the Watergate scandal. The fact is that when Walters was first asked, by Nixon aide Bob Haldeman, to warn the FBI (falsely) that a strenuous investigation of Watergate would jeopardize ongoing CIA operations, he did just that. In minutes of receiving those orders, he was on his way to Director Patrick Gray.<sup>10</sup> Several days later Walters was stonewalling, advising John Dean that the then Director, Richard Helms, wanted to distance himself and the Agency from the growing scandal.

A few weeks after his first, eager involvement, Walters realized he could not stall the investigation much further. When also anxious to protect himself, asked Walters if he could not make the CIA's request in writing, Walters said he could not write such a "spurious" letter. The relieved Gray then understood that he could let the investigation, already with a momentum of its own, go on; Walters did not want to be in the middle of wittingly covering up crimes, especially as so many

1. p. 22; *Washington Post*, February 9, 1985, p. A6; Jeff Stein, "The Man of American Diplomacy," *Boston Globe Magazine*, August 29, 1985, p. 29; *Washington Post*, December 29, 1976, p. 1; *Mid Wise*, *The American Police State* (New York: Random House, 1985), pp. 243-44.

people would know about it. Still, it was almost a year later that he first informed the Department of Justice of his knowledge of the White House's efforts to have the CIA stop the FBI, and during that year he received the Agency's Distinguished Intelligence Medal.<sup>11</sup>

### Chile, Allende, and Letelier

One of the most controversial series of charges against Walters involve his connections with the fascist opposition to the administration of Chilean President Salvador Allende, to the overthrow of Allende, and to the assassination of former Chilean Defense Minister Orlando Letelier.

While DDCI, Walters was in charge of the close liaison between the CIA and the Chilean intelligence services, which cooperated closely in the efforts to overthrow the Allende government. They also reportedly received considerable help from Walters's friends in the Brazilian service.<sup>12</sup> But the most controversial allegation against Walters is that he was complicit in the assassination of Letelier.<sup>13</sup>

It is almost impossible to believe, from all of the studies which have been published, and from the testimony of several trials and congressional hearings, that Vernon Walters did not have advance knowledge of a major Chilean secret police operation in the U.S. being planned in July and August of 1976, but no directly incriminating evidence has been found. Walters vigorously denies any connection with, or foreknowledge of, the Letelier assassination.

### Walters's "Private Life," 1976-1981

Whatever his reasons for leaving the Ford administration well before the elections, Walters spent the Carter years close to the friends he had made over the past three decades. And playing upon those friendships proved no fiscal hardship. In 1980, for example, Walters made nearly half a million dollars, \$300,000 of which was a fee from what may be one of the most misleadingly named companies in the United States, Environmental Energy Systems, Inc., of Alexandria, Virginia, which is, curiously, a major arms merchant. The money was a consultant's fee for assisting them in their efforts (apparently unsuccessful) to sell tanks to the King of Morocco.

Walters's work with Morocco during this time period has even more ominous overtones. He was (and possibly still is) a general partner in a Vienna, Virginia organization called Morocco Travel Advisers. In a letter to the Senate submitted with his April 1, 1981 Disclosure Statement he said the company "provides tours of Morocco for and at the expense of U.S. travel agents." But he also noted that it was involved in

11. *Ibid.*, pp 245-46; John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 529.

12. Stein, *op. cit.* n. 8, p. 36; Thomas F. Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets* (New York: Knopf, 1979), p. 231.

13. Jeff Stein, "Vernon Walters and the Death of Orlando Letelier," *Boston Globe*, August 29, 1982, p. 50; Taylor Branch and Eugene M. Propper, *Labyrinth* (New York: Viking, 1982), pp. 1-14; John Dinges and Saul Landau, *Assassination on Embassy Row* (New York: Pantheon, 1980), pp. 382-89; Donald Freed with Fred Landis, *Death in Washington* (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill, 1980), pp. 184-86.

14. New York Times, 1982.  
15. Massin, 1982.  
16. *Ibid.* W. Frank Ortiz, v. Ambassador to the regime. W. 17. Massin, 1982.  
18. Transc. national Court of America: Mili



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### Walters's Ties to Guatemala

Vernon Walters was perhaps President Reagan's most prominent apologist for the brutal military dictatorship of General Romeo Lucas García of Guatemala. In a May 1981 press conference in Guatemala City, Walters said the U.S. wanted to help Lucas García defend "peace and liberty."<sup>15</sup> When asked about Guatemalan human rights violations, Walters said, "There will be human rights problems in the year 2000 with the governments of Mars and the moon. There are some problems that are never resolved."<sup>16</sup> A month later, U.S. aid for Guatemala resumed at a significant level.

Walters had ties to Guatemala and its murderous leaders from his "civilian" interlude in the late 1970s. One of the clients he listed in his Senate disclosure statement was Basic Research International, S.A.. They paid him \$1,000 a day to influence the Guatemalan government to lift oil production quotas. It has been charged that in this project, Basic Research issued exaggerated estimates of Guatemalan oil reserves which the State Department then used to justify continued U.S. support for the brutal regime.

Walters continues to flak for Guatemala. In 1985 he told an interviewer that the administration's "quiet diplomacy" really worked; the Guatemalan military is "not killing as many people as they did before."<sup>17</sup> This faint praise was not even true; virtually all reports indicated that the Guatemalan government at the time continued to have the worst human rights record in the area.

### Joining the Reagan Administration

Walters was appointed a senior adviser to then Secretary of State Alexander Haig on April 1, 1981, just two months after Reagan took office. On July 22, 1981, after Senate confirmation, he was sworn in as Ambassador-at-Large. Among his earliest duties was a deep involvement in the administration's war against Nicaragua. In 1981 and 1982 he made numerous trips to Argentina to arrange for that government's training of contra leaders and for their handling of various secret payments to contra leaders, particularly prior to the final approval of the CIA's original plans.

Walters had a special role in the building up of the contra forces waging their brutal war against Nicaragua. According to the testimony of former contra leader Edgar Chamorro,<sup>18</sup> Walters was instrumental in consolidating the forces of the former members of Somoza's National Guard:

14. *New York Times*, December 6, 1981.

15. Massing, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 24.

16. *Ibid.* Walters was accompanied on his May 1981 trip to Guatemala by Frank Ortiz, who had been removed by President Carter from his post as Ambassador to that country because he was considered "too conciliatory" to the regime. *Washington Post*, May 13, 1981.

17. Massing, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 25.

18. Transcript, sworn testimony of Edgar Chamorro before the International Court of Justice, at The Hague, in *Nicaragua v. United States of America: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua*.

"At the time, the ex-National Guardsmen were divided into several small bands operating along the Nicaraguan-Honduran border...General Walters himself arranged for all the bands to be incorporated within the 15th of September Legion, and for the military government of Argentina to send several army officers to serve as advisers and trainers...the new organization was called the National Democratic Force, or by its Spanish acronym, FDN."

One of Walters's most significant achievements in his personal war against Nicaragua was a secret agreement he negotiated with the then President of Colombia, Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala aimed at setting up a top secret U.S. military base on the Colombian island of San Andrés, only 125 miles off the east coast of Nicaragua. Some \$50 million worth of sophisticated tracking radar and anti-aircraft batteries have reportedly been installed on the island and nearby keys.<sup>19</sup>

### Walters in for Kirkpatrick

In February 1985, Walters was nominated by President Reagan to succeed Jeane Kirkpatrick as United Nations Ambassador. Although most reportage continued to praise Walters, reiterating all the old war stories, some of the journals were less than flattering. As Claudia Wright noted in the *New Statesman*, "Walters's candidacy for the U.N. post carries an unusual cachet: Directly or indirectly, he has been involved in overthrowing more governments than any other official still serving in the U.S. government."<sup>20</sup>

Indeed, the downplaying of the role of the United Nations is a pillar of Reagan's foreign policy. And Walters is a staunch adherent of the Reagan Doctrine. He has called the U.N. a "measured disappointment," because it has "drifted away from resolution of conflicts." Walters has promised to be "very tough," to "work very hard to change these voting patterns unfavorable to the U.S."<sup>21</sup> His professed love for conflict resolution belies the administration's—and Walters's—contempt for the World Court, as evidenced by their refusal to participate in the case brought, successfully, by Nicaragua to challenge the *contra* war.

Recent press reports note that Walters has been absent from his U.N. post nearly continually the past few months, traveling around the world on more secret missions. As usual, his trips go undocumented while incidents of U.S.-sponsored terrorism continue unabated.

If all else fails, Walters is not above simple blackmail. *U.S. News & World Report* has described how he fended off a potentially hostile Senator during the Watergate hearings by discreetly threatening to bring up at the hearings the time the Senator had asked Walters, then military attaché in Paris, to ship some luxury items illegally through military channels for a group of junketing Senators.<sup>22</sup>

19. Jimeno and Caldas, *op. cit.* n. 2, p. 47.

20. *New Statesman*, February 8, 1985, p. 20.

21. *U.S. News & World Report*, September 3, 1985, p. 29.

22. *U.S. News & World Report*, June 3, 1985, p. 13.



# Savimbi Seeks "Understanding"

By Louis Wolf

*Editors' Note: This article appeared in CAIB Number 7, December 1979. It describes the first visit of Jonas Savimbi to the U.S. in many years, visits which became more frequent under the Reagan administration.*

The failure of the joint CIA-South African military operation (1971-74) that attempted to thwart the Angolan liberation struggle was amply documented in John Stockwell's "In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story." The CIA and South Africa pinned their hopes on two so-called "liberation movements," UNITA (led by Jonas Savimbi) and FNLA (led by Holden Roberto), to destroy the people's genuine liberation organization that had fought the Portuguese uninterruptedly since 1960, the MPLA.

In this context Jonas Savimbi arrived in New York for a week-long visit, his first to this country since 1961. The decision to come here was, according to *Newsweek*, not even made by Savimbi. He was expecting to begin his annual junket to drop in on the few African heads of state still friendly to UNITA. He was joined by *Newsweek's* star reporter Arnaud de Borchgrave, and informed that he was going to the United States instead.

The trip was sponsored by *Freedom House*, on whose board White House national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski sits (he is now listed "on leave"), and which trumpets itself as "a non-partisan, national organization devoted to the strengthening of free societies." Savimbi spoke at *Freedom House*, to an audience packed with Cuban exiles. The co-sponsor was *Social Democrats, U.S.A.*, whose executive director called Savimbi "one of the most impressive political figures I have ever met."

Although Savimbi said he had not come to the U.S. seeking military or economic aid, but simply wanting "understanding," *Newsweek's* headline "Savimbi Asks For Help" was more candid, as was his statement to De Borchgrave: "You should help your friends help themselves." Savimbi was not an official state visitor, but while in Washington, he and his party were provided with two long, sleek black cadillac limousines from the White House fleet.

## Kissinger's Role

One person, above all others, has lobbied most for Savimbi's cause. At the time of the huge CIA-South African thrust into Angola in 1974-76 and since the death of MPLA President Agostinho Neto, he has had the ardent backing of Henry Kissinger. Their meeting in New York was "very fruitful" and the former Secretary of State was "extremely sympathetic and brotherly to our leader," a Savimbi aide told *CAIB*.

Savimbi was slated to meet with ex-energy czar and former CIA chief James Schlesinger, Senators Sam Nunn (Dem.-Ga.)

and Henry Jackson (Dem.-Wash.), and House Speaker Thomas "Tip" O'Neill (Dem.-Mass.), all reportedly anxious to facilitate help for Savimbi and UNITA.

Savimbi was feted as a dinner guest at the home of AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland, and also met at their headquarters with Kirkland and a select group from their International Affairs Department—the CIA's well-worn channel for its global labor operations—including head of the African-American Labor Center, ex-Marine Patrick O'Farrell.

## Talking Turkey

For a guerrilla who has solicited and received aid from countries as disparate as the U.S., Portugal, France, North Korea, the Peoples Republic of China, Zaire, and South Africa, it was intriguing to see the flattery which awaited him as he addressed a crowded conference room at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, where Kissinger has an office and where James Schlesinger and other "retirees" from the national security establishment sit as board and staff members or as advisors. After giving his presentation, entitled "The Strategic Role of Angola in the Subcontinent," it became apparent that he really was talking about the strategic role of UNITA. He spoke rhetorically about "the interests" and the "best interests" of the U.S., suggesting that UNITA should be seen by his audience in the latter category.

Savimbi's justification for his war is the Cuban presence in Angola, but not everybody in the audience was prepared to accept him as the "liberation fighter" he described himself as. Some of those listening asked difficult questions.

One identifying himself as a South African said: "In the Kunene region of southern Angola, you are supported by South Africa. South Africa is bombing Angolans every day." To the surprise of many, Savimbi admitted this and even bragged about selling diamonds to South Africa for money to buy arms in various countries.

## CIA Pawn

Another questioner asked bluntly: "Are you in the CIA's pocket?" Savimbi chuckled and, after a thoughtful pause, said: "In 1975, I addressed myself to the American administration, then I asked for help. If they give it to me through which channel, that's a domestic problem...."

It is obvious that Savimbi will measure the "understanding" he generated in the United States very literally—in dollars and cents, in tanks, in guns, and in bullets the U.S. sends him. He has addressed himself to the Carter Administration in full view of everyone this time. Will the Administration wade in once more, and "through which channel?"



# Mozambique Smashes Spy Network

by Ellen Ray

*Editors' Note: This article first appeared in CAIB Number 12, April 1981. Since then, the South African government has dramatically increased its funding of and control over the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), a brutal terrorist organization which has killed thousands of Mozambicans in recent years. It is also important to note that this article describes an attempt by the CIA to secure the travel plans, including flight schedules, of Mozambican President Samora Machel. Machel died in a mysterious plane crash in 1987 which was thought by many to have been caused by sabotage.*

With the complicity of a U.S. media blackout, the CIA has once again managed to deflect attention from its criminal operations—in this case the exposure in Mozambique in early March of one of the largest and most sinister spy rings ever uncovered.

The joint operations of the CIA and South African intelligence, the Department of National Security (DONS, formerly BOSS) were directed against progressive African governments for a period of more than six years, according to a March 4 communique from the Mozambican Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The activities extended throughout southern Africa, and from Pretoria to Washington. "The CIA had initiated espionage activities and recruitment of agents during the colonial era," the communique states. After Mozambican independence in 1975, the spy ring was directed from the U.S. Embassy in Maputo, the Mozambican capital, by the successive CIA Chiefs of Station posing as second secretaries.

## Involvement in Mass Murder

Announcing the expulsion of six American CIA officers and agents, Mozambique's Ministry of Security produced a double agent, a young Air Force officer, who had infiltrated the network since 1978. According to his testimony and that of other Mozambican officials who confessed to involvement, the ring did not serve merely to gather intelligence information, but was actively engaged in subversion and interference in Mozambique's internal affairs.

The most blatant current example given was the direct involvement of the CIA with South Africa in the January 30 raid in which twelve members of the African National Congress were murdered and three others kidnapped and taken to South Africa. Evidence indicates that the CIA provided the addresses of the three homes in the Maputo suburb of Matola where the South African exiles were living. With this information, South African commandos crossed the border near Swaziland, drove to Matola, and attacked the homes.

Prior to the liberation of Zimbabwe, it was learned, the CIA network had also collected information on the location of Robert Mugabe's ZANU refugee camps in Mozambique, and transmitted this information to the Ian Smith regime in

Rhodesia, leading to repeated raids against Mozambican territory.

## The Expulsions

In retaliation for the latest and most vicious raid, the government of Mozambique expelled six Americans and arrested at least twenty other persons, both foreigners and Mozambicans, including Jose Massinga, a former director of research and personnel in the Foreign Ministry. Massinga confessed to having been recruited by the CIA while attending university in the United States. He was activated to work against his government in 1975, and continued until his arrest on March 2.

Another CIA agent arrested in connection with the smashing of this ring was Alcide Chivite, a veteran FRELIMO guerrilla leader, who has publicly detailed his work with the spy ring since 1978. Additionally, a number of Mozambican military officers have been arrested. President Samora Machel has, in several addresses to the people of Mozambique, urged far greater vigilance on the part of everyone, and criticized the relaxation of security which came with the victory of the progressive forces in Zimbabwe.

## Other CIA Recruits

At a recent press conference in Maputo, attended by more than 100 foreign reporters and diplomats, Flight Captain Joao Carneiro Goncalves described how he duped the CIA for more than three years by passing on false information provided to him by the Ministry of Security. The CIA was apparently interested in obtaining information on the Mozambican armed forces, on liberation movements which had representatives in that country, and, ominously, on the movements of President Samora Machel.

A pilot, Jose Gomes Neto, whom the CIA tried to recruit, described the methods used. A CIA agent, who was a trained pilot and parachutist, had joined the Mozambique Aero-Club and took part in various competitions. The agent made use of such occasions to take photographs of sensitive areas. He also used the excuse of flying from Maputo to Inhambane in the north for a parachute competition to make an aerial survey of areas near both cities. Determined to recruit Gomes Neto, the CIA agent tried to pass himself off as a representative of the U.S. Federal Aviation Agency, and invited Gomes Neto sailing on his yacht, playing squash at his club, and the like.

The information the CIA was trying to obtain included the identity of the flight staff which travelled with President Machel; the flights scheduled for the President and other civilian and military leaders; the security systems at Mozambican airports, particularly the stationing of security forces at Maputo airport; the quantity of spare aircraft parts in stock; the structure of Mozambican Airways workshops; and the



identities of the main aircraft mechanics. The Maputo daily, *Noticias* commented that the case of Jose Gomes Neto illustrates how the CIA uses social contacts to try to recruit agents, to lead them into illegal and subversive activities.

#### U.S. Response

Responding immediately to the expulsions, the U.S. State Department charged that the orders for the U.S. personnel to leave came after a Cuban intelligence team with Mozambican support had tried to recruit one of the CIA officers and failed. The State Department also alleged that three *CAIB* co-editors who had visited Mozambique were involved. The State Department stated it was "not coincidental" that the *CAIB* people were there "at the time," and that the incident was viewed "with the most serious concern."

Mozambican authorities criticized U.S. attempts to present Mozambique as subservient to any outside forces. The claim of "Cuban and private American involvement was intended to convey that Mozambicans were incapable of exposing the spy ring. That's racist," a Mozambican official said.

A number of related events followed in the wake of the Maputo CIA scandal. At the very time the press conferences were being called in Maputo, senior South African intelligence and military officers were visiting Washington, despite long-standing diplomatic policies forbidding such direct contacts. These officials, one of whom had actually been previously expelled from the United States, received visas, travelled to Washington, met with officials of the NSC and the Defense Intelligence Agency, all, according to the State Department, without their knowing of the South African's identities.

It turned out that the South African officials were invited by the American Security Council, which has long supported close relations with South Africa, and, according to John Fisher, ASC president, he had notified the State Department in advance of the invitations, but had not received any reply. The State Department professed surprise and embarrassment and the South Africans cut short their visit; presumably, not before certain deals were struck.

Most recently, it was learned that U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick also met on March 15 with one of the South Africans, Lt. Gen. P.W. Van Der Westerhuizen, head of military intelligence, despite State Department assertions to the contrary. She also met privately with Dirk Mudge, the white puppet "leader" of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance in Namibia.

The United States retaliated for the expulsions in Mozambique by abruptly cutting off all food shipments to Mozambique, indicating the level to which humanitarian considerations have sunk in the Reagan administration. Several high officials, including the President, have made public statements in the past few weeks indicating strong support for the South African government, much to the dismay of virtually all other African states.

South Africa, elated by these expressions of solidarity, has launched more outrageous raids against both Angola and Mozambique. These have included a massive bombing March



Credit: Associated Press

#### U.S. Embassy personnel departing Mozambique after being expelled for spying.

17 of the Lubango airfield in southern Angola, more than 190 miles north of the Namibian border, and a bizarre incident March 18 on Mozambique's southern border with South Africa.

According to South Africa, some fifty of its soldiers were simply strolling along the unmarked beach and "unsuspectingly and probably innocently" strayed across the line, whereupon they were attacked by Mozambican troops, suffering two deaths before reinforcements arrived to cover the retreat back to South African soil. The South African government had the audacity to refer to the Mozambican action as an "ambush," and said that such deeds "will without a doubt heighten tension on the border." This from the country which had just staged the murderous Matola raid.

The signals from Washington are more ominous than would have been thought possible a few months ago. The administration has announced its intention to press for the immediate repeal of the Clark Amendment, which purports to prohibit covert CIA operations in Angola — though it has been more honored in the breach during its five years on the books.

In a major international shock, the administration has announced that it is considering inviting the Prime Minister of South Africa, P.W. Botha, for an official visit to the United States. The United States has never before invited a South African Prime Minister to visit, and the proposal has African leaders deeply concerned. The President of Nigeria noted his fear that Mr. Reagan has no comprehension of the repercussions such a move would have.

It is nevertheless clear that the present U.S. administration is filled with boosters of South Africa intent on engineering a complete turnabout in U.S. foreign policy in the area. Open support for the apartheid regime is now the rule, not the exception. This support only encourages South Africa to resist any accommodation or negotiation with its neighbors, and to resist any change in its apartheid policy. If anything, such policies will only hasten the final military conflict in southern Africa. In this war it appears that the United States may be South Africa's only ally in the entire world.



# U.S. and South Africa Foment Terrorist Wars

by Sean Gervasi \*

*Editors' Note: This article was first published in CAIB Number 15, Fall 1984. To date, South Africa continues to supply counterrevolutionary armies in Angola and Mozambique even though it has formally agreed not to.*

South Africa has been conducting an undeclared terrorist war on the Front-line States, and in particular on Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, for more than three years. This war has been waged across an entire subcontinent, using every means of modern warfare from armored divisions and squadrons of bombers to economic sabotage, subversion and assassination.

Moreover, the Reagan Administration is a willing partner in the secret war in southern Africa. It has thrown the weight and power of the United States behind South Africa's campaign to destabilize the Front-line States. South Africa and the U.S. are now full partners in an almost invisible war to change the political balance in the region and to preserve and reinforce the principal institutions of the apartheid system.

Indeed, from its inception, it was clear that the Reagan Administration would seek to preserve the status quo in South Africa as part of an anti-Socialist crusade, just as it announced it would do in El Salvador. It has therefore pursued a "two-track" policy, revealing its commitment to South Africa and its antagonism to radical change, but concealing many of its actions in support of South Africa's war.

The war against the Front-line States has been much more complex than many observers have suspected. And the Central Intelligence Agency has inevitably played an important role in it, carrying out a second, secret "track" of U. S. policy, coordinating various programs of covert warfare and undertaking important operations.

## The 1981 Southern Africa Policy Review

When the Reagan Administration took office, the new President's foreign policy advisors shared the view that the U.S. had to become actively engaged in southern Africa. The Administration, however, needed a coherent position and a consistent set of policies for the region.

In the region as a whole, to seek to end "the dangerous cycle of violence in the region" and to direct "the impetus toward change into peaceful channels"; privately to encourage South Africa "to preempt any armed threat—guerrilla or conventional—from its neighbors" and "to use its military superiority for that end"; to apply strong pressure, with others, against

Angola and Mozambique and eventually to seek radical changes in the internal political balance in those countries; to apply pressure against the governments of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe and gradually to draw them closer to the West; to cooperate closely with South Africa in mounting pressures against the Front-line States; to use U.S. diplomacy "to help establish the rules of the game that will limit and discourage the application of outside force" in the region.

And publicly, to maintain strict secrecy about active collaboration in support of South Africa; to maintain strict secrecy about certain actions taken against the Front-line States; to mount an extensive campaign of political action and propaganda in Africa, Western Europe, and the United States to ensure that actions of the U.S. government remain invisible or are accepted by public opinion.

## Coercive Diplomacy

The strategy chosen was essentially an extension of the military doctrine of coercive diplomacy, according to which a nation can sometimes achieve certain limited political objectives by combining carefully measured doses of military force with diplomacy. Selective force can be used against an adversary who resists one's demands, while "negotiations" with him are continued. In some cases, inducements of aid or other incentives may be offered. The idea is that an adversary may be "persuaded" to accept one's demands after military pressure has been applied, and when inducements are offered.

But this strategy did not produce the results which were expected of it. The U.S. and South Africa were demanding much more of the Front-line States than they were prepared to give, even under pressure. What began as coercive diplomacy, therefore, broke down and became a full-scale terrorist war. When the Reagan Administration and South Africa met resistance, they had to choose between giving up their aims or escalating the war. They chose the latter course.

## The War is Launched

In March 1981, South African commandos raided Maputo, the Mozambican capital, only a few hours after Secretary of State Haig had declared the "war against international terrorism" a priority for United States foreign policy. Pretoria stepped up its military actions against Angola, initiating a continuous low intensity war in the southern part of the country. Its agents carried out sabotage and assassinations in Zimbabwe. It made an attempt to mount a coup against Zambia's President Kaunda. South Africa also began a major effort to build, arm and deploy special military units in Mozambique to attack roads, railways, bridges, and other economic targets;

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Credit: Noticias

The result of a South African commando raid into Mozambique which left 12 dead.

as well as to sow terror in rural areas.

At the same time, South Africa began preparations for full-scale economic warfare against several of the Front-line States, notably Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. During the latter part of 1981, the pressure against the Front-line States was increased, creating severe economic and political difficulties.

Sabotage increased in Zimbabwe, causing many millions of dollars in losses. At the end of 1981, a bomb blast nearly destroyed ZANU headquarters in the middle of Salisbury-arare, killing six people and wounding many others.

However, in 1981 the brunt of the attack was falling on Angola. In August, South Africa mounted a major invasion of the southern part of the country, deploying 11,000 men and several battalions of tanks and armored cars. There was fierce fighting in the center of Cunene province, and by September 100,000 Angolans from the area had been forced to flee. South Africa established a permanent military presence in southern Angola, substantially increased its support for UNITA and began to extend its own raids further and further to the north. In Mozambique, South Africa started a veritable war. It organized the Mozambique National Resistance, which had been started by Rhodesian Military Intelligence to attack FRELIMO inside Mozambique during the liberation struggle. FRELIMO units, assisted by South African commandos, were sent into Mozambique, where they repeatedly attacked transport links and power lines in the central provinces. Key roads and rail bridges to Zimbabwe were blown up by South African forces, cutting the movement of goods to and from the country, including oil. While the Mozambique Army failed to react with some effect in 1981, the scale of the South African operations was very large and difficult to cope with. Mozambique gradually came under siege.

#### Role of the U.S. Since 1981

Considerable evidence can be pieced together from public sources and from interviews, to give some idea of the extent

of U.S. actions aimed at destabilizing the Front-line States.

From 1981, the CIA, acting through third parties, began to provide substantial aid to the UNITA group in Angola, which has been heavily supported by South Africa for a decade. This aid has included money, arms, and equipment.

From 1981, the U.S. has orchestrated a campaign of economic pressure against Tanzania, demanding persistently behind the scenes that Tanzania abandon socialist economic policies. This campaign has succeeded in depriving Tanzania of needed investment, credit, and aid, thus contributing to the "economic failure" which the Reagan Administration decries.

In 1981, Zambian security forces thwarted a plot by dissidents and "South African commandos" to assassinate President Kaunda and seize power. It was reported in *Africa News*, July 13, 1981 that agents of the CIA had recruited Zambians in an effort to examine "the possibility of an alternative leadership in the country." CIA Director William Casey flew secretly to Lusaka and threatened sanctions against Zambia if the role of the CIA was exposed.

In 1981, the Reagan Administration blocked the implementation of the U.N. plan for a Namibian settlement by linking it for the first time to a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. While the U.S. continued to state its support for the U.N. plan, Secretary of State Haig wrote the South African Foreign Minister late in the year "that the United States would not press South Africa to settle the Namibian question unless Cuban troops were withdrawn from Angola." (*TransAfrica Forum*, Spring 1983, p. 12.)

While the U.S. and South Africa were applying various pressures against Angola, including substantial overt military pressure, General Vernon Walters, a former deputy director of the CIA and now a U.S. special envoy, made numerous trips to Luanda to persuade the Angolan Government to agree to the withdrawal of Cuban troops.

In 1983, when large numbers of people in Mozambique faced starvation and when tens of thousands had already died from lack of food, the Reagan Administration deliberately held back food aid to that country, while it was seeking to "persuade" it to sign a non-aggression agreement with South Africa. Mozambique has repeatedly refused to agree to South Africa's demand that the African National Congress be expelled from its territory. Mozambique began 1984 facing the most serious food shortages it had known and with a food deficit of well over 100,000 tons of cereals.

#### Rebuilding the *Cordon Sanitaire*

The Reagan Administration had concentrated its efforts on what it considered Cuba's intervention in Angola. The focus was on the issue of "linkage." Despite considerable military and economic pressure, against all the Front-line States, and especially against Angola, these efforts failed.

The response to this resistance was to escalate the war and to try to force through a "regional security settlement." In practice, this meant forcing the Front-line States to reduce their support for the liberation movements. The objective was to rebuild the *cordon sanitaire* of buffer states around South Africa which had been destroyed by revolutions in Angola,

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...and Zimbabwe  
...November 1982, shortly after the Frontline States had  
...President Reagan's approach on "linkage," William  
...to southern Africa. He visited a number of  
...including South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, and  
...CIA sources have stated that this was a "familiariza-  
...with no particular political purpose. This is not true.  
...to southern Africa, and particularly to South  
...to begin implementing a grand design for rebuilding  
...around South Africa. Press reports at the  
...made it clear that South Africa and the U.S. would  
...that the Front-line States cease or reduce their sup-  
...for SWAPO and the ANC or face an escalation of  
...economic and other pressures.  
...discussions with South African officials apparent-  
...in an agreement on implementing the next phase  
...diplomacy in southern Africa. Pressures on all the  
...States would be increased.

### The Road to "Settlements"

By the end of 1982, the situation in southern Africa was be-  
coming very difficult, especially in Angola, Mozambique, and  
Zimbabwe. The region was suffering from the effects of two  
years of drought. The world recession had hurt exports badly,  
and foreign exchange was generally very scarce. Parts of the  
region had already suffered serious damage as a result of  
South African military and terrorist operations.

The attacks on most of the Front-line States were inten-  
sified. South Africa resumed a low-level guerrilla war against  
Lesotho, using a surrogate Lesotho "liberation army." In  
Mozambique, the MNR attacked transport routes and ter-  
rorized the countryside, mining roads, burning stores, schools  
and health posts, poisoning wells, and deliberately mutilating  
peasants. In some cases, actions supposedly carried out by the  
MNR were actually carried out by regular South African com-  
mando units. South Africa had also begun to infiltrate former  
Rhodesian commandos into the southern part of Zimbabwe  
in an efforts to precipitate a "civil war."

In December of 1982, South African commandos attacked  
and destroyed the oil depot in the Mozambican city of Beira.  
The raid caused millions of dollars in damage and cut supplies  
of petroleum to Zimbabwe. On the same day, South African  
commandos flew by helicopter to Maseru, the capital of  
Lesotho, and carried out a raid against houses inhabited by  
South African refugees. Forty-two persons were killed, and  
many more were wounded.

By the beginning of 1983, South Africa was carrying out  
military and paramilitary attacks against the Front-line States  
almost openly. During 1983, economic warfare, most of which  
was covert, continued, and several countries found themsel-  
ves facing unprecedented difficulties. They could not export  
their goods. They could not attract foreign capital or purchase  
essential commodities, particularly adequate supplies of food.  
They lacked the means to substitute domestic production of  
needed goods and foreign aid projects had to be shut down,  
often for security reasons.

By mid-1983, drought, war, and a variety of external pres-  
sures had begun to make a difficult situation desperate. U.S.  
analysts predicted that the Front-line States would soon be  
"on their knees."

The situation which existed by the end of the year in most  
parts of the region is hard to describe. In Zimbabwe, millions  
of people were receiving emergency food aid. South Africa  
was again intensifying its efforts to produce chaos in the  
province of Matabeleland. It had mounted a further large-  
scale invasion of Angola, sending its troops nearly two  
hundred miles into the country. While Angola offered strong  
resistance, this third invasion was a harsh blow to a country al-  
ready suffering from drought, a partial economic blockade  
and the dislocation and damage caused by previous attacks.  
South Africa's UNITA surrogates, furthermore, were extend-  
ing their military actions into the center of the country.

Mozambique faced the gravest economic situation it had  
known. The drought had continued, further reducing food  
production. More than 100,000 Mozambicans had fled to  
Zimbabwe in search of food. In Inhambans province, where  
the war was especially intense, the lack of food had caused the  
death of tens of thousands of people, and possibly as many as  
100,000 people in 1983 alone.

As the war escalated in late 1983, and as the situation of  
several of the front-line States grew increasingly difficult, U.S.  
diplomats pressed hard for a series of "non-aggression"  
agreements. A South African official quoted in the *New York  
Times* (January 25, 1983) made it clear what kind of "peace"  
they were offering: "We want to show that we want peace in  
the region, we want to contribute and we can help a lot. But  
we also want to show that if we are refused we can destroy the  
whole of southern Africa."

U. S. officials were for the most part more circumspect  
about expressing such views. The Reagan Administration  
could not openly link its proposals to the Front-line States to  
such crude threats. But the link was there nonetheless, and the  
Front-line States understood this. In late 1983, in an interview  
with the *Johannesburg Financial Mail* (November 18, 1983),  
Charles Lichenstein, the Deputy U.S. Ambassador to the  
United Nations, said that "destabilization will remain in force  
until Angola and Mozambique do not permit their territory to  
be used by terrorists to attack South Africa."

### Conclusion

This account should help to explain why Angola and  
Mozambique eventually submitted to some U.S. and South  
African demands at Lusaka and at Nkomati some time ago.  
Something near all-out war, no less menacing for being un-  
seen, was waged against them to force them to do so.

However, the story is not ended. The Lusaka agreement  
has already broken down. South Africa has not withdrawn  
from Angola. And both South Africa and the U.S. are now  
seeking to by-pass the United Nations plan for decolonizing  
Namibia. Moreover, Angola has made it quite clear that it will  
not accept "linkage." The political situation in southern Africa  
has not changed.



# Profile of U.S. Intelligence in Southeast Asia

by David Truong D.H.\*

*Editors' Note: This article appeared in CAIB Number 5, July 1978. In January 1979, the Vietnamese army entered Kampuchea and overthrew the Pol Pot regime. Military forces opposing the Vietnamese-backed government, including a force led by Pol Pot, formed on the Kampuchean-Thai border and the CIA dutifully proceeded to arm them. The war continues today.*

In the aftermath of the US debacle in Indochina in April 1975, little has been written in the Western media about that part of Asia which affected the US for more than two decades. Brief visits by a few Westerners to Vietnam and Laos have produced sketches of life there, but most stories about Indochina deal with refugees, their plight, and at times, their dubious accounts of the internal situation. Official US statements in early 1976 gave the impression that the US was actually "leaving" Southeast Asia.

## The Situation Since the US Defeat

Has this been the reality since April 1975? Actually, except for the unravelling of the client Thieu regime and the chaotic situation of US interests from Saigon, events and trends within and without Indochina indicate that the US presence is much entrenched in Southeast Asia, especially in regard to its clandestine operations.

In April 1975, much of the CIA apparatus in South Vietnam was disrupted. Parts of it were moved to Thailand and to bases in the Philippines. Under the shock of the Vietnamese spring offensive, the Thieu regime's gigantic police intelligence machine — which the US took years to build — crumbled. According to Frank Snepp's *Decent Interval*, up to 10,000 Vietnamese special police, CIA, and Operation Phoenix employees were left behind (p. 567). The Saigon station — the largest in Asia — managed to pull out only 1,000 of its 19,000 Vietnamese (p. 566), including close to 1,000 high-level Vietnamese who had built close relationships with the agency over the years.

The CIA's other bases throughout South Vietnam, which operated under the cover of US consulates at the time, succumbed in taking out most of their Vietnamese, totalling 1,000.

One of the most immediate problems in 1975-76 for the administration lay in resettling all these suddenly unemployed CIA operatives — hundreds of them — as well as all 19,000 Vietnamese employees. A few high-level Agency employees stayed in Bangkok after the debacle to assist the

David Truong is a long-time political activist who spent many years fighting for intervention in Vietnam. David was a political prisoner for five years, and his case attracted international attention. After his release, he worked with CAIB for several years and recently left the U.S. to reside

station there in its intelligence-gathering activities. But they eventually joined the rest of the operatives in retirement in 1977. Although Stansfield Turner's Halloween purge removed most of these Indochina operatives from the Clandestine Division, the Agency was nevertheless left with a trim, and no less effective, "black operations" and paramilitary capability. With advances made in electronic technology, and the increasing practice of sharing resources with other services, Turner's move signaled the end of the Agency's era of large-scale para-military operations in Southeast Asia.

Most of the CIA's Vietnamese employees fared well. Following resettlement in the US, a few hundred refugees have been working as translators, monitors of events in Indochina, and consultants to the Agency and to the Pentagon on Indochina. Most low-level CIA-related refugees have been attached since 1976 to the HEW's Indochina refugee program, working throughout the US under the command of Americans who are either former Agency personnel or CORDS officers. (CORDS was predominantly a cover for the Agency's Operation Phoenix program to eliminate the NLF infrastructure.) This background indicates that the US has already set up in this country a similar network of Vietnamese agents designed to neutralize or eliminate Vietnamese suspected of pro-Hanoi views, and to build anti-Vietnam organizations of refugees. Nguyen Van Be, the former head of Saigon's Rural Development cadre program, now works for the HEW program, reporting on activities of various refugee organizations.

Working with the intelligence and counterinsurgency agencies of Southeast Asian governments are a small number of former Vietnamese officers of the Thieu regime's General Department of Political Warfare (GDPW). Established in the late 1950's under the guidance of CIA and counterinsurgency experts like Sir Robert Thompson, the GDPW borrowed its methods from all sources: from Agency experience in the Philippines with the Hukbalahap movement, from British counterinsurgency in Malaysia, from Goebbels' Nazi propaganda and psychological warfare techniques, and from tactics used by Chiang Kai-shek's command against the Chinese (*Etudes Vietnamiennes*, No. 42, p.82). These Vietnamese assist the Thai government in suppressing the liberation movement in Northern Thailand, and aid the Malaysian government as counterinsurgency advisors.

## Singapore and the CIA

A look at Singapore reveals some interesting facts. Singapore lies at the strategically important Straits of Malacca, a region where for many years there has been a convergence of US and British interests, and a strong coordination of intelligence activities vis-a-vis the rest of Southeast Asia.

The Agency's Singapore station has a long history of ac-



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against Vietnam. In the mid-1950s and during the  
of the CIA's efforts to prop up the Ngo Dinh Diem  
in South Vietnam, Singapore was the center for all  
"black propaganda" operations directed against Ho Chi  
Minh's Viet Minh movement. When the French colonialists  
in Geneva with the Vietnamese, the Singapore sta-  
put on an all-out drive of activities including "black opera-  
" to bolster the French position (Joseph B. Smith,  
of a Cold Warrior, p. 169). At the same time the Philip-  
station in Manila was the jumping-off base for the  
Agency's sabotage and other clandestine activities in North  
Vietnam, according to the *Avant-garde* Agency. In 1954, the es-  
tablishment of the Diem regime by Edward Lansdale of the  
CIA was backed by propaganda and clandestine operations  
out of Singapore (Smith, p. 178). It is common knowledge  
among intelligence observers of Southeast Asia that Sin-  
gapore, the main business center of the area, is routinely used  
by Agency operatives with business covers on their way to their  
missions elsewhere in Asia.

With the withdrawal of the British military presence East  
of Suez several years ago, the Agency expanded its activities  
in Singapore, especially with a heightened US interest in Sin-  
gapore following the closure of US bases in Thailand, and the  
establishment of US military and intelligence "transit"  
facilities there in the spring of 1978. At the present time, the  
Singapore station has developed a close working relationship  
with Singapore's intelligence service, monitoring and analys-  
ing events in Indochina, and of course cooperating in "black  
propaganda" operations.

#### Manila and the CIA

A post-1975 tour d'horizon of the CIA in Southeast Asia  
would not be complete without mention of the main station,  
and regional headquarters, Manila. The Agency's assets there  
are significant: it operates jointly with the Defense Intel-  
ligence Agency major electronic listening posts into In-  
dochina and southern China, which provided most of the  
intelligence on the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February  
1979. This joint CIA/DIA structure, called the Strategic  
Warning Staff, is headquartered in the Pentagon and operates  
a number of similar posts all over the world. The Manila sta-  
tion includes also very sizeable logistics capabilities for a wide  
range of clandestine operations against the governments of In-  
dochina.

In the mid-1950s, US bases in the Philippines were used as  
the headquarters for "Operation Brotherhood" in northern  
Vietnam, under the direction of Edward Lansdale and Lucien  
Conien, and involving CIA-trained Filipinos.

Aside from the CIA's huge telecommunications installa-  
tion—the Regional Relay Station—at Clark Air Force Base  
(the largest American military installation outside the con-  
tinental US), there is at least one other vital installation in the  
Philippines. Located in Manila at the Seafront Compound  
about a mile from the US Embassy is the so-called "Regional  
Service Center." Though ostensibly under the auspices of the  
International Communications Agency, this ultra-modern  
printing facility functions as a secret CIA propaganda plant.

It had the ability to produce large quantities of high-quality  
color offset magazines, posters, leaflets and the like in at least  
14 Asian languages.

One source in Manila has stated that the RSC was the  
source of counterfeit Vietnamese piasters which were  
airdropped in Vietnam. Officers from the CIA's Technical  
Services Division are known to maintain close liaison with the  
RSC, which still operates today in Manila.

In the post-Vietnam war period the regional headquarters



Henry Kissinger plans another covert action for South  
East Asia.

in Manila generally has increased in importance as a major lis-  
tening post into the Indochinese peninsula.

#### US Policy and Intelligence Activities Since 1975

Since April 1975, US policies toward Vietnam have  
reflected a strong current of hostility toward the Vietnamese  
revolutionaries, with a brief interruption in the first few  
months of 1977.

In the last year of the Ford administration, the US sought  
to conduct a massive program of economic warfare and to  
mount a campaign to isolate Vietnam diplomatically. Aside  
from the official embargo against Vietnam and Kampuchea,  
the US applied pressure on Thailand's Thanin regime to  
economically blockade Laos, a landlocked country which had  
extensive trade with Thailand for years, thus forcing Vietnam  
to divert food resources to assist Laos. Two specific areas of  
economic warfare that the US has concentrated on deal with  
scientific and technological information, and development of  
oil resources. Under Kissinger's initiative, US missions  
around the world sought to prevent the cooperation and con-  
tracts made by Western countries and Japan—particularly the  
latter—in Vietnam's petroleum development.

The range of clandestine operations programmed to sup-  
port US hostility toward Vietnam basically falls into two  
categories. The first one includes tactical, short-term opera-  
tions that attempt to disrupt every aspect of life in revolution-  
ary Vietnam. The second set of activities relates to the



# God is Phasing Out Democracy

by Fred Clarkson\*

*Editors' Note: This article first appeared in the November 1989 issue on the Religious Right, CAIB Number 27. Since then, the Moon empire has holdings around the world including the Washington [DC] Times, the New York City Times, a shiping fleet in Gloucester, MA, and an army factory in Korea. It also have numerous political fronts such as CAIB, AFET, and the International Security Council.*

Over the years, Reverend Sun Myung Moon, the founder, spiritual leader, and corporate head of the Unification Church conglomerate, has repeatedly declared that his goal is global theocracy. He has expressed his desire for political and economic control originating from centralized religious power. Equally important to understand is that the Moon organization<sup>1</sup> is an integral part of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL), which in turn has played a pivotal role in the development and activities of the Unification Church.

## Inside The League

The World Anti-Communist League (WACL) is an international coalition of fascist and conservative groups and political parties founded in 1966 by agents of the governments of Taiwan and South Korea.<sup>2</sup> One of the original groups was the Asian People's Anti-Communist League (APACL). Its Japanese affiliate, *Shokyo Rengo*, became a WACL chapter in 1968. *Shokyo Rengo* (Victory over Communism) began after a 1967 meeting between Sun Myung Moon, Rev. Sh. Sasakawa, Yoshio Kodama, and two of his lieutenants. Kodama was the head of Japanese organized crime, the *Yakuza*. One of the lieutenants, Osami Kuboki, became head of the Unification Church in Japan, as well as a leader in WACL. Soon afterward, WACL began indoctrinating young *Yakuza* gang members in anticommunist ideology similar to that the Moon organization was already doing in Korea with government officials. Sasakawa, an important World War II Japanese fascist leader, became the head of *Shokyo Rengo* and Kodama its chief advisor.

Meanwhile, the first Moon missionaries arrived in the U.S. in 1959. By the early 1960s, Moon fronts had been established

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The Moon organization is the term used by the congressional committee investigating the "Koreagate" scandal in the mid 1970s. It is used here with the caveat that the various Moon enterprises, including the church, operate with a high degree of central coordination and common purpose. Scott Anderson and Jon Lee Anderson, *Inside The League* (New York: Random House, 1986) is the first book-length expose of the World Anti-Communist League. It details the role of the Moon organization, as well as the involvement of Nazi war criminals, fascist governments, American fascist, Latin American death squad leaders, and other extremist and criminal elements comprise much of the League's membership.

and were working in collaboration with the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). Indeed, shortly after the military coup which elevated Park Chung Hee to power in 1961, his KCIA director (and founder), Kim Jong Pil, stated that he intended to "organize and utilize" the Unification Church as a "political tool" according to the Fraser Report.<sup>3</sup>

The Fraser Report, a House of Representatives investigation into Korean covert operations in the U.S., chaired by Ronald Fraser (Dem.-Minn.), reveals that one of the early KCIA-Moon projects was the Korean Cultural Freedom Foundation (KCFF). The ostensibly non-profit organization quickly turned from a "cultural" to a political operation under the influence of "Honorary Chairman" Kim Jong Pil, who wanted the "Freedom Center" in Seoul, South Korea to be its principal project. Thus, by the spring of 1964, KCFF was raising funds from private citizens in the U.S. for the Freedom Center, in fact an APACL project promoted and subsidized by the Korean government.<sup>4</sup> The Freedom Center serves as the "secretariat" of WACL to this day.

Moon's principal political organization, the International Federation for Victory Over Communism (IFVC) was formed in 1968 in Seoul. The American affiliate was incorporated in Washington, D.C. in 1969 as the Freedom Leadership Foundation (FLF).

FLF President Allen Tate Wood attended [the 1970 WACL conference in Tokyo] as a "youth delegate" with several American Moonies. (Wood later broke with Moon, gave press conferences denouncing Moon, and testified before the Fraser Committee.) While visiting Korea on the same trip, Wood was instructed by Moon to "win the power centers" of the U.S. for him, beginning with academia.<sup>5</sup> Moon also told him that "part of our strategy in the U.S. must be to make friends in the FBI, the CIA and police forces, the military and business community...as a means of entering the political arena, influencing foreign policy, and ultimately of establishing absolute dominion over the American people."<sup>6</sup>

Wood has said that "[u]nder the aegis of American Youth for a Just Peace (AYJP)...set up by myself and a man named Charles Stephens, the Unification Church carried out extensive lobbying in the spring of 1970. This lobbying was carried out by church members under orders from their superiors...to try to indicate to Congress...strong grassroots support for a

1. Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Report of the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, October 31, 1978 (hereafter, the Fraser Report), p. 415.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 121, 352-58.

3. Press Statement by Allen Tate Wood, November 15, 1979 (hereafter Wood Press Statement).

4. *Ibid.*, p. 121, 352-58.



the church's tax exempt status would be threatened if we carried out our political activities openly, we were careful to hide our identity behind the guise of AYJP. During this time, AYJP received 'anonymous' donations from 'friends of the president' [Nixon] through connections with Charles Colson and Jeb Magruder. So the Unification Church in the 1970s was the recipient of money to carry out the programs of the government."

"Mr. Moon has said," continued Wood, "that 'God is phasing out democracy.' Well, whether or not God is doing it, it is clear that Sun Myung Moon wants to do this...so right now, the United States is acting as a seedbed for fascist religious cults whose objective is in the end to destroy the Constitution, and remake America in the image of an autocratic hierarchical fascist state."<sup>7</sup>

Significantly, the youth section of WACL, currently headed by David Finzer<sup>8</sup> of the Washington-based Conservative Action Foundation, has reportedly received a grant from the South Korean WACL chapter.<sup>9</sup> Finzer's group is providing seminars on "political technology" for WACL Youth, and originated the Chevron/Gulf boycott—a campaign which received support from the RAMBO Coalition—designed to highlight the efforts of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA to overthrow the government of Angola.

#### An Automatic Theocracy

While WACL generally promotes fascist political programs, when the Moon organization is involved, the messages released are more explicitly theocratic. Essentially, Moon's followers believe he is the new Messiah, the second coming, not of Jesus but of the Messiah. Moon says that God told him: "You are the son I have been seeking, the one who can begin my eternal history."<sup>10</sup> He says that God has revealed his plan to him and that he has spoken with Jesus, Moses, and other great historical religious figures.

Moon intends to bend the U.S. to "God's will," which will lead to a final war with Soviet communism, and finally to the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth. According to *The Divine Principle*, the basic theological work of Unificationism, World War III is "inevitable." This war may be fought with weapons, or with "ideology," in order to "subjugate and unify the Satanic world." The organization created to refine and promote this ideology appears to be CAUSA which the *Unification News* describes as an "ideological movement," which "unites all religious people as a God-accepting force against the God-denying forces such as communism."<sup>11</sup>

The Moon organization has a long history of political activism. For example, after American Youth for a Just Peace was disbanded in 1971, its co-founder Charles Stephens moved to New York, and ran (unsuccessfully), first for the State legislature in 1972, and for Congress in 1974. In both

campaigns, FLF provided "volunteers." The Moon organization's party of choice has always been the Republicans, and the New Right of the GOP in particular. This relationship is epitomized by Moon's VIP seat at the first Reagan inaugural.

#### Moon as Martyr

[In 1984, Moon went to Danbury prison to serve an eighteen month sentence for income tax evasion. His supporters immediately launched a campaign to win his freedom]. The Moon-as-martyr campaign was orchestrated by the Moon organization, public relations firms, and grantees. The most



Sun Myung Moon

prominent example is the Washington-based Coalition for Religious Freedom (CRF) which, according to CRF president Don Silla, has received at least \$500,000 from Moon supporters.<sup>12</sup> A prominent CRF spokesperson and executive committee member is Joseph Paige. As Executive Vice President of the Black Baptist Shaw Divinity School, Paige received \$60,000 from the Unification Church for his school, which in turn gave Moon a much publicized honorary doctorate. Paige is also active in CAUSA.<sup>13</sup> The CRF executive committee has developed rapidly since 1984, to include most of the major televangelists, such as Tim LaHaye, Jerry Falwell, James Robison, Rex Humbard, D. James Kennedy, and Jimmy Swaggart.

Recently, the Moon organization opened an international front in its "religious freedom" campaign. Moonies founded the World Council on Religious Liberty (WCRL) in December 1986 at a conference in Geneva, Switzerland. The Chairman of WCRL is Joseph Paige, and its "Chairman of the North American Caucus" is Don Silla. They have recruited Dr. Robert G. Muller, assistant Secretary General of the United Nations, as chairman of the Council's International Advisory Committee. The Council's headquarters are in Raleigh, North

7. Wood Press Statement.

8. See "Christian Voice," CAIB, Number 27, Spring 1987.

9. Searchlight, October 1986.

10. Robert Boettcher, *Gifts of Deceit* (New York: Holt Rinehart, and Winston, 1980), p. 31.

11. *Church and State*, May 1986.

12. *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, September 27, 1986.

13. Fred Clarkson, "The Manifest Sins of Sun Myung Moon," *Christianity and Crisis*, October 28, 1985. Back issues are available from: 337 West 121 Street, New York 10027.



Carolina, which is also home to Paige's Shaw Divinity School.<sup>14</sup>

They also hired two public relations firms—Madison Fielding and Gray and Co. The latter was headed by Robert Keith Gray, a former Reagan campaign official. Gray, who co-chaired the 1981 Reagan Inaugural Committee, was also involved in the Koreagate scandal. He was the first President of the Georgetown Club, an elite social club financed by his friend, KICLA operative Tongsun Park. According to a former KICLA director, the Georgetown Club was a KICLA front used by Park to facilitate "lobbying activities" in the 1970s.<sup>15</sup> For at least the past few years, Gray and Co. has been registered as a foreign agent for Japan and South Korea.

The pardon campaign failed even though Osami Kuboki claimed that Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone and former Prime Minister Kishi had "interceded on Moon's behalf with President Reagan." According to the *Times of London*, Nakasone "telephoned the President because of Mr. Moon's status as an international leader, while Mr. Kishi, a supporter of the Unification Church in Japan, had written to the President three times."<sup>16</sup>

Kishi, who was a WACL leader in the late 1960s, is also involved with CAUSA's International Security Council (ISC). ISC's purpose includes organizing retired military officers of the Western Alliance, and holding anticommunist conferences. Kishi also co-chaired Moon's 1984 World Media Conference in Tokyo.

Kishi's involvement underscores the importance of Japan to the Moon organization. Despite its Korean roots and the historical animosity between Korea and Japan, the Unification Church has had a limited popular following in Korea and very large support in Japan. Indeed, its predominant source of funding has been Japan. The *Washington Post*, quoting a former ranking Japanese Moon official, reported that some \$800 million had flowed from Japan to the U.S. Unification Church over the preceding nine years (1975-1984).<sup>17</sup>

### Inside the New Religious Right

Part of Moon's U.S. strategy has been to seek alliances with the religious Right. However, the relationship has been highly controversial within the movement. While Moon money is widely rumored to be a major financial underpinning of the New Right, it is often kept secret because so many conservatives find the Moon organization repugnant.

In a letter to Bo Hi Pak, taped onto a cassette by Rev. Tim LaHaye of the American Coalition for Traditional Values (ACTV is a political coalition of televangelists), LaHaye thanked Pak for providing "timely" and "generous help" in connection with an "extremely expensive" move of ACTV's headquarters from California to Washington, D.C.<sup>18</sup> Like Falwell, LaHaye was one of the founders and executive committee members of CRF. LaHaye later denied receiving money

from the Moon organization.

The rightwing Christian Voice claims 350,000 members, including 40,000 ministers who become members by virtue of having responded to direct mail funding appeals. The organization, which employs 17 field organizers, stepped into the void left by the departure of the Moral Majority and ACTV from significant political activity. However, they may have overstepped their position.

The relationship between Christian Voice and the Moon organization has plagued them for some time. At the center of this controversy is lobbyist Gary Jarmin, a Moonie from 1967-1973 who was active in Moon's Freedom Leadership Foundation and who many suspect may be a Moon agent in the New Right. Jarmin, who was the legislative director of Christian Voice at the time, insisted, "I'm no longer affiliated with the [Moon] church; I'm not a member of it and I don't consult with their people."<sup>19</sup> Nevertheless, by February 1982 Jarmin had helped organize the first CAUSA North America conference, held in Jamaica. Also in attendance were Christian Voice chairman Robert Grant and Advisory Board member W. Stewart McBirney.

The relationships go even deeper. The three-member board of Christian Voice's political action committee is chaired by Jarmin, and includes Rev. Don Sills of the Moon-funded Coalition for Religious Freedom. In August of 1985, Jarmin helped organize CRF's God and Freedom Banquet held in celebration of Moon's release from jail. He also led legislative workshops at secretive CAUSA indoctrination sessions for U.S. legislators during 1986. These events drew about 100 conservative legislators from both parties to all-expense-paid junkets, ostensibly to discuss the Constitution.

Although CRF declares its independence from the Moon organization (despite the Moon funding), the current executive director of CRF is Dan Holdgrewe, a longtime Moon operative who worked for Moon's Freedom Leadership Foundation from the late 1970s to the early 1980s.<sup>20</sup>

### Conclusion: Moon's Law

The Moon organization is an ominous, anti-democratic element in American and world politics. Its history is synonymous with post-World War II fascism. In coalition with rightwing secular and religious groups the Moon organization is attempting to create a broad-based, mainstream fascist movement in the U.S.

The totalist Moon ideology tells new Moonies that everyone outside the "True Family," including their biological parents, may be agents of Satan. CAUSA's philosophy expresses a similar view. Doubt about Moon, even by loved ones, may be Satan at work. Moon's law is arbitrary and totalitarian. The activities of the Moon organization should be examined in this context, because despite the mendacity of the Moon organization, when it comes to their fascist politics, they mean what they say.

14. *New York Tribune*, December 10, 1986.

15. Jim Houghan, *Secret Agenda* (New York: Ballantine, 1984), p. 145.

16. *Times* [London], December 17, 1985.

17. *Washington Post*, September 16-17, 1984.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Mother Jones*, May 1981.

20. Louis Wolf and Fred Clarkson, "Arnaud de Borchgrave Boards Moon's Ship," *CAIB* Number 24 (Summer 1985), p. 34.



# CIA Relations with Media — Official and Otherwise

*Editors' Note: These articles first appeared in CAIB Number 7, December 1979. The media remains an important area where the CIA concentrates many of its vast resources. Recent examples of CIA manipulation of the media include NED funding of the rightwing Nicaraguan newspaper La Prensa and a disinformation campaign which attempted to show that the Salvadoran FMLN was receiving arms from Eastern bloc countries.*

It is clear that one of the most sensitive areas in government is the use by the CIA of media and of reporters as spies "in the national interest." As the CIA is supplying certain information to reporters in the U.S., even at their own request, it should not be forgotten that it is specifically forbidden from engaging in domestic propaganda activity by the 1947 National Security Act.

Nonetheless, the CIA has with impunity violated this part of its charter. It was exposed again and again during the Church Committee hearings which traced the pattern back many years; by Carl Bernstein in the October 1977 *Rolling Stone*, who asserted that about 400 American media people secretly collaborated with the Agency; and by the *New York Times* on December 27 and 28, 1977 which revealed operational assistance to the CIA rendered over the years by various editors and journalists whom it named.

The CIA has used major U.S. news organizations as cover for its officers. It has paid editors, reporters, columnists, commentators, and free-lancers for their intelligence favors. It has owned or funded over fifty news organizations. And it has sponsored, subsidized or produced more than 1,000 books (about one-fourth of them in English).

## Getting Briefed by the CIA

One of the ways in which the CIA exploits media personnel is characterized in an internal Agency regulation dated November 30, 1977 which sanctions the maintenance of "regular liaison with representatives of the news media." How does this process work? Take the case of journalists whose beat is foreign or military affairs, and who periodically travel to CIA Headquarters in Langley. There they sit down with Herbert E. Hetu, the chief CIA spokesperson, or his representative, and receive a "substantive" briefing on some topic. Normally, the briefings are "on background," meaning the information they receive can only be described as deriving from "a government official" or some such label, but can not be attributed to the CIA.

These sessions are, by the admission of the journalists, entered into on their own initiative — a fact which is the CIA's automatic justification of the program. Many observers question the propriety of these liaison activities, both from the standpoint of the CIA and of the journalists who choose the

Agency as a news source, particularly when the source is not CIA-attributed, which it rarely is.

The "voluntary" nature of the journalist's relationship with the CIA under such circumstances does not preclude the possibility that it is the CIA which receives the briefing and the journalist who gives it. Some are proud to say they have briefed the Agency.

CAIB has learned that a few chosen journalists in the U.S. receive briefings from the CIA, in printed form, delivered to them by courier, and known to contain a mixture of classified and non-classified material. Our source informed us that in some instances, recipients of these printed briefings have simply put their own by-line on the stories, which are printed almost verbatim by their newspaper.

The best known case of this kind is that of C.L. Sulzberger, *New York Times* foreign affairs correspondent. According to an intelligence agency source quoted by Carl Bernstein, Sulzberger was provided with a "background paper" and then "gave it to the printers and put his name on it." Even though he acknowledged knowing every CIA director personally since Allen Dulles, Sulzberger denied the incident.

## Sowing Seeds on Foreign Soil

Another sensitive area is the CIA's admitted liaison with foreign journalists. It is quite apparent this is a field where the Agency remains tenaciously unyielding to any proposed change or reform. In his 1978 reply to one journalist who challenged the practice, Admiral Stansfield Turner commented that because of "the knowledgeability of media people through their many contacts, foreign media people can be of great value to our intelligence activities." Another letter from Turner boldly claimed that to expand restrictions on the use of journalists "beyond U.S. media organizations is neither legally required nor otherwise appropriate."

Many journalists, U.S. and foreign, have expressed strong opposition to this practice. Gilbert Cranberg, editorial page editor of the *Des Moines Register-Tribune*, testified before the House Intelligence Committee in January 1978 that the CIA "should be required to quit planting false and misleading stories abroad, not just to protect Americans from propaganda fallout, but to protect all readers from misinformation."

CIA case officers posted abroad under diplomatic cover at U.S. embassies often contact American and foreign journalists at cocktail parties, diplomatic receptions, or over a private lunch together, to discuss matters of common interest. In cases where the particular individual has been tested by the CIA for reliability over a period of time, he or she may be compensated in the form of an occasional tip which can then be converted into a news "scoop."

One of the primary methods the CIA employs is fabrica-



tion and orchestration of propaganda as a central part in any covert operation. The Church Committee Final Report (Book 1, page 200) cites a portion of a CIA cable dated September 25, 1970, which was used as part of the Agency's dedicated efforts to discredit Salvador Allende's election:

Sao Paulo, Tegucigalpa, Buenos Aires, Lima, Montevideo, Bogota, Mexico City report continued replay of Chile theme materials. Items also carried in *New York Times* and *Washington Post*. Propaganda activities continue to generate good coverage of Chile developments along our theme guidance.

#### Intelligence Community Pow-wows

As with the media, or in major corporations, much of the battle on the Washington intelligence front is fought in the ways the public relations machinery handles the public on a day-to-day basis. How does the Director of Central Intelligence superintend the "public relations" of the intelligence community? The DCI convenes periodic "working lunches" for the PR officers from throughout the "community."

The agenda is of course set by the CIA, and it varies from lunch to lunch. Essentially, the aim of these CIA-controlled gatherings is to make sure the various PR people are in line

and that all pull together.

At one of the recent sessions, there were representatives from the following agencies in attendance: White House—one person; Vice President's Office—one person; Departments of Justice, Defense, and State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation—two persons each; Drug Enforcement Agency and Department of Energy—one person each; Central Intelligence Agency—ten persons.

All participating agencies (plus the National Security Agency and the intelligence arms of the three military services—whose absence is somewhat surprising) handle large amounts of classified intelligence, and each is accessible to a greater or lesser degree to the various media. The DCI's "line" on the relations between the intelligence "community" and the media/public is handed down at the meeting.

The House Select Intelligence Committee held hearings on the CIA and the media between December 1977 and April 1978. Its final report described, according to Committee chief counsel Michael J. O'Neill, "what the relationships could be" between the Agency and the media. The wealth of information which has emerged about CIA media operations in all the Congressional hearings and from persons who have worked in exposing the intelligence network, add up to a picture very close indeed. •

## CIA Covert Propaganda Capability

by Sean Gervasi \*

The series of articles on CIA media activities published in *The New York Times* at the end of 1977 gave some indication of the Agency's global reach. It revealed that an extensive network of assets had been established for carrying out covert propaganda around the world. Unfortunately, the *Times* articles were impressionistic rather than systematic. They contained much valuable information, but the wealth of detail was essentially unconnected and incoherent. The articles did not provide any clear account of covert propaganda operations as a whole.

The principal flaw of the series was that it left readers with almost no idea of the overall scale of CIA media activities. In this article, a rough estimate of CIA covert propaganda capability will be made. Such an estimate is essential if we are to begin to analyze the problems posed by covert propaganda within the present global information order.

The Central Intelligence Agency does not publish figures which would help to shed light on its capabilities in the sphere of propaganda. Nonetheless, information which has become available in the course of Congressional investigations and

private research can provide the basis for a tentative estimate of the amount of expenditure on covert propaganda and of the number of people engaged in that activity.

The starting point for any such estimate must be the size of the current overall CIA budget. The official figure for total CIA expenditure, of course, remains a secret, even to the U.S. Congress. Nonetheless, there is enough fragmentary evidence available to permit a reasonable estimate. In their book *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, Victor Marchetti and John Marks gave a figure of \$750 million for the CIA budget. That figure may be taken to refer to the year 1973, the year before the publication of the book.

Recent well-informed estimates place the current figure at approximately \$1 billion. *The National Journal*, for instance, a respected Washington weekly on politics and government, indicated at the end of 1977, that the CIA budget was "only slightly less than \$1 billion." This figure is within the range of the Marchetti and Marks estimate. Average annual increases of 5 percent added to their 1973 figure would give a 1978 budget total of some \$940 million.

It must be kept in mind, however, that these are all public estimates and that informed sources are, for a variety of reasons, likely to understate estimates given for publication or

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attribution.

Sources within and near the intelligence community indicate that the actual current figures are substantially higher. One Washington source with extensive knowledge of the CIA's

operations recently indicated that \$1.5 billion should be considered a "reasonable" estimate for total expenditure. A second source close to the intelligence community stated that such a figure is too low and that \$2 billion is more appropriate. Thus the range of estimates for current total expenditure by the CIA is from \$1 billion to \$2 billion. This is the same range given by Philip Agee in his most recent book.

Expanding on a breakdown given by Marchetti and Marks for 1973; the overall budget figure is doubled, and the separate figures for each directorate and function are doubled. Thus the main assumption is that the *structure* of activities within the CIA remains what it was five years ago. Each activity is assumed to account for the same proportion of total expenditure today that it accounted for in 1973. This seems a valid assumption. Reductions in operations due to the withdrawal from Indochina have in all probability been compensated for by increases in activity and expenditure in other areas such as Central America and the Caribbean, The Persian Gulf and southern Africa.

Covert propaganda is one of the principal covert activities carried out by the CIA. The other two principal covert activities are political action and paramilitary. Thus a detailed breakdown of the overall budget estimate helps us to begin to isolate covert propaganda activities and to make a rough estimate of their dollar cost.

There are fairly clear indications of the relative importance of propaganda in the Agency's covert action programs. The Report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence in 1976 stated: "Some 29 percent of 40 committee-approved covert actions were for media and propaganda projects...This number is probably not representative. Staff has determined the existence of a large number of CIA internally-approved operations of this type, apparently deemed not politically sensitive. It is believed that if the correct number of all media and propaganda projects could be determined it would exceed Election Support as the largest single category of covert action projects undertaken by the CIA."

The committee stated further that the expenditure on political action, or Election Support, was, for the period examined, 32 percent of the total expended for covert action.

Thus it would seem reasonable to assume that, when all covert action authorizations are taken into account, it is likely that covert propaganda accounts for one-third of the total for covert action. This means that, with a budget of some \$520 million for covert action, the CIA was probably spending some \$170 to \$175 million for covert propaganda within the Directorate for Operations in 1978.

These costs would be only the direct expenses, however. They would not include the support of indirect costs of covert

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**Covert propaganda is one of the principal covert activities carried out by the CIA....It uses far more resources in its propaganda operations than any single news agency.**

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propaganda activities. The indirect costs could be estimated by adding an appropriate proportion of the total costs incurred by the two supporting directorates of the CIA, those for Administration and Science and

Technology. These directorates provide support for all Agency operations. Adding indirect costs means no more than for support of covert propaganda.

The estimated total expenditure by the Directorates for Administration and for Science and Technology in 1978 was \$460 million. Some \$270 million, or 60 percent of the sum, is allocable to covert action support. One-third of that \$270 million, or \$90 million, could be considered the indirect cost of covert propaganda.

The reason behind the allocation of such a sum in support of covert propaganda is based upon a fundamental distinction between operations and those activities which support them. The purposes of the Central Intelligence Agency, in essence, are to gather intelligence and to carry out operations. Other activities support those efforts. Basically, the Directorate for National Intelligence supports intelligence-gathering activities in the Directorate for Operations. The two other Directorates support all Agency activities.

Thus, the total cost of covert propaganda in 1978 was probably in the range of \$265 million, that is, \$175 million in direct expenditure plus a further \$90 million in support costs.

Estimates of the number of personnel employed in covert propaganda activities are more difficult to make. In 1974 Marchetti and Marks estimated that the total number of CIA salaried employees was 16,500. Of that number they estimated that 6,000 were employed in the Directorate for Operations. Currently, the lowest estimate cited is 20,000. If it is assumed that personnel are allocated to different functions in the same proportions as expenditure, then this figure is reduced to 2,000 salaried employees in covert propaganda. In addition, of course, one would have to add some 1,000 contract employees, most of whom are employed overseas, who constitute the "media assets" of the covert propaganda program. Thus some 3,000 salaried and contract employees of the Central Intelligence Agency are likely to be engaged in clandestine media activities trying to influence world opinion.

It can be seen that the Central Intelligence Agency uses far more resources in its propaganda operations than any single news agency uses in gathering and disseminating news around the world. In fact, the CIA propaganda budget is as large as the combined budgets of Reuters, United Press International and the Associated Press. The Agency, furthermore, appears to employ as many, if not more, personnel than any single news agency.

It must be realized that these comparisons are very rough ones. For the estimates of the CIA's propaganda activities are approximate. Nonetheless, it is clear that the CIA's propaganda capability is formidable. The Agency, in fact, may be considered the largest "news" organization in the world. ●



# The "Grocery Store Papers"

*Editors' Note: This article first appeared in CAIB Number 12, April 1981. "The Grocery Store Papers" are a clear example of how the CIA and State Department cooperate to promote propaganda in the U.S. media. Jon Glassman, the author of the White Paper, rose to new heights as a propagandist in his recent post as chargé d'affaires in Afghanistan where he falsely predicted the imminent downfall of the Kabul government and led the departure en masse of Western diplomats.*

The *Boston Globe* called him the "State Department code-breaker;" Karen De Young of the *Washington Post* said his role "is described as more that of one of Smiley's people than of James Bond." But Hodding Carter, III, former State Department spokesman, in the *Wall Street Journal*, said he was responsible for a report which was "swallowed whole and regurgitated in a fashion not equalled since the Johnson administration's white paper on Vietnam 15 years ago."

They all were writing about Jon Glassman, 37, political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, who researched and assembled the 178-page White Paper entitled "Communist Interference in El Salvador." Although Glassman participated in the February 23 State Department briefing which unveiled the White Paper, nothing was said at the time of his personal detective role in the drama. Nearly a month later, after, as Hodding Carter pointed out, the U.S. press accepted the incredible report virtually without question, Glassman granted an interview in Mexico to attempt to answer the question which should have been asked before, but wasn't. Where had the documents come from?

Before assignment to Mexico, Glassman had served at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, at the State Department's Soviet desk, and spent two years at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. From Mexico he had attended the 1979 Sixth Summit of Non-Aligned Nations in Havana, where, as noted in CAIB Number 6, he continually briefed U.S. media representatives on the significance of speeches he had not listened to, and, on several occasions, got himself thrown out of guests-only hotel lobbies where he was accosting delegates.

Glassman's interview with the progressive Mexico City daily, *Uno Mas Uno*, was quickly picked up by the U.S. press, though the source was never mentioned. His tale, apparently designed to give the White Paper the human face journalists seek for the feature pages, unfolded like a third-rate detective story. In November—after Reagan's election—the Salvadoran police had allegedly captured a pile of documents in an art gallery owned by Toni Handal, the brother of Shafik Handal, leader of the Salvadoran Communist Party. They described an arms shopping trip Shafik Handal had made to Moscow and Eastern Europe, with numerous promises of military hardware. Toni Handal has since "disappeared," and, of course, unable to challenge any of this "evidence." But, said Glassman, these documents were unconvincing. He was not interested in promises of arms; he was looking for

deliveries of arms. On January 16 he was sent back to El Salvador to look for more evidence. He met with Defense Minister Guillermo Garcia and the Chief of Staff of the Salvadoran Army. Was there anything else besides the Handal documents, he wondered. One security officer apparently pointed to a plastic bag sitting on a dusty desk, noting that the documents inside the bag had been captured ten days earlier, but that they had not been able to make anything of them. Glassman opened the bag, and, in his words, "found a gold mine." (According to the March 23 *Time* magazine, the bag was captured in a grocery store; neither *Uno Mas Uno* nor any other paper carried this bit of information.)

Glassman brought the papers back to Washington, and after "burning the midnight oil" night after night, produced the White Paper, the likes of which hadn't been seen in Washington since the Gulf of Tonkin fabrication. Glassman's main feat was to discover that the code name "Esmeralda" meant Cuba, and the code name "Lagos" meant Nicaragua. This great deduction stemmed from tricky references to the first anniversary of the Sandinista victory held in Lagos and meetings with "Comrade Fid.," the Prime Minister of Esmeralda. (Esmeralda is also the name for the island of Cuba in a famous Cuban folk song.) As De Young pointed out, "more than one State Department officer, harking back to suspicions of an over-zealous intelligence community, has referred to (the documents') discovery and contents as 'a little too convenient.'"

Hodding Carter also noted that, at best, the documents make a mountain out of a molehill. Even if genuine—which is extremely unlikely—the documents suggest an influx of approximately 200 tons of materiel. An unnamed Pentagon official had pointed out that 200 tons of military equipment "would be used up by a 200-man company in one week of hard fighting." Yet this, the administration said, "underscores the central role played by Cuba" in the "arming of insurgent forces in El Salvador." It is hard to imagine how one week's ammunition could be "central" in a war of many years' duration.

The relative insignificance of 200 tons of materiel is further underscored by the details of the \$5 million in military supplies which President Carter rushed to El Salvador just before the end of his term. That aid amounted to over 3000 tons, and it was delivered in less than a week.

Finally, there is the "evidence" of the documents themselves; some are completely illegible; some contain merely columns of numbers which must, on faith, be taken to represent arms or ammunition; some contain mixed writing and typing; some contain non-Spanish usages or non-Salvadoran slang. As Philip Agee pointed out, the entire operation bears the trademarks of CIA falsifications which have been practiced incessantly over some thirty years. That there is skepticism in Europe is to be commended; that there is a slavish acceptance of the administration's line in the United States is, as Hodding Carter noted, inexplicable.



# The New York Times on the 1984 Salvadoran and Nicaraguan Elections

by Edward S. Herman \*

*Editors' Note: This article appeared in CAIB Number 21, Spring 1984. It documents a classic case of the double standard of American mainstream journalism and shows how effective this subtle propaganda can be in supporting U.S. foreign policy objectives.*

The U.S. mass media present a diverse picture in their reporting on Central America, ranging from the almost pure dissemination of the administration's line in *Readers' Digest*, *Time* magazine, and many others, to a pattern of generous coverage of the official view plus occasional jarring deviations in much of the rest. An opportunity to test media bias under excellent experimental conditions is provided by the juxtaposition of elections in 1984 in both El Salvador and (prospectively) Nicaragua. The former is a U.S. client, and the election has been organized by the United States itself to demonstrate to its home population that the Salvadoreans want us there and that its rulers are moving toward democracy. Nicaragua, by contrast, is under U.S. attack and openly sponsored subversion and proxy invasion. An unbiased media would raise the same questions about both elections; a biased media will differentiate according to the propaganda agenda provided by its own government.

In the book *Demonstration Elections: U.S.-Staged Elections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam and El Salvador*, [authors Broadhead and Herman] spelled out the symbolic format, the suitable questions that the government wishes to advance, and the unsuitable ones that are to be avoided in its own sponsored elections. It tries to associate the election with democracy; it stresses the rejection of this democratic exercise by the rebels and their attempts to disrupt it; and it makes voter turnout the dramatic denouement of the struggle between the forces of good and evil. The government dispatches observers to watch the vote on election day, to testify to fairness on the basis of long lines, smiling faces, no beatings in the observers' presence, and the assurances and enthusiasm of the U.S. and client state officials. "Off-the-agenda" are the basic parameters that make the election meaningful or meaningless prior to the election-day proceedings — freedom of speech, assembly, organization of intermediate groups; the ability of candidates to qualify and to campaign without fear of murder; and the absence of state terror and a climate of fear among the public. Also off the agenda is the election day "coercion

package" that may explain turnout in terms other than devotion to the aim and its plans, including any legal requirement to vote and explicit or implied threats for *not* voting. Other issues that must be downplayed in conforming to the government propaganda format are the U.S. government role in organizing and funding the election, the internal propaganda campaign waged to buy the vote, outright fraud, and the constraints and threats to journalists covering the election.

In *Demonstration Elections* we showed that the U.S. mass media cooperated fully in portraying the 1982 Salvadoran election in accordance with the government's agenda. Rebel disruption and "turnout" reigned supreme. Almost no mention was made of a legal obligation to vote, and the background facts of a state of siege and over 700 civilian murders per month for the prior 30 months were deemed not relevant to evaluating electoral conditions or turnout.

The dissident Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) of El Salvador was off the ballot and underground in 1982, with those of its leaders not already murdered on army death lists — but the U.S. mass media never condemned the election as a meaningless fraud because the principal opposition was off the ballot entirely. Nor did the media point out that this exclusion was *by plan*, to isolate the rebels and use them as a dramatic foil in the staged ceremony for public relations purposes. The media were part of the staging props, and they played their role to perfection.

An ironic feature of the media treatment of Salvadoran elections and their less favorable view of the prospective Nicaraguan election is that both the threat to journalist safety and violations of press freedom are vastly greater in El Salvador than in Nicaragua. Over 30 journalists have been murdered in El Salvador since 1979, and four Dutch journalists were killed only 11 days before the March 1982 election. The foreign press corps was trooped to a morgue by the Salvadoran army to see the bodies, with ripped genitals exposed to media view. This episode was suppressed in the U.S. mass media, led to no large outcries and generalizations about the quality of the Salvadoran government, and many have contributed to the remarkable mass media silence on unfavorable media (as well as other) conditions in the incipient democracy.

U.S. reporters can report what they like from Nicaragua without fear of bodily harm. This is not so in El Salvador. But the media cannot admit that in our client state they must adjust reports and reporters because of literal threats of death for improper thoughts. There is the public and self-image to be maintained of a crusading president that pulls no punches. Furthermore, the U.S. government does not audibly object to

\* Edward S. Herman is professor of finance at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. His most recent book, with Noam Chomsky, is *Manufacturing Dissent* (New York: Pantheon, 1989). He expresses thanks to Howard Friel for his help in preparing this article.



violations of press freedom in client fascist states and even apologies for literal murder and press closings. U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Deane Hinton explained to Michael Massing in 1982 that the two papers closed by security force violence (in one case including murder) had "advocated revolution;"<sup>1</sup> a lie, but even more interesting as an expression of Hinton's commitment to an open society. On the other hand,



Credit: Ron Kinney

Salvadoreans at polling place.

we can observe the wild indignation of the Washington libertarians at encroachments on the freedom of the press of *La Prensa* in Managua. The media accommodate. And they suppress the facts about their own accommodation to anti-journalist terrorism by "friends."

### The New York Times Coverage of the 1984 Elections

A comparison of the treatment of the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan elections in news articles in the *New York Times* between February 1 and March 30, 1984 provides an experimental universe of 28 news articles on the El Salvador election and eight on that to be held in Nicaragua (with one overlapping article, its separate parts included in each of the two sets). Obviously, this is only a small sample of the media and will support only qualified generalizations.

An analysis of the sources used by the *New York Times* in its news articles on the two elections [the original of this article is accompanied by several lengthy tabulations, not reprinted here] shows that for the Salvadoran election there was overwhelming reliance on U.S. and Salvadoran officials, amounting to 80% of the source total. In 20 of the 28 articles official sources were not only dominant, they were uncon-

1. The quote marks are around Massing's summary of what Hinton said to him. Michael Massing, "Central America: A Tale of Three Countries," *Columbia Journalism Review*, July-August 1982, p. 51.

tended. Although the majority of Salvadoreans are peasants, only two of 263 identifiable sources used by the *Times* — under 1% of the total — were peasants. The Salvadoran rebels were cited 27 times, approximately 10% of the source total. But this modest fraction grossly exaggerates the importance of the rebels as a source. In the great majority of cases the rebels were asked about and quoted only on their disruption plans. This is in accordance with the government's dramatic formula, which portrays the rebels as bad guys refusing to participate in this step toward democracy and even threatening to upset it.

The rebels were not asked about or quoted on more substantive questions, such as the reasons why free elections were unfeasible in El Salvador. They were several times quoted as describing the election as an "electoral farce," but they were never allowed to expand on the details.<sup>2</sup> This made their words mere denunciations by the enemy, without force. The opponents of the Sandinistas, in contrast, were regularly quoted on substantive defects of the electoral plan in Nicaragua.

On the sources used by the *Times* in dealing with the prospective Nicaraguan election, the Sandinistas themselves accounted for only 39.5% of the sources used; critical U.S. officials and the Nicaraguan opposition to the Sandinistas accounted for 60.5% of the citations. The Sandinistas were usually used only as an indirect source, by paraphrase, which reflects a less authentic, less dramatic, and often more skimpy mode of conveying fact and opinion. Thus, whereas the U.S. sponsors and their on-the-spot managers of the Salvadoran election were given overwhelming space to define the election according to their vision, for Nicaragua both the volume and the quality of sourcing favored the critics of the election, not its organizers.

To summarize the topics covered, for the El Salvador election the *New York Times* focused largely on the terms compatible with the Reagan administration's agenda — i.e., rebel disruption, personalities, and political infighting among eligible parties, election mechanics, and turnout. It is even more impressive to see the level of suppression of inconvenient items that are off the government's agenda. There is no mention of fraud in the 1982 election, although there was considerable evidence in the spring of 1982 that there had been an inflated vote count and an admission that fraud might well have affected over 20% of the 1982 ballots.<sup>3</sup> To acknowledge these claims and admissions would raise questions about the integrity of the election managers. Richard Meislin of the *Times* repeatedly stresses that various devices used in the election such as stamping fingers and transparent voting boxes were to "prevent fraud." He never once hints at the possibility that the managers may be less than honest. Suppressing coun-

2. A notable exception, though not a news article, was an OpEd column in the *New York Times* of March 22, 1984, by Guillermo Ungo on "Salvador's Electoral Farce."

3. See the discussion in Frank Brodhead and Edward S. Herman, *Demonstration Elections* (Boston: South End Press, 1984), pp. 130-33. The head of the Central Electoral Commission, Dr. Armando Rodriguez Equizabal, acknowledged that fraud might have affected over 25% of the 1982 ballots. Julian Preston, "1982 Vote Fraud Cited by Salvadoran Officials," *Boston Globe*, February 25, 1984.



about the recent elec-  
tions helps maintain this  
integrity.<sup>4</sup>

ment in its very own  
toward de

This suppression package is thrown into bold light by the fact that it is precisely these issues that the *New York Times* "articles feature in the coverage of Nicaragua. Most articles the dichotomy shown in the treatment of freedom is the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan elections—the press in the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan elections—the press is not mentioned once in 28 *Times* articles on the El Salvador election; it is mentioned in six of eight articles on the Nicaraguan election.

As factual background for this dichotomous treatment, it should be noted that serious opponents of the Sandinistas can and publish in Nicaragua; no supporter of the rebels in El Salvador, and even liberal papers seeking a have been driven out of existence.

The *New York Times* essentially suppresses the election day coercion package. In only four articles does it mention the obligation to vote, in two the requisite stamping of the voter's identification card. In fact, when the factor of coercion is mentioned, it is with a defensive answer. Thus, Lydia Chavez in the *Times* (March 13, 1984), "Under the election process in El Salvador, as in some other countries, citizens are obliged to vote or pay a fine. The system of fines has long been used in El Salvador, but no one can remember anyone actually paying a fine for not voting." Notice the defensive "in some other countries," without specification, and the assertion that fines have "long been used," which gives an aura of respectability to the practice. Note also that "no one remembers" a fine being paid; Chavez does not tell us to whom she spoke to reach this conclusion. And Charlie Clements testified before Congress that Salvadoran church workers told him that people unable to show evidence that they had voted had been killed.<sup>5</sup>

He had been killed.

Hedrick Smith manned the home front as an analyst of the Shadoran election of 1984 for the *Times*, earning an admired degree in official reporting, in recognition of distinction in the classic mode of handling an official beat — simply repeating the views of officials as objective news, without batting an eyelash at internal contradictions.

<sup>1</sup> Rodriguez was perhaps prepared to acknowledge fraud because Salmons were widely aware that it had occurred in 1982; his admitting it lessened the distance from the earlier perpetrators of fraud. For Meislin, acknowledging fraud in 1982 would only raise questions requiring painful ex-

U.S. Policy in El Salvador, Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations and Western Hemisphere Affairs, March 17, 1983, p. 620.

...the U.S. mass media will always find an election staged by their very own government in its very own client state a "step toward democracy."

pressive," and their view that this will enhance administration prospects for getting money for El Salvador. There is not a word about what the observers saw, the substance of the election, or the selectivity of choice of observers by the administration.

In "Clear Choices in Salvador, Murky Plans In Nicaragua," Smith captures all the essential elements of bias. The objective in El Salvador is legitimization; the threat is polarization. In Nicaragua, Reagan presses for elections to "relax" the Sandinista grip; the "risk" is that they will relax just enough to win acceptance "without giving up significant power or control." This frame postulates that the Sandinistas would not win an election that was truly free.

On what ground does Smith regard the choices as "real" in El Salvador? It is because there are several parties; but if the real left parties are off the ballot, is not the choice restricted by military force?

But Smith talks *only* about substantive electoral conditions in Nicaragua. He provides significant detail on press censorship, Sandinista monopoly of power, and limits allegedly imposed on opposition candidates. Not a word on the death squads in El Salvador, nor on journalists killed or papers closed. These are off the agenda in U.S. staged elections.

## Concluding Note

The dichotomous treatment of the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan elections by the *New York Times* lends powerful support to the hypothesis tested here: that the mass media follow a patriotic agenda, advance certain facts, suppress others, and even tell outright lies. Sometimes the lies are government untruths objectively transmitted; sometimes they are developed independently. The package is impressive and is capable of making a staged fraud carried out in an environment of ongoing mass murder saleable to the public.

The 1984 Salvadoran election experience demonstrated, as did Vietnam in 1967 and El Salvador in 1982, that even where the real opposition is off the ballot by force, and none of the essential conditions of a free election are met in advance, the U.S. mass media will always find an election staged by their very own government in its very own client state a "step toward democracy."

democracy."

It is clear from the propaganda chorus already under way in regard to the Nicaraguan election that there is nothing the Sandinistas could do short of turning their country over to the *contras* that would make their election other than a farce. The media will focus incessantly on U.S. official and Nicaraguan opposition claims of unfairness and abuse, until the Sandinistas are ousted. If a new Somoza is installed in their place, however, we may expect the media to resume the silence on the subject of free elections that prevailed from 1936 through 1978.



# Covert Action

## INFORMATION BULLETIN


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




George Bush: The Company's Man

El Salvador and Nicaragua:  
U.S. Undermines Elections





Credit: Oloof Veerkamp





## George Bush: From Langley to the Oval Office

A special issue on George Bush deserves a special editorial about George Bush. We therefore present an expanded version with some of our thoughts about the 41st President of the United States.

Who is George Bush and what is his agenda? We believe that, notwithstanding his reputation as a "wimp," George Bush is crafty and dangerous.

He is crafty because he has lived much of his political life as a "yes man," and this approach has served him well. Bush was the perfect head of the CIA during troubled times. According to Stansfield Turner, Bush's successor as DCI, "The reason they had a great love for George Bush [at the CIA] was that he let them do whatever they wanted. He came in and said: 'What do you want to do?' And then he said: 'OK, go ahead and do it.'"

Congress also had a great love for Bush. A former Senator, as well as former Ambassador to China and the United Nations, Bush had credentials to impress the old boy network in Congress. He frequently testified before committee hearings and assured the overseers that the CIA was out of the assassination business for good. His deferential style made Members of Congress believe that maybe he was telling the truth.

### The Wimp Factor

In the 1988 Presidential campaign George Bush faced the charge of wimpishness and he needed to look tough. What did he do? He paraded out a Black man named Willie Horton and assured the U.S. public that he would be tough against crime and not let all the bad guys out of jail. That is not only toughness, it is racist.

He imitated Clint Eastwood and exclaimed, "Read my lips." He beat-up on Dan Rather in a television interview. After the election his handlers staged photo opportunities of Bush driving a cigarette boat, and surf casting, or shooting little birds in Texas. Suddenly, George Bush has been "spun" into a "real man."

But then, after the election hoopla had died down, George Bush seemed to be back to his nondescript, vague self.

Ronald Reagan was no wimp. He was just plain stupid. He will be remembered as the president who proclaimed that trees are a major source of air pollution, that ketchup was a vegetable, and who routinely dozed off in Cabinet meetings. Reagan was truly "out of the loop" while the men and women around him played politics with Machiavellian vindictiveness. Witness Jeane Kirkpatrick, Elliott Abrams, Edwin Meese, Rita Lavelle, Raymond Donovan, James Watt, William Casey, Anne Burford, and other such notables.

George Bush is no Machiavelli but he is smart enough to be much more dangerous than Ronald Reagan.

### CIA Chief

Bush was the master of the CIA when Edwin Wilson, Frank Terpil, Thomas Clines, Ted Shackley, and Rafael Quintero ran their arms and assassination business with special support from CIA proprietaries. He helped stall the investigation of the 1976 Letelier/Moffitt murders, and met time and time again with CIA asset Manuel Noriega.

Is it not ironic that Shackley, Clines, Quintero, and Noriega show up less than ten years later in the thick of another CIA scandal? Is it not also ironic that Donald Gregg, the Vice President's closest adviser on national security issues, would be caught running a *contra* resupply effort from the Vice President's office and that Gregg would later end-up as Ambassador to South Korea, where he served as CIA station chief from 1973-76. The intelligence business is a small world and the same players keep popping up again and again.

At the same time that Clines, Wilson, and Terpil were making millions of dollars selling arms and explosives to just about anyone, right wing extremists and CIA assets Orlando Bosch and Luis Posada Carriles were plotting acts of terrorism as revenge for Cuba's revolution. In October 1976, a Cuban airliner was blown out of the sky over Barbados and all 73 passengers were killed. A few days later, Bosch and Posada Carriles were arrested and eventually convicted of the act. Bosch later escaped from a Venezuelan prison, some say, with the help of the CIA. He recently turned up in Miami, fighting extradition and seeking assistance from Bush's son Jeb and the President himself.

Posada Carriles also escaped from prison and later surfaced in El Salvador helping Felix Rodriguez in a CIA "counterterrorism" operation. Rodriguez recently compared this operation to the CIA's "pacification" program he participated in under William Colby in Vietnam.

Rodriguez, as noted in the Iran/*contra* hearings, is a good friend of Donald Gregg's. He and Gregg served with the Agency in Saigon when Theodore Shackley was station chief.

How is it that George Bush, the man appointed by Ronald Reagan to head the South Florida Task Force and the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System, could be so tied-up with drug dealing?

Besides his relationship with Noriega, Bush had connections to other alleged drug smugglers. Rodriguez, besides being Donald Gregg's helper, allegedly passed money from the Medellín cartel to the *contras*. Richard Armitage was to be Bush's choice for Secretary of the Army, but declined the nomination. There is speculation that the confirmation hearings would have brought up unpleasant questions about Armitage's role in heroin smuggling in the Golden Triangle during the Vietnam war.



What other secrets should we recall about George Bush?


Bush was brought in as head of the Republican National Committee during the downfall of Richard Nixon. Bush, no doubt at the instructions of his handlers, immediately got tough and tried to stop the Senate Watergate Committee's chief investigator, Carmine Bellion. The day after Archibald Cox subpoenaed the infamous "White House tapes," Bush jumped into the fray claiming that Bellion had himself tried to wiretap the Republican National Committee 13 years before.

Robert Mosbacher, Bush's friend, business partner, and campaign finance chair has had his share of shady dealings. Mosbacher made some interesting financial arrangements of his own. He collected millions of dollars from a business deal in the Philippines which reportedly stole from the Filipino treasury and enriched not only Mosbacher, but Ferdinand Marcos as well. A few years later, in a toast to Marcos, Bush would exclaim, "We love your adherence to democratic principles—and to the democratic process."

Bush has followed Reagan's tradition of placing buffoons in high places. Witness Dan Quayle. In the 1988 campaign, Quayle had a serious image problem so the Bush Campaign used a two-pronged approach to attack the embarrassment.

The first thing they did was to lock Dan Quayle in a closet and keep him as far away as possible from both the public and journalists. They also hired Stuart Spencer to be Dan Quayle's handler during the campaign. Spencer had experience and a reputation for cleaning up political embarrassments. Prior to his job as puppet master for Quayle, he had worked as a PR person for Panamanian General Manuel Noriega and the South African government.

When Ronald Reagan accepted the blame for Iran/contras, we interpreted this to mean, "I didn't really understand what



Credit: Associated Press

was going on, but I'll still take the blame." When George Bush claimed to have been out of the Iran/contras loop, we knew that he was lying.

In this issue of *CAIB* we present a great deal of evidence to show that Bush's vision of a "kinder, gentler America" is also a lie. If Bush is so interested in a "softer" image why is the CIA intervening in the Nicaraguan electoral process, as William Robinson and David MacMichael show? Why does he support the murderous government of El Salvador, as Edward Herman and Terry Allen's article so eloquently points out? Why is the Republican party littered with Nazis and fascists as Russ Bellant's investigative report proves?

If George Bush is so interested in "a thousands points of light," why has he appointed ex-CIA officials as ambassadors to China and South Korea? If he has such a great vision for the U.S., why does he belong to clubs which openly discriminate against women and subtly discriminate against African-Americans and other minorities?

And while George Bush continues with Ronald Reagan's "defense" budget legacy of almost \$300 billion dollars per year, where is Bush's kinder, gentler America for the poor, the unemployed, the homeless, and the people with AIDS?

And, if all this were not enough to demonstrate that George Bush should not be viewed as a wimp, but as a dangerous threat to world peace, his unconscionable invasion of Panama presents powerful confirmation. It is clear that he intends to continue the Reagan administration's complete disregard for international law.

A new president with an old agenda: Power politics, gun-boat diplomacy, and privilege for the wealthy but alms for the poor. The former head of the CIA is now the head of the nation. As if the Reagan reign of error was not enough—we're in for a long four more years.

### Are You Moving?

Please remember that *CAIB* subscriptions are sent bulk mail. If you move and do not tell us, the postal service will not forward your magazine nor will they return it to us. We will not know you have moved until we receive your nasty letter wanting to know why we did not send you the last issue. Remember to inform us when you move. Otherwise, we are constrained by our narrow budget to charge for replacement copies. Thank you.

### Corrections

An alert reader caught two errors in an article in *CAIB* issue Number 31. Footnote number one of the article entitled "The CIA on Campus" incorrectly names *Playboy* as the magazine that Ernest Volkman's article appeared in. The correct magazine is *Penthouse*, October 1979. Footnote 24 incorrectly cites June 6, 1986 as the day David Wise's article appeared in the *New York Times* magazine section. The correct day was June 8, 1986.



# Agents for Bush

by Bob Callahan\*

On Inaugural Eve, January 21, 1981, George Herbert Walker Bush, the new Vice President of the United States, could pause and look back on his own failed presidential campaign and yet feel satisfied knowing that the interests of the Intelligence Community would be well-represented in the new Reagan-Bush administration.

A tough Wall Street lawyer, and a strong advocate of covert operations, William Casey, was about to be installed as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). And George Bush, a former DCI, who also had many friends on Wall Street, was just "one heartbeat away" from the presidency of the United States.

To a great extent, George Bush owed his recent political fortune to several old CIA friends, chiefly Ray Cline, who had helped to rally the Intelligence Community behind Bush's candidacy in its early stages. It had been Ray Cline, after all, who had first started the loose organization of "Agents for Bush."

Bill Peterson of the *Washington Post* wrote in a March 1, 1980 article, "Simply put, no presidential campaign in recent memory—perhaps ever—has attracted as much support from the intelligence community as [has] the campaign of former CIA director George Bush."

It was true. By the first of March, Ray Cline had helped put together an intelligence community campaign support staff of such size, complexity and character, that, had the Bush campaign initiated its own covert actions, it undoubtedly had the capacity to bring down at least half of the world's governments based on its own past experiences and associations.

George Bush's CIA campaign staff included Cline, CIA Chief of Station in Taiwan from 1958 to 1962; Lt. General Sam V. Wilson and Lt. General Harold A. Aaron, both former Directors of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Also included were retired General Richard Stillwell, once the CIA's Chief of Covert Operations for the Far East, and at least twenty-five other retired Company directors, deputy directors and/or agents.

It is hard to overestimate the level of CIA support that then existed for Bush's presidential campaign. At the annual meeting of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) the previous fall, Bush's Virginia campaign coordinator (and the former director of AFIO) Jack Coakley, claimed to have counted 190 "Bush for President" buttons being worn by the convention's 240 delegates.<sup>1</sup>

\*Bob Callahan is the editor of *The Big Book of American Irish Culture* (Viking Penguin), and a former book columnist for the *San Francisco Examiner*. *Bring Me Geronimo's Skull*, the first in a series of George Bush comic books written by Callahan, and illustrated by artist Jim Pearson, will be published by Eclipse Books & Comics in the Spring of 1990.

1. *Washington Post*, March 1, 1980.

CIA support for Bush was apparently not limited to off-duty or retired agents, either. One of Bush's earliest supporters, Angelo Codevilla, informed a Congressional committee that he was "aware that active duty agents of the Central Intelligence Agency worked for the George Bush primary election campaign."<sup>2</sup>

Codevilla made this statement in a sworn affidavit prepared for a 1984 House investigation. In an amended copy of the document, Codevilla later changed his statement from "I am aware..." to "I have heard that active duty agents of the Central Intelligence Agency worked for the George Bush primary election campaign."<sup>3</sup>

It is an important correction (the possibility of jail hung on the distinction). Given the extent of CIA involvement in the Bush campaign, it is a wonder that "the spook issue" was not discussed more in the press. Some of Bush's CIA backers themselves worried that it might be. "I can see the headlines [now]," said one former covert operations officer, "Bush Sprinkles Campaign With Former Spooks."<sup>4</sup>

One person who wasn't surprised by the lack of adverse press coverage of the CIA's role in the Bush campaign was Ray Cline. Calling attention to his own resignation in disgust from the Agency in 1973, Cline claimed that he had been promoting the pro-CIA agenda that Bush had embraced for years, and that he had found the post-Church hearings criticism had died down some time ago. "I found there was a tremendous constituency for the CIA when everyone in Washington was still urinating all over it," Cline said, in his typically colorful manner. "It's panned out almost too good to be true. The country is waking up just in time for George's candidacy."<sup>5</sup>

### Bush and Counterterrorism

The Bush presidential campaign not only set the tone for the role and structure of the intelligence apparatus in the new Reagan administration, it also took up a new foreign policy theme which would reap huge political dividends in the years to come. This new theme was terrorism/counterterrorism.

In July 1979, George Bush and Ray Cline attended a conference in Jerusalem where this theme was given its first significant political discussion before leaders of Israel, Great

2. "Unauthorized Transfers of Nonpublic Information During the 1980 Presidential Campaign." Report prepared by the Subcommittee on Human Resources of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, House of Representatives (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 1112-14.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Op. cit.*, n. 1.

5. *Ibid.*



Britain, and the United States.

It would take an enormously important event to keep a major American presidential candidate away from campaigning on the Fourth of July weekend. For George Bush, the Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism was such an event. The Jerusalem Conference was hosted by the Israeli government and, not surprisingly, most of Israel's top intelligence officers and leading political leaders were in attendance.<sup>6</sup>

Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin rose to the podium on July 2, 1979 to provide the conference with its opening address. By the summer of 1979, even Menachem



Credit: Hoover Institute

Angelo Codevilla knew of CIA agents in Bush campaign.

Begin was willing to join in the bashing of his old Camp David friend, Jimmy Carter — a practice which had become almost endemic by the fall of 1979.

The Israelis were angry with Carter because his administration had recently released its Annual Report on Human Rights wherein the Israeli Government was taken to task for abusing the rights of the Palestinian people on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Israel's new anti-Carter tone was mild, however, compared to the rhetoric of the two separate U.S. delegations which attended the conference. The first delegation was led by the late Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson of Washington. It included the noted black civil rights leader Bayard Rustin; Ben Wattenberg of the American Enterprise Institute; and Norman Podhoretz and Midge Decter of *Commentary Magazine*. The members of this delegation were registered Democrats, yet all became very active in neo-conservative politics during the Reagan years.

The Republican delegation was led by George Bush. It included Ray Cline, and two important members of Bush's

Team B from his CIA days — Major General George Keegan, a Bush supporter who had served as intelligence chief for the United States Air Force; and Harvard Professor Richard Pipes.<sup>7</sup>

Looking for a mobilizing issue to counter the Carter-era themes of détente and human rights, the Bush people began to explore the political benefits of embracing the terrorism/counterterrorism theme.

As Jonathan Marshall of the *Oakland Tribune* explains: "At the conference, Ray Cline developed the theme that terror was not a random response of frustrated minorities, but rather a preferred instrument of East bloc policy adopted after 1969 when the KGB persuaded the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to accept the PLO as a major political instrument in the Mideast and to subsidize its terrorist policies by freely giving money, training, arms and coordinated communications."<sup>8</sup>

In Ray Cline's imagination, terrorism had now hardened into a system—an international trouble making system. Richard Pipes elaborated on the Cline hypothesis. "The roots of Soviet terrorism, indeed of modern terrorism," Pipes stated, "date back to 1879... It marks the beginning of that organization which is the source of all modern terrorist groups, whether they be named the Tupamaros, the Baader-Meinhoff group, the Weathermen, Red Brigade or PLO. I refer to the establishment in 1879 of a Congress in the small Russian town of Lipesk, of an organization known as Narodnaya Volya, or the People's Will."<sup>9</sup>

According to Philip Paull, who wrote his master's thesis on the subject of the Jerusalem Conference, "If Pipes was to be believed, the Russians not only support international terrorism, they invented it!"<sup>10</sup>

The Bush/Cline/Pipes definition of terrorism was of course both expeditious and powerfully political. "Left out of their equation," Jonathan Marshall comments, "was any mention of terrorist acts by CIA-trained Cuban exiles, Israeli ties to Red Brigades, or the function of death squads from Argentina to Guatemala. Soviet sponsorship, real or imagined, had become the defining characteristic of terrorism, not simply an explanation for its prevalence. Moreover, there was no inclination whatsoever to include, under the rubric of terror, bombings of civilians, or any other acts carried out by government forces rather than small individual units."<sup>11</sup>

Within days after the conference, the new propaganda war began in earnest. On July 11, 1979 the *International Herald Tribune* featured a lead editorial entitled "The Issue is Terrorism" which quoted directly from conference speeches. The same day Congressman Jack Kemp placed selected quotes from the conference in the *Congressional Record*. In his syndicated column of July 28, 1979, former CIA employee William F. Buckley blasted two of his favorite targets in one single

7. *Ibid*, pp. 103-07.

8. Jonathan Marshall, Peter Dale Scott, and Jane Hunter, *The Iran Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era* (Boston: South End Press, 1987), p. 210.

9. *Op. cit.*, n. 6, pp. 18-19.

10. *Ibid*, p. 19.

11. *Op. cit.*, n. 6, p. 211.

6. Philip Paull, "International Terrorism: The Propaganda War," University of San Francisco MA Thesis, San Francisco, CA, 1982, p. 3.



mixed metaphor: "No venture is too small to escape patronage by the Soviet Union," Buckley stated, "which scatters funds about for terrorists like HEW in search of welfare clients." Then in August, George Will, who also attended the conference, wrote about it in the *Washington Post*.

Before the year was out *Commentary*, *National Review*, and eventually *New Republic* writers would all churn out yard after yard of copy on this theme. Soon after, Claire Sterling, who had also attended the conference, would create the first "bible" of this new perspective with the publication of her highly controversial book, *The Terror Network*.<sup>12</sup>

With the help of George Bush and Ray Cline, the Jerusalem Conference had managed to start a propaganda firestorm.

In the following decade, the theme of terrorism/counter-terrorism would grow increasingly important to George Bush. He would become the ranking authority on this subject in the Reagan White House. Indeed, it would be Bush's own Task Force—the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism—which would eventually provide Oliver North back channel authorization through which he would bypass certain dissenting administration officials in his ongoing management of the Reagan/Bush Secret War against Nicaragua.<sup>13</sup>

### Uncle Bill

As important as Ray Cline's advice and support had been to George Bush, the real turning point in Bush's quest for the White House came when William Casey convinced Ronald Reagan to choose Bush as his running mate.<sup>14</sup>

Bush and Casey were, after all, old friends. By 1979, the two had worked closely on a number of intelligence matters for over a dozen years. In 1962, for example, William Casey and Prescott Bush—George's father—co-founded the National Strategy Information Center in New York City. The elder Bush and Casey were both leading Republican conservative members of New York's Wall Street community, and both could claim a background in intelligence matters while members of the U.S. military.<sup>15</sup>

In subsequent years, the organization which William Casey and Prescott Bush created became increasingly embroiled in political controversy. The National Strategy Information Center had funded a series of Forum World Features publications until it was publicly revealed that the Forum was a CIA proprietary operating out of London and was engaged in a variety of anti-left disinformation campaigns.

The Bush/Casey think tank had also played a pioneering role in establishing chairs and scholarships on numerous U.S. college campuses where friends of the CIA were able to gain a modicum of intellectual credibility teaching courses on intelligence and national security issues.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), at Georgetown University, was in many ways an outgrowth of

the original Bush/Casey think tank. CSIS's illustrious faculty included Henry Kissinger, George Carver, Michael Ledeen, and Ray Cline.

William Casey's relationship with young George Bush culminated in 1976 when Casey was appointed to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and George Bush was appointed Director of Central Intelligence. It had long been William Casey's contention that the CIA's assessment of Soviet military strength seriously underestimated the potential Soviet threat. In his young friend, Casey finally found a CIA Director willing to do something about the problem.

What George Bush and William Casey actually did was to form their own study group to provide the CIA with some competitive analysis—a new Team B analysis to contrast with the agency's own standard Team A analysis. Not surprisingly, the new Team B concluded that the CIA had indeed woefully underestimated the real Soviet threat. This argument was,



Credit: Associated Press

### William Casey.

of course, the primary justification for the massive U.S. arms build-up under Reagan.<sup>16</sup>

Team B was led by George Bush's future adviser, Professor Richard Pipes and by General Daniel Graham who later became a leader in the fight to develop Star Wars technology. Indeed, the entire anti-Soviet, "evil Empire" tone of the Reagan administration was set by this group of Bush-Casey analysts. The die, as they say, had been cast.

William Casey was entirely aware of this background when he approached the California governor with his recommendation for a vice presidential running mate. While some found George Bush too wimpish for their taste, Casey would not be so easily misled. Casey knew that when it came to issues of consequence for the CIA, George Bush could be counted on to do the right thing. It was spring at Langley, and the talk was of Restoration.

12. See Frank Brodhead and Edward S. Herman, "The KGB Plot to Assassinate the Pope," *CovertAction Information Bulletin*, No. 19, pp. 13-24.

13. See Peter Dale Scott, "The Task Force on Combatting Terrorism," this issue.

14. *New York Times*, May 7, 1987.

15. Prescott Bush served in Army Intelligence during the First World War and William Casey was a veteran of the OSS.

16. *The Nation*, August 27/September 3, 1988, p. 158. See also, John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), pp. 622-24.



## Eight Years of CIA Covert Action

by William Blum\*

Ronald Reagan was not the most interventionist American president of modern times. Dwight Eisenhower retains that honor, insofar as significant extralegal meddling in other countries' politics is concerned. Reagan intervened in the face of political obstacles which would most likely have inhibited Eisenhower or any other president to a marked degree.

Reagan presided over an American public grown extremely cynical and suspicious of the overseas adventures of the CIA, the U.S. military, and other arms of the U.S. Government. World opinion was yet more cynical. The previous decade had brought Indochina, Chile, Angola, Watergate, seemingly endless revelations about CIA misdeeds, exposés by former Agency officers, lengthy and relatively antagonistic Congressional investigations, oversight committees, professional CIA-watchers of the left and the center, and a media that had finally learned to ask some of the right questions and follow up on some of the right leads.

American destabilization and other covert operations of the 1950s did not have to deal with any of this; they did not face the glare of public exposure or censure until years after their occurrence, if ever.

In the 1980s, the information was leaked often within days, yet, in most cases, Reagan, CIA director William Casey, Oliver North & Co., et al., seemed unfazed by any of this.

CIA pilots bombed Indonesia in 1958 on several occasions, causing considerable death and destruction. In the United States, this was virtually a non-event. To this day, you will have to search long and hard to find any mention of it in standard works of reference, school texts, etc. In 1986, the U.S. bombed Libya and Reagan went on TV immediately to proudly announce the event.

For some 30 years, the CIA covertly funded foreign coups, counter-insurgency operations, politicians, political parties, labor unions, student organizations, book publishers, newspapers, and all manner of other, generally pro-capitalist and anti-communist institutions. Beginning in the 1970s, these activities, past and current, began to be exposed with alarming regularity and increasing embarrassment to Washington political leaders. Something had to be done.

What was done was not to end such activities. What was done by the Reagan administration was simply to make the activities ostensibly overt and thus, hopefully, eliminate the stigma associated with covert activities. It was a master stroke. Of politics, public relations, and cynicism.

In 1983, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)

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was set up to "strengthen democratic institutions throughout the world through private, nongovernmental efforts." Funded by Congress, i.e., the American taxpayers, NED engages in much of the same kinds of interference in the internal affairs of foreign countries which are the hallmark of the CIA.

Some causes which have been supported by NED largesse were the following:

- Over \$400,000 to the Center for Democracy, a New York-based foundation run by Soviet émigrés which has used the Soviet human rights network, tourists, and "experienced" travelers to gather political and military information on the U.S.S.R. The Center has also smuggled American films with anti-Soviet themes (*White Nights*, *Red Dawn* and *The Assassination of Trotsky*) into the Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup>

- Several hundred thousand dollars since 1985 to *La Prensa*, the anti-Sandinista newspaper in Nicaragua, which can only be viewed as part of the Reagan administration's campaign to overthrow the government; several million more has been allocated to support organizations opposing the Sandinistas in elections scheduled for 1990.<sup>2</sup>

- Newspapers in other developing countries, including Grenada, Guyana, and Botswana.<sup>3</sup>

- Translation into Polish of a book that accuses the Soviet Union of a World War II massacre of Polish Army officers. The book was to be smuggled into Poland.<sup>4</sup>

- \$400,000 a year to the Solidarity trade union in Poland, to clandestinely print underground publications, as well as funds for other political organizations, youth groups, and churches. This is in addition to several million dollars allocated to Solidarity by the U.S. Congress.<sup>5</sup>

- \$830,000 to Force Ouvrière, the French anti-communist trade union which the CIA began funding in the 1940s.

- \$575,000 to an extreme rightwing French group of paramilitary and criminal background, the National Inter-University Union. The funding of this group as well as Force Ouvrière was secret and is known of only because of its exposure by French journalists in November 1985.<sup>6</sup>

- \$3 million to the Philippines, "quietly being spent to fight the communist insurgency...and to cultivate political leaders there." Some of this money was channeled to the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections, which was set

1. Kevin Coogan and Katrina Vanden Heuvel, "U.S. Funds for Soviet Dissidents," *The Nation*, March 19, 1988.

2. *New York Times*, April 25, 1989, p. 8.

3. Laurien Alexandre, "War Without End: Propaganda and Public Diplomacy in the Reagan Era," *Extra!*, July/August 1988, p. 9.

4. *New York Times*, September 18, 1988, p. 4.

5. *New York Times*, July 10, 1988.

6. *Liberation* (Paris), November 27, 1985; *Washington Post*, November 28, 1985, p. A50; *The Guardian* (London), November 28, 1985, p. 6.



up by the CIA in the 1950s to support the presidential campaign of Ramon Magsaysay.<sup>7</sup>

The National Endowment for Democracy, like the CIA before it, calls this supporting democracy. The governments and movements against whom the financing is targeted, call it destabilization. The NED was not an aberration of an otherwise legal, accountable, non-interventionist Reagan foreign policy. Among the other stories of international intrigue and violence of the Reagan era worth noting are:

**South Africa:** Working closely with British intelligence, the U.S. provided South Africa with intelligence about the banned and exiled African National Congress, including specific warnings of planned attacks by the group and the whereabouts and movements of ANC leaders.<sup>8</sup> As part of South Africa's reciprocation, it sent 200,000 pounds of military equipment to *contra* leader Eden Pastora.<sup>9</sup>

**Fiji:** The coup of May 1987 bore all the fingerprints of a U.S. destabilization operation — the deposed prime minister, Timoci Bavadra, in office only a month after being elected over the conservative former Prime Minister Ratu Mara, was intent upon enforcing the ban upon nuclear vessels in Fiji ports; two weeks before the coup, Gen. Vernon Walters, he of extensive CIA involvement over the years, visited Fiji and met with the army officer who staged the coup; at the same time, Ratu Mara was visiting U.S. military headquarters (CINCPAC) in Hawaii; the AFL-CIO/CIA labor mafia was well represented, working against the nuclear-free Pacific movement; and several other similar components of a now all-too-familiar scenario.<sup>10</sup>

**Grenada:** The invasion by the U.S. military in October 1983 was accompanied by a battalion of falsehoods that stands out even in an administration noted for its creation of dial-a-lie. The "democracy" installed in the country reached fruition this year when the government banned the importation, by name, of over 80 leftist books, and later suspended Parliament to block a no-confidence vote.

**Libya:** Along with Nicaragua, Ronald Reagan's manic obsession, culminating in the April 1986 bombing which took the lives of about 37 people, all civilians but one, and wounded some 93 others. The dead included Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi's young adopted daughter; his other seven children and his wife were hospitalized. "Our evidence is direct, it is precise, it is irrefutable," announced the President of the United States in explaining that the bombing was in retaliation for the Libyan bombing nine days earlier of a West Berlin nightclub frequented by American servicemen which killed one soldier and injured many other soldiers and civilians. The evidence of Libyan culpability in the Berlin bombing, however, was never directly or precisely presented to the world.

**Surinam:** In December 1982, CIA Director William Casey told the House and Senate intelligence committees that President Reagan had authorized the CIA to try to topple Surinam

ruler Col. Desi Bouterse, supposedly leading his country into "the Cuban orbit." Even though the committee refused to approve the covert operation, there is good reason to believe that the administration did what it wished. An invasion of the country was scheduled for July 1, 1983 by Florida-based mercenaries — Americans and others. It was called off only after being discovered by the internal security agency of the Netherlands, the former colonial power in Surinam.<sup>11</sup>

**Seychelles:** The country's leader, France Albert René, amongst other shortcomings in the eyes of Washington, was a socialist, pursued non-alignment, and wanted to turn the Indian Ocean into a nuclear-free zone. For this he was the object of various American destabilization conspiracies beginning in 1979. In November 1981, the CIA reportedly was behind a mercenary invasion of the island nation which originated in South Africa and got no further than an armed battle at the Seychelles airport.<sup>12</sup>

**El Salvador:** The Reagan administration's bloodiest intervention. Largely obscured has been the extent of direct American involvement in the fighting. At least a dozen Americans have been killed or wounded in helicopter and plane crashes while flying reconnaissance or other missions over combat areas.<sup>13</sup> There have been numerous reports of armed Americans spotted in combat areas,<sup>14</sup> a report by CBS News of U.S. advisers "fighting side by side" with government troops,<sup>15</sup> and reports of other Americans, some ostensibly mercenaries, killed in action.<sup>16</sup> By 1983 there were more than two hundred U.S. intelligence agents (about two-thirds of them from the CIA) operating in El Salvador. At least until 1985, CIA paramilitary personnel were organizing and leading special Salvadoran army units into combat areas to track down guerrillas and call in air strikes.<sup>17</sup>

**Lebanon:** Another civil war the United States felt compelled to take part in, leading to the terrible bombings of the American Embassy and Marine barracks in 1983, followed, in December of that year, by American ships firing some 700 shells into the Beirut mountains, missing their military targets but causing destruction in civilian areas. In 1985, William Casey and a Saudi prince conspired to eliminate Muslim leader Sheikh Fadlallah, believed to be connected to the attacks on the American facilities. This plot culminated in March when the men employed to carry out the elimination drove a car bomb into a Beirut suburb near Fadlallah's residence. The explosion took 80 lives, wounded 200, and left widespread devastation. Fadlallah escaped without injury.<sup>18</sup>

11. *New York Times*, July 19, 1983.

12. *Sunday Tribune* (Durban, South Africa), November 29, 1981, pp. 49 and 52.

13. *The Guardian* (London), February 5, 1983; *New York Times*, March 30, 1984, p. 1, October 20, 1984; *San Francisco Chronicle*, July 17, 1987.

14. *Washington Post*, February 14, 1982, p. 1; *The Guardian* (London), March 26, 1984, October 22, 1984; *New York Times*, February 13, 1982, October 21, 1984, February 12, 1985, February 13, 1986, p. 3, April 1, 1987, p. 1; Michael McClintock, *The American Connection: State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador* (London: Zed Books, 1985), pp. 347-48.

15. *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 24, 1982.

16. *Washington Post*, December 19, 1980, p. A26; January 1, 1981, p. A1.

17. *Los Angeles Times*, July 9, 1987, pp. 1 and 22.

18. Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), pp. 396-97.

7. *San Francisco Examiner*, July 21, 1985; Raymond Bonner, *Waltzing With A Dictator* (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), p. 414.

8. *New York Times*, July 23, 1986, p. 1.

9. *New York Times*, August 20, 1987, p. 1.

10. *The Nation*, August 15-22, 1987, p. 117; *National Reporter*, Fall 1987, p. 33.



# NED: Quasi-Covert Action

There are difficulties in many cases in learning exactly who wound up with National Endowment for Democracy's (NED) money or exactly what it was spent for. For one thing, the money passes through various hands — conduits, as they used to be called in the era of CIA exposés. The principal initial recipients of NED funds are publicly known: the AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI), the Center for International Private Enterprise of the Chamber of Commerce, the National Republican Institute for International Affairs, and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. These institutions then disburse funds to other institutions in the United States and all over the world, which then often disburse funds to yet other institutions and individuals.

The FTUI, for example, funds three AFL-CIO regional institutes: the American Institute for Free Labor Development (Latin America), the Asian-American Free Labor Institute, and the African-American Labor Center. It happens that all three of these organizations were created in part by the CIA in the 1960s to work against leftist-leaning unions in the Third World. They each have more than 20 years experience in the art of fomenting economic turmoil against a target government, or keeping workers quiescent when the government is on Washington's favored-list.<sup>1</sup>

The FTUI channels NED funds to unions and other organizations associated with particular parties in Europe as well as in the Third World. It supports a "European organization" which has "infiltrators in Communist unions to report on their plans and activities." Making the details public would damage the effort, said the head of the FTUI.<sup>2</sup>

NED has funded a number of other activities in which no clear ideological line was apparent or relevant. The types of activities mentioned here, however, are indistinguishable from those carried out by the CIA during the Agency's heyday. In the 1970s, disclosures of such activities meant exposé type headlines and condemnations from congressmen and other public figures. In the 1980s, they are greeted largely with a straight face, if not silence. A long article on the NED in the *New York Times* in June 1986 raised analogies with the CIA only timidly, and was headlined: "Missionaries for Democracy: U.S. Aid for Global Pluralism."<sup>3</sup>

1. Winslow Peck, "The AFL-CIA," in Howard Frazier, ed., *Uncloaking the CIA* (New York: Free Press, 1978), pp. 262-65; Jonathan Kwitny, *Endless Enemies* (New York: Congdon and Weed, 1984), pp. 341-46.

2. *New York Times*, June 1, 1986, p. 16.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

The National Endowment for Democracy was the public side of Project Democracy, a White House program set up early in the Reagan administration to carry out foreign policy initiatives. The secret side was what the Iran-contra hearings were about. The two sides were not strangers to each other. Various organizations which were part of Oliver North's shadowy network received money from NED, including PRODEMCA (Friends of the Democratic Center in the Americas) which served as a conduit to Nicaraguan recipients and the Institute for North-South Issues which received almost \$500,000.<sup>4</sup> PRODEMCA placed full-page advertisements in major newspapers in 1986 urging Congress to support Reagan's request for aid to the *contras*.<sup>5</sup>

Col. North — who passed top-secret intelligence data to Iran,<sup>6</sup> the kind of act for which many men now sit in American prisons charged with treason — used the name

Project Democracy to describe his activities which grew into a parallel foreign policy apparatus, complete with its own communications systems, secret envoys, private employees and consultants, ad hoc foundations, leased ships, airplanes, off-shore corporations and

secret bank accounts. The operation was an expression of the administration's deep frustration over its inability to persuade the foreign policy bureaucracy or Congress to embrace the "Reagan Doctrine" of *laissez faire* intervention.

Congress agreed to fund NED only after CIA Director Casey promised that his agency would not use the organization as a vehicle for covert activities. As it turned out, Casey could make this promise because officials had decided to run the covert side from the National Security Council, to which North was officially attached. In 1983, Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive No. 77, a classified executive order that permitted the NSC to coordinate inter-agency efforts for Project Democracy. The directive makes no direct mention of the program's covert side, but does authorize "political action strategies" to counter moves by "the Soviet Union or Soviet surrogates."<sup>7</sup>

The primary purposes of these off-the-books operations, in addition to the personal enrichment of the leading operators, were: a) to assist the *contra* forces in Nicaragua in their war to overthrow the Sandinista government; and b) to get arms to the Iranian government in order to free American and other hostages.

4. *Washington Post*, February 28, 1987, p. A13.

5. *Washington Post*, July 11, 1986, p. A19.

6. *The Guardian* (London), February 21, 1987.

7. *New York Times*, February 15, 1987, p. 20.



**Dominica:** "Financial support to the Freedom Party of Eugenia Charles to defeat Oliver Seraphin in the Dominican elections." In 1980 Charles won the election.<sup>19</sup>

**Mauritius:** In 1981-82, financial support was given to Seewoosagar Ramgoolam in an attempt to bring him to power in the 1982 elections. Ramgoolam did not win in the elections.<sup>20</sup>

**Chad:** In 1981, the administration formally decided to supply Hissene Habré in his attempt to overthrow the government of Goukouni Oueddei. Through the CIA, Habré was supplied with money, arms and ammunition, and other equipment. "The operation was coordinated with Egypt,...which furnished Habré with weapons and ammunition in exchange for U.S. replacements."<sup>21</sup> Sudan provided a base of operations and a supply-line. American commitment increased several times during 1981, ending with a total of about \$10 million. In June 1982 Habré's men "took control of N'Djamena, the capital of Chad, and set up a provisional government."<sup>22</sup>

**Afghanistan:** Approximately \$625 million was appropriated between 1980-84, "including about \$40 million reprogrammed from the Pentagon budget and as much as \$250 million in fiscal year 1985 alone."<sup>23</sup> Afghanistan has become one of the most expensive covert actions in American history. This money was used in continuing military aid to the rebel forces of Zia Khan Nassery, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Sayed Ahmed Gailani and to conservative mullahs "to harass Soviet occupation forces and challenge the legitimacy of the government of Babrak Karmal."<sup>24</sup> The Afghanistan rebels also received monies from the National Endowment for Democracy. This included one grant of \$180,000 ostensibly for their school system; but in the extreme chaos of the war area, there can be no satisfactory way of determining what the ultimate disposition of the money was; this can only be viewed as part of the Reagan administration's campaign to overthrow the government supported by the Soviet Union. (This is ironic in light of the deep loathing Americans feel for the government of Iran, for if the Afghan rebels take power they will undoubtedly create a similar fundamentalist Islamic state.)

**Ethiopia:** A support operation of about \$500,000 per year for the opposition to the so-called Marxist government.<sup>25</sup>

**Cambodia:** Several million dollars a year for the forces fighting against the Vietnamese-backed government, a policy which indirectly benefited the notorious Khmer Rouge.<sup>26</sup>

**Angola:** In 1985 the Clark Amendment banning covert

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**Profits generated from the illegal sale of arms to Iran...may have been used to fund UNITA.**

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military aid to Angolan rebels was lifted and Reagan ordered the release of \$13 million in covert aid to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces. As Reagan left the White House, the CIA was reportedly expending at least \$45 million annually to back

Savimbi. According to government sources, profits generated from the illegal sale of arms to Iran, as well as money intended for the Afghan rebels, also may have been used to fund UNITA.<sup>27</sup>

**Argentina:** "Aid and training were provided (in 1981) to the *contras* through the Argentinean Defense Forces in exchange for other forms of aid from the U.S. to Argentina. This arrangement...avoided detailed congressional scrutiny and public explanations, and...hid the cost in various aid budgets for Argentina."<sup>28</sup> CIA-Argentine cooperation ended when the U.S. supported Britain in the 1982 Malvinas War.

**Nicaragua:** A traditional, multi-level, multi-millions-of-dollars, CIA destabilization operation to overthrow the government: economic boycott and cut off of international credit; crippling of the oil supply by blowing up fuel depots, ports, and pipelines, and mining the waters of oil-unloading ports; extensive damage to the agricultural infrastructure; covert funding of private organizations and the Catholic church which were actively subverting the government; a major military campaign in support of the *contra* rebels, including U.S. reconnaissance flights over Nicaragua and U.S. pilots flying combat and supply missions; several attempts to assassinate the Sandinista leadership; a major attempt to undermine the 1984 elections which the Sandinistas won handily.<sup>29</sup>

**Honduras:** Honduras was turned into a launching area and support base for the Nicaragua operation: landing strips, docks, radar stations and communication centers were built under the cover of repeated U.S.-Honduran military exercises. For seven years, attacks were carried out against Nicaragua from the soil of a supposedly neutral Honduras.<sup>30</sup>

The eight years of the Reagan administration brought an unparalleled growth in CIA covert activities and U.S. intervention abroad. This listing is only a sample of hundreds of operations that sought to destabilize foreign governments and have diminished the prospects for international peace. The victims of CIA interventions will remember the Reagan years far into the future.

Now a new U.S. president is on the scene speaking of "a kinder and gentler America." How willing are the people of Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Cambodia to believe the former Director of Central Intelligence? George Bush will likely carry on the Reagan legacy, even in light of changes in U.S.-Soviet relations. It promises to be a long four years. ●

19. Darrell Garwood, *Undercover: 35 Years of CIA Deception* (New York: Grove Press, 1985), p. 298.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 298.

21. Jay Peterzell, *Reagan's Secret Wars* (Washington, D.C.: The Center for National Security Studies, 1984), p. 47.

22. *Op. cit.*, n. 18, p. 215; *Op. cit.*, n. 19, p. 289.

23. John Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1986), p. 360.

24. *Op. cit.*, n. 19, p. 298; John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA from Wild Bill Donovan to William Casey* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 682; *op. cit.*, n. 18, p. 372.

25. *Op. cit.*, n. 18, p. 373.

26. *Op. cit.*, n. 18, pp. 216, 373, and 385.

27. William Blum, *The CIA: A Forgotten History* (London: Zed Books, 1986), p. 291; Sanford J. Ungar and Arnold Kohen, "An Angola Angle to the Scandal?" *New York Times*, January 20, 1987; *Washington Post*, April 25, 1989, October 23, 1989.

28. Ranelagh, *op. cit.*, n. 24, pp. 680-81; *CovertAction Information Bulletin*, Number 16, March 1982, pp. 14-16.

29. *Op. cit.*, n. 27, pp. 330-44.

30. *Op. cit.*, n. 27, pp. 333-38.



# The Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

by Peter Dale Scott\*

Media concern with the Iran/contras affair suddenly vanished in the spring of 1988, as soon as it became clear that George Bush, one of the scandal's *dramatis personae*, would become his party's presidential candidate.

On the surface, the Iran/contras controversy might indeed seem to have subsided. U.S. arms sales to Iran appear to have ceased. Overt military aid to the Nicaraguan contras now appears a remote possibility—although we should not forget that its successor, “humanitarian assistance,” was exactly what Oliver North called the arms he was supplying to the contras via Richard Secord's “Enterprise.”<sup>1</sup>

And yet there remains a disturbing institutional legacy from the Iran/contras era which was responsible for the flagrant abuses of covert power. This legacy is the secret counterterrorism apparatus that was assembled under the auspices of then Vice President Bush and which became the vehicle for Oliver North's extraordinary influence within the government.

With the world-wide decline in the number of private terrorist incidents, there is even more reason to review the powerful and still intact counterterrorism apparatus organized under the Reagan administration whose overall coordinator in the National Security Council (NSC) was Colonel Oliver North.

The 1987 Congressional investigation of the Iran/contras scandal revealed in passing how North and his counterterrorism associates in other agencies abused the secret institutions of this apparatus to bypass legal restrictions and to further the controversial Iran arms sales. In fact, it was through the auspices of Vice President Bush's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism that North began his rise to power and infamy in the U.S. government.

## Bush, North, and Domestic Repression

This article will examine how the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism served as the springboard for Oliver North's operations both in the U.S. and abroad. This revealing aspect of the relationship between North and Bush has often been overlooked in the mainstream media and provides evidence of just how deeply Bush was involved in the Iran/contras scandal.

We will begin by reconstructing from the public record

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1. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair (henceforward cited as *The Iran-Contra Report*), 100th Congress, Session, H. Rept. No. 100-433; S. Rept. No. 100-216 (November 1987), p.

what little is known of the North-Bush collaboration in the area of domestic repression, including the contingency plans developed by North (under Bush's auspices), for the roundup and deportation of “terrorist aliens.”

The little-noticed secret relationship between North and the Office of the Vice President goes back at least to 1982, when North was the National Security Council staff coordinator for crisis management. Bush at this time was charged by National Security Decision Directive #3 (NSDD3) with responsibilities for crisis management, and had been reported to be the head of a Cabinet-level crisis management committee.<sup>2</sup>

North's secretary, Fawn Hall, joined him in February 1983, and the two then worked on the development of a secret Crisis Management Center.<sup>3</sup> North also met with members of the Office of the Vice President on such related committees as the Crisis Pre-Planning Committee and the National Security Planning Group.

There has been much debate as to what this first phase of North's work on crisis management involved. On July 5, 1987, the *Miami Herald* reported that North “helped draw up a controversial plan to suspend the Constitution in the event of national crisis such as nuclear war, violent and widespread internal dissent, or national opposition to a U.S. military invasion abroad.”<sup>4</sup> The plan allegedly envisaged the roundup and internment of large numbers of both domestic dissidents—some twenty-six thousand—and aliens—perhaps as many as three to four hundred thousand—in camps scattered across the country.

In June 1986 a new “Alien Border Control Committee” was established, “to implement specific recommendations made by the Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism regarding the control and removal of terrorist aliens in the U.S.”<sup>5</sup> One of its working groups was charged with conducting “a review of contingency plans for removal of selected aliens.”<sup>6</sup>

These contingency plans “relating to alien terrorists...anticipated that the INS may be tasked with...apprehending, and removing from the U.S., a sizable group of aliens,” and

2. Top Secret White House Memo of May 14, 1982, Subject: Crisis Pre-Planning (Bates No. N 29464); *New York Times*, April 12, 1981.

3. Public testimony of Fawn Hall, *The Iran-Contra Report*, June 8, 1987, p. 15.

4. See Diana Reynolds, *The Rise of the National Security State*, this issue.

5. Memo of September 15, 1986 from Immigration and Naturalization Service Assistant Commissioner Robert J. Walsh, quoted in *Mideast Monitor*, vol. IV, no. 4, 1987, p. 2. The Alien Border Control Committee was formally established on June 27, 1986, by former Deputy Attorney General D. Lowell Jensen.

6. *Ibid.*



again called for housing "up to 5,000 aliens in temporary (tents) quarters" at a camp in Oakdale, Louisiana.<sup>7</sup> As the designated coordinator of counterterrorism in the National Security Council, North would certainly have known of these contingency plans, which, disturbingly enough, appear to still be with us.

In the televised Iran/contras Congressional hearings North was asked by Representative Jack Brooks (Dem.-Tex) to discuss the alleged contingency plan to suspend the U.S. Constitution. Daniel Inouye (Dem.-HI), the Committee Chairman, twice intervened, ruling that the question was "highly sensitive and classified," and should only be discussed in executive session. The next day North told Senator David Boren (Dem.-OK), a much more pliant questioner, that to his knowledge the United States had no such plan "in being," and that he had not participated in it.<sup>8</sup>

### The Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

In October 1983, under the guidance of the Vice President's Special Situations Group, North helped draft the National Security Decision Directive which authorized the invasion of Grenada. That winter the two men visited El Salvador, where Bush told local army commanders they would have to cease their support for death squads. North testified that Bush's action "was one of the bravest things I've seen for [sic] anybody." Bush has since reciprocated by repeatedly referring to North as a "hero."<sup>9</sup>

In April 1984 North drafted another National Security Decision Directive, creating a new counterterrorism planning group, the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG), to rescue U.S. hostages in Lebanon (and above all CIA station chief, William Buckley). North became the chair of the new counterterrorist group and TIWG's first major action was the October 1985 interception and capture of the hijackers of the Achille Lauro — which gave a big boost to North's prestige inside the administration.

In July 1985, the Reagan administration convened the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism. Then, on January 20, 1986, following the recommendations of an official report of the Task Force, National Security Decision Directive 207 institutionalized North's role as coordinator of the administration's counterterrorism program. He was given a secret office and staff (the Office to Combat Terrorism) that were kept hidden from certain members of the National Security Council.

Possibly the only official reference to NSDD 207 appears in a letter of April 17, 1987, from FBI Executive Assistant

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**"[North] was responsible for working closely with the designated lead agencies and...facilitating the development of response options and overseeing the implementation of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism recommendations."**

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Director Oliver B. Revell to Senator David Boren (Dem.-OK), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, explaining some of the contacts which he and the FBI had with Oliver North. This document, which explains

North's exact duties, is quoted here at length:<sup>10</sup>

At the time [April 1986], Col. North was the NSC official charged by the President with the coordination of our national counterterrorist program. He was responsible for working closely with the designated lead agencies and was responsible for participating in all interagency groups, maintaining the national programming documents, assisting in the coordination of research and development in relation to counterterrorism, facilitating the development of response options and overseeing the implementation of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism recommendations.

This description of Col. North's position is set forth in the public report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, February 1986. There is an even more detailed and comprehensive description of Col. North's position in the classified National Security Decision Directive #207 issued by the President on January 20, 1986.

Two key members of Bush's Task Force staff, Robert Earl and Craig Coy, moved over to staff North's new office. Earl and Coy spent much of the next year working on the Iran arms sales and *contra* support operation, making it easier for North to travel. While working for North, Earl and Coy were in fact officially attached to the Crisis Management Center, where North had worked in 1983.<sup>11</sup>

### Bush's Lies

Bush's political autobiography, *Looking Forward*, gave the impression that he had only minimal acquaintance with North and the Iran arms sales initiative. The Vice President acknowledged only two contacts with North: during the Grenada operation, and when he telephoned North from Israel before meeting that country's top representative in the Iran arms deals. He admitted knowing of the secret trip by North and Robert McFarlane to Teheran, but denied knowing of North's "other secret operations" before November 1986.<sup>12</sup>

North's diaries suggest, however, that in this period he was

10. *Washington Post*, February 17, 20, and 22, 1987; *Wall Street Journal*, February 20, 1987.

11. Deposition of Robert Earl, *The Iran-Contra Report*, May 2, 1987, vol. 9, pp. 22-23; Deposition of Craig Coy, *The Iran-Contra Report*, March 1987, vol. 7, pp. 24-25.

12. George Bush, with Victor Gold, *Looking Forward: An Autobiography* (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1987), pp. 242-43.

7. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Investigations Division, "Alien Terrorists and Undesirables: A Contingency Plan" (May 1986), pp. ii, 19, 25; partially quoted in *Mideast Monitor*, vol. IV, no. 4, 1987, p. 2.

8. Public testimony of Oliver North, *The Iran-Contra Report*, pp. 643, 732-33.

9. *Ibid*, pp. 574-75; *San Francisco Chronicle*, December 14, 1987 and January 14, 1988.



in recurring contact with Bush, Bush's advisers, and the other members of Bush's Task Force. From July 1985 to January 1986, when the secret end-run around George Shultz on Iran arms sales was devised, the available pages of North's diaries (most remained classified by the government) show only one meeting with President Reagan. However, the diaries show four meetings with Vice President Bush, either alone, or with Amiram Nir, the top Israeli counterterrorism expert, or in the presence of Donald Gregg. In addition there are at least six recorded meetings between North and members of the Vice President's Task Force during this period.

The Operations Sub-Group (OSG),<sup>13</sup> an interagency creation of the Task Force and NSDD 207, was convened for the first time on January 7, 1986—the day that Shultz and Casper Weinberger vigorously opposed the Iran arms sales plan. The



Credit: State Department

**Robert Oakley, member of the Terrorism Task Force.**

OSG met twice again that month but its members appear to have been *already* meeting with North, under the auspices of the Restricted Terrorist Incidents Working Group (RTIWG) months earlier. The diaries also show at least fourteen other meetings between North and the Task Force's senior members (Admiral James Holloway, Ambassador Robert Oakley, Charles Allen), its principal consultant (Terry Arnold), and its staff (Robert Earl and Craig Coy).<sup>14</sup>

In his testimony North suggested an even more intimate relationship with Bush. He told the Committee that "when my father died, there were three people in the government of the United States that expressed their condolences." Two of these were Admiral Poindexter and William Casey, his top bosses in the Iran/*contra* covert operations. The third "was the Vice President of the United States."<sup>15</sup>

Though they seem to have worked chiefly on the Iran arms deals and the *contra* supply operation, North and his two staf-

fers, Robert Earl and Craig Coy, operated at the heart of a whole complex of controversial secret operations in 1986. Earl himself testified that he spent between a quarter and a half of his time on Iran matters; his colleague Coy "knew every thing...about Democracy Incorporated" (the *contra* supply operation).<sup>16</sup> Earl and Coy also took the minutes for the inter-agency Operations Sub-Group.

#### Others Involved

By establishing a special apparatus to combat terrorism, the Reagan administration, and the Bush Task Force in particular, created an ongoing network able to bypass normal channels and proceed with an Iran arms sales policy that was opposed by both Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger, as well as the area desk officers in their departments and in the CIA.

It is therefore important to consider the other players involved in the counterterrorism apparatus because this will help demonstrate the scope and depth of the network. This apparatus, while clearly not some sort of well-planned and thought-out conspiracy, is more accurately described as a cabal. It was created as an arrangement which suited all parts of the Reagan administration, including those who preferred to have no responsibility for a policy (selling arms to Iran) which they could not bring themselves to support. This consensual sidestepping of responsibility (or what we might call "guiltlessness by dissociation") was not even limited to the administration.

The true cabal appears to have consisted largely of those middle-level operatives brought together by their responsibility for counterterrorism, a group including not only North and Poindexter but the CIA's Duane Clarridge and the quintet who moved from developing and reviewing the "counterterrorist" policies with North at the Bush Task Force Senior Review Group to executing them with North through the Operations Sub-Group. (The five were Charles Allen of the CIA, Robert Oakley of State, Noel Koch of the Defense Department, Lt. Gen. John Moellering from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Oliver Revell of the FBI.) Some of these men survived in the Reagan administration unscathed, despite having responsibilities for the Iran/*contra* affair that would seem at least comparable to North's.

It can be argued that these men were not only accomplices of North's in the execution of the controversial Iran arms sales, but the true authors of the counterterrorism gambit which led a Marine Lieutenant Colonel to act in defiance of official U.S. policy.

For example, in 1985-86, Robert Oakley was the director of the State Department's Office to Combat Terrorism. In this capacity he served first on the Bush Task Force Senior Review Group, and then co-chaired the Operations Sub-Group (OSG) with North until about July 1986. He then resigned from the administration, allegedly because he disagreed with the Iran arms sales policy of North. One of National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci's early acts of post-Iran/*contra* housecleaning in 1987 was to bring Robert Oakley back from

13. The OSG is a subgroup of the TIWG to deal with immediate crises.

14. The preceding information is from Oliver North's diary pages in *The Iran-Contra Report*, Shultz public testimony, GPS-74-78, pp. 833-1037.

15. Public testimony of Oliver North, *op. cit.*, n. 8, p. 345.

16. Earl deposition, *op. cit.*, n. 11, pp. 35, 98-99.



private life to the National Security Council. Oakley now serves as U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan.

It is noteworthy that the Iran arms deals with Ghorbanifar, although they had been proposed as early as November 1984, were blocked until the Bush Task Force began to operate in July 1985. Thereafter the arms deals were handled by a number of bureaucrats whose common denominator, and whose means of communicating directly with each other, was their responsibility for counterterrorism. (These men were Michael Ledeen, Charles Allen, Duane Clarridge, Robert Oakley, Oliver North for the United States; Amiram Nir for Israel.)

By creating a counterterrorism network, with its own secure system of intelligence communications, channels had been opened whereby other bureaucrats, with opposing viewpoints, could simply be excluded. The counterterrorism network even had its own "special worldwide antiterrorist computer network, code-named Flashboard," by which members could communicate exclusively with each other and with their collaborators abroad.<sup>17</sup> Those involved in the Iran arms deals appear to have used "flash" messages on this secure system, as late as October 31, 1986.<sup>18</sup>

### The Criminals Judge the Crime

When Ronald Reagan admitted in March 1987 that the arms sales to Iran were a mistake he asked Bush to reconvene his Task Force "to review our policy for combatting terrorism and to evaluate the effectiveness of our current program."<sup>19</sup> Having been asked, in effect, to evaluate his own creation, Bush's public response in June 1987 was predictable: "our current policy as articulated in the Task Force report is sound, effective, and fully in accord with our democratic principles and national ideals of freedom."<sup>20</sup>

Bush's public finding was truly ominous. The depositions that Robert Earl and Craig Coy gave to the Congressional committee investigating the Iran/contras affair reveal that the Office to Combat Terrorism had rapidly become the means whereby North could coordinate, not only the Iran arms sales and the *contra* supply operation, but also the domestic propaganda activities of Carl "Spitz" Channell and Richard Miller, the closing off of potentially embarrassing investigations by other government agencies, and the handling of right-wing contributors for illegal *contra* arms purchases.<sup>21</sup>

Thus the Bush people in the Reagan administration, having first used North and then acquiesced in his departure, would appear to have approved the continuation of most of his secret political activities in the name of combatting terrorism; they denounced only "the mistakes involved in our contacts with Iran." (These "caused a temporary reduction in credibility which has been regained as our resolve has become apparent.") In concluding his 1987 review Bush not only en-

dorsed the achievements of the apparatus which North put together, but declared that we must "do better."

It is not surprising that the Vice President's Task Force should so exonerate the extraordinary abuses of power committed by the counterterrorism apparatus which it set up. To an extraordinary extent the men at the center of that apparatus were drawn from the Senior Review Group of the Task Force itself. That they should have been reconvened to evaluate what



Credit: Wide World Photos

**Robert Earl on his way to the Iran/contras hearings.**

changes were needed was a sure sign, if one were needed, that the Republicans were determined to resist any pressures for significant change.

### Conclusion

It is clear now that members of the Bush Task Force Senior Review Group used their counterterrorism channels to thwart official U.S. policy and to conceal their activities from their superiors. It is interesting to note that the Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair did a reasonable job of chronicling the "secrecy, deception, and disdain for the law" of "a small group of senior officials" but that it went out of its way to ignore the existence of the counterterrorism network that operated through its own institutions, institutions which at least partly still exist.

This should be a matter of grave concern to those who believe in the open and democratic determination of foreign policy, particularly in matters that could lead to war. As we have seen, members of the counterterrorism cabal, above all Oliver North, used the extraordinary powers of this apparatus to carry out a covert foreign policy agenda as well as silence domestic opponents of the administration's Central American policies. With this counterterrorist apparatus still intact, and with George Bush in the White House, there's no doubt it will be used again.

17. *Newsweek*, October 21, 1985, p. 26.

18. Earl Exhibit, nos. 3-8, *op. cit.*, n. 11.

19. Presidential address to nation on March 4, 1987; Bush press release of June 2, 1987.

20. Bush press release of June 2, 1987.

21. Earl Deposition, *op. cit.* n. 11, May 30, 1987, pp. 33-37; May 15, 1987, pp. 117-21 (Channell and Miller); May 15, 1987, pp. 131, 119 (rightwing contributors).



# The VP's Office: Cover for Iran/Contra

by Jane Hunter\*

Throughout George Bush's presidential campaign and well into the first year of his presidency, polls consistently showed that a majority of the U.S. public did not believe Bush was telling the truth about his role in the Iran/contra affair. Of course, they were right — he wasn't.

Bush's plea of ignorance of the arms sales to Iran, that "I was out of the loop," was widely repeated, and always certain to get a laugh. However, we should not forget that in reality, George Bush attended all but one of the important White House meetings on the subject. (The one he missed conflicted with the December 7, 1985 Army-Navy football game.)

Secretary of State Shultz testified before the Iran/contra committee that, at a key January 6, 1986 meeting about the "finding" authorizing arms sales to Iran, Bush had not supported Shultz's own vehement opposition to the plan. This undercut Bush's assertion that he had had "reservations" about trading arms for hostages but just didn't think it was proper to reveal the counsel he had given President Reagan on the subject.<sup>1</sup>

During the course of investigating Bush's role in the Iran/contra affair both the U.S. Congress and several news agencies revealed that, contrary to his assertions of innocence, the president-to-be was up to his knees in "deep doo-doo."

## The Harari Network

One of the most compelling revelations came in 1988 and related to the connection between Donald Gregg and the so-called "Harari network." The Harari network consisted of Israelis, Panamanians and U.S. citizens set up by the Reagan administration and the government of Israel in 1982 to run a secret aid program for the *contras*. Its namesake was Mike Harari, a longtime *Mossad* official, who since around 1979 has served as Israel's agent in Panama.<sup>2</sup> Still reliably reported to be a senior intelligence operative,<sup>3</sup> Harari supervises Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega's security arrangements and is credited with helping the general withstand a coup sponsored by the Reagan administration in 1988. Harari also acts as a financial adviser and business partner to Noriega.<sup>4</sup> Following the October 1989 coup attempt, Harari reportedly took over

the day-to-day supervision of Panama's military intelligence.

The existence of the Harari network became public known in April 1988, during testimony before the Subcommittee on Narcotics, Terrorism and International Operations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which was looking into the connections between the war against Nicaragua and drug trafficking. It is, however, possible that the Congressional Iran/contra investigators knew all about this organization but, because the committee made a decision not to examine anything prior to 1984, it easily avoided exposing the network.

In April 1988 José Blandón, a former intelligence aide to Gen. Noriega told the narcotics subcommittee, headed by Sen. John Kerry (Dem.-Mass.), that the Harari network brought East bloc arms to Central America for Nicaraguan *contras* and had smuggled cocaine from Colombia to the United States via Panama. Blandón testified that on occasion, the aircraft and Costa Rican airstrips the Harari work used for arms deliveries to the *contras* also carried narcotics shipments north to the U.S.<sup>6</sup>

Three days after Blandón testified, ABC News interviewed a U.S. pilot, who said he had helped purchase and deliver Harari network's arms and had also flown drugs from Colombia to Panama. Using the pseudonym "Harry," the pilot said he had regarded Israel as his primary employer and the Harari network as his secondary employer.<sup>7</sup>

A short time later, Richard Brenneke, who was involved in the Harari network, went public. Brenneke is an Oregon businessman who claims to have worked for both *Mossad* and the CIA. Brenneke said he was recruited to work with the Harari network by Pesakh Ben-Or, the *Mossad* station chief in Guatemala. When he asked if the operation was approved by the U.S., Brenneke claims that Ben-Or gave him Donald Gregg's phone number in Washington, DC to verify that it was. He said that when he called Gregg on November 3, 1983, Gregg told him that he should "just means cooperate."<sup>8</sup>

ABC News reported that Israel had provided \$20 million in start-up capital for the Harari network and was later reimbursed from U.S. covert operations funds. Brenneke claimed that the funding, aircraft, and occasionally pilots for the Harari network and its counterpart in Honduras, dubbed

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1. Joel Brinkley, "Bush's Role in Iran Affair: Questions and Answers," *New York Times*, January 29, 1988.

2. For more on Harari and the Harari Network, see *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, May 1987, and February, March, April, May and June 1988.

3. Andrew Cockburn, "A friend in need," *Independent*, March 19, 1988.

4. Uri Dan, "Israeli is Power Behind Noriega," *New York Post*, July 11, 1988.

5. Stewart M. Powell and John P. Wallach, "Israeli Working For U.S.," *San Francisco Examiner*, October 22, 1989.

6. Hearings of the Narcotics, Terrorism, and International Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 1988.

7. Transcript, ABC News, April 7, 1988.

8. Jim Redden, "Burning Bush," *Willamette Week* (Portland, Ore.), May 14-20, 1988; United Press International (UPI), May 15, 1988; Robert and Rod Nordland, "Guns for Drugs?," *Newsweek*, May 23, 1988.



"Arms Supermarket," were supplied by the Medellín Cartel.<sup>9</sup>

According to United Press International, the Arms Supermarket consisted of three warehouses in San Pedro Sula, Honduras which were filled with Eastern bloc arms. Brenneke stated that it was established "at the request of the Reagan administration" and "initiated jointly by operatives of the Israeli Mossad, senior Honduran military officers now under investigation for drug trafficking, and CIA-connected arms dealers."<sup>10</sup>

Brenneke, however, claims the Supermarket was a separate operation from the Harari network. This was because Pesakh Ben-Or did not get along with Mario Del Amico and Ron Martin, the CIA arms dealers connected to the Supermarket.<sup>11</sup>

In a May 1988 article about the Arms Supermarket,



Credit: Jean Marie Simon

#### **Pesakh Ben-Or, Mossad Station Chief in Guatemala.**

*Newsweek* said it had possession of a 1986 report prepared for Oliver North by an arms dealer "warning bluntly that disclosure of 'covert black money' flowing into Honduras to fund military projects 'could damage Vice President Bush.'"<sup>12</sup>

Both Brenneke and ABC News identified Felix Rodriguez, the former CIA official who managed secret *contra* supply operations from Ilopango Air Base in El Salvador, as the Harari network's U.S. contact in Central America.<sup>13</sup>

Brenneke said that in 1985, after becoming disenchanted with the drug smuggling element of the operation, he called Gregg to warn him about the Harari network's connection to the Medellín Cartel. Brenneke claims that Gregg told him "You do what you were assigned to do. Don't question the decisions of your betters."<sup>14</sup>

Making Brenneke's allegations about Gregg more

plausible are classified documents, which, according to Steven Emerson, author of *Secret Warriors*, "show that the National Security Council had assumed a new operational role as early as 1982, with Gregg serving in a key role as a pivotal player in the NSC 'offline' links to the CIA."<sup>15</sup>

"By early 1983," wrote Emerson, "officials of the NSC and the vice president's staff assumed authority over Central America policy, having wrested control over it from the State Department."<sup>16</sup> Gregg was a lifelong CIA officer before going to work as a member of the NSC staff between 1979 and 1981, after which he became Bush's national security adviser.

When Vice President Bush challenged Richard Brenneke's credibility, Brenneke produced documentation that seemed to substantiate some of his claims.<sup>17</sup> Unfortunately, all he had to document his conversations with Gregg were his phone records.

In fact, Bush was so threatened by Brenneke's charges that he and his supporters decided a strong counter-attack was in order. Bush personally accused Sen. Kerry of allowing "slandorous" allegations to leak from his committee, which Brenneke had testified before in closed session. Bush also exclaimed that *Newsweek*, which used Brenneke as one of its sources for a report on the Arms Supermarket, was printing "garbage." Of Brenneke, Bush said "The guy who they are quoting is the guy who is trying to save his own neck."<sup>18</sup> It is important to note, however, that Richard Brenneke has never been indicted on any criminal charges (compared to Oliver North, Robert McFarlane, and John Poindexter who all worked closely with George Bush).

#### **Just Say No To Quid Pro Quo**

After Bush was safely ensconced in the presidency it was revealed that in March 1985 he had served as an emissary to Honduras, as part of a Reagan administration effort to keep that government cooperating with its illicit support of the *contras*. Bush was sent a copy of a February 19, 1985 memorandum from National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane to President Reagan, in which McFarlane advised accelerating the flow of economic and military aid to Honduras as "incentives for them to persist in aiding the freedom fighters."<sup>19</sup> A second memo by McFarlane, dated the same day, suggested sending an emissary to then Honduran President Roberto Suazo Cordoba to privately offer this *quid pro quo*. Another

15. Steven Emerson, *Secret Warriors* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1988), p. 129.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 125-26.

17. Brenneke's documents of his activities are reproduced in *The Brenneke Report: An Assessment of the International Center's Investigation*, Washington, DC, August 25, 1988. (Brenneke worked for the International Center for Development Policy after he went public.) For a more detailed examination of Brenneke's veracity, see *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, October 1988 and Jane Hunter, "A Renaissance Man," *NACLA, Report on the Americas*, September/October 1988. It must also be said that some analysts do not believe that José Blandón is the essence of credibility, either, even though his testimony was less disconcerting than Brenneke's.

18. David Hoffman, "Bush Lays 'Slandorous' Leaks to Kerry; Senator Denies Charge; Contras and Drug-Running Involved," *Washington Post*, May 17, 1988.

19. Doyle McManus, "Senate Panel to Probe Iran-Contra Papers," *Los Angeles Times*, April 27, 1989.

9. ABC News interview, May 28, 1988.

10. UPI, May 15, 1988.

11. Interview with Brenneke, *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, June 1988.

12. *Newsweek*, May 23, 1988.

13. "Arms, Drugs and the Contras," a *Frontline* television documentary aired on U.S. Public Television stations in May 1988, also identified Rodriguez as the contact.

14. Parry and Nordland, *op. cit.*, n. 8.



# Bush and Noriega

During the 1988 campaign, George Bush was repeatedly asked whether, when he met with General Manuel Noriega in 1983 and 1985, they had discussed the allegations that Noriega was involved in narcotics money laundering. Bush managed to neatly evade the issue with the response that he did not know about the reports of Noriega's involvement with drug trafficking until a U.S. court indicted the general in February 1988. Commented *US News & World Report*, "The best that can be said is that Bush displayed little curiosity in an environment rich with allegations about Noriega." A prosecutor who worked on Noriega's indictment said Bush "either closed his eyes to it or deliberately ignored it."<sup>1</sup>

Yes, but he got away with it. Bush himself said of the December 1983 meeting, "What I talked to the Panamanians about was doing what they could to get their banks out of laundering any money, that was laundering it for the narcotics traffic." A Bush spokesman said that Gen. Noriega was at the 1983 meeting, but he [Noriega] didn't "participate."<sup>2</sup>

Donald Gregg also attended the 1983 meeting<sup>3</sup> and, according to José Blandón, former intelligence aide to Noriega, Gregg obtained Noriega's commitment "to help secretly arm, train and finance the *contras* in early 1984." Gregg, however, denies ever dealing with Noriega.<sup>4</sup> In September 1988, Panamanian Col. Roberto Díaz Herrera and José Blandón appeared in a British documentary, saying that Gen. Noriega claimed to have photographs and tape recordings made at this meeting that would show "Bush or his aides knew that the United States was helping to train Nicaraguan insurgents at a time when this was prohibited by American law."<sup>5</sup>

In December 1985, Bush met in Washington with the then U.S. Ambassador to Panama, Edward Everett Briggs.

1. Kenneth T. Walsh and Andy Plattner, "Miami Nice: George Bush as drug czar," *US News & World Report*, July 11, 1988.

2. Jim McGee and David Hoffman, "Rivals Hint Bush Understates Knowledge of Noriega Ties," *Washington Post*, May 8, 1988.

3. Stephen Engelberg and Jeff Gerth, "Bush and Noriega: Their 20-Year Relationship," *New York Times*, September 28, 1988.

4. "More on Bush-Noriega," *Newsweek*, October 31, 1988.

5. Gerald M. Boyd, "Aides to Bush Move to Counter Report on Noriega," *New York Times*, September 23, 1988.

According to a memo prepared by Bush's aides to brief him for the meeting, its purpose was to "discuss U.S. relations with Panama and narcotics matters." In the weeks leading up to the meeting, Briggs had sent a number of cables to the State Department detailing allegations of Noriega's narcotics trafficking.<sup>6</sup> Nonetheless, Briggs later admitted he had lacked the evidence to brief Bush on that subject. That somewhat surprised a Treasury Department aide and two congressional staffers who said Briggs briefed them about the allegations 17 days after he met with Bush.

In November 1987, [retired] Adm. Daniel J. Murphy, who had been Bush's chief of staff until 1985, visited Noriega in Panama. According to José Blandón, Murphy undercut U.S. efforts to persuade Noriega to retire by proposing an alternative deal and telling the Panamanian that "anything could happen" after the 1988 election. Accompanying Murphy on his trip was Korean lobbyist (and central figure in the Koreagate scandal) Tongsun Park. They reportedly promised to lobby for Japanese economic assistance, both with Japan and with the White House. A Bush spokesperson said that Murphy had spoken with Donald Gregg after Murphy returned from Panama. However, the spokesperson did not know whether the two had talked before Murphy left.<sup>8</sup>

What is known is that in 1988 the Reagan administration ordered the State Department, the Pentagon, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the CIA not to cooperate with the GAO (the investigative arm of the Congress) in a "case study" it had been ordered to conduct, using Panama as an example of how drug trafficking by foreign officials influences U.S. foreign policy decisions. "Democrats and investigators said the White House order was aimed at preventing potentially embarrassing disclosures from rocking the presidential campaign of Republican Vice President George Bush."<sup>9</sup>

6. Stephen Engelberg and Jeff Gerth, "Officials Say Bush Hears '88 Charge Against Noriega," *New York Times*, May 8, 1988.

7. Stephen Engelberg, "Envoy's Account on Noriega Surprises Those He Briefed," *New York Times*, May 14, 1988.

8. Michael Wines and Ronald J. Ostrow, "Ex-Bush Aide Seen Spoiling Bid to Oust Noriega," *Los Angeles Times*, February 11, 1988.

9. Brian Barger, "White House Blocks GAO Report of Noriega," *United Press International*, August 18, 1988.

memo which gave details of this proposal was written by North to McFarlane the following day and had a notation by John Poindexter saying, "We want VP to also discuss this matter with Suazo."<sup>20</sup>

The memos were two of six documents that were released during North's trial but which the Congressional committees investigating the Iran/*contra* affair never received. Another document, summarizing a phone conversation between

20. Sara Fritz, "Hamilton Prods Bush on 2 Papers," *Los Angeles Times*, April 15, 1989.

Reagan and Suazo, had a notation indicating that Bush was supposed to receive a copy.<sup>21</sup>

Rep. Lee Hamilton (Dem.-Ind.), who chaired the House side of the joint Iran/*contra* committee, said the missing documents were "about as clear a statement of *quid pro quo* as you'll ever see in a government document" and did not discount the possibility that they would be cause to reopen the

21. "Dispute over Iran-Contra papers grows," *Washington Post & Sacramento Bee*, April 27, 1989, which notes that incomplete versions of two of the six documents had reached the committee.



Iran/contras investigation.<sup>22</sup>

Not surprisingly, when the Senate intelligence committee did investigate the matter of the withheld documents, they concluded there was "no evidence to suggest" that the documents "had been deliberately and systematically withheld by the White House, or persons within the White House, from the Congressional investigating committees."<sup>23</sup>

President Bush denied discussing a *quid pro quo* with Suazo and he refused to respond to the stories while North's trial was underway. Michael G. Kozak, acting Assistant Secretary of



Credit: The White House

#### Donald Gregg and his good friend, George Bush.

State for Inter-American Affairs, told Congress that from his review of the documents, the plan to have Bush carry the message to Honduras had been killed.<sup>24</sup> He said he had a secret cable proving that Bush never explicitly linked *contra* aid and assistance to Honduras. However, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs pointed out that the cable, written by then Ambassador John Negroponte—himself a main Iran/*contra* player—would have been routinely sanitized (in this case, probably by Donald Gregg) before it was consigned to the permanent files.<sup>25</sup>

None of this back and forth even touched on a paragraph contained in a document submitted in Oliver North's trial. Referred to as an official admission of facts, the document summarized classified material North was not permitted to introduce. The government agreed, for the purposes of the trial, that the 107 assertions contained in its 42 pages, were true.

22. Doyle McManus, "Details Surface of U.S. Deal to Aid Contras," *Los Angeles Times*, April 16, 1989; "Iran-Contra Prober Doubts Bush's Denials," UPI, *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 8, 1989.

23. Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, "Were Relevant Documents Withheld from the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair?" June 1989 (Doc. No. 199-533-89-1), p. 7.

24. Stephen Engelberg, "No Quid Pro Quo President Insists," *New York Times*, May 5, 1989.

25. Council on Hemispheric Affairs, "Bush, Gregg, Negroponte: Was There a Quid Pro Quo Deal?" Press release, May 16, 1989.

The 79th stipulation recounts preparations for a Bush mission to Honduras:

In mid-January 1986, the State Department prepared a memorandum for Donald Gregg (the Vice President's national security adviser) for Vice President Bush's meeting with President [José] Azcona. According to DoS [Department of State], one purpose of the meeting was to encourage continued Honduran support for the *contras*. The memorandum alerted Gregg that Azcona would insist on receiving clear economic and social benefits from its cooperation with the United States. Admiral Poindexter would meet privately with President Azcona to seek a commitment of support for the *contras* by Honduras. DoS suggested that Vice President Bush inform President Azcona that a strong and active *contra* army was essential to maintain pressure on the Sandinistas, and that the United States government's intention to support the *contras* was clear and firm.<sup>26</sup>

#### Gregg's Reward

Donald Gregg's reward for his loyalty to George Bush, as well as for his role in running the Nicaraguan *contras*, was to be nominated as ambassador to South Korea. Members of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee had pleaded with the administration to withdraw Gregg's nomination, warning that to press on risked a reopening of the Iran/*contra* affair and an unraveling of the newly-forged "bipartisan consensus" on foreign policy. The administration could hardly have withdrawn the nomination, as that would have been regarded as an acknowledgment of President Bush's own complicity in the illegal resupply of the *contras*.

According to Sen. Alan Cranston (Dem.-Calif.), Gregg's diplomatic nomination came after "key members" of the Senate Intelligence Committee blocked a move to appoint him to a "top CIA post." Gregg claimed that he lost out on the CIA job when discreet inquiries had revealed that his nomination to a top CIA post would embroil the Agency in questions over his role in the Iran/*contra* affair.<sup>27</sup>

Incredibly, when asked during his confirmation hearings why Bush had nominated him as Ambassador to Korea rather than taking him to the White House, Gregg said that Bush had a marked aversion to seeing the NSC take on an operational role.<sup>28</sup> Did he mean to imply that his assignment in South Korea was operational? Reflecting widespread disappointment with the nomination, an editorial in a South Korean newspaper asked whether Gregg's return to the nation where he had been CIA station chief from 1973-75 meant that "the U.S. regards Korea not as a diplomatic but as an intelligence and operations target."<sup>29</sup>

The confirmation hearings that stretched over May and

26. Government submission to U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, April 6, 1989, Criminal No. 88-0080-02-GAG, pp. 31-2.

27. Gregg's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 15, 1989.

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Chosun Ilbo* quoted by Peter Maass, "Gregg Post Causes Ire In Seoul; Envoy's CIA Past Resented by Critics," *Washington Post*, January 14, 1989.



June 1989 were a test of strength, with the committee destined from the start to be the loser. Speaking—under oath—in an indifferent monotone Gregg baited Alan Cranston, chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs and his principal interrogator, with outrageous answers. For example, after denying that in 1985 he met with Oliver North and Col. James Steele—then the chief U.S. military adviser in El Salvador—to discuss the *contra* operation, Gregg coolly absorbed the news that Steele had confirmed the meeting.<sup>30</sup>

An indignant Cranston charged: "Your career training in establishing secrecy and deniability for covert operations and your decades-old friendship with Felix Rodriguez apparently led you to believe that you could serve the national interest by sponsoring a freelance operation out of the Vice President's office."<sup>31</sup>

### Copters not Contras

The greatest moment of absurdity (and outright lying) came when Gregg offered what he called a "speculative explanation" for a reference to a mention of "resupply of the contras" in a May 1, 1986 memo, prepared for a meeting between Bush and Rodriguez. It was "possible," Gregg said, that it "was a garbled reference to resupply of copters instead of resupply of *contras*." Later, Gregg remarked to reporters, "I don't know how it went over, but it was the best I could do."<sup>32</sup>

Cranston failed to question Gregg on a key point. Steven Emerson reported that he had seen a March 1983 memo prepared by Gregg which accompanied a plan to organize a "search-and-destroy air team." The plan was drafted by Felix Rodriguez and contained a map which "strongly suggested that targets inside Nicaragua would be attacked." Emerson said these "still classified" documents bore the handwritten approval of then National Security Adviser William Clark.<sup>33</sup>

Cranston repeatedly tried to crack Gregg's facade and Gregg continued to deny any connection to the *contras* or ever having discussed the mercenaries with Bush. He didn't even back away from his earlier statement that Bush had learned of the secret resupply network from an interview Gregg gave the *New York Times* in December 1986.

Cranston wondered aloud how Gregg didn't know that Rodriguez was involved with the *contras* when the NSC staff, the State Department, and Gen. Paul Gorman, head of the U.S. Southern Command, all knew that the illegal *contra* aid operation was Rodriguez's real priority in Central America. Gregg said he had to agree with Cranston's (heavily sarcastic) interpretation of his testimony: that Oliver North and his longtime friend Felix Rodriguez were conspiring against him! At his trial Oliver North testified that "I was put in touch

**"If Gregg was lying, he was lying to protect the president, which is different from lying to protect himself."**

with Mr. Rodriguez by Mr. Gregg of the Vice President's office"<sup>34</sup> and that Gregg knew about the arms shipments. During his confirmation hearing Gregg said North's statements

were "just not true."<sup>35</sup>

Hopeless as all of this was, Cranston's interrogation hovered around the fundamental question. Recalling Bush's statement in October 1986 that Felix Rodriguez was not working for the U.S. government and Gregg's own knowledge that Rodriguez had received help from the U.S. military in El Salvador, Cranston asked Gregg, "Did you inform Bush of those facts so he could make calculated misleading statements, or did you keep him in the dark so he could make misleading statements?"

Gregg evaded the question, contending that Rodriguez was not being paid a government salary but was living off his CIA pension. He also insisted that Bush "made no misleading statements."<sup>36</sup> During the hearings, Cranston had accused Gregg of using Rodriguez's work with the Salvadoran government as "a cover story," to which Gregg replied that Cranston was providing "a rather full-blown example of a conspiracy theory."<sup>37</sup>

That Donald Gregg had blithely lied under oath was apparent to everyone. Even one of his Republican supporters on the committee, Sen. Richard Lugar (Rep.-Ind.), said that some of Gregg's testimony "certainly strains belief." Another Republican, Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, noted—perhaps disingenuously, certainly inaccurately—that other Bush ambassadorial appointments of individuals more heavily involved in the Iran/*contra* affair than Gregg had "sailed through."<sup>38</sup>

Ultimately it was power that overrode perceptions, not to mention truth. The senators did not really want to challenge Bush, whose popularity was soaring. Just to get the administration to release relevant documents it had been withholding, Cranston had to promise to schedule a vote on Gregg.<sup>39</sup>

Three Democrats on the Foreign Relations Committee joined all the Republicans, in voting to report the nomination favorably to the full Senate. One of the Democrats, Terry Sanford of North Carolina, confirmed Cranston's explanation of his vote—that he was afraid "the path would lead to Bush." "If Gregg was lying," said Sanford, "he was lying to protect the president, which is different from lying to protect himself."<sup>40</sup> Oh, really?

34. " 'Black Hole,' " *Newsweek*, April 24, 1989.

35. Lee May, "Panel Probes Ex-Bush Aide on Contra Supply Scheme," *Los Angeles Times*, May 13, 1989.

36. Gregg's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 15, 1989.

37. Joseph Pichirallo and Walter Pincus, "Gregg: Kept Bush in Dark About North Role; Senators Greet Ex-Aides' Contra Testimony with Skepticism," *Washington Post*, May 13, 1989.

38. Mary McGrory, "The Truth According to Gregg," *Washington Post*, June 22, 1989.

39. Walter Pincus, "State Dept. Budget, 4 Nominations Advance; Iran-Contras Questions Delayed 1 Appointee," *Washington Post*, June 9, 1989.

40. McGrory, *op. cit.*, n. 38.

30. Robert Parry, "Bush's Envoy on the Grill," *Newsweek*, May 29, 1989.

31. Robert Pear, "Bush Nominee Is Quizzed Over Illicit Contra Aid," *New York Times*, May 13, 1989.

32. Joseph Mianowany, "Former Bush aide tries to explain Iran-Contra role," UPI, May 13, 1989.

33. Emerson, *op. cit.*, n. 15, pp. 124-26.



## Bush's Boy's Club:

# Skull and Bones

To be a member of the ruling elite, George Bush must meet certain criteria. He must be white, he must be male, and he must be rich. He must also belong to certain elite clubs and institutions which help to distinguish him from those he is called upon to rule.

George Bush is a member of Skull and Bones, an elite secret society open only to a select 15 males in their senior year at Yale University. If this club appears somewhat exclusionary, don't worry; they have made great strides in the past few years. Recent Bones inductees include a few blacks, gays, and even some foreign students. However, it has been said that if women were ever allowed into the secret "tomb" (meeting place) of Skull and Bones, the tomb would "have to be bulldozed."<sup>1</sup>

The importance of Skull and Bones is not that it provides good gossip about young males doing strange things in tombs, but that it provides a certain bond between members which they carry for life. Membership to Skull and Bones is the first initiation into the world of power politics and capitalism. It is somewhat akin to a "junior" old boy's network.

One of the interesting aspects of this secret society is the number of Bones members who, after graduation, move on to do intelligence work. There has even been informed speculation that there is a "Bones cell" in the CIA.

Whether there is a Bones cell or not in the CIA is open to interesting debate. We can, however, examine the histories of several Bonesmen who have gone on to illustrious careers in intelligence work.

One of the most unusual Bonesmen is the Reverend William Sloane Coffin, Jr. Known best for his anti-Vietnam war activities and his political activism at Riverside Church in New York City, Sloane Coffin was recruited by the CIA shortly after he graduated from Yale in 1949. Although his tenure at the Agency was short, he is one example of the CIA's use of the secret society to fill their ranks.<sup>2</sup>

Another illustrious Skull and Bones member with close ties to the CIA is arch conservative and renowned propagandist, William F. Buckley. According to several experts on the CIA, Buckley began his cooperation with the Agency while he was in Mexico City in 1952, where his good friend, E. Howard

Hunt, was CIA station chief at the time.<sup>3</sup>

As an interesting aside, Buckley and Bush (as well as many other Washington and business elites) are members of the "prestigious" older-boys California getaway, "The Bohemian Club."

It is not surprising, given the Buckley family's wealth and status, that Bill's older brother, James Buckley, is also a member of Skull and Bones. From 1981-82 Buckley was Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology where it was his job to see that U.S. military aid went to support the right regimes.<sup>4</sup>

He once stated that CIA covert activities in Chile, which led to the overthrow of democratically-elected Salvador Allende, were necessary because, "It was only by virtue of covert help by the United States that these free institutions were able to survive in the face of increasingly repressive measures by the Allende regime."<sup>5</sup>

Buckley was also directly connected to the work of the Chilean secret police, DINA. In September 1976, DINA agents assassinated former Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier and his colleague, Ronni Moffitt in Washington DC. "Independent researchers verified through the FBI and Department of Justice — that on September 14, 1976, one week before the Letelier assassination, Michael Townley and Guillermo Novo [two DINA agents involved in the assassination] drove to the office

of Senator James Buckley in New York City for a meeting. Buckley had helped finance trips to Chile for Novo and others close to the killing."<sup>6</sup>

When CIA agent David Atlee Phillips was accused of being involved in the assassination he started an organization entitled "Challenge: An Intelligence Officers' Legal Action Fund." The board of "Challenge" included former CIA director William Colby, former CIA Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick, former intelligence officer General Richard Stillwell, and interestingly, James Buckley.<sup>7</sup>

Hugh Cunningham, Bonesman from the class of 1934, is a


3. Donald Freed and Fred Landis, *Death in Washington: The Murder of Orlando Letelier* (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1980), p. 152; Winslow Peck, "Death on Embassy Row," *CounterSpy*, December 1976, p. 65.

4. Ronald Brownstein and Nina Easton, *Reagan's Ruling Class* (Washington, DC: The Presidential Accountability Group, 1982), p. 568.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 570.

6. Freed and Landis, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 168.

7. Louis Wolf, "Old Soldiers Fade Away...Old Spies Lobby," *Covert-Action Information Bulletin*, December 1980, p. 27.



1. Ron Rosenbaum, "The Last Secrets of Skull and Bones," *Esquire Magazine*, September 1977; David Dunlap, "Yale Secret Society Resists Peek into Its Crypt," *New York Times*, November 4, 1988, pp. B1-2.

2. *Ibid.*



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## SKULL AND BONES

FOUNDED 1832

EDWARD WILLIAMSON ANDREWS, JR.  
THOMAS WILLIAM LUDLOW ASHLEY  
LUCIUS HORATIO BIGLOW, JR.  
GEORGE HERBERT WALKER BUSH  
JOHN ERWIN CAULKINS  
WILLIAM JUDKINS CLARK  
WILLIAM JAMES CONNELLY, JR.  
GEORGE COOK, III  
ENDICOTT PEABODY DAVISON  
DAVID CHARLES GRIMES  
RICHARD ELWOOD JENKINS  
DONALD LOYAL LEAVENWORTH  
RICHARD GERSTLE MACK  
THOMAS WILDER MOSELEY  
FRANK O'BRIEN, JR.  
PHILIP O'BRIEN, JR.  
GEORGE HAROLD PEAU, JR.  
SAMUEL SLOANE WALKER, JR.  
HOWARD SAYRE WEAVER  
VALLEAU WILKIE, JR.

of Senator James Buckley in New  
Buckley had helped finance trips to  
...the killing"6



Rhodes Scholar with a lengthy career in the CIA. He was in the Agency from 1947 to 1973 during which time he served in top positions with the Clandestine Services, the Board of National Estimates, and was the Director of Training from 1969-73. He also served with the CIA's precursor, the Central Intelligence Group from 1945-47.<sup>8</sup>

William Bundy is a Bonesman from the class of 1939. Bundy began his intelligence career in the OSS during World War II. From 1951-61 he worked at the CIA, including at its Office of National Estimates.<sup>9</sup> During the Vietnam War, he was the Assistant Secretary of State for Asian Affairs and a vocal advocate for escalating the war.

A true Cold War liberal, Bundy expressed his belief in the necessity of CIA covert actions in his foreword to the book *The Counter-Insurgency Era*: "The preservation of liberal values, for America and other nations, required the use of the full range of U.S. power, including if necessary, its more shady applications."<sup>10</sup> "Shady applications" is a veiled euphemism for covert activities which support dictators, overthrow legitimate governments, and contribute to the destabilization of world order.

From the class of 1950 comes Bonesman Dino Pionzio. His claim to fame was the time he spent as CIA deputy chief of station in Santiago, Chile in 1970, during the massive CIA destabilization of the Allende government. He is also a member of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers.<sup>11</sup> The CIA proved not to be lucrative enough for Pionzio so he left his intelligence career behind and became an investment banker. As of 1983, he was a vice president at the investment firm Dillon, Read. (Just to illustrate how small these circles really are—

Nicholas Brady, the current Secretary of the Treasury was the co-chair of Dillon, Read and a graduate of Yale University. Brady, however, was not a Bonesman. He belonged to another Yale secret society called "Book and Snake."<sup>12</sup>

From the days of George Bush's father, Prescott Bush, comes former spook F. Trubee Davidson. Davidson, a Bones-

man from the class of 1918, was the Director of Personnel at the CIA in 1951.<sup>13</sup> Davidson then begot little Bonesmen, Edicott Peabody Davidson and Daniel Pomeroy Davidson. Edicott Davidson went to work at the law firm of Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam, and Roberts (Henry Stimson was the Secretary of War during World War II and also a Bonesman).

Another interesting Bonesman is David Lyle Boren, the Senate Democrat from Oklahoma. While he is not an employee of the CIA (some say this is open to question) Boren is nevertheless part of the intelligence community because he is the chair of the Select Committee on Intelligence.

Finally, but certainly not at the end of the list, comes Richard A. Moore. Moore began his intelligence career in World War II where he served as a special assistant to the chief of military intelligence. He was rewarded for this service with the Legion of Merit for Intelligence Work.<sup>14</sup>

In the 1970s, Moore was special assistant to President Nixon and in the thick of things during the Watergate scandal. At his recent congressional confirmation hearing for the post of Ambassador to Ireland, Moore was asked by one of the committee members if he was one of 14 unnamed and unindicted co-conspirators of the Watergate scandal.<sup>15</sup> Moore, however, emphatically denied the accusation. It is interesting to note that Moore, a Bonesman from 1936, was recently appointed to a high-level State Department post by George Bush, Bonesman, 1948.

The list of Bonesmen-made-good goes on and on and includes McGeorge Bundy (National Security Adviser to Kennedy and Johnson), William Draper (Defense Department Import-Export Bank, etc.), Dean Witter, Jr. (investment banker), Potter Stewart (Supreme Court Justice who swore in George Bush as Vice President in 1981), John Forbes Kerry (Senator from Massachusetts), Winston Lord (Kissinger protégé and former Ambassador to China), Robert H. Gow (president of Zapata Oil, once owned by Bush and which had possible links to the CIA), and Henry Luce of Time-Life fame.<sup>16</sup>

This old (and new) boys network helps to illustrate the old adage "it's not what you know, it's who you know." Given the extent of Bones members in intelligence, it is also "how you come to know it."

A special thanks to Peggy Adler-Robohm who provided research assistance for this article.

13. *New York Times*, July 5, 1951.

14. *Intelligence Newsletter* (Paris), May 24, 1989.

15. *Washington Post*, August 8, 1989, p. A15.

16. Yale Yearbook, 1969.



8. Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1974), p. 110-11; Yale Alumni Directory, 1985.

9. Ronald Payne and Christopher Dobson, *Who's Who in Espionage*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 110.

10. Douglas S. Blaufarb, *The Counter-Insurgency Era* (New York: Free Press, 1977), p. x, quoted from Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism* (Boston: South End Press, 1979), p. 373.

11. Members List, *Association of Former Intelligence Officers*, 1989.

12. Yale Yearbook, 1952



## Bush's "Secret Team"

by Jane Hunter\*

The media honeymoon that marked the first weeks of the Bush administration soon gave way to complaints that the new administration had no overall direction and no foreign policy. In April 1989, *New York Times* White House correspondent Maureen Dowd noted that:

White House officials worry that the coming evaluations of the "first hundred days" will suggest that the President has done little of note so far. They are nervous that pundits will charge that Mr. Bush has no agenda, no money, no strategy, no message, no ideology, no world view and no explanation of his mysterious role in the Iran-contra scandal.<sup>1</sup>

It might take some time for George Bush to assemble a coherent foreign policy, even one simply for purposes of display. However, from the very beginning, the Bush administration has had the mechanism—and the actors in place—for pursuing a covert foreign policy.

The day after his election, Bush announced he would receive daily briefings from the CIA. According to a former CIA official, "This is a major change. It says that Bush wants a very close and direct relationship with the agency, without any filters in between. It says something about the role of intelligence and the degree to which the CIA, not the other intelligence agencies, is going to be a major influence on policy development. It says to me that the agency is back in the saddle."<sup>2</sup>

Well before he took the oath of office, Bush wrote a letter to UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi assuring the longtime South African and CIA client of continued U.S. support for his war against Angola. One of Bush's first moves as president was to make a highly unusual appearance before the Congressional Intelligence Oversight Committee, asking them to fund a CIA operation to influence the May 1989 Panamanian elections.<sup>3</sup>

Unlike the ideologues of the Reagan era, the Bush people have no driving need to unite the nation in a war against "god-

less communism." The new administration does not want to lead public crusades. Indeed, it does not want anyone to look at what it is doing, or even wonder about it.

It is possible to draw these conclusions by looking at the history of the people whom Bush has appointed to senior positions in his administration. By examining the record, we see that many of the Bush appointees were involved in the Iran/contras affair and should probably be in jail rather than making policy. Furthermore, some of Bush's new (and old) recruits are longtime intelligence operatives.

### The New (and Old) Players

**Robert Gates:** Gates was deputy director of the CIA under the late William Casey, but Congress refused to consider him as Casey's replacement because of his knowledge of the CIA's role in the Iran/contras affair. Now, under Bush, he holds the position of deputy national security adviser.

At the NSC, it is Gates's job to convene a daily "deputies committee" meeting of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Director of the CIA, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and when needed, the Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense will attend. The idea, according to an administration official, is to avoid the plethora of inter-agency committees—the Restricted Inter-Agency Group (RIG) being the most infamous, which was devised to direct the secret war against Nicaragua.<sup>4</sup>

**John Tower:** One of several instances in which the President tried to repay those who helped him squeeze through the Iran/contras scandal was his nomination of John Tower as Defense Secretary. Tower, as the Reagan-appointed head of the Tower Commission, was the man who cleared Bush of complicity in the scandal—thus acquiring the moral status of co-conspirator. Bush stuck by Tower's nomination through weeks of revelations about the former Texas Senator's sordid past up until the time when the nomination went down in a lopsided defeat on the Senate floor.

Tower was asked during a question-and-answer session at the National Press Club whether his nomination was a "payoff" for the "clean bill of health" the Tower Commission gave Bush. He responded:

I think that when you consider the fact that the Commission was made up of three people, Brent Scowcroft and Ed Muskie in addition to myself, that would be sort of impugning the integrity of Brent Scowcroft and Ed Muskie.

4. Bernard Weinraub, "Bush Backs Plan to Enhance Role of Secret Staff," *New York Times*, February 2, 1989.

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1. Maureen Dowd, "White House," *New York Times*, April 14, 1989.

2. News Conference, November 9, 1988; Stephen Engelberg, "With Bush in the Oval Office, Is the CIA 'Back in the Saddle'?" *New York Times*, November 13, 1988. The article notes that the CIA briefed Bush every morning when he was Vice President, after which Bush "usually attended the national security briefing for Mr. Reagan."

3. Doyle McManus, "CIA Aids Opposition in Panama Election," *Los Angeles Times*, April 24, 1989, citing *U.S. News & World Report*.



that came to be known as the *contras* and to ensure continuing Honduran cooperation.<sup>9</sup> According to one report, Negroponte "allegedly helped [Gen. Gustavo] Alvarez Ferra Battalion 316, an elite unit responsible for more than 100 death squad killings."<sup>10</sup>



Credit: Rick Reinhard

**Robert Gates was slated to be head of the CIA but Congress refused because of his role in Iran/*contra*.**

In a written response to a question posed during his confirmation hearing, Negroponte wrote: "I was not involved in the operational details of *contra* activities, and my contact with *contra* leaders was strictly limited."<sup>11</sup>



kie.... We found nothing to implicate the Vice President.... I wonder what kind of payoff they're going to get?<sup>5</sup>

Perhaps Tower did not consider Scowcroft's appointment as Bush's national security adviser sufficiently rewarding.

**Thomas Pickering:** In December 1988 Bush appointed Thomas Pickering, another Iran/contras player, to the prestigious post of Ambassador to the United Nations. Former Secretary of State George Shultz recommended him to Ronald Reagan, who sent him as Ambassador to El Salvador, as "the cream of America's career diplomats."<sup>6</sup>

Yet during his time in El Salvador, from 1983-85, Pickering became entwined in the Iran/contras affair and never bothered to report some of his activities to the State Department.<sup>7</sup> In his (extensively censored) deposition to the Congressional committee investigating the Iran/contras scandal, Pickering admitted receiving a document in El Salvador from a representative of a "private" contras support group and delivering it to Oliver North in Washington, D.C.

The group was having trouble arranging for the delivery of the weapons and equipment—enough to outfit 4,000-5,000 contras—listed in the document and wanted it passed to contras boss Adolfo Calero. "At that point I had heard enough rumors of Ollie's activities in connection with private support for the contras that I thought he would be a useful address," Pickering told committee staffers. Later, he said, intelligence reached him that the weapons had been delivered.

Pickering also dismissed communications he received from Donald Gregg (at the time, Vice President Bush's National Security Adviser) regarding Felix Rodriguez as well as those from Gen. Paul Gorman, head of the U.S. Southern Command. Rodriguez was well connected to Bush and Gregg, as Gorman's communications clearly noted, and Oliver North wanted to use him as well. The general also spelled out that "Rodriguez' primary commitment to the region is in [one word censored] where he wants to assist the FDN," the main contras force bivouacked in Honduras.

Nevertheless, Pickering staunchly maintained that his contact with Rodriguez mainly concerned the helicopter warfare techniques he was supposedly developing for the Salvadorans.<sup>8</sup>

Pickering's contention that, during his tenure as ambassador in Israel, from 1985-1988, he had no idea that the arms-for-hostages machinations might be closer to the truth. The Israelis would hardly want regular reports going to the State Department of how, working through friends in the White House and the Iran/contras network, they were guiding U.S. policy toward Teheran.

5. "How Tower Responds," *New York Times*, March 2, 1989.

6. John M. Goshko, "Low-Profile, High-Prestige Diplomat," *Washington Post*, December 7, 1988.

7. Walter Pincus, "Pickering Told Hill Panel of Aiding Contras; Bush Choice for U.N. Assisted on Donation," *Washington Post*, December 8, 1988.

8. Deposition of Thomas R. Pickering, July 15, 1987, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, Appendix B: Volume 20, 100th Congress, 1st Session, H. Rep. No. 100-433, S. Rept. No. 100-216, pp. 950-996. Quotations, pp. 962, 973.

**John Negroponte:** Bush's choice as Ambassador to Mexico was John Negroponte, who was Ambassador—many thought the term proconsul was more descriptive—to Honduras between 1981 and 1985. A foreign service officer in Vietnam in the 1960s, then an aide to former Secretary of State Kissinger during the Paris peace talks, Negroponte was assigned in the early 1980s to oversee the assembling of the mercenary army that came to be known as the contras and to ensure continuing Honduran cooperation.<sup>9</sup> According to one report, Negroponte "allegedly helped [Gen. Gustavo] Alvarez create Battalion 316, an elite unit responsible for more than 100 death squad killings."<sup>10</sup>



Credit: Rick Reinhard

**Robert Gates was slated to be head of the CIA but Congress refused because of his role in Iran/contras.**

In a written response to a question posed during his confirmation hearing, Negroponte wrote: "I was not involved in the operational details of contras activities, and my contact with contras leaders was strictly limited."<sup>11</sup>

It is an open question as to whether Negroponte, whose last post in the Reagan administration was as deputy to National Security Adviser Colin Powell, is intended to preside over the dismantling of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) or to protect it from defeat by the ascendant coalition slightly to its left, led by Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas. The Mexican government was unimpressed with Negroponte's reportedly close personal connections with Bush and hesitated a week before approving his appointment. "The impression people have is that you don't send Negroponte to a place where you don't expect trouble," said Jorge Castañeda, a Mexican political scientist.<sup>12</sup>

9. Adam Platt, et al., "Have Savvy, Will Travel," *Newsweek*, February 20, 1989.

10. "Bush's ambassadorial mistakes," *Washington Report on the Hemisphere*, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Washington D.C., June 21, 1989.

11. Robert Pear, "A Bush Nominee Runs Afoul of the Contra Issue," *New York Times*, April 19, 1989.

12. *Op. cit.*, n. 9.



## Melton and Others

**Richard Melton:** George Bush has picked Richard Melton to be Ambassador to Brazil. Melton was Reagan's Ambassador to Nicaragua until he was kicked out in June 1988 for helping to organize a violent demonstration. Melton has an interesting knack for turning up in unstable political situations—he was stationed in the Dominican Republic when the U.S. invaded in 1965 and was sent as Ambassador to Portugal after the overthrow of the military government in 1974.

Ironically, a bit of Melton's previous experience was gained in Brazil when he was a political affairs officer at the U.S. consulate in Recife in 1968. Ricardo Zaratini, now an adviser to a member of the Chamber of Deputies, recently saw a picture of Melton and recognized him as one of two U.S. officials who interrogated him in 1968. Zaratini, at the time a union organizer, says he had been arrested several days earlier and tortured before his confrontation with Melton. The encounter was brief, said Zaratini. "They were wearing short-sleeve shirts. They did not touch me." Melton, recalled Zaratini, "asked me what I had against the United States."<sup>13</sup>

Brazilian officials, who had expected Herbert Okun, a former U.S. consul in Brazil, to be appointed, were greatly displeased.<sup>14</sup> Brazilian government sources said that, while Brazil would not refuse to accept Melton, he would be put at the end of a long list of diplomats waiting to be officially received.<sup>15</sup>

**Richard Armitage:** Another Bush nominee—and Iran/contras activist—Richard L. Armitage, withdrew from consideration for the post of Secretary of the Army to avoid hearings "that were expected to include questions about his role in the Iran-contras affair" as well as allegations of drug dealing during his service in the Vietnam war. Armitage also resigned as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

In December 1985, Armitage discussed Iran arms sales with Menachem Meron, the director-general of the Israeli defense ministry, and, according to an unreleased Israeli report on the Iran/contras affair, told Meron that, besides Secretary Caspar Weinberger, he [Armitage] was the only Pentagon official "in the picture on the Iranian issue."<sup>16</sup>

**Robert Kimmitt:** Robert Kimmitt is yet another actor involved in the Iran/contras scandal who now serves in the Bush administration. Kimmitt was the executive secretary of the NSC during much of the Reagan presidency. As a member of Bush's campaign staff, Kimmitt is credited with dreaming up the choice of Dan Quayle for vice president. Kimmitt is a West Point graduate and Vietnam veteran and is one of the only people to know if Dan Quayle is indeed "impeachment in-

surance" for Bush.<sup>17</sup>

According to one account, Kimmitt was not part of the Oliver North-Robert McFarlane inner circle at the NSC,<sup>18</sup> but he was involved in the *quid pro quo* deals with Honduras in 1985-86. (These were the agreements through which the Reagan administration secured Honduras's continued cooperation in the war against Nicaragua and in which George Bush played an important role.) As Bush's under secretary of state for political affairs, Kimmitt recently pressured Honduras into ignoring the agreement of the Central American governments to disband the *contras* and into dropping its demand that the mercenaries leave Honduran territory.<sup>19</sup>

**Cresencio Arcos:** Cresencio S. Arcos, Jr., commonly known as Chris Arcos was deputy director of the State Department's notorious Nicaraguan Humanitarian Aid Office between September 1985 and August 1986. Bush has recently chosen him to succeed Everett Briggs as Ambassador to Honduras.<sup>20</sup>

A career foreign service officer with the U.S. Information Agency since January 1973, Arcos had spent the five years leading up to his NHAO assignment as a public affairs counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Honduras under then Ambassador John Negroponte.

While in Honduras, Arcos said he had the opportunity to meet Oliver North and Felix Rodriguez. Rodriguez, he claims, "was referred to me by Mr. Jorge Mas Canosa, who is the President of the Cuban-American [National] Foundation in Miami."

In his deposition to the Congressional Iran/contras committee, Arcos recounted meeting Rodriguez again, in December 1985 during a stopover in El Salvador on a one-day trip to Honduras he made with Oliver North and deputy assistant secretary of state William Walker (now U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador). Arcos said he and Walker became good friends when Walker was deputy chief of mission in Honduras from 1980-82.

Arcos also recalled sitting at a meeting of the Restricted Inter-Agency Group (RIG) and listening to Walker, Elliott Abrams, and NHAO director Robert Deumling, discuss a request by Oliver North to give Rob Owen a consultancy at NHAO. After his stint at NHAO, Arcos went to the State Department once again, this time as coordinator for public diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean.<sup>21</sup>

**John Kelly:** John Kelly, a long time State Department employee, has been nominated to be Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Before he left to begin work as Ambassador to Lebanon in August 1986,

17. Joe Conason, "The New Zoo," *Village Voice*, November 22, 1988.

18. Jane Mayer & Doyle McManus, *Landslide* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1988), pp. 57-63.

19. "Honduras Bows to U.S. Pressure," *Washington Report on the Hemisphere*, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Washington D.C., June 21, 1989.

20. *Washington Report on the Hemisphere*, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Washington DC, July 5, 1989.

21. Deposition of Cresencio Arcos, May 11, 1987, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, Appendix B, Volume 1, 100th Congress, 1st Session, H. Rep. No. 100-433, S. Rept. No. 100-216, pp. 1239-1358. Quotations, pp. 1342 and 1253.

13. *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, May 31, 1989, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)*, Latin America, U.S. Department of Commerce, June 1, 1989, p. 47.

14. *Folha de Sao Paulo*, May 27, 1989, *FBIS Latin America*, May 31, 1989, p. 35.

15. EFE (Spanish News Agency, Madrid) 1400 UCT, June 2, 1989; *FBIS Latin America*, June 5, 1989, p. 42.

16. Andrew Rosenthal, "Armitage Withdraws as Army Secretary Nominee," New York Times News Service, *International Herald Tribune*, May 27, 1989.



Kelly sought out Robert McFarlane (then no longer National Security Adviser) and asked for his help in obtaining release of U.S. hostages in Lebanon. Kelly is also known to have met with an assistant of Oliver North regarding the same issue. Kelly acknowledged having known McFarlane for over a decade and having met North during the Reagan years.

McFarlane told Kelly that he might be asked to help with a hostage release and three months later he was. Kelly admits that he followed instructions from Oliver North and John Poindexter, McFarlane's successor, communicating through a back channel without informing the State Department. Secretary of State George Shultz reprimanded Kelly for this breach and sent him back to Lebanon. Kelly's involvement might have been more extensive — much of the testimony he gave Iran/contra committee investigators has been blacked out.<sup>22</sup>

**John Bolton:** In February 1989, Bolton became Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. Until that time, he was Assistant Attorney General, a post he also held under Attorney General Edwin Meese. In the Meese Justice Department, Bolton sabotaged Sen. John Kerry's investigation into *contra* connections with drug trafficking, according to an aide to Kerry's subcommittee on terrorism, narcotics and international operations, by failing to provide requested information and by working actively with Republican senators who were opposed to Kerry's investigation.<sup>23</sup>

**Herman Cohen:** Cohen, the Bush administration's new Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, was formerly on the Reagan administration's National Security Council staff. According to the London weekly *SouthScan*, Cohen "emerged as a key actor in the arming of Unita through Zaire"<sup>24</sup> which the CIA began after the repeal of the Clark Amendment in 1985.

**Lawrence Eagleburger:** The refusal of Eagleburger, who made \$900,000 last year as president of Kissinger Associates, to reveal the names of all the "consulting" company's clients during his confirmation hearing for Assistant Secretary of State in the Bush administration, provoked an outcry which led nowhere. (National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, another associate, salaried at \$293,000, also refused this request during his confirmation hearing.<sup>25</sup>) Speculation on exactly what Henry Kissinger has been doing as a private citizen — and for whom — resulted in the portrayal of Eagle-

**James Lilley, who was the CIA's China station chief when Bush was ambassador there...is now himself Ambassador to China.**

burger as a man who would have a special relationship with the political and corporate elites of the creditor nations.

Yet Eagleburger's involvement in the Reagan administration's covert partnership with Israel suggests that there will be an additional dimension to his function in the Bush administration, where cooperation with Israel is certain to be a key element in covert policy.

"Strategic cooperation" is the code phrase for U.S.-Israeli covert operations against developing countries that was formalized in three "strategic" agreements during the Reagan presidency. In 1983, a U.S.-Israeli political-military committee was established and David Kimche, director of the Israeli foreign ministry, and Eagleburger "were named as coordinators of the new strategic cooperation outside the Middle East."<sup>26</sup> Kimche and Eagleburger met at least three times, the last one being in April 1984, when a major topic on the agenda was Israeli support of the administration's activities in Central America.<sup>27</sup>

In addition to Donald Gregg,<sup>28</sup> Bush has kept at least two other CIA veterans in circulation. James Lilley, who was the CIA's China station chief when Bush was ambassador there (and was most recently Ambassador to South Korea, following a stint at the NSC and in the Taiwan diplomatic office),<sup>29</sup> is now himself Ambassador to China, where he is well positioned to continue the covert relationship, most notably coordination of Cambodia policies.

Vernon Walters, formerly deputy director of the CIA and most recently the Reagan administration's Ambassador to the United Nations, is now serving as Ambassador to West Germany.<sup>30</sup> It is not clear whether Walters will continue the special missions to trouble spots around the world that kept him busy during his tenure at the UN. He has already made it clear, however, that he is dead set against the nuclear disarmament that West Germans are increasingly demanding.<sup>31</sup>

With this crew of Iran/contra conspirators assembled, it would be wise for the major media outlets to have reporters mulling over administration handouts and statements for subtle signs of purpose.

Perhaps now some of the highly regarded (and highly paid) columnists and news analysts who were so shocked when the Iran/contra scandal broke might not be so easily fooled the next time around.

22. Deposition of John H. Kelly, June 10, 1987, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, Appendix B, Volume 14, 100th Congress, 1st Session, H. Rep. No. 100-433, S. Rept. No. 100-216, pp. 1153-1206.

23. David Corn and Jefferson Morley, "Beltway Bandits," *The Nation*, April 17, 1989.

24. "Hopes for Unita cut-off recede as Mobutu's dependence on Washington increases," *SouthScan*, April 5, 1989.

25. "The out-of-office reign of Henry I," *U.S. News & World Report*, March 27, 1989.

26. "Israeli arms sales pick up," *Latin America Weekly Report*, January 13, 1984.

27. John M. Goshko, "Israeli Technical Aid to El Salvador Part of Meetings Here," *Washington Post*, April 21, 1984.

28. See Jane Hunter, *The VP's Office: Cover for Iran/Contra*, this issue.

29. *The Today Show*, NBC, June 8, 1989; Jim Mann, "Bush Reportedly Picks Ex-CIA Officer as Ambassador to China," *Los Angeles Times*, February 2, 1989.

30. See "Vernon Walters: Crypto-diplomat and Terrorist," *CAIB* Number 26, Spring 1987, p. 3.

31. Terrence Petty, "Bluntness is trademark of new U.S. envoy to Bonn," *AP, Sacramento Bee*, April 25, 1989.



## The Republican Party and Fascists

by Russ Bellant\*

It is May 17, 1985: Ronald Reagan has been back in the nation's capital less than two weeks after his much criticized trip to the Bitburg cemetery in West Germany. Now, floodlights and television cameras that are part of a President's entourage are waiting at the Shoreham Hotel, as are 400 luncheon guests.

Ronald Reagan had recently characterized the Nazi Waffen SS as "victims" and these comments held special meaning for some of his afternoon luncheon guests. Although it was a Republican Party affair, it was not the usual GOP set, but a special ethnic outreach unit, the National Republican Heritage Groups (Nationalities) Council (RHGC).

The RHGC is an umbrella for various ethnic Republican clubs and operates under the auspices of the Republican National Committee. It has a special type of outreach and appears to have consciously recruited some of its members — and some of its leaders — from an Eastern European émigré network which includes anti-Semites, racists, authoritarians, and fascists, including sympathizers and collaborators of Hitler's Third Reich, former Nazis, and even possible war criminals. The persons in this network are a part of the radical right faction of the ethnic communities they claim to represent.

These anti-democratic and racist components of the RHGC use anticommunist sentiments as a cover for their views while they operate as a defacto émigré fascist network within the Republican Party. Some of the unsavory personalities who were present in that 1985 luncheon audience would later join the 1988 election campaign of President George Bush.

This fascist network within the Republican Party represents a small but significant element of the coalition which brought Ronald Reagan into the White House. It is from this network that the George Bush presidential campaign assembled its ethnic outreach unit in 1988 — a unit that saw eight resignations by persons charged with anti-Semitism, racism, and even Nazi collaboration.

### Axis Allies and Apologists

This network organizes support for its ideological agenda through national and international coalitions of like-minded constituencies which often work with other pro-fascist forces.

\*Russ Bellant is a researcher who has written extensively on the rise of the New Right in the U.S. This article is an edited version of a monograph by the Political Research Associates. The monograph entitled, "Old Nazis, The New Right and the Reagan Administration," is available for \$5 from: Political Research Associates, 678 Massachusetts Ave., Suite 205, Cambridge, MA 02139.

This broader coalition ranges from Axis allies and their apologists to friends and allies of contemporary dictatorships and authoritarian regimes.

In the case of the Republican Heritage Groups Council, the nature of this network can be illustrated by briefly reviewing the backgrounds of some of the past and current leadership:

- Laszlo Pasztor: The founding chair and a key figure in the Council, Pasztor began his political career in a Hungarian pro-Nazi party and served in Berlin at the end of World War II. He continues to be involved in ultra-rightist groups and fascist networks while working with the GOP.
  - Radi Slavoff: The RHGC's executive director is a member of a Bulgarian fascist group and leader of the Bulgarian GOP unit of the Council. He was able to get the leader of his Bulgarian nationalist group an invitation to the White House even though that leader was being investigated for concealing alleged World War II war crimes. He is also active in other émigré fascist groups.
  - Nicolas Nazarenko: A former World War II officer in the German SS Cossack Division, Nazarenko heads the Cossack GOP unit of the Republican Heritage Groups Council and has declared that Jews are his "ideological enemy." He is still active with pro-Nazi elements in the U.S.
  - Florian Galdau: He is a close associate and defender of Valerian Trifa — the Romanian archbishop prosecuted for concealing his involvement in war crimes of the pro-Nazi Romanian Iron Guard. Charged by former Iron Guardists and others with being the East Coast recruiter for the Iron Guard in the U.S., Galdau heads the Romanian Republican unit of the RHGC.
  - Philip A. Guarino: He is a honorary American member of the conspiratorial P-2 Masonic Lodge of Italy, which plotted in the early 1970s to overthrow the Italian government in order to install a dictatorship. Guarino, an Italian Heritage Council member and Republican National Committee advisor, offered aid to those P-2 members being investigated.
  - Anna Chennault: The newly-elected Republican Heritage Groups Council chairperson and funder of the Chinese Republican affiliate, which for years has been closely linked to the authoritarian Taiwan regime.
- The names of all but one of the persons listed above appeared on the invitational literature for the October 1987 meeting of the National Republican Heritage Groups



(Nationalities) Council in Washington, D.C.

#### History of the Republican Heritage Groups Council

Many of the RHGC leaders of Central and Eastern European nationalities were part of the post-World War II immigration from displaced persons camps. It would be unfair to suggest that all or even a majority of Eastern and Central Europeans were anti-Semites or fascists. Most displaced persons were victims of the war who played no role in collaborating with Nazism. Yet quite a few persons in the displaced persons camps were there as political escapees to avoid the consequences of their collaboration with the German occupation of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The Displaced Persons Commission, which worked from 1948 to 1952, arranged for approximately 400,000 persons to come to the U.S.<sup>1</sup> Initially it sought to bar members of pro-Nazi groups, but in 1950 a dramatic reversal took place. The Commission declared "...the Baltic Legion not to be a movement hostile to the Government of the United States."<sup>2</sup> The Baltic Legion was also known as the Baltic Waffen (armed) SS.

The final report of the Commission noted that the decision "was the subject of considerable controversy,"<sup>3</sup> as well it should have been. The Waffen SS participated in the liquidation of Jews in the Baltic region because the SS units were comprised of Hitler's loyal henchmen, recruited from fascist political groups long tied to the German Nazi Party. Anyone opposed to the German occupation of the Baltic region (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) was likely to meet a cruel death at their hands. They were now considered qualified to come to the United States, to become American citizens. Further, pro-Nazi elements from other parts of Europe came to the U.S. through nominally private groups associated with the Commission.

In 1952, the Commission completed its work. The Eisenhower-Nixon presidential campaign was on and the Republicans were charging the Democrats with being "soft on Communism." Talk of "liberating" Eastern Europe became part of the GOP message. That year, the Republican National Committee formed an Ethnic Division. Displaced fascists, hoping to be returned to power by an Eisenhower-Nixon "liberation" policy, were among those who signed on. This would become the embryo for the formation of the Republican Heritage Groups Council in 1969.

In a sense, however, the foundation of the Republican Heritage Groups Council lay in Hitler's networks in Eastern Europe before World War II. In many Eastern European countries the German SS set up or funded political action or-

**The founding chair of the Republican Heritage Groups Council was Laszlo Pasztor, an activist in various Hungarian rightist and Nazi-linked groups.**

ganizations that helped form SS militias during the war.

In Hungary, for example, the Arrow Cross was the Hungarian SS affiliate; in Romania, the Iron Guard; The Bulgarian Legion, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the Latvian Legion, and the Byelorussian (White Russian) Belarus Brigade were all SS-linked. In each of their respective countries, they were expected to serve the interests of the German Nazi Party before and during the war.

This should not be taken to suggest that all Eastern and Central Europeans were Nazi collaborators who participated in atrocities, but it is a historical fact that some rightwing elements from virtually every Eastern European nationality tied their nationalistic goals to the rising star of fascism and Hitler's racialist Nazism.

#### The Council's Leadership

The founding chair of the Republican Heritage Groups Council was Laszlo Pasztor, an activist in various Hungarian rightist and Nazi-linked groups. In World War II Pasztor was a member of the youth group of the Arrow Cross, the Hungarian equivalent of the German Nazi Party.<sup>4</sup>

When Pasztor came to the U.S. in the 1950s, he joined the GOP's Ethnic Division. One of the leaders of the 1968 Nixon-Agnew campaign's ethnic unit, Pasztor says that Nixon promised him that if he won the election, he would form a permanent ethnic council within the GOP, as the Ethnic Division was only active during presidential campaigns.

Pasztor was made the organizer of the Council after Nixon's victory. Pasztor claims, "It was my job to identify about 25 ethnic groups" to bring into the Republican Heritage Groups Council. "In 1972 we used the Council as the skeleton to build the Heritage Groups for the re-election of the President."<sup>5</sup>

Pasztor's choices for filling émigré slots as the Council was being formed included various Nazi-collaborationist organizations mentioned above. Each formed a Republican federation, with local clubs around the country. The local clubs of the various federations then formed state multi-ethnic councils. Today there are 34 nationality federations and 25 state councils that constitute the National Republican Heritage Groups Council.

According to RHGC delegates interviewed during the May 1985 conference, in setting up the Council, Pasztor went to various collaborationist and fascist-minded émigré groups and asked them to form GOP federations. It eventually became clear that it was not an accident or a fluke that people with Nazi associations were in the Republican Heritage

1. U.S. Displaced Persons Commission, *Memo to America, The DP Story, The Final Report of the Displaced Persons Commission* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. V.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 101.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Jack Anderson, "Nixon Appears a Little Soft on Nazis," *Washington Post*, November 10, 1971, p. B17; Nora Levin, *The Holocaust: The Destruction of European Jewry 1933-1945* (New York: T.Y. Crowell, 1963; Schocken Books, 1973), pp. 610-11, 644, 653-55, 662-64.

5. Interview with Laszlo Pasztor, Washington, D.C., May 15, 1985.



Groups Council. In some cases more mainstream ethnic organizations were passed over in favor of smaller but more extremist groups. And it seems clear that the Republican National Committee knows with whom they are dealing. A review of the federations will illustrate this point.

#### Bulgarians

One of the organizations which Pasztor approached to help form the RHGC was the Bulgarian National Front, headed by Ivan Docheff. As early as 1971, the GOP was warned that the National Front was beyond the pale. A Jack Anderson column quoted another Bulgarian-American organization, the conservative Bulgarian National Committee, which labeled Docheff's National Front as "fascist."<sup>6</sup> Neither the GOP nor the Nixon campaign took action. Professor Spas T. Raikin, a former official of the National Front, says the group grew out of an organization in Bulgaria that in the 1930s and 1940s was "pro-Nazi and pro-fascist."<sup>7</sup>

Docheff, age 83, is semi-retired from GOP activity, and the National Front is now represented by Radi Slavoff, Republican Heritage Groups Council executive director and head of the Bulgarian GOP federation. Slavoff also represents the National Front in several other Washington, D.C. area coalitions, including one that is Nazi-linked.<sup>8</sup>

While Docheff was representing the National Front, the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations (OSI) was investigating him for possible war crimes he was suspected of committing while the mayor of a German-occupied city in Bulgaria. Docheff denies he ever committed war crimes, and the OSI never brought charges.

Docheff's political history, however, is not in dispute. Founder of a Bulgarian youth group in the early 1930s, Docheff met with Adolf Hitler and the Nazi movement's leading philosopher, Alfred Rosenberg, in 1934, shortly after the Nazis came to power.<sup>9</sup> Docheff then established the Bulgarian Legion, a pro-Hitler group that agitated for government action against Bulgarian Jews.

#### Romanians

Romanian-American Republicanism is led by a retired priest who, in 1984, said that the most important issue for Romanian Republicans is stopping "...the deportation of our beloved spiritual leader, Archbishop Valerian Trifa."<sup>10</sup> Faced with charges by the OSI that he participated in the murder of Jews as part of a coup plot in Bucharest, Romania in 1941, Trifa left the U.S. in 1984. But his political network stayed behind. The Romanian Republican priest, Florian Galdau, is part of that network.


After the war, Trifa was able to come to the U.S. and take over the Romanian Orthodox Church by means of physical coercion and with some help from the U.S. government. In

1952, Trifa became an Archbishop of the Romanian Orthodox Church.<sup>11</sup>

FBI documents from 1954 and 1955 (which were used in the prosecution of Trifa) show that Trifa "is bringing Iron Guard members into the U.S. and installing them as priests." One of those priests, according to a document dated October 5, 1955, was Florian Galdau, whom an FBI source described as "a Romanian Iron Guard member and who at Trifa's instructions was elected Pastor of St. Dumitru," a Manhattan parish.<sup>12</sup>

#### Friends of Dictatorships

Certain Republican Heritage Groups Council members have close allies in Italy who have plotted to overthrow the



Credit: Russ Bellant.

George Bush stands next to Bohdan Fedorak at the 1988 Captive Nations banquet in Warren, Michigan.

government and re-install fascism in Rome. Italy's problems with fascism have been much more recent than World War II. In 1981, Italian authorities uncovered a conspiracy in which a group of business, political, Mafia, military, and Vatican-connected figures planned to overthrow Italian parliamentary democracy and install a dictatorship. The group, called the P-2 Masonic Lodge, had nearly a thousand members. The prestige of P-2 members (heads of the intelligence agencies, 38 generals and admirals, and 3 cabinet officers, for example), plus revelations of financial scandals, brought extensive European press coverage, the collapse of the Italian government, and a parliamentary inquiry.<sup>13</sup>

One American involved in this intrigue was Philip A.

11. Howard Blum, *Wanted: The Search for Nazis in America* (New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co., 1977), pp. 109-11, 114-16. Trifa offered an opening prayer for the U.S. Senate on May 10, 1955, at the request of Richard Nixon, who presided over the Senate as part of his vice-presidential duties.

12. "Viorel Donise Trifa," FBI Memo (April 6, 1954), p. 1; on Galdau, "Viorel Donise Trifa," FBI Memo (October 5, 1955), p. 2. Copies of these memos are in the possession of the author.

13. *New York Times*, May 25-June 10, 1981; Thomas Sheehan, "Italy: Terror on the Right," *New York Review of Books*, January 22, 1981, pp. 23-26. Also, Luifi Di Fonzo, *St. Peter's Banker* (New York and London: Franklin Watts, 1983); Larry Gurwin, *The Calvi Affair* (London: MacMillan, 1983).

6. Anderson, *op. cit.*, n. 4, p. B17.

7. Interview with Spas T. Raikin, by telephone, August 1986.

8. Interview with Ivan Docheff, by telephone, September 1984.

9. Interview with Professor Frederic Chary, Detroit, MI, August 1984. Chary is author of *Bulgarian Jews and the Final Solution* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972).

10. Interview with Florian Galdau, by telephone, September 1984.



Guarino, 79, an adviser on senior citizens' affairs to the Republican National Committee, who was long active in Italian GOP politics. A theology student in Mussolini's Italy in the late 1920s and much of the 1930s, Guarino helped establish the ethnic division of the GOP in 1952. He was vice-chair of the Republican Heritage Groups Council from 1971-75.<sup>14</sup> He attended the 1985 Council convention to ensure that his friend, Frank Stella, won the chairmanship of the Council in a tight race with former Cleveland mayor Ralph Perk.

Guarino was also described in *St. Peter's Banker*, a book about activities involving P-2, as an "honorary member of P-2."<sup>15</sup> Foreign members of P-2 were rare. Another member of the select group was José López Riga, founder of the Latin American death squad group known as the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance (AAA).



Credit: Coalitions for America

**Laszlo Pasztor, founding chair of the Republican Heritage Groups Council.**

Guarino was also involved in John Connally's Committee for the Defense of the Mediterranean, which disseminated propaganda on the Italian Communist Party (PCI) supposed threat to the West.<sup>16</sup> Connally was Richard Nixon's Secretary of the Treasury and member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under Nixon and Gerald Ford.<sup>17</sup> In 1978, Guarino's friend and ally, Frank Stella, became National Chair of the "Heritage National Committee of Connally for President," when Connally sought the 1980 GOP nomination for president.<sup>18</sup>

Later Stella got on track with Ronald Reagan. Mark Valente, a Stella protégé and suburban Detroit City Council member now serving as a Republican National Committee Ethnic Liaison staffer, says, "Everyone at the White House

knows Frank." Stella's name has gone through the White House appointment process on several occasions. In 1981 he was nominated for the little-known Intelligence Oversight Board, which is supposed to monitor the legalities of covert operations of the intelligence agencies.<sup>19</sup> He withdrew his name after it had been publicly released. Stella was being considered for the post of Ambassador to Italy in 1985, but withdrew his name again, according to Valente. In 1983 he was made a White House Fellow.

### Taiwan's Input

The Chinese-American and Asian-American Republican federations are led by Anna Chennault, who gained fame in the 1950s and 1960s as an ardent advocate of Chiang Kai-Shek's dictatorship of Taiwan. Both federations appear to be little more than adjuncts to Taiwan government activities in the U.S. This fact was highlighted at the 1985 RHGC convention when an official Taiwan Republican Heritage Groups Council delegation arrived at the meeting as part of a nationwide tour belatedly celebrating Reagan's second inauguration four months earlier. While the foremost visitor from Taiwan was the Deputy Minister for National Defense, the honorary president of the delegation was Ben John Chen, who also chairs the Asian-American Republican Federation.<sup>20</sup> Other Chinese and Asian GOP federation members are part of trade groups linked to Taiwan.

The Republican Heritage Groups Council agenda was interrupted at the Chinese federation's request so that the delegation could present awards from the Taiwan government to Michael Sotirhos, the outgoing Republican Heritage Groups Council chair (who later became Reagan's ambassador to Jamaica). Also receiving an award from the Taiwan regime was Anna Chennault, who funds the Asian-American GOP federation, according to Chen. Chennault became RHCG chair in 1987.

### Ethnic Realignment

The Republican Heritage Groups Council's ethnicity is broad, ranging from Albanians to Vietnamese. But two groups are missing at the RHGC. There are no African-American or Jewish Republican federations. Remarks by a number of delegates at the 1986 RHGC meeting made it clear that there was no desire to have either community represented on the Council.<sup>21</sup> Republican leaders say that African-American and Jewish relations are "special" and are dealt with in separate units of the GOP.

The key issues for every one of the Eastern European Heritage Council leaders interviewed were foreign policy issues. All of them called for more support for Radio Free

19. *Op. cit.*, n. 14, p. 767. The announcement was made October 20, 1981, according to an undated White House letter received by the author in February 1984.

20. The delegation's membership, their backgrounds and planned itinerary were described in a booklet distributed at the Republican Heritage Groups Council meeting, "President Reagan's [sic] Reinauguration Celebration Delegation" (Room 8, 11F, 150, Chi Lin Road, Taipei, Taiwan: Chinese Times, 1985).

21. A proposal to create such affiliates was roundly denounced by delegates at the June 1986 convention.

14. *Who's Who in American Politics: 1987-1988*, 11th ed. (New York and London: R.R. Bowker Co., 1987), p. 258.

15. Di Fonzo, *op. cit.*, n. 13, p. 229.

16. Gurwin, *op. cit.*, n. 13, p. 189.

17. *Who's Who in America: 1984-1985*, 43rd ed. (Chicago: Marquis Who's Who, 1984); Gurwin, *op. cit.*, n. 13, pp. 12, 189-190.

18. Stella's curriculum vitae, 1986, p. 2.



Europe and Radio Liberty. Most called for the abandonment of the Yalta agreement, the major treaty that set the post-war policy against the Soviet Union. The most aggressive foreign RHGC participant in is the annual "Captive Nations" rallies held in cities across the U.S. "Captive Nations" is the term used to describe countries which have communist governments.

The Republican National Committee seems to identify the RHGC as one of its keys to past electoral success and future opportunities. Republican Chairman Frank Fahrenkopf told the 1985 Council meeting, "On behalf of the Republican Party I want to express thanks for all of you in this room who were such a vital, integral part of the great victory we achieved on November 6 last year. We couldn't have done it without you, and I want you to know that."<sup>22</sup>

A few minutes later, President Reagan told the meeting, "The work of all of you has meant a very great deal to me personally, to the Party, and to our cause....I can't think of any others who have made a more vital contribution to the effort than those of you who are in this room today....I want to encourage you to keep building the Party. Believe me, bringing more ethnic Americans into the fold is the key to the positive realignment that we are beginning to see take shape."

Former RHGC chair Michael Sotirhos said in an interview that "The Council was the linchpin of the Reagan-Bush ethnic campaign....The decision to use the Republican Heritage Groups was made at a campaign strategy meeting that included Paul Laxalt, Frank Fahrenkopf, Ed Rollins, and others." He claims that 86,000 volunteers for Reagan-Bush were recruited through the Council.<sup>23</sup>

### Forgive and Forget

The GOP cannot be ignorant of the backgrounds of their ethnic leaders. When Nixon was encouraging the growth of the Republican Heritage Groups Council in 1971, Jack Anderson did a series of reports on the pro-Nazi backgrounds of various GOP ethnic advisors. Included in the reports were Ivan Docheff and Laszlo Pasztor. In November of 1971, the *Washington Post* did a story that elaborated on some of the fascist elements coming into the GOP.<sup>24</sup>

On August 2, 1988, many of the key figures in the RHGC were named as leaders of the George Bush presidential campaign's ethnic outreach arm, the Coalition of American Nationalities (CAN). These included Anna Chennault, Walter Melianovich, Laszlo Pasztor, Frank Stella, Radi Slavoff, Philip Guarino, and Florian Galdau. Other persons on the Bush ethnic panel with questionable views or pasts were Bohdan Fedorak and Akselis Mangulis.

In September 1988, Pasztor, Slavoff, Guarino, Galdau, Fedorak, Brentar, and Ignatius Billinsky resigned from the Bush panel following revelations about their pasts or views ap-

22. Quotations from the 1985 Republican Heritage Groups Council convention are from the author's own notes of the event.

23. Interview with Michael Sotirhos, Washington, D.C., September 1984.

24. Peter Braestrup, "GOP's 'Open Door': Who's Coming In?," *Washington Post*, November 21, 1971, p. A1.

pearing in the *Washington Jewish Week*, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, and the extended version of this article which was published by Political Research Associates.

Bush adviser Fred Malek resigned from the Bush campaign after the *Washington Post* identified him as having compiled lists of Jews working at the Bureau of Labor Statistics on orders from the Nixon White House.

In early November, the *Philadelphia Inquirer* raised questions about a Latvian member of CAN, which prompted the final resignation, that of Akselis Mangulis, charged with having belonged to the pro-Nazi Latvian Legion which had connections to the SS.

While Bush campaign spokespersons pledged there would be an investigation into the backgrounds and views of the CAN members whose resignations it had announced, no serious investigation ever took place, and the campaign repeatedly



Credit: RHGC

Frank Stella and Florian Galdau at RHGC Convention.

referred to the charges as unsubstantiated politically-motivated smears. Several of the persons who had been reported as resigning told journalists they had never been asked to resign and considered themselves still active with the Bush campaign. Furthermore, Guarino, Slavoff, Galdau, and Pasztor are still active with the Republican Heritage Groups Council.

As a candidate, President Bush defended Galdau, Pasztor, Guarino, and Slavoff as innocent of all accusations of collaboration, and insisted they are all honorable men. But the historical record belies his assertions.

The GOP for decades has misread ethnic America's concerns about crime, employment, anti-ethnic discrimination and the future of its youth. It has offered instead the fascism and ethnic prejudices of the Heritage Council, which focuses primarily on funding Radio Free Europe and stopping Justice Department prosecutions of Nazi-era war criminals who illegally entered the country.



## NED Overt Action:

# Intervention in the Nicaraguan Election

by William Robinson and David MacMichael\*

A great deal of attention is being paid to the Nicaraguan election, to be held on February 25, 1990. While most outside observers see the elections as a contest between the governing FSLN (the Sandinistas) and their political opposition within the country, the Sandinistas view the elections as another stage of the struggle between the Nicaraguan Revolution and the government of the United States.

Although current U.S. strategy does not rule out a military element, its thrust is to transfer the anti-Sandinista struggle from the battlefield to the political arena. This strategy dates from the August 1987 Esquipulas Accords where the Central American presidents signed an agreement that sealed the defeat of Reagan's armed counterrevolutionary project. Even though the Republican right wing denounced the Esquipulas agreement and did their worst to undermine it, many Democrats and the more pragmatic Republicans accepted the *contras'* military defeat and made plans to exploit the political openings within Nicaragua. The slogan in Washington changed from "support the freedom fighters" to "democratization in Nicaragua."

The U.S. Embassy in Managua declared it was going to strengthen ties and gain increased influence with the "civic opposition."<sup>1</sup> The State Department put out a call for "other governments, foreign political organizations and private U.S. foundations...to fund the Nicaraguan opposition."<sup>2</sup>

Soon after, the U.S. government began sending money, supplies, and political specialists to Managua in support of the anti-Sandinista opposition. This was the beginning of the all-out U.S. effort to create an anti-Sandinista political opposition.

The U.S. strategists faced a difficult task. For years the opposition believed that a *contra* military victory or a U.S. invasion would oust the Sandinistas. This left the internal political opposition fragmented and lacking any real grassroots political support. Splintered into some two dozen parties and factions, the opposition wasted its time on internal bickering. The U.S. largesse exacerbated divisions because it made money available for any professed opposition group. For many, anti-Sandinista activity was more business

than politics.

In addition, many of the brightest potential opposition leaders left the country to join the constantly reshuffled ranks of CIA-organized *contra* political fronts. A Bush State Department official described the situation as, "Reagan's policy was to take the political protagonists out of Nicaragua; ours is to put [them] back in."

Thus, the first task for the U.S. was to bring the internal and external political fronts together: "Unification is the single most important ingredient for the success of the opposition."<sup>3</sup>

The U.S. needed to provide the opposition with a political definition that went beyond vague anti-Sandinista rhetoric. Next would come intensive training for "civic activists" and political instruction in building party infrastructures, youth and women's organizations. All these would then form the framework for the U.S. anti-Sandinista strategy.

As one Bush official explained, "The 1990 elections figure prominently in the administration's strategy toward Nicaragua. They give us a chance to test the Nicaraguans, to mobilize all international pressure possible against [the Sandinistas]..., to transfer the conflict in Nicaragua to the political terrain."<sup>4</sup>

### The "Democracy Network"

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was set up by the Reagan administration in 1983 as an instrument to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives through direct political intervention in other countries. At the time of its inception, NED's founders explained that the public nature of NED activities would provide an important tactical alternative to clandestine CIA intervention.<sup>5</sup>

NED is funded wholly by Congress and its main purpose is to provide grants—in close consultation with the State Department—to U.S. organizations working to create and support the growth of pliant political institutions abroad. Although its charter defines it as "promoting democracy abroad," the NED 1985 annual report outlines its work as

3. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), internal memorandum, "Nicaragua, Municipal Elections," the report is of an NDI survey mission, October 31, 1987, prepared by Martin Anderson and Willard Dupree.

4. Peter Rodman, National Security Council (NSC) representative, in testimony to the "Bipartisan Commission on Free and Fair Elections in Nicaragua," May 10, 1989, Washington, DC. Rodman is Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs at the NSC. He opened his statement confirming he was speaking on behalf of the administration.

5. Memorandum prepared by David MacMichael for the Institute for Media Analysis' "Nicaragua Election Monitoring Project," November 1989.

\* William Robinson is the ANN (Nicaragua News Agency) correspondent in Washington, DC and co-author of *David and Goliath: The U.S. War Against Nicaragua*. David MacMichael, a former CIA analyst, is an outspoken critic of U.S. intervention who researches and writes on U.S. foreign policy.

1. See *Central American Information Bulletin*, February 24, 1989, special report, "The Chileanization of the Nicaraguan Counterrevolution," William Robinson. See also, *New York Times*, August 26, 1987, October 15, 1987.

2. State Department briefing, August 10, 1987.



such "planning, coordinating and implementing international political activities in support of U.S. policies and interests relative to national security."

There are four "core" groups which receive most of their funding from NED and which are tied to different facets of U.S. political and foreign policy structure.<sup>6</sup> These groups are the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and its Republican counterpart, the National Institutes (NRI) (the international affairs departments of the Democratic and Republican parties, respectively), the Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI) (the operational part of the American Institute for Free Labor Development [AFLD], whose ties to the CIA are well documented and which acts to generate moderate, pro-U.S. labor movements in Latin America), and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Center on International Private Enterprise (CIPE).

The logic behind this so-called "democracy network" is that the first two groups (NDI and NRI) form the bridge with political parties and organizations, the third (FTUI) forges ties with labor, and the fourth (CIPE) with private enterprise. The U.S. is using this intervention strategy throughout the world.

Beyond the "core" groups are a host of secondary organizations directly tied to U.S. foreign policy and intervention. These groups include Freedom House, the Center for Democracy, as well as many others who have received NED funding to begin election projects in Nicaragua. Among more "shadowy" groups receiving funding from NED for programs in Nicaragua are the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), Delphi International, the Simon Bolivar Fund, and the Centro para las Asesorías Democráticas (CAD). In Fiscal Years 1989 and 1990, Congress appropriated \$12.5 million for NED to use in the Nicaraguan electoral process.<sup>7</sup> If we just consider the \$12.5 million of U.S. political aid this averages to about \$10 per voter. It is the equivalent of a foreign power injecting \$2 billion into a U.S. electoral campaign.

On August 4, 1988 NED held a major meeting in Washington, DC to map out "a more broad-ranging strategy" for developing the opposition. Present at the meeting were NED officials, core group representatives, and Richard Melton, the then recently-expelled U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua. The record of the meeting speaks of

- "...enlisting the support of the Central Americans generally,
- "...in preliminary phases — create lines of vertical command,
- "...continue to organize seminars and workshops, focusing on imparting group dynamics, styles of leadership, hypothetical situations,
- "...encourage more outside visitors to Nicaragua; visitors can provide moral and political support.

6. Carl Gershaman, president of NED, public testimony before the International Operations Subcommittee, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, September 26, 1989.

7. Congress approved \$1.5 million in a special Nicaragua appropriation in September 1988, then another \$2 million in June 1989. In October it approved \$5 million, allocated specifically for the electoral process.

- "...try to establish a permanent [U.S.] presence in the country."<sup>8</sup>

In expectation of future funding the August 1988 meeting was used to map out a plan for expanding organizing activities in labor, the communications media, business, women and youth. A month later Congress approved \$2 million which would go through NED to fund these programs. New contracting groups were brought in to administer the projects.

#### U.S. Parties Get Involved

NDI and NRI act as major conduits for NED funding of the Nicaraguan opposition and have received NED money for work on a "democratic development program"<sup>9</sup> in Nicaragua. The initial phase of this program called for formalized and systematic contacts with the opposition. An internal NDI document describes the initial efforts:

NDI and NRI, following conversations in Washington with visiting [Nicaraguan] party representatives and meeting with the other core institutes of the NED, visited Caracas, Panama, and Nicaragua to hold exploratory talks with civic opposition leaders.... Follow-up talks have also taken place and FTUI and CIPE have agreed to pursue opportunities for strengthening the civic opposition.<sup>10</sup>

NDI President Brian Atwood explained, "We have set about to unify the opposition and orient its anti-Sandinista activities."<sup>11</sup>

In 1987, NDI and NRI began organizing seminars with opposition leaders in Managua and abroad. According to an NDI official, these seminars "generate international support and attention for the opposition leaders, put the Sandinistas on notice, and explore the possibilities for the civic opposition to take major advantage of the Esquipulas opening."<sup>12</sup>

The seminars, funded with \$600,000 in NED grants, "provide[d] training, in how to formulate organizational strategy and tactical planning, to the civic opposition... designed around three core themes: party planning and organizational strategies, constituency building, and coalition formation.... U.S. and international experts will be brought in."<sup>13</sup>

These initial efforts also involved U.S. political consultants who analyzed the opposition groups' strengths and weaknesses. One NDI team went to Managua and reported:

The purpose of the mission was to find the answers to the following questions: 1) what are the prospects of democratization in Nicaragua? 2) what are the

8. Internal NED document, August 1988.

9. *Op. cit.*, n. 3.

10. *Ibid.*

11. *Central America Information Bulletin*, op. cit., n. 1.

12. NDI Program Assistant Michael Stoddard, in testimony before the Bipartisan Commission on Free and Fair Elections in Nicaragua, May 10, 1989, Washington, DC.

13. NED's executive summary on Nicaragua projects, "Programs of the Endowment and its Institutions in Nicaragua," 1988; updated version, Fall 1989.



capabilities and needs of the democratic opposition? 3) What program(s) could be developed by NDI to assist the democratic opposition in presenting a unified, effective challenge to Sandinista rule?

On the surface, the overall environment for change in Nicaragua appears to favor the opposition. The economy is in shambles.... Poverty and despair are evident everywhere.... It is hard to know where the Sandinista mismanagement ends and the country being bled white by the *contra* war begins. This should not be a problem for the democratic opposition; incumbents are almost always blamed for the mess at hand....

But, the various political parties which are included in the opposition have been unable or unwilling to forge an effective coalition due to personal or ideological rivalries....<sup>14</sup>

### Delphi International Group

Another private organization central to the U.S. government's plan to influence the Nicaraguan electoral



Credit: Delphi International Group

**Paul Von Ward, President of Delphi.**

process is the Delphi International Group. In 1988, Delphi was the largest single recipient of NED funds.

In 1988 Henry R. Quintero directed Delphi's Nicaraguan operations.<sup>15</sup> Quintero is an intelligence community veteran. Since World War II, he has served as an intelligence analyst with the Department of Defense, State, and U.S. Information Agency (USIA). He helped run the Institute for North-South Issues (INSI), which was exposed in the Iran/*contra* scandal as an Oliver North front group which had laundered illegal *contra* funds, while at the same time holding a \$493,000 NED contract.<sup>16</sup>

Delphi's president is Paul Von Ward, a former government official who has held several delicate State Department posts

14. *Op. cit.*, n. 3.

15. Phone interview with Delphi President Paul Von Ward.

16. Ben Bradlee, Jr., *Guns and Glory: The Rise and Fall of Oliver North* (New York: Donald I. Fine, Inc., 1988), pp. 233-36.

in the U.S. and overseas between 1966-79. These problems included special personnel adviser to the Director General, the Foreign Service and U.S. coordinator of a special NATO committee on the "Challenges of Modern Society."

One of Delphi's projects is the "Nicaraguan Independent Media Program." This program is designed to strengthen opposition media, including *La Prensa*. In 1984-85, *La Prensa* received \$150,000 in NED funds.<sup>17</sup> Beginning with 1986, Delphi has acted as the conduit for NED funds to *La Prensa*, and more recently the amount of funding has jumped to almost \$1 million.<sup>18</sup>

Delphi has also established the "Independent Radios Project" which equips and advises opposition radio stations in Nicaragua. It was begun with initial grants from NED totaling \$150,000. In a memo from Delphi to NED the group stated that "Radio remains the best means for reaching the masses of Nicaragua...."<sup>19</sup>

In August 1989, the Bush administration suspended the United States Information Agency funded *contra* radio station, "Radio Liberacion," operating from Honduras, and redirected its propaganda efforts to creating "Radio Democracia," a new outlet inside Nicaragua.

An October 19, 1989 letter from opposition leader Roger Guevara Mena to NED reported that the Board of Directors for "Radio Democracia" had been formed. The board was comprised exclusively of anti-Sandinista opposition leaders. "Radio Democracia," the letter explained, would serve as an "instrument of democratization and the formation of a civic consciousness, functioning both in the pre and post-election period, in order to offset the FSLN's instruments for consciousness formation."

Two of Delphi's Nicaraguan operations targeted youth and women, these groups were identified by NED strategists as special constituencies critical to the elections. Early in 1988, NED awarded Delphi \$33,000 to create the Centro de Formación Juvenil (CEFOJ)<sup>20</sup> and in 1989 another \$118,000 to consolidate this new "civic youth organization."<sup>21</sup>

According to internal Delphi documents, their plan was to hold seminars throughout 1988 for a core group of youth leaders from rightwing political parties. As a paid national leadership, this group would identify regional leaders. These regional leaders would oversee local activists who would work in the nation's secondary schools, communities, and recreational centers to organize an anti-Sandinista political youth

17. NED Annual Reports, 1985-87; *op. cit.*, n. 13.

18. *La Prensa* began to receive covert CIA subsidies as early as 1979 to enable it to play the counter-revolutionary role that *El Mercurio* had done during the Allende years in Chile and that *The Daily Gleaner* performed in Jamaica in 1976-1980 in the anti-Manley effort. In Nicaragua, the result was that the incorruptible managing editor, Xavier Chamorro, resigned along with 80 percent of the staff to found the pro-Sandinista *El Nuevo Diario*. The new editor, Violeta's son, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, later went into self-exile in Costa Rica where, on a CIA salary supposed to have been several thousand a month, he published an exile edition of *La Prensa* and served on the contra political directorate.

19. "Support for Nicaraguan Independent Radios," internal Delphi document, June 1989; *op. cit.*, n. 13.

20. *Op. cit.*, n. 13.

21. *Op. cit.*, n. 13.



movement.

This system of "multiplier" political training is standard in most NED-funded programs in Nicaragua. This method of political organizing is recommended in CIA, AID, and Department of Defense political operations manuals.<sup>23</sup> In fact, some of the language of the Delphi documents is remarkably similar to that of the CIA's 1984 *contra* "assassination manual" — *Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare*. One major difference is that the old reference to the "freedom struggle" against "communist dictatorship" has been updated to refer to the "civic struggle" for "democratic objectives."

Delphi's "women's project" focuses on organizing efforts in the marketplace. "Nicaraguan women have begun to speak of the decisive role they must play in organizing rallies and protests." The document prescribes "seminars and workshops tailored to train 'multipliers' to train and motivate their peers to participate."<sup>24</sup>

Meanwhile, the Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI) worked to bring labor into the program. Like their political counterparts, the non-Sandinista trade union movement was splintered into small groups of diverse ideologies.

These groups include the Confederation of Trade Union Unity (CUS), two opposing Christian Democratic labor factions — both of whom call themselves the Nicaraguan Workers' Confederation (CTN), the General Confederation of Labor — Independent (CGTI), and the Communist Party's Federation of Trade Union Action and Unity (CAUS). It was the U.S. government's strategy to unify the union movement. Thus, FTUI used \$992,000 in NED money<sup>25</sup> to bring together the factions, at least nominally, in the Permanent Workers Congress (CPT). U.S. second secretary of the Embassy, David Nolan worked directly in this process.<sup>26</sup>

According to U.S. analysis, labor was especially critical to the election project. Although the Sandinistas had strong worker support, the U.S. strategy was to exploit Nicaragua's economic crisis in an attempt to turn the workers against the FSLN. From 1984 to 1989, FTUI received just under \$2 million in NED grants for its labor programs;<sup>27</sup> this however does not include covert funding.

An FTUI internal document dated August 22, 1989 expressed satisfaction with its progress and described plans to spend \$1 million more for mobilizing workers and their families. FTUI planned to organize 4,000 activists "to mount an effective, nation-wide effort to register workers and their families and then see that they vote." FTUI's training, super-

vision and direction of the effort was considered "crucial." The plan involved using a trained Managua headquarters staff to supervise an elaborate network reaching down to ten-member voter teams in towns and villages.

#### The United Nicaraguan Opposition

After months of negotiations, it was announced in June 1988 that the Union Opositora Nicaraguense (UNO) would be the formal coalition to represent the opposition in the upcoming elections. Their presidential candidate is *La Prensa* director, Violeta Chamorro.

Congress has stipulated that NED and its funding should only be used to "bolster democratic political systems...[and] to support democratic activities in Nicaragua...."<sup>28</sup> However, the majority of NED funding is going to specifically support UNO. In 1989, the CIA provided \$5 million in covert funding for UNO "house-keeping,"<sup>29</sup> and it is estimated that the CIA gave \$10-12 million in the previous year.<sup>30</sup>

According to the independent research group, Hemisphere Initiatives, U.S. covert and overt support to anti-Sandinista political groups in Nicaragua totaled \$26.1 million over the last five years. Added to this money is substantial funding provided by European, principally West German conservative foundations.<sup>31</sup>

In April 1989, the five Central American presidents signed the Costa del Sol agreement in which Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega agreed to call early elections. The U.S. took this as a signal to begin intensive efforts to organize the anti-Sandinista election campaign.

In an April 1989 meeting at the U.S. Embassy, NED representatives and *charge d'affaires* John Leonard planned the creation of the formal coalition which was later to become UNO. An internal NED document states that their primary strategy was to "organize the opposition around a single candidate. It should include as many parties as possible, COSEP and the labor movement, women and youth. The CDN [Coordinadora Democratica Nicaraguense] would form the core..."<sup>32</sup>

NED had earlier given Delphi International \$22,000 to consolidate CDN as the core group and to carry the unity process forward.<sup>33</sup> After the Costa del Sol agreement advanced the elections, a flood of visitors raced to Managua from Washington, DC to take part in the unity negotiations, including the president of NED, Carl Gershman. It was made clear to opposition figures that failure to get on-board meant no U.S. money. One top opposition leader confessed to a friend, "The pressures on me from the Embassy to join are

22. "Youth voter education project in Nicaragua," NED summary of the Delphi programs, June 1989; "CEFOJ Evaluation," internal Delphi evaluation of the first year of the program.

23. Department of the Army, "U.S. Army Guide for the Planning of Counter-insurgency" (Washington, DC, 1975); William Robinson and Kent Norworthy, *David and Goliath* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987), p. 216.

24. "Women's voter education and training project in Nicaragua," internal Delphi document presented to NED, June 1989.

25. NED Annual Reports, *op. cit.*, n. 17.

26. See William Robinson, "Special Report: The Melton Plan — Chronicle of a Destabilization Plot Foretold," *Central America Information Bulletin*, August 10, 1988.

27. *Op. cit.*, n. 13.

28. AID Report to Congress on Public Law 101-119, November 1989, *Newsweek*, September 25, 1989.

29. UPI Dispatch, August 1, 1988.

30. West German foundations which support UNO include the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the Friederick Naumann Foundation. The West German donations alone are in the several million dollar range. For more information see, Ralph Fine, David Krusk, Jack Spence, and George Vickers "Hemisphere Initiatives: Nicaragua Election Update Number 2 — Foreign Funding of the Internal Opposition," Boston, October 16, 1989.

32. Internal NED document, April 1989.

33. *Op. cit.*, n. 13.



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IFES) to administer *Via Civica*.<sup>37</sup> On the IFES board of directors sit many Reagan-era *contra* supporters. The Chair of IFES is F. Clifton White (also on the board of NRI), who oversees the CIA develop covert propaganda used to encourage U.S. public support for the *contras*.

The IFES treasurer is Richard Stone, a rightwing Republican and former Senator from Florida. In the early 1980s Stone was Reagan's roving ambassador to Central America where he played a key role in supporting the *contras*. Stone is currently the chief operating officer of the Miami and Washington-based Capital Bank, which houses the accounts of UNO and IFES.<sup>38</sup>

Robert Walker is another IFES official. He was a White House aide to President Reagan and is currently vice president of Coors Brewing Company, which provided millions of dollars in private *contra* assistance. Walker is a close personal friend of *contra* political director Adolfo Calero.

In June 1989, Henry Quintero, having launched Delphi's media, youth, and women's projects, transferred to IFES to oversee its Nicaragua program, *Via Civica*.<sup>39</sup>

### The Flow of Funds

As in countless other interventions, the U.S. is attempting to buy the Nicaraguan elections. In pursuit of this goal, the U.S. is flooding the country with money during a time of general economic hardship. One observer calls this the "strategy of gringo dollars." In violation of Nicaraguan law, millions of NED dollars marked for political use have entered the country without being registered with the Central Bank.

As late as November 1989, UNO still claimed to have not received funding from the U.S. Yet, a *Barricada* report explains how U.S. payments to opposition groups are laundered.<sup>40</sup> The article reports that hundreds of thousands of dollars which IFES provided for UNO use in voter registration was laundered through a Nicaraguan company, Construcción y Proyectos, SA (CYPASA). CYPASA is the local subsidiary of Inversiones Martinez Lopez (IML). IML was funded by a one-time Somoza minister of finance who moved to Miami after the overthrow of the regime. IML recently opened an office in San José, Costa Rica.

CYPASA's president is Jeronimo Sequiera, a COSEP and *Via Civica* leader. *Via Civica*'s president, Carlos Quinonez, acknowledges that he sent Sequiera to San José to meet with Henry Quintero and IFES president Richard Soudriette on August 1, 1989.<sup>41</sup> On August 28, Quintero entered Managua and registered with immigration officials as a "consultant for CYPASA."

On each of the four registration Sundays in October 1989, UNO party workers set up refreshment stands at registration centers, and gave out thousands of sandwiches, coffee, and cold drinks. The UNO teams were transported in flashy new

Toyota jeeps. For many, these scenes recalled the days of Somoza elections when peasants were trucked to the polls and rewarded for their vote with a meal and cheap liquor.

Although UNO denies receiving any money from the U.S. government, it has requested plenty. Its campaign budget, drawn up by the U.S. Embassy in Managua, and made available by a UNO delegation which visited Washington, DC in September, totalled \$5.67 million. This included \$1.24 million in salaries for campaign staff; \$2,000 a month for the national campaign manager; \$1,000 a month for the national directors; and \$500 a month for administrators and publicity ministrators. There is also \$337,000 in vacation pay budgeted, \$525,000 to run rallies and meetings, \$600,000 for poll watchers, and \$50,000 for international travel.

*Via Civica* is also able to spend openly. It has budgeted



Credit: CPAC

### F. Clifton White, Chair of IFES.

\$55,000 for salaries, but many observers regard this as money to be spent for buying votes. Henry Quintero has acknowledged that IFES is paying 1,500 *Via Civica* "volunteers" a dollar a day, a considerable inducement in today's Nicaragua.<sup>42</sup> High school students at one registration center in Managua told reporters the CEFOJ activists were giving out free T-shirts and offering students 20,000 cordobas (about one-half days' wages at the time) to sign up with UNO.<sup>43</sup>

### Centro para las Asesoría Democrática

The U.S. is also coordinating the opposition's campaign from three key offshore centers. They are Miami, Caracas, and San José, Costa Rica. The U.S. has also established opposition centers in every Central American capital and their activities are coordinated regionally from San José through an NED conduit, Centro para las Asesoría Democrática (CAD). CAD began under the name "Asociación Pro-

37. *Op. cit.*, n. 13.

38. Holly Sclar, "Washington Wants to Buy Nicaragua's Elections—Again," *Zeta Magazine*, December 1989, p. 46.

39. Telephone interview with IFES Director, Richard Soudriette.

40. *Barricada*, October 10-11, 1989.

41. *Ibid.*

42. From a source close to IFES.

43. *Barricada*, October 9, 1989.



Democratica" (APD). Between 1986-87, it received at least \$250,000 from NED for the "training and civic education" of the Nicaraguan opposition.<sup>44</sup> In 1988, NED decided to expand APD's role, and changed its name to Centro para las Asesorías Democráticas. NED then gave CAD \$247,000 to "improve the communications within and among the organizations of the Nicaraguan democratic opposition and promote regional solidarity with the non-violent struggle for democracy in Nicaragua."<sup>45</sup>

With the beginning of the electoral process in April 1989, NED decided to link CAD more directly to the specific NED electoral projects. CAD would reinforce the already existing programs run by Delphi, the IFES, the FTUI, and the NDI and NRL. The plan called for CAD to inject clandestine and overt support to bolster these projects.<sup>46</sup>

The range of CAD activities included sending "reporters" from Costa Rica to reinforce the *La Prensa* staff in Managua. It also purchased Toyota vehicles in Costa Rica for UNO and then drove them into Nicaragua in order to avoid paying Nicaraguan import taxes.<sup>47</sup>

### The Miami Connection

The city of Miami, where there is a large Nicaraguan exile community, has been transformed from a *contra* rearguard to a base for the electoral effort. A number of new Nicaraguan "civic opposition" groups have been formed there. The largest is the "Committee for Free Elections and Democracy in Nicaragua," headed by José Antonio Alvarado. In September and October 1989, Alvarado, with help from NRL, raised approximately \$30,000 to produce UNO T-shirts and baseball caps which were sent to Nicaragua for distribution during the registration period. Alvarado also confirmed that the committee was receiving private donations from "wealthy Americans."<sup>48</sup>

*La Prensa* has recently opened a post office box in Miami for all its international correspondence. *La Prensa* will send a courier three times per week to pick-up its mail and bring it to Managua.

An important element in the Miami operation is the television station "Channel 23," owned by the Spanish-language UNIVISION network. In early 1989, the State Department contracted Channel 23's Carlos Briceño to develop a television production facility in Managua. On September 15, 1989 NED approved a grant for \$200,000 to begin the project. In October, NED authorized NRL and NDI to rechannel some \$300,000 into the television project.

In a letter from Briceño to the anti-Sandinista opposition, Briceño states:

44. *Op. cit.*, n. 13.

45. *Op. cit.*, n. 13.

46. ADF document, "Modified Programmatic Structure and Contents for NED Grant 89-08.0 (Elections Nicaragua-90)," July 1989. One of the U.S. conduits that NED used to fund CAD is the America's Development Foundation (ADF). This Alexandria, Virginia-based organization is headed by Michael Miller.

47. Internal CAD document, "CAD - Centroamérica. Participation Through Media and Civic Organizations," November 2, 1989.

48. Phone interview with José Antonio Alvarado, October 1989.

"This production facility, in addition to producing commercials for the political campaign, will also prepare reports in English and Spanish on the electoral process aimed at abroad, in order to keep the world informed on the Sandinistas' compliance or non-compliance...."

"...If you participate in the elections and there are anomalies [sic], the opposition needs to have the capacity to almost instantly transmit an international condemnation of this fraud through the use of satellite signals...."

In early May 1989, Briceño met with Jeb Bush, son of the president and a close friend of *contra* leader, Adolfo Calero. A few days after the meeting, Bush sent Briceño a letter which strongly endorsed the television project and wished him "every success in generating political and financial support."

Briceño also received help from the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) whose president, Edward O. Fritts, sent letters to NAB affiliates soliciting "broadcast equipment which would be used to establish a facility to produce TV programming on behalf of groups opposing the Sandinistas."

Briceño also has stated that he intends to violate Nicaraguan law by trying to avoid import duty on the broadcasting equipment. In a letter to Barbara Haig, program director at NED (and daughter of Alexander Haig), Briceño wrote, "...According to Luis Sanchez (UNO's 'Communications Director'), I won't have any trouble introducing the equipment. In the worst case I would have to pay a 15 percent import duty on it, which would not be substantial since purchase receipts could be fudged down."

### The Contra Role

The Bush administration has opted for the electoral route in Nicaragua yet it has refused to forsake the *contras* as a bargaining chip. Moreover, the old guard of the *contra* leadership retains a certain degree of clout because of its ties to Nicaragua's right wing opposition and the U.S. far Right.

Meanwhile, in Congress, the Democratic leadership entered into a bipartisan compromise which sent \$47 million in "humanitarian aid" to the *contras*. It was understood that the *contras* were to remain in their camps and undertake no offensive actions inside Nicaragua.

However, there appears to have been some rethinking of this strategy after the 10th anniversary celebration of the Sandinista Revolution. This event produced a groundswell of support for the FSLN which greatly troubled the U.S. government. On August 8, 1989, the Central American Presidents signed the Tela Accords, calling for the demobilization of the *contras* by December 5th. This sent shock waves through the U.S. government as policy makers scrambled to find a way to stop the demobilization.

In August 1989, the *contras* announced that there would be a large increase in the level of *contra* infiltration from Honduras. The rationale behind this move was to avoid detection by the U.N. monitoring troops sent as a condition of the Tela Accords. By September, Nicaraguan intelligence found that this number had reached 1,000 a month.



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It was clear that the reappearance of the *contras* was not separate from the electoral activity. Nicaraguan government officials believed the *contra* infiltrations would recreate fear in the rural areas after months of relative peace; thus the Sandinistas could not maintain their claim to have militarily defeated the *contras*. The lesson would be drawn that unless the Sandinistas were voted out, there would never be peace. The *contras* also hoped to provoke government reactions such as a reintroduction of the military draft which would alienate voters or that could be denounced by the opposition as interfering with the electoral process.

Nicaraguan government reports and independent investigators (including the North American church group, Witness for Peace) state that the *contras* have both openly and covertly acted for UNO. In one case in the town of La Gateada in Chontales, in September, numerous witnesses testified that the *contras*, trying to pass themselves off as state security officers, murdered a local resident who had been accused of being a Sandinista infiltrator of UNO.

Elsewhere the *contras* carry and distribute UNO leaflets. Peasants have reported being threatened at gunpoint by *contras* who tell them they must vote for UNO. During most of 1988, *contra* military actions averaged about 50 per month. That figure jumped to 100 in the first half of 1989 and by October, it had risen to 300 actions per month.<sup>49</sup> Sandinista electoral officials have been threatened and murdered and during the October 1989 registration period at least 37 registration places had to closed because of *contra* military actions.<sup>50</sup>

In November 1989, *Barricada* caused a controversy by reprinting a letter allegedly from Alfredo Cesar to Enrique Bermudez that had appeared in *El Tiempo*, the independent newspaper of San Pedro Sula, Honduras. In it Cesar tells Bermudez not to demobilize because the existence of the *contras* is necessary for a UNO victory.

Cesar denounced it as a forgery and former President Jimmy Carter, at an Atlanta conference, criticized the Sandinistas for dirty politics in reprinting the letter. However, until a few months ago Cesar, as a political director of the *contra* movement, routinely made such statements publicly.

As for Bermudez, in October 1989, he signed the following communiqué:

We want to express all our backing and unconditional support for the UNO candidates.... We are not going to put down our arms, we are not going to accept demobilization.... We will carry on in the mountains with our weapons loaded against Sandinismo. So as to avoid fraud, we are going to prevent Sandinista accomplices and collaborators from registering. We are going to assure the triumph of UNO.<sup>51</sup>

After a *contra* ambush killed 18 young reservists in route to their hometowns to register for the elections, President Daniel

Ortega angrily announced the end of the government's unilateral cease-fire. UNO denounced Ortega's action as detrimental to the holding of free elections. The U.S. media and Congress reacted by condemning the Sandinista revocation of the cease-fire, not the killing of the reservists.

#### Conclusion

Whether the U.S. effort to oust the Sandinistas pays off in February 1990 remains to be seen. However, the long-term intervention strategy should not be lost sight of. University of Southern California professor, and executive director of Inter-American Dialogue, Abraham Lowenthal writes, "Even if [the opposition] does not win — and defeat is probable — the



Credit: NDI

NDI President, Brian Atwood (second from left).

[electoral] effort opens the way.... In the long run, their best chance of countering the Sandinistas is by building national support step by step. Sustained internal opposition can eventually pay off."<sup>52</sup>

In its attempt to defeat the Sandinistas, the U.S. government has organized an astonishing array of resources and has expended huge sums of money. Even though NED claims to be a legitimate, above-board institution, it is in reality, a quasi-official conduit for U.S. covert and overt activities in Nicaragua and in dozens of other countries.<sup>53</sup>

NED claims it is building a framework for democracy in Nicaragua. However, a close examination of NED documents clearly shows it is attempting to manipulate the electoral process to U.S. government ends. Through NED's "legitimate" activities, the U.S. government obfuscates its true intentions for Nicaragua.

U.S. actions toward Nicaragua have a strange and disturbing Orwellian character. Intervention is defined as non-intervention. Non-partisan bodies are made up of highly partisan figures. Those who champion democracy in Nicaragua have shown contempt for democracy in the rest of the world.

This is the new covert action. Kinder, gentler and open to view — if you only know where to look and what to look for. ●

52. Abraham Lowenthal, "Even Loss in Nicaragua Vote Can Be Gain," *Los Angeles Times*, September 20, 1989, Op/Ed page.

53. A policy report by the Resource Center provides good background material on NED activities. The report is due to come out in February 1990. For more information write, The Resource Center, P.O. Box 4506, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 87196.



## We Need Your Help

We recently sent a letter to all our subscribers asking for their help in funding our work. To all those people who responded, we want to express our deepest thanks.

To all those who received our letter and haven't yet had the time to respond, and to those loyal readers who buy *CAIB* off the newsstand, we need your help as well.

I know many of you are going to see this letter and say "oh no, not another fund raising letter" but please take a minute and read this—learn a little more about just what *CAIB* does and why your support is so important.

First, as most of you recognize, *CovertAction Information Bulletin* is a unique magazine containing articles which you will not find in other places. It is an important outlet for information and an important asset in the struggle against U.S. government abuses.

We all know that the CIA is repeatedly involved in destructive covert activities all around the world. The problem is that the "mainstream" press refuses to write about them. The difference is—we do.

Our value as a magazine is that we provide an outlet for information that the U.S. government would rather not see in the public domain. Your contributions support this critical voice and help to provide knowledge for those organizing and struggling for progressive change in the U.S. and around the world.

There is, however, another side of *CAIB* that you probably don't know about. When we are not working on the magazine, we spend our time doing research for other writers, keeping our files current, and helping countless organizations, individuals, and media outlets to expose the covert activities of the CIA.


Our office houses an enormous collection of data and resources on a multitude of CIA operations, rightwing organizations, and government documents. Our library contains over 1000 books on the CIA, covert operations, and intelligence-related activities.

We play an important role in providing information and we need your support to continue our work. I'm not going to "cry wolf" and tell you that we're going to fold if we don't get your money immediately. The truth is, we are always on the edge, always struggling to raise money.

The important thing to remember is that when you contribute to *CAIB*, you are not just helping to publish a magazine—you are supporting solid, yet often unrecognized, political work.

Please contribute as much as you can to *CAIB* and help to continue the fight against destabilizing CIA intervention. A lot of people are counting on it.

Our sincerest thanks,

  
Bill Vornberger  
for the *CAIB* staff

Send your contribution to: *CAIB*, P.O. Box 50272, Washington, DC 20004.  
(Contributions of \$100 or more can be tax-deductible if made to our fiscal sponsor, the Institute for Media Analysis.)



## Book Review:

# Cults and Christian Warriors

by Fred Clarkson\*

*Spiritual Warfare: The Politics of the Christian Right* by Sara Diamond, South End Press, 116 St. Botolph Street, Boston, MA 02115; *Combatting Cult Mind Control* by Steven Hassan, Park Street Press, One Park Street, Rochester, VT 05767.

It is rare when a book comes along that takes the wind out of the sails of the conventional wisdom. Rarer still when there are two. It could leave the conventional wisdom rudderless. This wisdom has told us that the Religious Right is dead or dying. We've also been told that "cults" are not a problem anymore, and that criticism of "new religions" is simply religious and/or racial intolerance. For anyone who has heard and not known how to respond, or believes these notions, *Spiritual Warfare: The Politics of the Christian Right* by Sara Diamond, and *Combatting Cult Mind Control* by Steven Hassan may help the convention-bound jump ship.

Much has been written about low-intensity conflict in recent years. But on the critical intersection between LIC and the activities of the Christian Right, reporting has been piecemeal and there has been little analysis. *Spiritual Warfare* establishes Sara Diamond as the foremost writer in this emerging field of investigative reporting and scholarship.

Much has also been written about "cults" and "mind control," as complex and controversial a subject as there is. Thus Steven Hassan's book is a guide for the perplexed, offering practical advice on how to view and what to do about unethical techniques of recruitment and indoctrination used by "cults." Hassan is an ex-Moonie leader, with a Master's Degree in counseling psychology, and ten years' experience as an "exit counselor" (as distinct from a "deprogrammer").

Hassan defines a cult as a group that practices "mind control;" he explains what it is, how it works, and suggests sensible, humane ways for friends and family to regain contact with a loved one, and perhaps help them find an "exit" from a group that seems to have them locked in.

The significant political implications of this are only touched on in the book itself. Many of the right-wing or fascist groups discussed in *Spiritual Warfare* are cults. The political utility of cult-controlled individuals to intelligence agencies and national security states is well documented in *Spiritual Warfare*. Tactics for community leaders, families and societies for dealing with cults are the subject of *Combatting Cult Mind Control*.

### Spiritual Warfare

While the U.S. media were obsessed with the sexual peccadillos of Jimmy Swaggart, and the outrageous criminal

frauds (and, of course, sexual escapades) of Jim Bakker, Sara Diamond was investigating the political activities of the Christian Right. She reveals, among other significant, and generally unreported, activities, Swaggart's assistance to dictators Augusto Pinochet of Chile, Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay, and the white minority regime in South Africa.

*Spiritual Warfare* is a primer on the history, ideology, factions, and plans of the Christian Right, focusing on the 1970s and 1980s when it emerged as a political force. Though there is much noteworthy reporting on U.S. politics, some of the most original and remarkable reporting is on international operations. One may find many of the roots of contemporary Christian broadcasting in the international radio broadcasts of the Cold War. "...[O]ne can point to a dramatic shift in the role of missionary radio when," writes Diamond, "after World War II, evangelicals decided to broadcast into countries that were closing its [sic] borders to U.S. missionaries." For example, after Mao's victory in China, the Far East Broadcasting Company was established, and according to Sig Mickelson, the former head of Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) it was a "U.S. government operation with intelligence ties similar to RFE and RL."

The message articulated the Manichean Cold War vision of good Christian vs. evil atheistic communists who persecute Christians for their faith. These themes played domestically as well, and continue today. Diamond details how these themes were used during the Reagan administration's war on Nicaragua — and even exposes a phony persecutee, who was popular on evangelical Christian talk shows.

There are many such stories of the recent foreign adventures of the U.S.-based Christian Right. For example — the extensive support provided by evangelicals (especially Pat Robertson), to the genocidal Gen. Ríos Montt of Guatemala during 1982-83. This support for Montt (a member of a U.S. based Pentecostal sect) had the blessing, if not partnership, of the Reagan administration. For many evangelicals, it was also a political epiphany: "The Guatemalan experience, however vicarious, of a born again Christian shepherding an entire nation reinforced a mentality...that they could seize the reigns of power and install — by force if necessary — a 'kingdom of God on earth.'"

Diamond persuasively argues that in order to understand the strategy of "total war" employed by the U.S. and other governments, it is necessary to study the role of religion. "It is doubtful," she insists, "that counterinsurgency could be effective without the use of religion. Because the conduct of 'psychological operations' relies on the successful interpretation and manipulation of a target population's deeply held beliefs and cultural practices, the functional use of religion

\*Fred Clarkson is a Washington, D.C. based freelance journalist. He has written extensively about the Religious Right.



simply must be addressed...."

There are discussions of such operations in the Philippines, Central America, Southern Africa, and the Middle East, including an updated report on the Christian Right's collusion with South African government propaganda and political operations and its peculiar relationship to the government of Israel. The Christian Right's role in Oliver North's supply lines to the *comras* is further explored — as is the report that it is still intact, untouched by the Iran/contras scandal.

"Humanitarian aid, and psychological operations are the two areas of total war where the Christian Right serves U.S. foreign policy best," she continues. The Christian Right as "promoters of anti-communist ideology use religion to mask the aggressive, cynical use of 'humanitarian' projects. Cloaked as missionary evangelism, the 'spiritual warfare' component of counter-insurgency escapes serious attention by anti-intervention activists..." and most everyone else. One brief example: The head of Pat Robertson's Operation Blessing relief arm, Robert Warren, is a retired U.S. Navy Captain and a veteran of counterinsurgency programs in the Philippines. In 1984, Warren and Harry "Heinie" Aderholt of the Air Commando Association established a medical clinic in Guatemala as part of "then president Gen. Mejia Victores's counter-insurgency 'model village program.' The model villages where civilians are 'protected' by the military, have frequently been declared by human rights observers as *de facto* concentration camps."

One of the critical discussions in *Spiritual Warfare* is the relationship between cults and the national security state. Diamond describes, for example, how fanatical cultic groups are being organized and armed into vigilante death squads in the Philippines. What's more, Diamond reveals the CIA's long term interest in cults: "At least as early as 1964, the CIA was aware of the political potency of such groups. In a 1964 'National Intelligence Survey,' the CIA analyzed a pseudo-Catholic Filipino cult called 'Iglesia Ni Kristo' (Church of Christ), which then represented an estimated one percent of the population and which, the CIA noted, was distinguished by its intense authoritarianism, its multi-tiered cell group structure, and the fact that members were required to vote for 'church designated political candidates.' In other words, the CIA analysts understood the political utility of the kind of 'shepherding' groups described in Chapter 4."

Indeed, in Chapter 4, Diamond documents the role of shepherding cults in American politics, and other countries. In shepherding cults, one "submits" to a "shepherd" influence, who may not control just religious, but all aspects of life; personal relationships, finances and politics. Many in Pat Robertson's "hidden army" of activists in the 1988 presidential campaign were members of shepherding cults, notably Maranatha Campus Ministries.

Of tremendous significance is the covert cooperation between Protestant and Catholic shepherding leaders, who have worked secretly together since 1968, orchestrating much of the "charismatic revival" in mainstream Protestant and Catholic churches. In fact, mainstream Christianity has been systematically infiltrated by charismatic shepherding cells

which peel away members, or influence, even take over congregations. Mainstream Christianity has not fully come to grips with its cult problems. Nor has the secular Left, which not only faces off politically with such groups, but has cults of its own. Several cults of the Left wreak havoc in coalitions and in the broader progressive movement, notably the New Alliance Party led by Lenore Fulani, and (former Lyndon LaRouche associate) Fred Newman.

### Combatting Cult Mind Control

The attack of cultic groups on communities can be profoundly disorienting, leaving people feeling helpless before strange, even fearsome entities. Hassan demystifies the cult phenomenon, providing clear definitions, and guidance for how to distinguish between what is a cult, and what is just an unconventional group. Hassan says that mind control, or "thought reform," is not to be confused with "brainwashing," which best describes methods used on political prisoners, to extract false confessions, etc. Mind control is more subtle, not usually involving physical force. It does involve deceptions intended to place people in vulnerable positions for purposes of indoctrination, which Hassan says usually involves forms of hypnosis and sophisticated manipulations of group dynamics.

Hassan stresses that he believes in religious freedom, recalling the random abuses he suffered as a "Moonie." His is a case study in how to distinguish between fair criticism and bigotry. It is important to note that cults are not just religious, but may be political, commercial, or psychotherapy groups. Thus the use of "mind control" is what distinguishes a cult.

Ultimately, this book is about empowerment—how individuals and societies can defend themselves against these unethical applications of behavioral sciences. The reader is provided with resource lists, usable definitions, and simple communication and investigative strategies for when a loved one falls under cultic influences—as well as strategies for intervention. Hassan teaches for example about how to use one's history and strengths of family, community, beliefs, and individual identity to reach and rescue people from false, cultic identities: "...cult mind control never fully succeeds in erasing a person's core self. It does impose a dominating cult identity...As a Unification Church member, I thought that the old Steve Hassan was dead. Yet the core 'me' woke back up during my deprogramming. He had been there all along."

"I have discovered," he writes, "that when someone in slavery is given a free choice, he or she does not choose to be enslaved." It is not unlike people in company towns who form unions to stand up to a domineering industry, or societies that rise up against unjust political or economic elites.

*Spiritual Warfare* makes clear that cults are being deployed by powerful interests to further their political agendas. But whether a cult is connected to power or not, *Combatting Cult Mind Control* warns: "People who know how mind control operates will have a distinct advantage over those who do not." Similarly, those who need to understand the Christian Right, and read *Spiritual Warfare*, will have a distinct advantage over those who do not.



El Salvador 1989:

# Elections Under State Terror

by Terry Allen and Edward S. Herman\*

On March 19, 1989, in an election in which two thirds of the eligible voters did not vote, the ARENA party won full control of the government of El Salvador. Chile's General Augusto Pinochet was the first to congratulate the President-elect, Alfredo Cristiani. It was a fitting conclusion to a U.S. investment of \$4 billion, in the interest of "democracy," that power should fall into the hands of a party founded and still strongly influenced by the death squad organizer and "pathological killer" Roberto D'Aubuisson.<sup>1</sup> It was also predictable that the U.S. mass media and leading liberal Democrats would still find this election, as they had its predecessors, a legitimating exercise in democracy.

We will review here the background of the March 1989 election and the reasons why it was democratic in form but not in substance.

## The 1982 and 1984 Elections

The 1982 and 1984 elections in El Salvador were classic examples of "demonstration elections" and effectively served their purpose: they induced the U.S. mass media and the Congress to find El Salvador a "democracy" worthy of material and moral support, and money flowed there to sustain administration policy. That policy was exclusively military, aiming at the defeat of the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) by a counterinsurgency (CI) war of attrition; the elections were simply a public relations (PR) arm of this military effort.

The U.S. mass media helped make the 1982 and 1984 demonstration elections successful by failing to acknowledge and discuss the primacy of the CI war and the role of elections in clearing the ground for intensified warfare. Reporters at the 1982 election almost universally observed that "peace" was the first objective of the voters. The electoral slogan formulated in the United States to encourage voting by the war-weary people of El Salvador was "Ballots versus Bullets," suggesting that the election was a route to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. But neither the Salvadoran army, the Reagan administration, nor any party represented in the elections favored a negotiated settlement of the war. When the 1984 elections approached, the media avoided discussing the anomaly of the public having desired peace above all in 1982, and the obvious failure of the earlier allegedly democratic election to bring about—or even to elicit attempts to

negotiate—peace.

In order to perpetuate the myth that democracy was a goal of the Salvadoran elites, the army, and the U.S. government, it was also incumbent on the mass media covering the 1982 and 1984 elections to avert their eyes from history. The Salvadoran elite had been fighting furiously against political, social and economic democracy for decades before 1982. So had the army, which was its ally and instrument. The U.S. government showed no concern over the lack of democracy in El Salvador until rebellion threatened the status quo. Could these parties be taken seriously as sponsors of democracy? The question doesn't arise for a patriotic media. Client state leaders who have murdered thousands are assumed to have "changed course" and must be "given a chance." By contrast, spokespersons for states being destabilized "cannot be trusted," and their word is not accepted on their claimed beneficent plans.

Above all, the mass media do not discuss the fundamental conditions of a free election. Is there freedom of speech and assembly? Is there a free press? Are organizations like unions, peasant leagues, and student groups allowed to organize and operate openly? Can parties and candidates qualify and campaign without fear, irrespective of their political position? Is the public subject to any threats of violence? *None* of these conditions was met in El Salvador in 1982 and 1984.<sup>2</sup>

The 1982 election was held in the midst of an ongoing reign of terror in which 700-800 unarmed civilians were murdered *per month* during the preceding 30 months by official and officially sponsored paramilitary forces. Many of the victims were raped, tortured, and mutilated; their bodies often left on public display. More than two dozen journalists were murdered in El Salvador between 1979 and 1984 and the two independent newspapers were eliminated by violence in 1980 and 1981. A large number of organizations were destroyed and their leaders killed or driven underground.

The "main opposition," the guerrilla movement and the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), could not participate in any election for fear of assassination. Their five top leaders had been tortured and murdered in November 1980, and the remaining leadership was on army death lists. Furthermore, *they were not intended to run*. The U.S. plan was to clear the ground by systematic terror, then to pretend that the guerrillas wouldn't join in the election because they feared losing in a fair contest! The guerrillas were also portrayed as trying to disrupt the election, and voter turnout was used as a

\*Terry Allen, a journalist and writer, was in El Salvador during the March 1989 election. Edward Herman is the author of the forthcoming book, with Gerry O'Sullivan, *The "Terrorism" Industry*, to be published by Pantheon in January.

1. The quoted phrase was applied to D'Aubuisson by former U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Robert White.

2. For a full discussion, see Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, *Demonstration Elections: U.S. Staged Elections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and El Salvador* (Boston: South End Press, 1984), pp. 119-26.



measure of support for the army—which was “protecting the election”—and by implication, U.S. policy and the CI war.

The mass media also failed to report in 1982 that voting was required by law, ID cards had to be stamped, and the head of the army had warned the public that a failure to vote was treasonous. In an environment of mass killing, these characteristics of the voting process were clearly relevant to explaining voter turnout.

In the 1984 election, the presence and victory of José Napoleón Duarte gave the election credibility as a genuine exercise in democracy. As an alleged reformer, running against D'Aubuisson, he provided an appearance of choice. Duarte was also a charismatic man, spoke excellent English, and was able to convince many members of Congress that he was really going to improve human rights and bring peace to El Salvador. The reality, however, is that Duarte joined the Salvadoran junta in March 1980, just as the real reformers resigned in recognition of their inability to stop an army reign of terror. Duarte then served as a fig leaf for the organized violence that followed, engaging in steady apologetics for the army's mass murder.<sup>3</sup>

Most important, in order to be able to take power, survive in office, and maintain the vital flow of U.S. aid, Duarte had to accept the army's and Reagan administration's pursuit of a war to the finish, and engage in no compromise with “the subversives” (a phrase used regularly by the army and by Duarte himself). At no time, therefore, did Duarte offer the peace option of a negotiated settlement, although he was vague and duplicitous enough to convince some that he was a peacemaker.<sup>4</sup> During his tenure in office no state or para-military murderer was prosecuted for killing or torturing Salvadorans, despite the huge civilian toll and the fact that in many cases eyewitnesses presented official depositions identifying the perpetrators and presenting ironclad evidence of their guilt. Duarte was the perfect front man for a regime of terror.

### The Rise of ARENA

The decline of the Christian Democrats was inevitable. Their base of popular support gradually eroded as a result of regressive economic policies, failure to make progress toward ending the war, exposure of their massive corruption, increasing party divisions, and resentment at their subservience to U.S. interests. The Christian Democrats had split apart in 1980, when Duarte and his faction decided to align itself with the army against the guerrillas (who Duarte admitted at the time had the support of the general populace).<sup>5</sup> It split apart again in 1988, partially over the choice of Duarte's successor, but also because of attempts by the faction led by Rey Prendes to distance itself from the increasingly obvious corruption, ineptitude and dwindling support of the ruling group.

ARENA, on the other hand, prospered under the conditions created by the U.S.-sponsored CI war, which fostered

the growth of the army and anticommunist ideology, and concentrated on weakening and destroying the left and its popular support base. There was little “center” to begin with, and the lukewarm liberal-left support of Duarte and the Christian Democrats eroded as they revealed themselves to be corrupt, powerless, and agents of the army and a foreign government. ARENA almost won the 1982 election. It lost in 1984 only because of a massive foreign (i.e., U.S.) intervention in support of Duarte and a last gasp of electoral hope by an important segment of the public that Duarte and the Christian Democratic Party might do something constructive. Following the 1984 election, ARENA embarked on a systematic organizational effort that positioned it well for future politicking.<sup>6</sup> By the end of 1988, ARENA had gained control of the legislature, the judiciary, and a good portion of the electoral apparatus. In 1989, with its new organizational structures in place, and backed by the wealth of the army and oligarchy, it presented itself as a unified party standing for peace, prosperity, and incorruptible patriotism.

Organized by Roberto D'Aubuisson, ARENA is the party of the oligarchy, the army officer corps, and the death squads. D'Aubuisson is the best known leader of the Salvadoran death squads.<sup>7</sup> Trained in Taiwan and the United States, and a close ally of Guatemalan leader and death squad organizer Mario Sandoval Alarcon, D'Aubuisson was a participant in the murder of Archbishop Oscar Romero, and has close links to the fascist international.<sup>8</sup> In 1982, he told several Western European correspondents that Hitler had treated the Jews appropriately.<sup>9</sup>

D'Aubuisson and ARENA were always *acceptable* to the Reaganites—they were merely less desirable than Duarte and the Christian Democrats. The latter provided a better facade for the alleged democracy, and had the additional advantage of being more subservient to U.S. demands than ARENA. Historically, the Salvadoran oligarchy has been relatively independent and not eager to share its power and profits with foreign capital. As the party of the oligarchy, ARENA represents a rightwing nationalist movement that resents U.S. intervention, even while accepting it out of necessity. Its leaders do not kiss the American flag and do not accept orders as readily as the “reformers.”

But ARENA is anticommunist and hostile to radical change in El Salvador, and it is therefore “within the ballpark” for U.S. leaders and bureaucrats, just as Stroessner, Pinochet, and Somoza were quite acceptable for most of their lengthy tenures in power. When ARENA came close to full power in 1982, the U.S. Embassy quietly began to rationalize D'Aubuisson,<sup>10</sup> setting the stage for his becoming a First World leader. The press did likewise, suppressing his state-

3. Dennis Hans, “Duarte: Man and Myth,” *CovertAction Information Bulletin*, No. 26, Summer 1986.

4. See Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent* (New York: Pantheon, 1988), pp. 101-102.

5. See Edward Schumacher, *New York Times*, February 21, 1981.

6. On this organizational program, see Sara Miles and Bob Ostertag, “The Rise of the Reebok Right,” *NACLA Report on the Americas*, July 1989.

7. Michael McClintock, *The American Connection Volume One: State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador* (London: Zed, 1985), pp. 360-74; Craig Pyles, “Dirty War in the Name of Freedom,” *Albuquerque Journal*, December 18, 1983.

8. Scott Anderson and Jon Lee Anderson, *Inside the League* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1986), pp. 136-7, 147-48, 191-213.

9. *Op. cit.*, n. 4, p. 58.

10. *Op. cit.*, n. 2, pp. 140-142.



Table 1.

# Human Rights Violations Against Civilians in El Salvador in 1988\*

Number of Incidents	
Number of Civilians by Uniformed Soldiers or Armed Men in Civilian Clothes <sup>11</sup>	1,556
Assassinations	412
Attempted Assassinations	30
Reported Disappearances	36
Members of Cooperatives Killed or Disappeared	20
Civilians and Unidentified Persons Killed During Military Operations	167
Incidents of Violence Against Internationals (Captives, Deportations, Injuries, Assassinations)	87
Violations Attributable to FMLN:	
Kidnappings	56
Executions	21

\*Source: El Rescate Human Rights Department, (*Chronology of Human Rights, Violations in El Salvador*, January-December 1988, pp. vi-vii.

ment on Hitler and the Jews and treating him in a tone quite different from that accorded enemy terrorists like Abu Nidal or Carlos.<sup>11</sup>

Despite these sanitation efforts, ARENA remains the party of terrorism. D'Aubuisson, its founder and continuing leader, is a "terrorist" by any western definition of the word. Even ARENA's Honorary President for Life in 1988, he retains his power in the party and still gets the loudest applause at ARENA gatherings. Before the 1989 election it was widely known in El Salvador that D'Aubuisson dominated the party, set policy, and did most of the talking at planning meetings. Christiani contributed little and nodded often, according to a source who was present.<sup>12</sup> D'Aubuisson also maintains his charismatic influence with a portion of the middle class, small business people and peasants who are fiercely nationalist. These groups see ARENA as the only party capable of standing up to the United States. They are tired of war, but believe the rightwing line that the FMLN is part of an

international communist conspiracy, and that it can be defeated by a burst of intensified warfare.

The ARENA support base overlaps with the membership of the earlier terrorist organization ORDEN, a paramilitary structure from which the death squads were partly drawn (along with the army and police). With D'Aubuisson a death squad organizer, many other death squads supported by oligarchs who joined ARENA, and the remnants of ORDEN supplying many death squad cadres, the death squads may be said to be institutional affiliates of the ARENA party.

ARENA has long had strong representation in the El Salvador judiciary, and its entrenched position has been a major factor rendering the law inoperative as regards state and rightwing terror. A steady stream of Supreme Court decisions in 1988 and 1989 exonerated the murderers of Archbishop Romero, the assassins of two American labor advisers, the mass killers at La Hoya and San Sebastian, and others. It is evident that ARENA's taking control of the executive, as well as the legislative and judicial apparatus of the state, will eliminate all internal legal protections against unrestrained state terrorism.<sup>13</sup> This series of court decisions received little coverage in the U.S. media, and their implications for the meaning of the election have also been ignored.

## The Brief Opening — And Then Escalated Terror

Following the 1984 election, a small amount of space opened up in El Salvador.<sup>14</sup> The press and TV stations were able to criticize, and unions and other groups could organize and engage in protest without assured violent retribution. The media were still under conservative ownership and control, and outright espousal of the guerrilla cause was not possible above ground. A newspaper with a level of dissent equal to that of *La Prensa* in Nicaragua would not have been able to operate, even in the "thaw" years. Leaders of the FDR, Reuben Zamora and Guillermo Ungo, returned to El Salvador and initiated a campaign, thus reintroducing a left presence into the electoral process.

From 1987 on, however, as the army made little progress in the CI war, and elections loomed on the horizon, the space opened up in 1984 began to shrink. Death squad activity increased, army violence against ordinary citizens escalated,

13. The constitution and laws of El Salvador do provide the trappings of democratic process and legal guarantees of civil rights. Although these are selectively enforced at best, they provide a basis for public protest and are often cited at demonstrations and in paid public advertisements in *El Mundo*, the one daily newspaper which occasionally prints them, as evidence of the hypocrisy and lawlessness of the Duarte and ARENA regimes. Rather than bring actual policy in line with the law, ARENA has proposed a draconian "anti-terrorism law" which eliminates most civil rights and would bring the law into line with policy.

14. This was partly a result of the fact that after 30,000 killings and organizational disruption of the popular forces, mass killing was no longer needed. It was also a result of pressures and demands from Duarte's voting constituency, which could be met within limits and for a period without excessive cost to the war project. The U.S. antiwar movement had also been pressuring Congress to cut off funds, so that unrestrained killing threatened the flow of dollars. Until such time as a new wave of mass terror might become politically necessary, assassination and imprisonment could be more selective and the body count kept at a level that could be easily ignored by the U.S. press and Congress and more acceptable to pressure groups.

11. *Cyn* 676, n. 4, p. 58.

12. This information was given to Terry Allen by an official of the ARENA Party.



and systematic attacks on dissident unions and other revived groups and their leaders rose sharply. Death squad killings increased 138 percent between 1987 and 1988, Tutela Legal, with four new groups coming into existence and threatening "subversives."

Table 1 shows the number and type of attacks on civilians for the year 1988, derived from the *El Rescate Chronology* and list of abuses for that year. The vast majority of these incidents were carried out by members of the army and security forces. It should be noted that the largest item, 1,556 "Captures of Civilians by Uniformed Soldiers or 'Heavily Armed Men in Civilian Clothes'," is almost entirely the result of operations of state agents, to whom we may also allocate virtually all of the large total for "Assassinations." The flavor of the reality that lies behind these numbers is hinted at in the tiny sample of *El Rescate* entries given in Box 1, taken from their *Chronology* which is 291 pages for 1988 alone.

One of the most notable features of the growing state terror in El Salvador has been the return to systematic attacks on popular organizations and the arrest, torture, disappearance and murder of their leaders. Americas Watch published two volumes which described in detail the recent onslaught against organized labor in El Salvador: *Labor Rights in El Salvador* (March 1988) and *Petition Before the U.S. Trade Representative on Labor Rights in El Salvador* (March 1989). In the former document, which notes 13 murders and disappearances of labor activists in a 12 month period, it is stressed that the security forces have been systematically attacking organized labor as an important part of their overall service; that "recurrent military involvement in detentions of, and attacks against, union and peasant cooperative activists suggests that such measures remain a component of government policy" (p. 14). The *Petition* submitted in 1989 summarizes case after case of police and army intervention in labor disputes, with frequent arrests, torture, sexual abuse, and sometimes murder. These two documents by Americas Watch were not reported on in the *New York Times* and mass media in general.

Box 2 shows a small sample of the record of increasing and systematic attacks on organizations, which encompassed virtually all the major trade union groups, peasant organizations, the University of San Salvador, refugee groups, and even day care centers. The murders and raids are not on the scale of 1980-1981, but they are numerous, destructive, and traumatizing.

### Freedom of the Press and the Murder of Journalists

As in the earlier period, open media support for the guerrillas is impossible in El Salvador. Broadcast stations interviewing guerrilla leaders were sent a "quiet message" of warning by the army.<sup>15</sup> The two largest newspapers in El Salvador not only supported ARENA, they blacked out news of the activities and statements of moderate and left opposition groups and even refused to take their paid advertisements.<sup>16</sup>

15. International Human Rights Law Group (IHLRG), *Report on the 1989 Salvadoran Electoral Process* (Washington, D.C.: March 1989), p. 131.  
16. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

### Box 1.

## How Security Forces Treat Civilians in "Free" El Salvador, 1988\*

January 6: Jose Victor Manuel Gomez de Leon, 25 years old, a member of ANTA (the National Association of Agricultural Workers), in Las Marias, Chinameca, San Miguel, is captured by soldiers from the ARCE Battalion on the Las Zelayas Farm, Plan Grande. Days later, his body is found with the feet and legs burned, and the head and left arm missing. (Tutela Legal)

January 11: Jose Angel Alas Gomez, 27 years old, is captured by the Treasury Police. The Police announce that Alas dies from a "cardiac arrest" in a Treasury Police vehicle. According to investigations by the CDHES (Non-Governmental), the body shows lacerations, swelling, burns on one shoulder and on the legs, and blows and pokes on the testicles. (CDHES)

January 25: Nelson Rivas, 16, is abducted from his house in Cuesta Blanca by men in civilian clothes at 9:00 p.m. According to neighbors from the area, there were many soldiers on the highway that day. The next day Rivas's body is found with his hands tied, his shirt in his mouth, his throat slashed, and with signs of torture. (IDHUCA and North American churchworkers)

January 29: Bodies of eight persons are found in La Libertad, six in Sacoyo and two in San Pablo Tacachico: all tortured including two young women found hanging from a tree, breasts cut off, faces painted red. (*El Mundo*, January 30, 1988)

January 31: Six uniformed soldiers abduct Juan Alberto Guevara Monge and his son Jose Adelmo Deras Guevara, 9 years old, who is mentally handicapped, from Platanillo, La Libertad. Guevara Monge's body is found in the Agua Caliente River, with the legs broken, the head mutilated, the shirt and pants burned, an ear split, and a bullet in one cheek. (Tutela Legal)

\*Source: A tiny sample taken from the almost 5,000 incidents reported in the *El Rescate*, Human Rights Department, *Chronology Of Human Rights Violations in El Salvador*, January-December 1988.

In the pre-election period, also, the Salvadoran Attorney General officially warned the press against allowing any statements "inciting" the public not to vote.<sup>17</sup> This was not mentioned in the U.S. mass media, to our knowledge.

17. "Attorney General Restricts Media Activities," U.S. Dept. of Commerce, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)*, March 17, 1989.



## Attacks on Organizations by the Armed Forces\*

December 28, 1988: A bomb explodes in the Lutheran Church, causing extensive damage to the sanctuary and the pastor's office. A group of men entered the church at 3 a.m. and after throwing religious ornaments on the floor, placed an explosive. Bishop Medardo Gomez had received death threats in recent weeks. (*El Mundo* December 28, 1988)

December 29: ANTA offices in Santa Ana are searched and ransacked by soldiers of the Second Brigade; two workers are captured and almost \$6,000 in equipment stolen. Later the two workers are released. (San Salvador Television, Channel 12, December 30, 1988)

June 1, 1989: The Bracamonte Battalion enters San José Las Flores, Chalatenango, destroys the day care center and holds people captive in the church for more than two hours; gunfire damages a home, the clinic and the convent, and soldiers threaten to rape the nuns. (*El Mundo*, June 19, 1989)

June 6: Soldiers of the Atlacatl Battalion raid and rob the SOICES union offices in San José Las Flores, Chalatenango. (*El Mundo*, June 17, 1989)

July 17: Twenty thousand rounds of ammunition fired by soldiers and security forces into the National University campus in San Salvador, injuring 11 people. Fourteen students and professors have been captured by authorities in the past two weeks; two from Santa Ana campus are thought to be "disappeared."

July 18: Treasury Police invade UNADES office (Office of Earthquake Victims) to search. They rip the office apart. According to Carmen Rivera, at midnight they took ten workers to the police headquarters. "There the interrogator pulled my hair and chased me around the cell.... More than anything else they asked me about my children. Then they asked me about my husband. This was the hardest thing for me. Every time I would answer he would say I was lying, and that the next interrogator would kill me. The entire time I was not allowed to use the bathroom, given no food or water. I was denied sleep and forced to stand for 72 hours. They kept touching my breasts; I feared they would rape me. I had been told that they would put me in the electric chair." [She was transferred to the women's prison on July 21].

\*Sources: El Rescate, Human Rights Department, *Chronology for 1988*; updates for June and July 1989.

During the 1989 election the Salvadoran state continued its practice of murdering journalists, and the U.S. mass media continued their role of protecting a client state election by looking the other way. On election day, two reporters from *Reuters* were shot by Air Force personnel, one of whom died, the other severely wounded. A Dutch journalist was shot in a cross-fire, and died while his fellow reporters were unable to get him to a hospital because military helicopters kept firing at their trucks, plainly marked with press insignia. Another reporter, from the local San Salvador TV Channel 12, was shot dead by military personnel. The western reporters assembled in El Salvador were perturbed at these murders, and asked sharp questions of Defense Minister Vides Casanueva at a press conference. He claimed these were regrettable accidents, that he would investigate, and that anyone guilty of misbehavior would surely be punished.<sup>18</sup>

But once again, the U.S. mass media down-played these murders. None of them featured this story, and few provided the background information that there had been several dozen prior journalist killings. None of them called attention to the fact that Channel 12 had angered the security establishment by its reporting on human rights abuses and that other staff from the station had been captured, tortured and released the previous year as a warning. They did not mention that the two Reuters reporters had been shot in the back after having been allowed to pass through a check point. None of the papers followed up the press conference with a report on whether or not guilty parties were found and punished.

### The Democratic Convergence and Its Role

Among the factors differentiating the 1989 election from those held in 1982 and 1984, the most striking was the presence of the Democratic Convergence, a coalition of three left parties which was openly aligned with the FMLN.

According to its officials, the Convergence chose to participate in order to create political space, widen the frame of debate, obtain a seat on the Central Election Council (CCE),<sup>19</sup> and serve as a bridge between the FMLN and the government and United States in future negotiations. It remains to be seen whether this strategy was effective. What is certain, however, is that the participation of a leftist group gave the U.S. press another reason for declaring the 1989 election open (although the absence of such an electoral option in earlier years hadn't prevented the media from finding those also triumphs of democracy). The press failed, however, to provide the context that would explain why the Convergence was not able to mount a serious electoral bid.

In 1980, opposition parties had been forced underground by systematic murder. It was not until 1987 that Zamora and Ungo felt able to return from exile abroad. However, they had neither the necessary time nor the money to develop an organization that could span the country. With a budget of only

18. Michael Massing, "When More Means Less," *Columbia Journalism Review*, July-August 1989, p. 44.

19. The Democratic Convergence failed to attain this objective, as it came in fourth in the vote, losing third place by a very tiny margin. Only the first three parties in voter popularity obtained a seat on the CEC.



\$200,000 — covered with an estimated \$6 million and \$3 million for the Christian Democrats and ARENA, respectively. The Convergence was not able to hire U.S. public relations firms, organize many rallies or pay for extensive advertising.

These “legal” disadvantages were exacerbated by a pattern of illegal tactics used against the leftist party. In violation of the electoral code, a propaganda campaign was mounted against the Convergence by the army and others. In Santa Ana, army personnel passed out leaflets proclaiming that Zamora and Ungo were traitors. At one rally, the army distributed leaflets featuring Zamora enveloped in a hammer and sickle. Posters also appeared throughout the country with “enemies of the people” superimposed over photos of Zamora and his running mate Reni Roldan. So many violations were recorded that the president of the Central Election Committee (CCE) told a delegation from the International Human Rights Law Group (IHRIG) that he had “formally requested the armed forces to cease interfering with the Convergence’s campaign.”<sup>22</sup> This request, and the numerous incidents of army partisanship in the election, were not reported in the mainstream U.S. press.

Because of the personal risks and lack of money, the Convergence’s campaign was limited largely to San Salvador. Only once did Zamora travel outside the city to campaign. Even within the capital the danger was substantial. Their major rally, held in front of the National Cathedral on the last campaign day before the election, was broken up as it started to grow dark by the approaching sound of machine gun and heavy weapons fire. The candidates were rushed to cars and the crowd melted away.<sup>23</sup>

Another source of problems for the Convergence was the opposition of the FMLN to their participation in the electoral process. The FMLN claimed that “elections at the point of a gun” could not lead to a democratic outcome, and it called for a boycott. This split over tactics on the left cost the Convergence a great many votes.

As noted, the U.S. media cited the Convergence’s participation as evidence of the openness of the election. In this connection, Lindsey Gruson observed in the *New York Times* that “In 1981... the armed forces put a bounty on the heads of 138 leftists by publishing a list of their names and describing them as wanted traitors.”<sup>24</sup> This important fact, which tells us so much about the integrity of the 1982 election, was not reported by the *New York Times* in 1982. Now, with this fact mere “history,” with the social democrats running in 1989, it can be mentioned! The suppressions now move to the factors

20. Linda Garrett, “Salvadoran Election: A Victory For the Right or For Peace?” *El Rescate*: El Salvador, March 22, 1989, p. 8.

21. Both the Christian Democrats and ARENA hired U.S. PR firms to handle their campaigns. ARENA worked with political consultant Roger Allies, who was George Bush’s media advisor. “With Allies’s help, the party has succeeded in conveying a populist image through television advertisements employing to a great effect humor and upbeat jingles (one of which is strikingly similar to the song used in the ‘No’ campaign in Chile’s plebiscite),” *Op. cit.*, n. 15, p. 85.

22. *Op. cit.*, n. 15, p. 122.

23. This scene was observed by one of the authors, Terry Allen.

24. “A Fingertold for Dissent in Salvador,” March 17, 1989. This statement is in error: many of those on the list were centrists, not leftists.

worked in favor of ARENA, sometimes outside the law.

#### From Mandatory to Restricted Voting

Another major difference between the elections of the early 1980s and that of March 1989 was the government’s policy on obligatory voting. In the elections of 1982 and 1984 voting was mandatory and citizens without a stamp on their national identity card (ID, cedula) certifying that they had voted risked fines, accusations of FMLN collaboration, harassment and even death. After their legislative victories in 1988, ARENA introduced a series of electoral “reforms.” Among these, the legal requirement to vote was eliminated. Instead of having his/her voting record on the ID, which citizens are required to carry at all times, a new card (carnet) was issued specifically for voting.

At the same time, however, confusing and often arbitrary and costly restrictions were placed on obtaining these cards. The ID was required for obtaining a voting carnet, and this could only be gotten in one’s home town or by paying more than \$60 (approximately half the annual income of a rural worker) for alternative documentation. This discriminated heavily against refugees, migrant workers, and the poor. According to the IHRIG, “Fully 20 percent of those applying for a new carnet were rejected by the computer” because of technical “discrepancies,” leading the IHRIG to conclude that the “procedure may eliminate more eligible voters than ineligible ones.”<sup>25</sup> Local boards, often controlled by ARENA, also had discretionary authority to rule on the validity of documentation presented to obtain a carnet. In addition, the registration period was shortened.

Many Salvadorans did not even try to get the new cards. Publicity about the changes in the law was poor and travel in El Salvador is dangerous, especially without proper papers. As of 1985, over half the 285 municipalities in the country reported that their town halls (where birth certificates and records are kept) had been destroyed. The number is undoubtedly higher today.

Between 20 and 30 percent of the Salvadoran population is either internal or external refugees. The IHRIG estimated that there were 450,000-700,000 internal refugees and displaced persons, who had great difficulty voting under the new restrictions. A large fraction of these were effectively disqualified from voting. All of the estimated 600,000-1,000,000 external refugees were ineligible to vote by law. This adds up to between 1-1.7 million Salvadorans excluded from the vote (a million actually voted in the election). The excluded Salvadorans were mainly rural and urban peasants and workers, many of whom had been victimized by the army and paramilitary forces, and would tend to oppose ARENA.

Not all the exclusions were legal, even by Salvadoran standards. “[José Ricardo] Perdomo [President of the CCE] announced that the records of an estimated 290,000 voters in the election registry have been tampered with.”<sup>26</sup> Charges of

25. *Op. cit.*, n. 15, p. 52.

26. Washington Center for Central American Studies, *El Salvador On Line*, July-August 1989.



double and even triple voting were made in some districts. "It's like sneaking into a fair," joked one multiple voter to an international observer (who told this story to Terry Allen). The Convergence charged that fraud had robbed them of the third place standing which would have given them a place on the election review board.

By eliminating mandatory voting and instituting restrictive registration requirements and control over documentation, ARENA gained not only a public relations victory, but also a tactical advantage over both the Convergence and the Christian Democrats. With its large campaign fund and extensive organization, ARENA was able to ensure that its supporters registered and turned out. The Christian Democrats went into the election disorganized, dispirited, and outvoted on the electoral boards. The Convergence was unable to compete in organizational reach and communications effort.



Credit: Terry Allen

**Figure 1: Clear plastic balloting boxes used in Salvadoran elections.**

The extremely effective transportation strike called by the FMLN, which brought most traffic to a halt throughout the country on election day, undoubtedly helped ARENA. It had planned for an *Operacion Rescate*, and mobilized thousands of private vehicles that brought its supporters to voting stations.<sup>27</sup> The army also helped bring voters to the voting stations in trucks, bedecked with banners "In the service of the public." Ordinary citizens might not be keen on riding to vote in army trucks. For the Convergence, the strike emphasized the split with the FMLN over participation in the tainted electoral process, and like the Christian Democrats it was unable to provide private transportation to get its supporters to the polls.

Of 3.1 million eligible voters (i.e., excluding external refugees), only 2.2 million actually registered; and of these

only 1.8 million eventually received cards allowing them to vote. Of those, 1 million actually voted. Another 56,000 ballots were unmarked or annulled<sup>28</sup> (a strategy supported by the FMLN for those who were afraid to stay away from the polls, but did not wish to support the electoral process). Thus while almost 54 percent of those who voted cast their ballots for ARENA, this represented only 16.5 percent of the number of eligible voters and under 14 percent of the potential electorate (including external refugees). Thus while ARENA may be said to have won by a "landslide,"<sup>29</sup> it was of a shrunken and minority electorate. The number of eligible voters participating in the election fell from 68.5 percent in 1984 to 32.5 percent in March 1989.

Although the low turnout was partially the result of the elimination of compulsory voting, the transportation strike, and the exclusion of many potential voters by the new registration procedures, another important factor was the loss of credibility of elections as a means of achieving any useful ends. This attitude also biased the election in favor of the right. Its constituency could hope to achieve power and implement their preferred agenda. Those who had thought that elections might bring peace, human rights improvements, and progressive reform, had reason for disillusionment and justification for the search for other tactics.

#### The Non-Privacy of the Vote

If an election is held in an environment of potential coercion, it is important to examine possible abuses in the basic mechanics of voting. Despite the Salvadoran constitutional guarantee of voter privacy, the ballot boxes used in the 1982, 1984 and 1989 elections were made of clear plastic. Figure 1 is a photograph taken by one of the authors (Allen) at the March 19 election. The ballots, which are numbered, are printed on translucent paper and can easily be seen after they are deposited by the voter in the plastic bags. The brightly colored party logos and the voters mark (an official felt tip pen is provided) bleed through and are readable on the reverse side of the paper, even when the ballot is carefully folded.

Figure 2 shows numerous members of the armed forces standing near the polling stations. The government announced in early March that 75 per cent of its 56,000 man force would be deployed on election day to ensure "security." ARENA poll watchers were also present at every one of the 7,000 voting booths in the country, sometimes in numbers greater than the single watcher permissible by law (ARENA mobilized an army of 23,000 poll watchers,<sup>30</sup> who were provided with fancy box lunches, decorated with the party logo).

We cannot be certain what effect these violations of voter secrecy had on the election result. In the past, however, voting for the "wrong" faction was sometimes punished by such sanctions as harassment, loss of employment, beating, rape, im-

28. Arnon Hadar, ed., *Central American Bulletin*, May 1989, p. 3.

29. Michael Massing was one of many reporters who called the ARENA victory "a landslide." Michael Massing, "Sad New El Salvador," *New York Review of Books*, May 18, 1989, pp. 53-60.

30. *Op. cit.*, n. 27, p. 25.

27. Sara Miles and Bob Ostertag, "Marching Orders," *NACLA Report on the Americas*, July 1989, p. 25.



imprisonment, and even murder. As these punishments were commonly meted out by death squads closely linked to both ARENA and the army, voters contemplating dissent were not likely to be put at ease when members of these two groups were present and able to observe their votes. Although the U.S. media are very alert to the intimidating threats of security forces in the case of enemy elections, friendly security forces only "protect elections," whatever their actual record.<sup>31</sup> In accord with this patriotic rule, the threats to the most basic requirements of privacy in El Salvador that we have just described were not reported by the mainstream media in 1989, just as they were not in the two prior elections.

After the 1988 elections, a Permanent Committee of the National Debate, a broad-based coalition of 59 social, political and religious institutions and organizations, was formed under the leadership of the centrist Archbishop of San Salvador, to assess electoral politics. Meeting in September 1988, a large majority of the participants agreed that elections under existing conditions, which excluded a large fraction of the population from participation, and were closely tied to the aims of the war party, were neither very helpful in solving the nation's problems nor an expression of democracy.<sup>32</sup>

Although the National Debate was organized under respectable auspices and included a wide range of Salvadoran groups, its activities and findings were blacked out in the U.S. mass media (which did the same to the powerful critique of the Guatemalan elections of 1984-1985 by its Catholic Bishops).<sup>33</sup> The press sticks to sources that will confirm the official view, such as the official observer delegations, which always find client state election turnouts impressive and public enthusiasm for the new army-sponsored "democracies" inspiring.<sup>34</sup>

### The FMLN Proposal

On January 24, 1989, two months before the election, the FMLN put forward a proposal "To Convert the Election Into a Contribution Toward Peace," which offered FMLN acceptance of and participation in the electoral process in exchange for concessions by the government. The proposal called for postponement of the election from March 19 to September 15; guarantees by the government to end repression of the popular movement; confinement of the army to the barracks on election day (and the substitution of less threatening ob-



Credit: Terry Allen

Figure 2: Soldiers watch over Salvadoran voters.

servers and "protectors"); participation of the Democratic Convergence in the Central Electoral Commission; a revised electoral code; arrangements to allow the huge external refugee population to vote; and U.S. withdrawal from the election process.

This proposal shocked the Salvadoran establishment and U.S. government, and they spent a month hemming and hawing and working out the best way of rejecting the proposal. There were some elements of the establishment who were interested, and the Church and popular groups urged serious consideration. They pointed out that the FMLN proposals added up to the conditions for making the election democratic. The United States, however, was still committed to winning the war, and the dominant elements of the army and ARENA were adamantly opposed to doing business with "delinquent terrorists." Thus an important peace option was rejected, and a public still claiming peace as a foremost objective was allowed an election that would consolidate the power of the extreme war party. This irony escaped the western media.

### Conclusions

The March 19, 1989 election in El Salvador was neither free, fair, nor democratic. The level of state-sponsored terror was too high to allow the basic conditions of a free election to be met. Among other limitations, journalists continued to be murdered, unions, peasant groups, and other popular organizations and their leaders were under steady threat and attack by the army and paramilitary groups, and transparent voting boxes that compromised the secrecy of the vote remained in use. We believe that if these electoral characteristics existed in Nicaragua, the U.S. media would find that election a farce. As it is, they remained discreetly silent on the negatives and, as in the past, saw to it that an election sponsored by their government was a triumph of democracy.

The victory of the ARENA party was an ironic but logical

31. *Op. cit.*, n. 2, pp. 157, 173-80.

32. Catholic Archdiocese of San Salvador, *Final Document, National Debate*, San Salvador, September 1988, p. 11.

33. *Op. cit.*, n. 4, pp. 113, 116.


34. For a humorous case, see Appendix 1, "The U.S. Official Observers Guatemala, July 1-2, 1984," *op. cit.*, n. 4. Senator Mitch McConnell, head the U.S. delegation to El Salvador in March 1989, commented that "Our minds aren't this good in the United States." Newly-elected President Crispien concurred shortly after on the *MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour*, "The turnout equaled or surpassed the voter participation rate in the 1988 [U.S.] presidential election."

These remarks are inaccurate, as the U.S. voter participation rate in the 8 election substantially exceeded 32.5 percent. Furthermore, as we noted Salvadoran turnout declined precipitously from that in 1984. It was also actually below the turnout for the Nicaraguan election of 1984. None of these points was featured, or even mentioned, in the mainstream media.



consequence of U.S. intervention and policy. The United States supported the systematic attack on and decimation of popular organizations, while trying to shore up Duarte and a largely mythical center. But U.S. policy assured that Duarte could not fulfill any reformist or peace-making campaign promises, and his support base disintegrated. With the collapse of the Christian Democrats, only the nationalist right remained as a viable force in electoral politics. The Convergence Party and other progressive forces could make only a nominal showing in the face of the earlier destruction of its leaders and organizational support base, and the continuing attacks from the army and right. Only the party of D'Aubuisson, the death squads, the army and the oligarchy had the enthusiasm, money, organization and military force to win an election under the conditions of economic crisis and in the midst of an ongoing counterinsurgency war.

As we stressed earlier, an important feature of the electoral environment of El Salvador has been the shift from mandatory



Credit: Terry Allen

This banner, displayed in front of bombed-out labor union office, reads "ARENA ASSASSINS."

to restricted voting. This reflects the growing legislative muscle of ARENA. In 1982 and 1984, when the United States viewed "turnout" as crucial to the success of the election (reflecting its PR role), voting was legally required in El Salvador. For ARENA, a distinctly minority party, restricted voting was desirable because it would tend to keep off the voting rolls the support base of the left. ARENA would do best with a small but "select" voter turnout. Its legislators used their legislative power to eliminate mandatory voting and put in its place laws which made registration more difficult. A million or more potentially eligible voters therefore did not register. Many more didn't bother to vote, and ARENA won with the vote of only 16.5 percent of the eligible electorate and under 14 percent of potentially eligible voters. But just as the U.S. press failed to report and discuss the significance of mandatory voting in 1982 and 1984, the next phase of undemocratic and manipulative adjustment of the vote — by the deliberate shrinkage of the electorate — also escaped their notice in 1989.

Following the March 1989 election, and helped by the fact that the U.S. mass media simply refused to publish information on the escalating state terror in El Salvador, the Senate Democrats joined forces with the Bush administration and voted \$90 million in unconditional military aid to the Salvadoran government on September 20, 1989, to show that "we appreciate and support what he [Cristiani] is doing and we stand behind him" (Christopher Dodd). There are two fallacies in this position. One is that, even on the assumption that Cristiani is a moderate who means well, and is not merely a powerless front man for D'Aubuisson and the security forces, unconditional aid would weaken his ability to restrain the hardliners. It would signal them that any barriers to kill imposed by the United States are down. Second, apart from the matter of incentives, there is a question of what Cristiani is actually doing? Under considerable pressure, he was *talking* to the rebels, although no agreement has been reached, and in our view, no useful compromise is likely to come out of negotiations reluctantly engaged in by the Salvadoran extreme right. We believe these talks are necessary to ARENA for political and PR purposes, but that they will only clear the ground for an intensified war, just as demonstration elections did earlier.

On the other hand, Cristiani has escalated state terror against popular groups in El Salvador since he took office. The National Union of Salvadoran Workers (UNTS) reports that in the first three months after ARENA took over executive power, there were 317 civilians assassinated, 62 disappeared, over 400 captured by the security forces, and more than 100 women sexually assaulted while in detention. According to this same group, over 140 of its members were seized by the military and police in the period during and immediately after the September 13-15 peace talks in Mexico City. Eight of the 11 members of the executive board of the National Trade Union Federation of Salvadoran Workers (FENASTRAS) have been arrested under ARENA rule, and their protests and demonstrations have been broken up violently. In a press conference in late September, members of FENASTRAS claimed that of 64 people detained by the National Police during their protest march on September 18, eight were raped while in custody. The National University has been periodically attacked by gunfire which has wounded significant numbers, and over a dozen faculty and students have been arrested, with several murdered or disappeared. The office of the Union of Earthquake Victims (UNADES) has been ransacked and its officials arrested and abused.<sup>35</sup>

These are a sample of Cristiani's *material* actions, but as the mainstream press is not featuring — or even mentioning — them, for the Democrats these events do not occur. Just as the election of Duarte — a front man for the army and the Reagan administration — neutralized the Democrats in 1984; five years later they have embraced Cristiani — a front man for Roberto D'Aubuisson, the death squads, and the oligarchy.

35. See El Rescate's Human Rights *Chronology* for June through September; Washington Center on Central American Studies, *On Line*, October 2, 1989; Kate Thompson, "Repression Targets Popular Movement," *Alert!* Oct. 1989.



### El Salvador 1989: Epilogue on the Collapse of the Democratic Facade

Shortly after the completion of our article, on October 31, the San Salvador office of FENASTRAS was bombed, killing nine senior labor leaders and wounding 40 other people. On the same day the office of COMADRES (Committee of Mothers and Relatives of Political Prisoners) was bombed, wounding six. These events were given low-key coverage in the U.S. media, just as the escalating state terrorism of the preceding year (summarized in our text above) was hardly noticed.

Thus, when the FMLN began a major offensive on November 11-12, this was portrayed by the political establishment and in the media as perverse behavior coming out of the blue, not as an almost inevitable result of a growing state violence which showed that the Cristiani/ARENA participation in peace talks was a meaningless gesture. Another fact that would have put the FMLN offensive in meaningful context was the Salvadoran (and U.S.) government's refusal to take seriously the FMLN pre-election proposed accord that would have ended the war, eliminated state terrorism, and provided the basis for genuinely free elections. That refusal, the escalating attacks on popular groups, and the increased and unconditional military aid by the U.S. government, suggested that it was the Salvadoran establishment and U.S. government, not the rebels, who understand only the language of force.

It was the cold-blooded murder and mutilation — following torture — of six distinguished Jesuit clerics and their two housekeepers, on November 16, 1989, that weakened the liberal establishment's post-election complaisance regarding the "new" ARENA. The Salvadoran army and police had been torturing and killing ordinary citizens week after week without being called to task, and were even given accolades for their moderation. Killing and torturing notables, however, resulted in publicity and focused attention, and although nothing changed, suddenly there was the "perception" of a human rights problem! The line that resurfaced in the establishment was that Cristiani might be "unable to control" the army and death squads, just as the junta of 1980-84 and Duarte allegedly couldn't control them. The fact that not one soldier or officer has yet to be punished for murdering any Salvadoran in nine years, and that the party of death squad killer D'Aubuisson now runs the government and judiciary, is still not seen as making the "inability to control" argument a foolish apologetic.

The nature of the Salvadoran regime revealed itself once again during the renewed warfare of November 11 and after. During the stepped up fighting the Air Force used rockets, 500 pound bombs and gatling guns capable of firing 8,000 rounds per minute on heavily populated areas. The army and death squads moved more aggressively against members and leaders of the popular movements, the murder of the six clerics and two women providing only the most dramatic and "newsworthy" episode of a wide-ranging assault. Despite offers from the FMLN, ARENA also refused to negotiate a truce or to respect the neutrality of the Red Cross and the press corps. Civil liberties such as the rights of due process, assembly, and the press were totally suspended. A draconian

"anti-terrorism" package is in its last stages of movement through the ARENA-controlled legislature, a bill which even the *New York Times* describes as involving "sweeping new restrictions on individual freedoms, including virtually unhindered government power to ban dissent and peaceful protest" (November 25). Leaders of the Christian Democratic Party describe this legislation as a "fascist project." This is entirely compatible with the long-standing agenda and aims of the leaders of the ARENA party.

In light of the main focus of the present article, on the March 1989 Salvadoran election, it is notable that President Bush himself, questioned on U.S. support of the Salvadoran government, relied heavily on the legitimation by election. And on CNN's "Crossfire" on November 21, Michael Kinsley of the *New Republic*, relying entirely on the clichés of state propaganda, sharply criticized an FMLN representative for the military offensive against a government duly accredited by an election. As we have described in the main text, however,



Credit: Terry Allen

### Firebombed office of Jesuit priests murdered by Salvadoran Army.

this was an election held after an extended period of extreme state terror which dismantled the left opposition and its organized base, and under conditions of ongoing state terror. Like its predecessors, the March 1989 election failed to meet the basic conditions of a fair and free election.

It is interesting to note that the United States gave unconditional support to the terror regime of January 1980-March 1982, which was *unelected*. The elections of 1982 and 1984 then consolidated the power of an army and political establishment that had previously run the killing machine without elections. Nevertheless, these elections legitimized the government according to U.S. official observers and the mass media. Official observers, however, always find U.S.-sponsored elections meritorious, and no matter how biased they may be and how superficial their observations, they are always cited as credible sources by the mainstream media. We believe that the establishment press will find any election carried out under their government's imprimatur to be legitimizing, no matter how distant it may be from fairness and freedom. The legitimized government may also kill its citizens freely, if it avoids murdering and mutilating notables, in which case the press may raise questions about whether the "elected government" real



# News Notes

*Washington's War on Nicaragua*, written by Holly Sklar and published by South End Press, is without question one of the most important books on U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. She has presented this material with singular, easy-to-follow scholarship and with straight-forward prose.

A brief introduction places the subject within a historical context and then digs into current U.S. policy. She traces the roots of the Reagan-Bush Nicaraguan intervention to Jimmy Carter's presidency. Sklar demonstrates that Washington's current policy towards Nicaragua began in the months before the July 19, 1979 Sandinista triumph.

Holly Sklar provides a gold mine of information, documentation, analysis, and dozens of revealing quotes by key actors in the war. Examples include:

- Reagan's roving ambassador, Richard Stone, told Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto in June 1983, "You should do as we say. You will see how almost by magic the problem [of the *contras*] will disappear."
- John Hull, *contra* supporter and alleged drug smuggler, said, "If it were within my power people like [liberal Senators] Kennedy and Kerry would be lined up against a wall and shot tomorrow at sunrise."
- An anonymous U.S. government official proclaimed, "We were going to knock off these little brown people on the cheap."
- Finally, a U.S. Ambassador in Central America acknowledged, "If they do it, it's terrorism, if we do it, it's fighting for freedom."

We highly recommend *Washington's War on Nicaragua* to everyone interested, not only in Central America, but in how U.S. policy is conceived and implemented throughout the world.

Political Research Associates recently released a topical report called "The Coors Connection: How Coors Family Philanthropy Undermines Democratic Pluralism." The Coors family made its fortune brewing beer in Colorado and, particularly with the rise of Ronald Reagan, became important funders of the extreme rightwing movement in the U.S.

The Coors report was written by Russ Bellant who also authored "Old Nazis, The New Right, and the Reagan Administration." The preface of "The Coors Connection" states that "Those who have benefited, directly and indirectly, from that 'Those who have benefited, directly and indirectly, from Coors family generously include persons whose views reflect not only traditional conservatism, but also nativism, xenophobia, theories of racial superiority, sexism, homophobia, authoritarianism, militarism, reaction and in some cases outright neo-fascism.'"

We strongly recommend this report to anyone interested in learning about how the extreme Right uses its profits to promote the rightwing agenda in this country. It is available for \$5 from Political Research Associates, 678 Massachusetts Avenue, Suite 205, Cambridge, MA 02139.

In *CAIB* issue number 31, we wrote about the "Resistance Conspiracy" case in which seven anti-imperialist activists were charged by the U.S. government with conspiracy and with a number of bombings of military and government buildings.

On the eve of their trial, supporters of the "Resistance Conspiracy" defendants have written an open letter to the progressive community asking for support in their efforts to combat this political persecution. Their letter states that "The country, need to be returned to our communities and not disappear into the prison system. We must lend our voices and support to ensure their rights — and our own."

We would encourage all our readers to support the "Resistance Conspiracy" defendants in their struggle for justice and to contribute to the defense of these political prisoners. For more information or to make a contribution, write: Emergency Committee for Political Prisoners, P.O. Box 28191, Washington, DC 20038-8191.

Also in issue 31 we announced "Campus Watch," a newsletter writing about CIA campus recruiting, officer-in-residence programs, and special CIA campus operations.

We want to report that "Campus Watch" is alive and well and still available. A must for anyone who wants to keep informed about CIA activities on university campuses. It is also a great resource for student activists organizing to end CIA operations at their universities. Published four times during the academic year; \$10 individual; \$20 institutions; \$3 for current issue. Order your subscription from: Campus Watch, P.O. Box 9623, Warwick, RI 02889.

We also want to bring your attention to a speaker's bureau which features lecturers who are experts on intelligence issues. Becker Lectures can arrange for your group to host David MacMichael (former CIA analyst), William Schaap (co-editor of *CAIB*), Edgar Chamorro (former *contra* leader turned outspoken critic), Daniel Ellsberg, Jack Ryan (former FBI agent turned critic), and many others.

Contact Becker Lectures at:  
P.O. Box 1094, Northampton, MA 01061; (413) 585-0708.

Finally, we would like to call your attention to a new publication entitled "CIA Off Campus: An Organizing Handbook for Student Activities." This edition combines the accumulated knowledge of more than a dozen anti-CIA organizers and activists from campuses across the country.

Chapter topics include: CIA-sponsored student and faculty recruiting; CIA-sponsored research funding; how to organize using university and community resources; taking action — how to expose CIA campus activity.

Available from: Bill of Rights Foundation, 220 S. State St., Suite 1430, Chicago, IL 60604, (312) 939-0675; \$5.00/copy plus \$1.00 for postage and handling.



# The Rise of the National Security State

by Diana Reynolds\*

Since the advent of changes which took place during the Reagan regime, America has been a presidential directive away from a civil security state of emergency which, if ever enacted, could create a constitutional crisis equal in severity to the American Civil War.

A national state of emergency can be declared by a concurrent resolution of both houses of Congress or by the President in the case of natural disasters, nuclear war, a massive mobilization in anticipation of an enemy attack on U.S. territory, or domestic civil unrest.

A disturbing shift in policy occurred during the Reagan years which could have profound consequences with respect to civil liberties. Whereas civil defense planning in the past had focused on disaster relief, the national security focus of the Reagan administration meant implementing new ways to expand police powers in times of nuclear war, domestic unrest, or civil disorder.<sup>1</sup> Bending under pressure brought by the Reagan Administration, Congress gave the president and his executive agencies sweeping emergency powers. This article will examine how those powers came to be, and will explore a possible scenario—the U.S. government's war on drugs—in which these powers might be used.

## Civil Security Planning

Since WWII, the U.S. government has had contingency plans in preparation for a large scale disaster or attack. However, during the last twenty-five years—beginning with civil unrest at the height of the Vietnam War—the government's plans have increasingly on focused ways of controlling political dissent.

On October 30, 1969, President Richard Nixon issued Executive Order 11490, "Assigning Emergency Preparedness Functions to Federal Departments and Agencies," which consolidated some 21 operative Executive Orders and two Defense Mobilization Orders issued between 1951 and 1966 on a variety of emergency preparedness matters.

In 1976 President Gerald Ford ordered the Federal Emergency Preparedness Agency (FEPA) to develop plans to establish government control of the mechanisms of productions and distribution, of energy sources, wages and salaries, credit and the flow of money in American financial institutions in any (heretofore undefined) "national emergency." This Executive

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1. Alfonso Chardy, "Reagan Aides and the 'Secret' Government," *The Miami Herald*, July 5, 1987.

Order (EO 11921) also indicated that, when a state of emergency is declared by the President, Congress could not review the matter for a period of six months.<sup>2</sup>

Even arch-conservative activist Howard J. Ruff was quick to point out that, since the enactment of EO 11490, "The only thing standing between us and a dictatorship is the good character of the President and the lack of a crisis severe enough that the public would stand still for it...."<sup>3</sup>

While Ruff thought a national emergency might be used to destroy the free markets in the U.S. and take away the C.B. radios and guns of Americans, *The Washington Afro-American* was alarmed for more rational and obvious reasons. In an editorial, the paper repeated Ruff's warning:

Executive Order No. 11490 is real, and only the lack of a crisis big enough, a president willing enough, and a public aroused enough to permit it to be invoked, separates us from a possible dictatorship, brought about under current law, waiting to be implemented in the event of circumstances which can be construed as a "national emergency."<sup>4</sup>

President Carter evidently did not share this concern and, in 1977, he signed Executive Order 12148 which created the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to replace the Federal Emergency Preparedness Agency. This Presidential Directive mandated an interface between the Department of Defense (DOD) and FEMA for civil defense planning and funding.<sup>5</sup>

When Ronald Reagan came to power he gave FEMA vastly expanded executive emergency powers and appointed retired National Guard General Louis O. Giuffrida as his "emergency czar." Giuffrida's creation of contingency emergency plans to round up "militant negroes" while he was at the Naval War College caught the attention of then-Governor of California Reagan and his executive secretary Edwin Meese III.

As Governor, Reagan called on Giuffrida to design Opera-

2. Executive Order 11921, "Emergency Preparedness Functions," June 11, 1976; *The Federal Register*, vol. 41, no. 116 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), June 15, 1976), pp. 24294-300.

3. Howard Ruff, *How to Prosper During the Coming Bad Years* (New York, NY: Warner Books, 1979), p. 150.

4. Editorial, "The Implications of Miami," *The Washington Afro-American*, May 31, 1980.

5. Executive Order 12148, June 13, 1977, as cited in, "The Civil/Military Alliance In Emergency Management," FEMA and DOD (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982); for a comprehensive review of FEMA's activities from 1979 to 1985 see: Keenen Peck, "The 'Take Charge Gang,'" *The Progressive*, May 1985, pp. 17-24.



tion Cable Splicer. Cable Splicer I, II and III were martial law plans to legitimize the arrest and detention of anti-Vietnam war activists and other political dissidents.<sup>6</sup> In 1971, Governor Reagan, with a \$425,000 grant from the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, established a counterterrorism training center—the California Specialized Training Institute (CSTI)—and made Giuffrida its commandant.<sup>7</sup>

Shortly after he assumed the directorship of FEMA in 1982, Giuffrida had flooded high-level FEMA posts with friends from CSTI and the military police,<sup>8</sup> had created a Civil Security Division of FEMA, and had established a Civil Defense Training Center in Emmitsburg, Maryland—based on the CSTI model. By 1984, the Center had trained one thousand civil defense personnel in survival techniques, coun-



Credit: White House Photo

**Louis Giuffrida and George Bush discuss disasters.**

terterrorism and military police methods.<sup>9</sup>

From February to July of 1982, President Reagan signed a series of National Security Decision Directives (NSDD)—presidential decisions on national security objectives—on civil defense policy and emergency mobilization preparedness. While Reagan's real U.S. civil defense policy is contained in the classified NSDD 26, some of the law enforcement and public safety provisions of the policy are made public in NSDD 47. This National Security Decision Directive provides for an intensified counterintelligence effort at home and the maintenance of law and order in a variety of emergencies, particularly terrorist incidents, civil disturbances, and nuclear emergencies.<sup>10</sup>

Reagan gave the National Security Council (NSC) authority over the planning for civil defense policy with its expanded civil security powers. He mandated the creation of a

6. Edwin Meese III, Executive Secretary to Governor Reagan, Speech transcript, Law Enforcement and Administration Association meeting, San Francisco, CA, March 5, 1970.

7. Ken Lawrence, "The New State Repression," *CovertAction Information Bulletin*, Number 24 (Summer 1985), pp. 6-9.

8. Howard Kurtz, "Retired Military Policemen Troop Into Highly Paid Agency Jobs," *The Washington Post*, February 3, 1985.

9. Louis O. Giuffrida, "Memorandum For Edwin Meese III, Counselor to the President," (Washington, DC: FEMA, May 16, 1984), p. 5.

10. National Security Decision Directive 47, "Emergency Mobilization Preparedness," July 22, 1982, p. 10.

senior-level interdepartmental board, the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board (EMPB) and charged it with responsibilities for policy and planning guidance, coordination of planning, resolution of issues, and monitoring progress.<sup>11</sup>

The members of the EMPB were the Assistant for National Security Affairs (as its Chair), the DOD's Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives from 10 other federal agencies. FEMA provided the staff, support secretariat and operational supervision for the EMPB and their working group on civil defense. According to then Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, by February 1983, the EMPB had prepared—and the President had approved—a national policy statement on emergency mobilization preparedness.<sup>12</sup>

Oliver North served on the EMPB, having been assigned there from 1982 to 1984 by former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane. General Giuffrida was there too, providing operational supervision. By forming the EMPB, Ronald Reagan made it possible for a small group of people, under the authority of the NSC, to wield enormous power.<sup>13</sup> The in turn, used this executive authority to change civil defense planning into a military/police version of civil security.

### Military Rule

In January of 1982, FEMA and the Department of Defense issued a joint paper entitled, "The Civil/Military Alliance in Emergency Management" which specified many of the provisions of Reagan's policy on emergency mobilization preparedness. This document indicates that FEMA had been given *carte blanche* emergency powers to acquire resources from federal and state agencies (including National Guard personnel) and the private sector (banking, communications, transportation, etc.) "for use in civil disturbance operations."<sup>14</sup>

Apparently General Frank S. Salcedo, Chief of FEMA's Civil Security Division and Giuffrida's former colleague at CSTI, wanted more. In 1983, in a workshop at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Salcedo recommended expanding FEMA's power further in the area of survivability training, research on imposing martial law,

11. *Ibid.*, p. 12. From 1982-1988, a new secret Defense Mobilization Planning Systems Agency under the authority of then Vice President George H. W. Bush spent more than \$3 billion upgrading command, control, and communications links in FEMA's continuity of government infrastructure. For a comprehensive discussion of this agency see: Steve Emerson, "America's Doomsday Project," *U.S. News and World Report*, August 7, 1989, pp. 30-31.

12. *Op. cit.*, n. 10.; also see Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report To The Congress, Fiscal Year 1984* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1983), p. 261.

13. Ben Bradlee, Jr., *Guts and Glory: The Rise and Fall of Oliver North* (New York, NY: Donald I. Fine, Inc., 1988), pp. 132-135; also see Roy L. Harrisman, *Banana Diplomacy: The Making of American Policy in Nicaragua* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1988); Hedrick Smith, *The First Game* (New York, NY: Random House, 1988).

14. FEMA/DOD, "The Civil Military Alliance in Emergency Management." A background paper to support the Civil/Military Action Officers Planners Conferences on Military Support of Civil Defense and Defense of CONUS, San Francisco, CA, January 26-29, 1982; New York, February 9-12, 1982.



the potential threat posed by foreign and domestic adversaries. As he saw it at least 100,000 U.S. citizens, from survivalists to tax protesters, were serious threats to civil security.

Salcedo saw FEMA's new frontier in the protection of industrial and government leaders from assassination, and of civil and military installations from sabotage and/or attack, as well as the prevention of dissident groups from gaining access to U.S. opinion or a global audience in times of crisis.<sup>15</sup>

#### "This Is Only A Test, Repeat..."

While improving capabilities to respond to civil security emergencies was for the most part a planning activity with the Reagan Administration, FEMA was also active in exercises to test these plans. In 1981, FEMA and DOD began a continuing tradition of biannual joint exercises to test civilian mobilization, civil security emergency and counterterrorism plans using such names as "Proud Saber/Rex-82," "Pre-Nest," and "Rex-84/Night Train."<sup>16</sup>

The Rex-84 Alpha Explan (Readiness Exercise 1984, Exercise Plan), indicates that FEMA in association with 34 other federal civil departments and agencies conducted a civil readiness exercise during April 5-13, 1984. It was conducted in coordination and simultaneously with a Joint Chiefs exercise, Night Train 84, a worldwide military command post exercise (including Continental U.S. Forces or CONUS) based on multi-emergency scenarios operating both abroad and at home. In the combined exercise, Rex-84 Bravo, FEMA and DOD led the other federal agencies and departments, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secret Service, the Treasury, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Veterans Administration through a gaming exercise to test military assistance in civil defense.<sup>17</sup>

The exercise anticipated civil disturbances, major demonstrations and strikes that would affect continuity of government and/or resource mobilization. To fight subversive activities, there was authorization for the military to implement government ordered movements of civilian populations at state and regional levels, the arrest of certain unidentified segments of the population, and the imposition of martial rule.<sup>18</sup>

15. Frank S. Salcedo and Richard Fierman, "The Fifth Horseman of the Apocalypse: Civil Security During and After the Unthinkable," Speech transcript, Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences Annual Meeting, March 5, 1983.

16. Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report To The Congress, FY 1984* (Washington, DC: GPO, February 1, 1983); also see FEMA, *Exercise PRENEST 84* (Washington, DC: FEMA, September 1983).

17. FEMA, *REX-84 ALPHA: Exercise Plan* (Washington, DC: FEMA, February 28, 1984), pp. 2-4.

18. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Exercise Division, Operations Directorate, in Coordination with Plans and Policy Directorate, *Military Support of Civil Defense System Description* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 1, 1983), pp. 1-4.

Attorney General William French Smith finally became aware of the abuses of the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board operating under the NSC. He admonished McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who theoretically chaired the planning group. In a letter dated August 2, 1984, Smith responded to a request by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to review, for form and legality, a draft Executive Order revising the powerful EO 11490, assigning emergency preparedness functions to federal departments and agencies. The Attorney General said that apart from the legal review by the Office of Legal Counsel,

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**It came to light that while FEMA has been expending the lion's share of its energy and funding on building a civil security infrastructure, it had neglected its authorized civil defense role.**

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...I believe that the draft Executive Order raises serious substantive and public policy issues that should be further addressed before this proposal is submitted to the President. In short I believe that the role assigned to the

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on the revised Executive Order exceeds its proper function as a coordinating agency for emergency preparedness.

This Department and others have repeatedly raised serious policy and legal objections to the creation of an 'emergency czar' role for FEMA. Specific policy concerns regarding recent FEMA initiatives include the abandonment of the principle of 'several' agency responsibility and the expansion of the definition of severe emergencies to encompass 'routine' domestic law enforcement emergencies. Legal objections relate to the absence of Presidential or Congressional authorization for unilateral FEMA directives which seek to establish new Federal Government management structures or otherwise task Cabinet departments and other federal agencies.<sup>19</sup>

#### The Fall of FEMA

Smith's letter signaled what seemed to be the beginning of the end for FEMA and Reagan's Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board. Federal Bureau of Investigation Director William Webster had previously complained when FEMA's Director of Civil Security, General Salcedo, had intruded into the FBI's domestic intelligence jurisdiction under the rubric of counter terrorism. Salcedo was forced to turn over to Webster some 12,000 names he had been compiling on a list of potential threats to civil security.<sup>20</sup>

Furthermore, it came to light that while FEMA had been expending the lion's share of its energy and funding on build-

19. William French Smith, U.S. Attorney General, to The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, August 2, 1984.

20. Deposition of Daniel Sheehan, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, *Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey v. John Hull, et. al.*, 1984.



ing a civil security infrastructure, it had neglected its authorized civil defense role. On June 15, 1984, barely a month after Giuffrida filed his glowing accomplishment report with Meese, Robert Guffus, Inspector General of FEMA, wrote a draft report on FEMA's Comprehensive Cooperative Agreements (CCA) (with states) in civil defense preparedness.

He concluded that management actions were needed to improve the effectiveness of programs with state and local governments. In his review of the CCAs he found inadequate FEMA management control, imprecise program guidelines and a lack of personnel resources. Programmatic and financial weaknesses were a result of fiscal mis-management, unclear assignment of responsibilities, overlapping job descriptions, inflated training figures, and lack of written procedures.<sup>21</sup>

McFarlane removed North from the EMPB and assigned him to help with conducting unconventional warfare in Nicaragua. Giuffrida resigned in 1985 after a House subcommittee charged that FEMA was being mismanaged, and it was publicized that Giuffrida had staffed FEMA with his military/police cronies and had allowed \$170,000 of agency funds to be used to outfit a deluxe bachelor pad at the Civil Defense Training Academy at Emmitsburg.<sup>22</sup> He now operates a security consulting firm in Washington, D.C. General Salcedo has moved on to be Presidential Liaison to Veterans Organizations at the Veterans Administration.

There is some debate about what happened to the plans for a civil security emergency. There was a rumored joint investigation conducted by the Defense Department and the CIA into the unconstitutionality of planning for a civil security emergency by several government agencies. Supposedly, the two investigators, Special Forces Lt. Colonel Kvererdas and the CIA's William Buckley, prior to his fatal Beirut assignment, destroyed the plans and the exercise data.

Some believe that much of the planning was incorporated into Vice President Bush's Report from his Task Force on Combatting Terrorism which has inspired civil security contingency planning at the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service by an Alien Border Control (ABC) Committee. The working group within the INS was designing plans and programs regarding the control and removal of alien terrorists, potential terrorist aliens and those "who are likely to be supportive of terrorist activity within the U.S."<sup>23</sup>

The most obvious resting place for the material is the National Security Council. In 1987, Reagan signed another

21. Robert Guffus, Inspector General, FEMA, "Draft Report # H-7-84 - Management Actions are Needed to Improve the Effectiveness of Programs with State and Local Governments," (Washington, DC: FEMA, June 15, 1984). According to FEMA's "Budget in Brief for FY 1990," the net of total agency obligations for 1990 are \$1.45 billion. (This is nearly equal to the total budget authority of \$1.5 billion for the Justice Department for 1989). Of this budget authority of \$1.5 billion for the Justice Department for 1989, only 1% (\$9 million) is allocated for earthquake and other hazards and \$280 million for disaster relief.

22. *Op. cit.*, n. 8; Pete Earley, "Smith Accuses FEMA of Grab for Power," *Washington Post*, September 3, 1984.

23. Robert J. Walsh, Assistant Commissioner, Investigations Division, Immigration and Naturalization Service, "Alien Border Control Committee," (Washington, DC: Immigration and Naturalization Service, October 1, 1986).

NSDD, number 259, which superseded both NSDD 26, the secret civil defense plan of February 25, 1982 and the unclassified version dated March 16, 1982. Even though the 1987 version is shorter and more vague than its predecessors, no significant changes are evident in civil defense planning and programs from the 1984 EMPB scenarios.

Just before he left office, Reagan signed Executive Order 12656 which assigned new emergency preparedness responsibilities. Reagan's final national security legacy to civil defense planning puts the NSC clearly in charge.<sup>24</sup> In Section 104, EO 12656 states that the NSC is the principal forum for consideration of national security emergency preparedness policy and will arrange for Executive branch liaison with, and assistance to, the Congress and the Federal judiciary on national security emergency preparedness matters.

The Director of FEMA has now been promoted to advisor to the NSC on mobilization preparedness, civil defense, continuity of government, technological disasters, "and other issues, as appropriate." The Director of FEMA is also authorized to assist in the implementation of national security emergency preparedness policy by coordinating federal departments and agencies; as well as state and local governments. The exercise program is to continue and plans and procedures "will be designed and developed to provide maximum flexibility to the President for his implementation of emergency actions."<sup>25</sup>

On the same day that Reagan signed EO 12656 he also signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 which provided yet another in a series of get-tough-but-do-nothing drug policies produced by the Reagan Administration. If and when the Anti-Drug Abuse Act fails - a victim of underfunding and bureaucratic in-fighting - then Executive Order 12656 could become an historic document in the war on drugs.

#### The National Security State and the Drug War

The U.S. government's proposed "war on drugs" is on such case in which the U.S. government will have the authority to use the national security apparatus to suppress civil liberties. It may be the first opportunity to call into action the years of planning and expense used to develop the emergency preparedness network.

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act was passed in the final hours of the 100th Congress, when incumbents were anxious to return to their districts in order to campaign and when public opinion was calling for drastic action in the war on drugs. The Act was quickly drafted by *ad hoc* congressional committees, private consultants, then passed by Congress without the usual legislative hearings and debate.<sup>26</sup>

The Act broadly defines the programs, goals, guidelines and appropriations for all the 58 federal departments plus thousands of state and local agencies involved in the national war on drugs. Some provisions were made for drug education.

24. Executive Order 12656, "Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, November 18, 1988," *Federal Register*, vol. 53, (Washington, DC: GPO, November 23, 1988).

25. *Ibid.*, p. 47492.

26. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "Commitment to Drug Treatment Law," *New York Times*, September 17, 1989.



preventive, treatment and rehabilitation, but much of the text focuses on the punitive measures to be taken by the government.

The anti-drug policy authorizes the use of the U.S. military to assist in the drug war at home. If you live in federal housing or if you reside in large urban areas such as New York, Boston, Washington DC, or Los Angeles—where crime and addiction have turned neighborhoods into combat zones—this Act will authorize the military to fence off your streets, keep track of who comes from and goes to your home, stop and frisk you, your friends and family, and regularly inspect your home and belongings. If you or anyone who visits you is suspected by the authorities of using, selling or trafficking in any kind of illicit narcotic substance, you can be evicted from your home whether your landlord is the government or a private party.<sup>27</sup>

The Act increases state powers in the areas of government surveillance, intelligence gathering, and seizure of private property. It authorizes regional intelligence sharing centers, which not only compile statistics but provide contracts to states, local criminal justice agencies, and non-profit organizations for purposes of identifying, targeting and removing criminal conspiracies and activities spanning jurisdictional boundaries.<sup>28</sup>

The Justice Department is given the power to confiscate private property and deny state and federal entitlement by decree. Once caught, even casual marijuana users could be subject to the confiscation of their homes, cars, and bank accounts.<sup>29</sup> The government seizure takes place through civil proceedings where the burden is on the defendant to prove his or her innocence, unlike the "innocent until proven guilty" due process guarantee of criminal proceedings.<sup>30</sup>

### A National Drug Czar

William Bennett, as the Director of the Office of National

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**The Act increases state powers in the areas of government surveillance, intelligence gathering and seizure of private property.**

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27. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, November 18, 1988, Public Law 100-690: 100th Congress, Title I, Section 1005, paragraph (e), p. 4186; also see Bernard Weintraub, "Bush Considers Calling Guard To Fight Drug Violence in Capitol [sic]," *New York Times*, March 21, 1989; Michael Isikoff, "Bennett Plans War On Drugs in D.C. Area," *Washington Post*, March 19, 1989.

28. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, *ibid.*, Title I, Section 6101, paragraph (a), p. 4340.

29. *ibid.*, Title V, "User accountability."

30. For all of its draconian prescriptions, however, the U.S. anti-drug policy is, in effect, a paper tiger. On September 5, 1989, George Bush announced his strategy for carrying out the policies outlined by Reagan's Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. Although the Bush strategy implements only a portion of Reagan's policy for a drug-free America by 1995, professionals in law enforcement, the judiciary, the military, health, and education know that even Bush's piecemeal strategy cannot be funded nor administrated.

Low estimates indicate that \$50 billion dollars will be required over the next four years to implement Bush's present battle plan. The money is unlikely to come from federal taxes. Overburdened and underfunded state and local governments are expected to come up with the majority of the revenues and personnel needed to implement the federal anti-drug policy. In the long run, according to state and local officials, the policy will be very costly to state and local agencies because of further proposed Congressional cuts in social services and education in order to fund the federal government's drug war.

Drug Policy, is an adviser to and voting member of the National Security Council.<sup>31</sup> It is here in the NSC that the ultimate drug war could be fought. All it would take is a President determined e-

nough, a Congress pliant enough, and people desperate enough for the drug war in America to be declared a national security emergency. If and when that happens, the NSC—as part of civil emergency preparedness—would be in charge of its implementation under the guidance of the President.

A national security emergency would without a doubt decrease drug use in America. The government would be authorized to increase domestic intelligence and surveillance of U.S. citizens. State security measures would be enhanced by restricting the freedom of movement within the U.S. and granting the government authority to relocate large groups of civilians at will. The U.S. Continental Forces and a federalized National Guard could seal off borders and take control of U.S. airspace, all ports of entry, and interstate highways.<sup>32</sup> It was James Madison's worst nightmare that a righteous faction would some day be strong enough to sweep away the constitutional restraints, designed by the framers to prevent the tyranny of centralized power, executive privilege and arbitrary government authority over the individual.<sup>33</sup> These restraints, the balancing and checking of powers among branches and layers of government and the civil guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights would be the first casualties in a drug-induced national security state with Reagan's civil emergency preparedness unleashed.

Nevertheless, there will be those who will welcome the National Security Council into the drug fray, believing that increasing state police powers to emergency levels is the only way left to fight America's enemy within. In the short run, a national security state would probably be a relief to those whose personal security and quality of life has been diminished by drugs or drug related crime. And as the general public watches the progression of institutional chaos and social decay, they too may be willing to pay the ultimate price: one drug-free America for 200 years of democracy. ●

31. *op. cit.*, n. 27, Section 1003, paragraph (f), p. 4182; also see Diane Alters, "Bennett's 2 Battles: Drugs and Politics," *Boston Globe*, January 15, 1989.

32. The *Posse Comitatus* Act passed by the U.S. Congress in 1879, prohibited the use of federal troops in civilian law enforcement. Legislation passed by Congress from 1981 to 1988 has substantially undermined the *Posse Comitatus* Act permitting U.S. Continental Forces and active reserves which constitute a portion of each state's National Guard to participate in domestic law enforcement. See: 1982 Department of Defense (DOD) Authorization Act's amendments to title 10 U.S. Code, Sections 371-378 entitled, "Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials"; DOD Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1985 which amends title 10 Code by changing the meaning of "active duty" as it relates to Air Guard Reserve personnel; and National Defense Authorization Act, FY 1989 which amends title 10, section 371-378 and adds Sections 379 and 380 for drug interdiction and law enforcement (Public Law 100-456, Section 1105). Also see, Maj. Aleksandra M. Rohde, "Pushing the Limits of Posse Comitatus," *National Guard Magazine*, August 1989, p. 22.

33. James Madison, "Checks and Balances", *The Federalist Papers*, No. 51.



# Dealing With Drugs In Cuba

by Debra Evenson \*

"That's a Cuban cigar. You see where it come from? Havana," Reinaldo Ruiz, an imposing man six feet four inches in height and weighing 270 pounds, sat in the Miami office of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) informant in mid-1987 and bragged about transporting cocaine shipments from Colombia through Cuba with the help of "top" Cuban officials.<sup>1</sup> The DEA informant, Hu Chang, was well aware of Ruiz's contacts in Cuba since he himself had flown the first successful transshipment for Ruiz from Colombia to Cuba on May 9, 1987.<sup>2</sup> Nor was Chang new to the drug trade. A former Nationalist Chinese air force pilot who had worked as a contact pilot for the CIA in Southeast Asia, Chang had been arrested on drug smuggling charges shortly after immigrating to the U.S. in 1979.<sup>3</sup> The collaboration between these two men initiated the first proven involvement of Cuban officials in international drug trafficking.

For years the U.S. accused Cuba of trafficking in drugs but never had credible evidence to back its accusations.<sup>4</sup> Reinaldo Ruiz provided that opportunity. When Ruiz persuaded a young relative working for the Cuban Ministry of Interior (MININT) to arrange use of Cuba as a transit point in 1987, U.S. law enforcement officials tracked the operation from its inception, taping the conversations among the participants.

The information DEA obtained was never shared with the Cuban government, which did not uncover the drug-dealing operations on its own until the spring of 1989. Then the Cuban government moved quickly to expose the scandal and to prosecute the officials involved. But rather than praise the Cubans for taking decisive steps to stop drug trafficking, the Bush administration harshened its public repudiation of Cuba and rejected Cuba's offers to cooperate in drug interdiction.

## What Did the U.S. Know?

The facts raise many questions about the involvement of U.S. agencies in the Cuba drug operation. They also call into question whether the Bush administration is more concerned with anti-communism than it is with interdicting drug traffic.

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1. The statement was made in a videotape played at Reinaldo Ruiz's pre-trial detention hearing in Federal District Court, Southern District of Florida on March 9, 1988; *Washington Post*, March 10, 1988, p. A18.

2. Chang's involvement is reported both in the indictment of Reinaldo Ruiz and in the *Miami Herald*, July 9, 1989, p. 1A.

3. *Ibid.*

4. U.S. law enforcement officials acknowledged this in a *Washington Post* story following the trial of drug smugglers with alleged connections to Cuba. *Washington Post*, July 26, 1988, p. A4. See also, *CovertAction Information-Bulletin*, No. 19 (Spring-Summer 1983), pp. 9-11.

Reinaldo Ruiz left Cuba in 1962 at about age 25. By 1986, he was living comfortably in Los Angeles where he owned two homes worth more than \$800,000. One apparent source of income was a business he operated out of Panama called Colombian Tours, S.A., which arranged travel to and from Cuba. To carry out some of his business arrangements with Cuba, Ruiz contracted for the legal services of Interconsult, a Cuban office in Panama. Coincidentally, Miguel Ruiz Poo, the 34-year-old son of Ruiz's cousin, happened to be a captain in the Cuban Ministry of Interior functioning as manager of the Interconsult office in Panama. In the fall of 1986 Ruiz went to the Interconsult offices to look up his young relative.

After establishing a relationship with Ruiz Poo, Reinaldo began to suggest business deals in which he would acquire various blockaded equipment for the Cubans, proposals which Ruiz Poo passed on to his superior, Amado Padron who was in charge of Cuban intelligence activities in Panama. As these discussions progressed, Reinaldo introduced the idea of drug shipments through Cuba. He told Ruiz Poo that his girl friend, Ligia Cruz, a Colombian, could obtain cocaine through her connections to Gustavo Gaviria, a cousin of Medellin cartel boss Pablo Escobar Gaviria, and through contacts in Miami, Ruiz could arrange for the drugs to be picked up by speedboats and taken to Florida. Thus, if Miguel Ruiz Poo could arrange a transshipment base in Cuba, Reinaldo Ruiz could take care of getting the drugs to and from Cuba. Ruiz Poo took the proposal to Padron, and the three met in Panama in late 1986 to discuss the scheme.

A few weeks later, Ruiz flew to Cuba to meet with Padron and Tony de la Guardia, the chief of the special MC department set up by the Cuban Ministry of Interior in 1986 to break the U.S. trade blockade by obtaining U.S. goods in Miami and elsewhere and getting them into Cuba.<sup>5</sup> These operations frequently involved receiving clandestine shipments by plane or by speed boats coming from Miami. On de la Guardia's orders alone, the coast and landing strips were cleared for receipt of these shipments which were unloaded only by members of the MC department. So the mechanism by which Cuba could

5. The United States imposed a partial trade blockade on Cuba in 1961 which was extended in 1961 to include almost all U.S. goods with the exception of some foodstuffs and medicines. By 1964, the U.S. had pressured the OAS to join the blockade. Most Latin American allies of the U.S. joined the notable exception of Mexico. Today, most Latin American countries have lifted the blockade and have re-established diplomatic relations with Cuba. The U.S., however, has extended its economic embargo under the Reagan and Bush administrations, including the restriction of travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba.

In order to get needed parts and goods, the Cuban Ministry of Interior (MININT) set up the MC Department within MININT to find ways to obtain blockaded goods.





Credit: Wide World Photos

**Reinaldo Ruiz, convicted drug smuggler.**

used as a transit base for drugs without the knowledge of officials outside the MC department was already in place when Ruiz proposed his deal.

Arrangements were made for a first operation to take place in January 1987. Ruiz purportedly sent his plane to Colombia for the drugs, the speedboats arrived from Miami, but the plane never came. Perhaps Ruiz was just testing his Cuban counterparts; he told them problems with the airplane caused the operation to be aborted.

A second operation was planned for April 10, 1987. As early as October 1986, Ruiz had established a relationship with Hugo Ceballos, a Colombian living in Miami who was looking for ways to transship cocaine from Colombia to Florida. Ceballos worked with a group of Miami-based speedboat operators. According to U.S. legal documents, Reinaldo's son Ruben Ruiz and an American co-pilot named Richard Zzie flew Ruiz's plane from Florida to Panama on March 28. On April 10, they flew from Panama to Colombia, picked up about 400 kilograms of cocaine and landed the shipment at Cuba's Varadero airport concealed in boxes of Marlboro cigarettes.<sup>6</sup> The boxes were then loaded onto speedboats which had arrived from Florida. The U.S. Coast Guard intercepted the boats as they entered U.S. waters.

Later, in a "secretly" recorded videotape, Ruben Ruiz bragged about how the Cubans "tricked" U.S. customs officials in Fort Lauderdale by calling ahead and reporting that Ruiz's plane had had engine difficulty forcing it to land in Varadero.<sup>7</sup> Thus, according to Ruben, U.S. Customs did not give them any trouble for coming in from Cuba. However, given the constant accusations of Cuban complicity with drug

trafficking, it is inconceivable that U.S. Customs would not closely scrutinize an unscheduled plane coming from Cuba no matter what the reason given. The most plausible explanation is not that the Cubans were able to give Ruiz cover, but that U.S. officials knew full well where the plane had been and were not going to interfere with the activities of Ruiz.

Only on the third try, in May 1987, did the operation succeed. This time DEA agent Chang co-piloted the plane with Ruben Ruiz. The drugs arrived in Cuba packed in Epson computer boxes, were repacked into cigar boxes and loaded onto waiting speedboats which took the shipment to Florida. The plane flew from Cuba to Mérida, Mexico, before returning to Miami. After this operation, the MININT officials involved decided to stop the operation for the rest of the year; Ruiz ceased his dealings with Cuba and moved his operations to Haiti. The four Cuban officials involved had received a total of approximately \$400,000 from their deal with Ruiz.

The DEA, and probably the CIA, were both involved in and knowledgeable of these operations as early as the summer of 1986, when a DEA undercover agent infiltrated Ceballos's organization. Coincidentally, in late July Ruben Ruiz purchased a Cessna 401 aircraft which was used to transport the drug shipments. It is not clear from the court documents in the case how Ceballos was put in contact with Ruiz, but according to the documents, U.S. law enforcement officials were aware that Ceballos and Ruiz met at least as early as October 1986, which is about the same time that Ruiz approached his Cuban relative Ruiz Poo. Meetings among the U.S.-based participants were held at Chang's offices in Miami which were recorded on videotape.

In February 1988 Ruiz and his co-conspirators including his son Ruben Ruiz were indicted by a Federal Grand Jury in Miami.<sup>8</sup> At the same time, Hugo Ceballos and 10 others were arrested under a separate indictment.<sup>9</sup> In July 1988, Ceballos and his cohort involved in smuggling the drugs into Florida were convicted.<sup>10</sup> Eight months later, in early March 1989, Ruiz and his son pleaded guilty, but were not sentenced until late August, more than a month after the Cuban government had convicted and sentenced the officials involved.

Although the February 1988 indictments in the Ruiz/Ceballos cases alleged use of Cuba as a transshipment point, the Cuban government denied the allegations of official involvement as just so much more U.S. propaganda. There was nothing to distinguish such allegations from the barrage of previous accusations which the Cubans claimed were patently false. Among the evidence proffered to show the Cuban connection was one of the "secretly" recorded videotapes made at Chang's office.

In the portion of the tape which was played at Reinaldo Ruiz's bond hearing in March 1988, Ruiz says "the drug money went into Fidel's drawer." Though Ruiz admitted afterwards

6. Marlboro cigarettes are one of the primary brands of U.S. cigarettes brought into Cuba to be sold in tourist and diplomat stores.

7. Ruben Ruiz also liked to boast of his terrorist skills. According to the transcript of Reinaldo Ruiz's pre-detention hearing, he had been taped as saying that he was expert in blowing up cars.

8. Indictment No. 88-127, United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

9. Indictment No. 88-126, United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

10. Ceballos was sentenced to 30 years on each of 5 counts of importing and distributing cocaine, the sentences to run concurrently.



that he had no actual knowledge of Fidel Castro's involvement, the taped statement made headlines in the U.S. press.<sup>11</sup> To the Cuban government, however, the allegation was spurious and provided convincing evidence that the charges were unfounded.

### Cuban Suspicions Arise

It was not until the trial of Hugo Ceballos in July 1988 that Cuban intelligence began to take interest in the allegations. Ceballos did not have direct contacts with Cuban officials, but evidence presented at his trial suggested use of Cuban territorial waters for drug shipments. Although the testimony regarding Cuban connections was not specific, Cuban diplomats nevertheless approached officials of the DEA to request an exchange of information. DEA officials in Miami were interested in exploring such an exchange and took the proposal to the State Department where it was tacitly rejected.<sup>12</sup> The rejection may have further convinced the Cubans that the U.S. had no concrete evidence to share. In any event, left with nothing more than unsubstantiated general statements in the context of a virulently hostile propaganda campaign, Cuba undertook no further investigation of its own at that time.

According to *Granma*, the newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party, Cuba began its investigation when it received reliable information from friendly diplomats in March 1989.<sup>13</sup> State Department representatives in Havana have claimed that they had attempted to provide information to the Cuban government in 1988, but that their warnings were ignored.<sup>14</sup> However, in briefing a House Narcotics Subcommittee delegation bound for Cuba to discuss drug-related issues with Fidel Castro, State Department officials in Washington advised in December 1988 that the U.S. was not cooperating with the Cubans on narcotics matters either officially or unofficially.<sup>15</sup> Obviously, if the Bush administration was interested in furthering its purported effort to inform the Cubans, it would have solicited the aid of the House delegation, and at a minimum advised them of the situation.

It is evident that the U.S. did not want to hasten the Cuban probe into drug dealing, and some U.S. law enforcement officials have expressly stated that the Miami investigation did not provide the informational basis for the Cuban investigation. Indeed, only after Cuba completed its own investigation

did the DEA admit that although it had the names of the Cuban officials working with Ruiz, these names were never released in public documents nor given to Cuba. DEA's claims that it had uncovered these names by October 1988 are disingenuous. Since its own agents were involved even before Ruiz made contact with the Cubans and a DEA agent participated in landing drugs in Cuba, DEA knew the names of these contacts from the very beginning.

### The Arrests in Cuba

In June 1989, the Cuban government arrested 14 military officials including 11 Ministry of Interior officers on charges of corruption and drug trafficking. Among those arrested



Credit: Prensa Latina

### General Arnaldo Ochoa testifying at the military trial.

were the three officers who dealt with Reinaldo Ruiz in 1987.<sup>16</sup> Despite the substantial amount of information compiled by DEA from July 1986 to the present on the Ruiz/Cuba connection, Johnny Phelps, assistant special agent in charge of the DEA office in Miami, told the press after the announcement of the Cuban arrests that "there's nothing at this point to say that there is [a connection between the two operations]."<sup>17</sup> The U.S. continued to conceal the facts it had in its possession.

An explanation for the Reagan/Bush administrations' refusal to share information with the Cubans surfaced on the editorial page of the *Wall Street Journal* on September 25. According to an Op-Ed piece by David Asman, the CIA sent operatives into Cuba on several occasions after the arrest of Reinaldo Ruiz in attempts to get Tony de la Guardia and

11. *Washington Post*, March 10, 1988, p. A18; *Miami Herald*, March 10, 1988, p. 4C.

12. The account of this thwarted attempt at cooperation was reported in the *Miami Herald*, July 9, 1989, p. 1A. DEA's request was simply shelved by the State Department.

13. The recent trial of former Minister of Interior Jose Abrantes Fernandez revealed that Abrantes had received a report from one of his officers in late February 1989 suggesting that some MININT officials might be involved in drug trafficking. When Abrantes failed to act on the information, it went no further. Since prosecutors could not prove that Abrantes deliberately furthered the drug scheme, he was not charged with involvement in the drug operations and thus not subject to the death sentence. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for abuse of office, negligence in service and unauthorized use of financial resources belonging to the ministry.

14. *Washington Post*, July 25, 1989, p. A17.

15. Jeff Leen, *Miami Herald*, July 9, 1989, p. 1A.

16. Even after the Cubans arrested the officials and publicized their names, U.S. Attorney Dexter Lehtinen in charge of the Miami cases would not reveal the names of the Cuban officers identified in the U.S. investigations.

17. *Miami Herald*, July 9, 1989, p. 1A.



## Cuba's Policy Against Drug Trafficking

Soon after the triumph of the revolution in 1959, Cuba completely eliminated the U.S.-based Mafia which had made the island a major drug center. Even before taking power, the revolutionary forces issued a proclamation in 1958 stating its objective "to completely eliminate hard drugs and illicit gambling."<sup>1</sup> Making note of the ways in which drug trafficking corrupts social institutions, the revolutionary Cuban government took a very puritanical stance with respect to narcotics. Drug dealing in Cuba today is a rare occurrence and involves almost exclusively small amounts of home grown marijuana. The Cuban criminal justice system has achieved what U.S. law enforcement has not — swift prosecution even for small dealers.

In the area of international drug trafficking, Cuba has played a role in interdicting shipments. Since Cuba lies directly in the path of drug producers and the Florida coast, smugglers frequently use routes through neighboring waters and the country's airspace. According to Cuban reports, its Coast Guard arrested 328 drug smugglers in 83 violations of Cuban airspace and territorial waters between 1970 and March 1986.<sup>2</sup> Most of those captured strayed accidentally onto the Cuban coast, broke down or landed because they were out of fuel.

In 1978 and 1979 the Cuban and U.S. Coast Guard services held two rounds of talks during which they agreed upon cooperative measures in the attempt to interdict drug trafficking. Although no official document was signed, DEA officials have publicly acknowledged the collaboration. Cuba renounced the agreement in 1982 in response to the U.S. federal indictments of four Cuban officials on drug trafficking charges which the Cuban government labelled false.<sup>3</sup> Even so, Cuba continued to arrest drug traffickers caught within its territorial waters or whose planes landed on the island. DEA officials concede that as many as 18 U.S. citizens arrested on drug charges are now in Cuban jails.

### The U.S. Propaganda Campaign Against Cuba

More aggressively hostile in its policy toward Cuba than the previous administration, the lies of the Reagan administration were unabashed. Shortly after Reagan's inauguration, U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick told a Washington audience that Soviet submarines were

operating out of Cuba.<sup>4</sup> According to Wayne Smith, who was chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana at that time, no Soviet nuclear or missile submarines had docked in a Cuban port since 1974.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, Smith denounced as false Reagan administration accusations that Cuba was arming the Salvadoran rebel forces in 1982.<sup>6</sup> In fact, Smith had informed Washington that Cuba had stopped such shipments in hopes of engaging the U.S. in negotiating an end to the armed conflict.<sup>7</sup>

Accusations of Cuban drug dealing have been part of the U.S. government's claims of Cuban wrongdoing since the 1960s. In 1966, a Senate report charged Castro with smuggling "Red" Chinese heroin into the United States to finance its guerrilla activities.<sup>8</sup> The Reagan administration intensified the accusations of Cuban drug trafficking. In 1982, based on testimony of convicted drug smugglers, four Cuban officials were indicted by a federal grand jury in Miami. The indictment accused the Cubans of making a deal in 1980 with reputed Colombian drug smuggler Jaime Guillot to give safe passage to Guillot's shipments to the U.S. in exchange for the transport of arms to the M-19 guerrillas operating in Colombia. The Cuban government vehemently denied the charges.

Based on the alleged brief arrangement between the then Cuban ambassador to Colombia and Guillot, the Reagan administration along with the extremist anti-Castro Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) began coupling Cuba with both drugs and terrorism. The primary premise of the allegations was that Cuba was engaged in drug trafficking to earn hard currency to support terrorist forces operating in any number of Latin American countries. An even more repugnant allegation repeated *ad nauseam* in CANF literature was that Cuban officials were given specific orders by Fidel Castro to "penetrate and addict U.S. youths with drugs."<sup>9</sup>

U.S. efforts to prevent drug trafficking through Caribbean air and water routes have failed, in some measure because of its own cooperation with known dealers. When

4. Introduction by Wayne Smith to Carla Anne Robbins, *The Cuban Threat* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983), p. xiii.

5. *Ibid.*

6. Wayne Smith, *The Closest of Enemies* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1987), pp. 258-60.

7. *Ibid.*

8. See Carla Anne Robbins, *The Cuban Threat* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983), p. 3.

9. *The Cuban Monitor: News from the Cuban American National Foundation*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (August 1989), p. 5 (quoting former Cuban official Manuel de Beunza); see also "The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic," Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, April 30, 1983, p. 389 (testimony of convicted drug smuggler Mario Estevez-Gonzalez in Federal District Court, Southern District of Florida, February 7, 1983).

1. Provision No. 6 for the Civil Administration of the Free Territory in the Sierra Maestra reads: "It is the responsibility and aim of the Revolutionary Movement and this Administration to completely eliminate hard drugs and illicit gambling, which at present make the real physical, mental and economic development of the Cuban people impossible."

2. These statistics were published by the Cuban government in a document entitled *Drug Consumption and Traffic 1986*.

3. See CAIB No. 19 (Spring-Summer 1983), pp. 9-11.



revelations of CIA and contra involvement in drug trafficking surfaced, both Congress and the administration looked the other way and actively removed evidence from public view. Since a substantial portion of U.S.-based drug traffickers and money launderers have been Cuban Americans operating out of Miami, it is advantageous for the CANF and State Department to continue to point the finger at Cuba particularly during election years.

Further, to avoid some of the embarrassment of the significant involvement of Cuban Americans in illicit drug related activities, rumors were spread in the early 1980s that Castro had infiltrated over 400 agents among the Mariel émigrés in order to start U.S.-based drug operations. In response to a Senate subcommittee question regarding such rumors, acting DEA director Francis M. Mullen, Jr. testified in 1983 that no evidence had been uncovered to substantiate such charges.<sup>10</sup>

Asked again in 1984, he gave the same reply.<sup>11</sup>

In fact, until 1987 few drug shipments, if any, were reportedly making their way to the United States with the cooperation of Cuban nationals. In hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in February 1984, DEA director Mullen reported two isolated instances of possible drug smuggling allegedly made with Cuban cooperation since 1982. In both instances the evidence was inconclusive as to whether Cuba was in fact involved.

In his testimony, Mullen described two incidents allegedly involving Cuban cooperation. In March 1983, a diary found on a sailboat carrying marijuana showed an itinerary of Florida, the Bahamas, Haiti, Cuba, Jamaica, Cuba, the Bahamas, and finally Florida. The second incident took place six months later in September 1983. According to the DEA, the wreckage of an aircraft which crashed in the Florida Keys indicated that the flight was involved in drug activity. One of the items found was a let-down chart for Varadero, Cuba, and fuel from the wreckage showed it to have a different octane and lead content than aircraft fuels commercially available in the United States and Jamaica.<sup>12</sup>

Searching for more damning evidence, Representative

Lawrence Smith (Dem.-Florida) asked "Is there anything more? I mean...are we all just running around here shooting ourselves in the foot in terms of having one isolated incident here, one isolated incident here, but not enough to really put together something which might be...some kind of operation to break down?" Mullen replied, "We are looking for that pattern.... We have not reached that point yet."<sup>13</sup>

Although the harangue of accusations of Cuban drug trafficking continued unabated, drug enforcement officials had no substantial evidence of Cuban involvement until 1987. Investigations leading to the February 1988 in-

dictments of Cuban exile Reinaldo Ruiz and Colombian Hugo Ceballos on charges of smuggling drugs into Florida by way of Cuba, provided the first real evidence that Cuban officials were actually cooperating with drug smugglers. Jack Hook, a spokesperson for

the DEA in Miami, was quoted as saying, "This is the first time we've had evidence that Cuba—like other Caribbean countries—is being used as a transshipment base.... Before this, it's only been rumors."<sup>14</sup>

Moreover, statements made by law enforcement officials at the time of the Ceballos trial in Miami in July 1988, suggest that they believed Cuba had not previously been used as a shipment base. Some U.S. officials considered the evidence in the Ceballos case significant because it signalled that cocaine traffickers were turning to Cuba as a transit point as other routes through the Bahamas were choked off.<sup>15</sup>

United States repudiation of Cuban offers of cooperation have hurt efforts to stem the flow of drugs into this country. According to Mullen, only a very small portion of the cocaine, marijuana, and methaqualone coming through the Caribbean was believed to pass through Cuba: "If Cuba were completely neutralized as a transit point, the effect on drug availability would be minimal. On the other hand, if Cuba were to cooperate fully in international drug interdiction efforts, ...a more significant impact could be made on the drug traffic through the Caribbean."<sup>16</sup> The amount of cocaine trafficking in which Cuban MININT officials participated between April 1987 and 1989 was indeed minimal. Now it has been stopped altogether. •

10. "The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic," Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, April 30, 1983, p. 76.

11. "United States Response to Cuban Government Involvement in Narcotics Trafficking," Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 21 and 23, 1984, p. 39.

12. These examples which offered only circumstantial evidence, even though the persons involved were taken into custody, were the most concrete the DEA could offer. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

13. *Op. cit.*, p. 40.

14. *Washington Post*, July 26, 1988, p. A4.

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Op. cit.*, n. 11, p. 29.



Miguel Ruiz Poo out before they were arrested by the Cuban government. Rescuing drug traffickers from trial in their native country is an odd tactic in the "war on drugs," but it is consistent with the objective of preventing Cuba from learning the full facts about the drug operations.

When Cuba arrested 14 officials, the Bush administration had the audacity to insist it had a right to interview the defendants.

Not only did Cuba uncover the facts despite the U.S. concealment, the Cuban investigation went much further than the



Credit: CANF

**Then-DEA Director Frances Mullen speaking at the extreme rightwing Cuban American National Foundation.**

DEA's and uncovered operations involving other Cuban-Americans based in Miami who had engaged the cooperation of the Cuban officials convicted. There are no reports that these Miami dealers have been arrested or indicted in the U.S.

### The Trials in Cuba and Miami

In the more than eight days of televised court proceedings, the Cuban population learned in detail how the special MIN-INT division secretly set up to break the U.S. trade blockade became involved in drug smuggling. At the same time evidence described how three members of the Cuban Armed Forces (FAR) assigned to Angola, including popular military hero Division General Arnaldo Ochoa, unsuccessfully tried to arrange a drug deal with Medellín drug cartel boss Pablo Escobar in an escapade which seriously threatened Cuban national security.

Although all the defendants confessed to the charges, under Cuban law, like many other civil law systems, a guilty plea does not obviate a trial. The state must still demonstrate independent evidence of guilt and present argument for sentencing. In this case, the corroborating evidence consisted of the testimony of other defendants and witnesses, stashes of cash, drugs and documentary evidence.

At the end of the trial, the prosecutor requested the death penalty for seven defendants. The three-judge military court sentenced to death the four highest ranking officials who had

directed the operations, and with one exception sentenced the others to 25-30 years imprisonment.<sup>18</sup>

In Miami, both Reinaldo and Ruben Ruiz were given reduced sentences for their "cooperation" with the prosecution. For his part, Reinaldo Ruiz, who initiated the operation was sentenced on August 21st to 17 years imprisonment with the possibility of parole in 1993. Under the new sentencing guidelines which went into effect on November 1, 1987, Ruiz should have received life in prison, but government lawyers moved that the guidelines not apply to Ruiz, conceding that his criminal activity ended prior to that date. Interestingly, the indictment alleges criminal activity through mid-February 1988. Ruben Ruiz was sentenced to 15 years in prison.

Although Reinaldo Ruiz received leniency on the basis of post-arrest cooperation, the record suggests that the information yielded by Ruiz was available to the DEA throughout the criminal conspiracy in 1986 and 1987. No significant new information emerged after arrest. Could it be that Ruiz's "cooperation" began in 1986 before he contacted his Cuban cousin?

### The Disinformation Campaign Continues

In the tradition of spurious allegations and exaggerations which has characterized the U.S. propaganda campaign against Cuba since 1960, some U.S. officials, anti-Castro exile groups, and members of the establishment press launched an attack marked as much by inconsistency as by preposterous lies and speculation. Among the baseless allegations most popularized by the U.S. media were charges that 1) the prosecutions were merely a "show" trial to cover up a political purge; 2) the trafficking was directed or at least condoned by Fidel Castro himself; 3) the Cubans knew of the Cuban involvement in 1988 when the U.S.-based connections were indicted in Miami and did nothing to stop the operations; and 4) Cuba continues to cooperate with drug smuggling operations.

Among the more specious invectives was the charge that the Cuban prosecutions were merely a "show" trial to cover up a political purge. Although the evidence manifestly contradicts such speculation and U.S. intelligence officials were reported by *Newsweek International* to have rejected such assertions as unfounded,<sup>19</sup> U.S.-funded Radio Martí broadcast daily bulletins to Cuba alleging that the drug charges were groundless and that Ochoa and the others were being pilloried for plotting against Castro. That Radio Martí would broadcast such an obvious lie to the very audience with which it tries to establish credibility is astonishing. But, then, the U.S. national press put forth similar allegations as news reporting.<sup>20</sup>

18. Under Cuban law, a death sentence must be reviewed by the Supreme Court and the Council of State before it can be executed. Both institutions reaffirmed the sentences in this case. Because of the critical significance of the trial and its consequences both domestically and internationally, the 29 members of the Council of State publicly explained their individual reasons for affirming the death sentences.

19. *Newsweek International*, July 10, 1989.

20. Julia Preston, "Cuba Sentences Officers to Death for Corruption; General's Dealings Circumvented Castro," *Washington Post*, July 8, 1989, p. A1.



## Chronology

*July 1986: Ceballos group infiltrated by DEA undercover agent. Ruben Ruiz buys Cessna aircraft later used in drug operations.*

*October 1986: Ceballos makes contact with Reinaldo Ruiz in arranging drug shipments from Colombia.*

*October or November 1986: Reinaldo Ruiz contacts Miguel Ruiz Poo, captain in Cuban Ministry of Interior, to discuss drug trafficking.*

*December 1986: Ruiz meets with Ruiz Poo and Amado Padron in Panama to discuss arrangements for drug transshipments through Cuba. Ruiz travels to Cuba to firm up deal on arrangements for transshipping drugs through Cuba. Meets with Tony de la Guardia and Amado Padron.*

*January 1987: Arrangements made for first shipment, but Ruiz never arrives in Cuba with drugs.*

*April 10, 1987: Ruben Ruiz, with co-pilot Richard Zile, lands drugs at Varadero. Drugs loaded onto speedboats which are intercepted.*

*May 8, 1987: Ruben Ruiz, with co-pilot Hu Chang, who is a DEA agent, lands drugs at Varadero packed in computer boxes. Drugs transferred to speedboats.*

*February 1988: Reinaldo and Ruben Ruiz and two others indicted in Federal District Court in Miami. Cebal-*

*los and ten other co-participants are charged in separate indictment in Miami. All are arrested.*

**March 1988:** Tape played at Ruiz pretrial detention hearing in which he and son Ruben Ruiz boast about having a Cuban connection but without naming specific Cuban officials.

**July 1988:** Hugo Ceballos and ten other defendants convicted on drug smuggling charges. Ceballos sentenced to 30 years. Cuban officials seek information from DEA on Ceballos and Ruiz cases. State Department turns down request to share information.

**March 8, 1989:** Reinaldo Ruiz and other co-defendants plead guilty.

**March 1989:** Cuba begins investigation to uncover drug operations in Cuba.

**June 12-13, 1989:** Fourteen Cuban officials arrested on charges of corruption and drug trafficking.

**July 8, 1989:** Cuban defendants found guilty and sentenced. Four sentenced to death.

**July 13, 1989:** Four Cuban officials who directed drug trafficking operations are executed in Havana.

**August 1989:** Reinaldo and Ruben Ruiz sentenced in Miami. ●

The proponents of the "purge" theory apparently want it both ways: They chastise Cuba for refusing to acknowledge drug trafficking by its officers, but when Cuba prosecutes drug traffickers, they accuse Cuba of masking a political plot against the government. If Fidel Castro wanted to purge officers, he did not need to risk his credibility by exposing Cuban involvement in drug trafficking which he had long denied. Moreover, much of the evidence in the case against the MININT officers closely paralleled evidence in the Ruiz/Ceballos cases, and prosecution was limited to the MININT officers working for the special MC department and three FAR officers. The evidence of drug trafficking was both detailed and compelling.

A prominent component of the propaganda campaign is the assertion that the trafficking was directed or at least condoned by Fidel Castro himself. According to this theory, the prosecution of high ranking officials was, therefore, just a maneuver to dissociate Castro from the drug activities. No evidence has been offered to substantiate such a claim. Indeed, the facts make such a charge highly implausible and it has been rejected by prominent Castro biographers Gianni Mina and Tad Szulc.<sup>21</sup>

First, the quantity of drug transshipments by way of Cuba, even at the height of the operations was relatively insignificant, even at the height of the operations was relatively insignificant,

even at the height of the operations was relatively insignificant, even at the height of the operations was relatively insignificant,

hardly worth the effort, given the likelihood of detection by the U.S. If Fidel Castro was really engaged in drug trafficking, why wouldn't he make the most of it? Cuba lies directly in the path of Latin American cocaine producers and the primary port of entry into the United States, Florida. Why be involved in penny-ante isolated efforts which could not in the least give the Cuban economy the support the U.S. claimed it was seeking through such illegal activity? The evidence at the recent trial in Cuba suggests that from 1987 to April 1989, Cubans received only \$3 million for all their efforts and much of this was taken for the private use of the officials prosecuted. Castro would never have risked his prestige and the prestige of the revolution for so little.

Moreover, it is no secret that where there is drug trafficking the CIA is often close at hand. The CIA was undoubtedly aware of the MC operations to break the blockade. In late 1986 and 1987, contacts in Panama and Miami suggested to the MC officials that the MC initiative could be aided financially by allowing Cuba to be used as a transshipment base for drugs. To permit Cuban territory to be used as a transshipment base invites CIA involvement and infiltration. And indeed, a CIA operative flew one of the first cocaine-laden planes which landed at the military airport at Varadero Beach in 1987.

Further, it appears that Ruiz, if not an agent himself, cooperated with the CIA to send an operative to Cuba to attempt

21. "Juicio a Fidel, entrevistas con sus biografos," *Proceso*, September 18, 1989.



to get Tony de la Guardia and Miguel Ruiz Poo to defect before they were arrested.<sup>22</sup> It is not inconceivable that some of the drug operations were initiated by CIA connections, but it is inconceivable that Castro would willingly compromise Cuban security to such an extent.

Second, those involved had a convincing cover which hid their drug activities from higher officials. As director of the special MC department—the mission of which was to bring blockaded goods into Cuba—Tony de la Guardia and other members of the department established operations in Panama to purchase U.S. goods. Since sale of such goods to Cuba violated U.S. Treasury Department regulations, the goods had to



Credit: Prensa Latina

#### **Audience listens to testimony at the trial of Cuban military officials.**

be obtained through secret channels. Some of the goods came into Cuba by speedboat from Miami and by air from Panama and Colombia. In order to achieve their objectives in secret, de la Guardia and company had to have authority to permit such boats and planes to enter Cuban territory without interference by the Coast Guard. To further the cover, drugs arrived in boxes marked "Epson Computers" or other blockaded goods. After reviewing the evidence, even U.S. diplomats in Havana gave credence to Cuba's claim that Castro did not know about the operations.<sup>23</sup>

Third, such involvement is contrary to Cuban interests in maintaining international prestige and in improving relations with the United States. Since Cuba is hopeful of loosening the trade embargo to help its economy, it would be irrational to play into U.S. propaganda used to justify the continuation of the blockade.

The latest version of the "Castro connection" asserts that Fidel Castro's brother and Cuban Defense Minister, Raul Castro, took part in the operation. The support for this accusation came from confessed smuggler Reinaldo Ruiz as he

was about to be sentenced this past summer.<sup>24</sup> Ruiz, who initiated the first drug operation with the Cubans, was purportedly facing a life sentence for his involvement but after his "cooperation" with prosecutors he received only 17 years with eligibility for parole in 1993 (only four years' time) and a promise from the judge that his sentence could be further reduced if he continued his "cooperation." How coincidental that as he is about to be sentenced months after he pleaded guilty he suddenly remembered that he saw Raul Castro at the airport when one of Ruiz's cocaine shipments was unloaded at a military airfield in 1987.<sup>25</sup>

With Cuba now taking firm measures to prevent any recurrences of Cuban nationals cooperating with drug traffickers, the Bush administration will probably stretch spurious charges as far as it can. And with nothing to lose but time in jail, Ruiz will probably come forth with additional revelations which cannot be corroborated.

#### **Is Cuba Now Engaged in Drug Trafficking?**

Although there appears to be some evidence that drugs have been transported near or through Cuban territorial waters and over Cuban airspace since June, such facts alone do not implicate Cuban involvement any more than they would implicate the governments of all countries lying along known drug shipment routes. There is no evidence of any Cuban cooperation with these shipments. The harm done to Cuba by the recent scandal was substantial. To risk additional harm to national security and prestige by continuing such operations simply does not make sense. The harsh sentences handed down by the Cuban military court were a clear warning to any others who might engage in such ventures.

Elliott Abrams suggests that if the Cubans are really serious about stopping drug trafficking, they should shoot down planes flying over their territory without authorization. It is not difficult to predict the U.S. reaction here if Cuba shot down an innocent plane.

Cuba persists in its effort to enter into cooperative agreements on drug interdiction with the U.S. The Bush administration has responded by tightening the economic embargo and seeking further restrictions on travel between the two countries. In criticizing the Bush administration for rejecting Cuba's offers, Representative Charles B. Rangel (Dem.-New York), chair of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control put the issue bluntly: "It's time for the State Department to stop playing anti-Communist politics. It's drugs, not Communists, that are killing our kids." ●

24. Ruiz was originally scheduled to be sentenced in May. Sentencing was delayed until July. Although the reason for the delay has not been made public, it is probable that it was related to the trial in Cuba. Sentencing was again postponed in early August, purportedly due to Ruiz's health problems. After the sentencing which took place on August 21, enforcement officials disclosed Ruiz's allegation that he saw Raul Castro at the military base where he landed one of the planes. *Miami Herald*, August 22, 1989, p. 1B.

25. Since Ruiz's account of Raul Castro's possible involvement, another Cuban American indicted in a separate drug trafficking operation has stated that Raul Castro approved the operations. No doubt many more drug smugglers will make such revelations since the pay off in reduced sentences is such an attractive incentive.

22. *Wall Street Journal*, September 25, 1989.

23. *Washington Post*, July 24, 1989, p. A17.



port for the *contras*, political training for UNO personnel in Costa Rica, transmitting radio messages on *Radio Impacto* from Costa Rica into Nicaragua, financing "electoral observer" trips to Nicaragua for unnamed European journalists, and planting black propaganda in European media for the purpose of "blowbacks" in the U.S. and Nicaragua.<sup>8</sup>

Other sources reported that CIA political funds formerly used to run the closed Miami *contra* office had been redirected to UNO.<sup>9</sup> On November 11, 1989, the Managua daily *El Nuevo Diario* published an exposé about covert commercial enterprises in Costa Rica that had been sending U.S. money to the political opposition since 1981 and were now being used for the UNO electoral campaign.

On October 2, 1989, NED Deputy Director of Programs Barbara Haig (daughter of Alexander Haig) met with Carmen Group officials (see sidebar) to discuss coordination of the Nicaragua project. "We are excited about the opportunities that lie ahead," stated David Carmen in a letter to Haig, "I am positive that together we'll bring about real change for democracy in Nicaragua."<sup>10</sup>

NED's charter prohibited it from giving direct campaign aid to UNO and from carrying out projects within the U.S. Thus, while NED took charge of public and "overt" funding to UNO and its auxiliary organizations in Nicaragua, the Carmen Group was called upon to carry out two clandestine functions: public relations and fund raising for UNO in the United States. The money and supplies raised for UNO by Carmen, in distinction to the NED funds, were sent secretly to Nicaragua and never reported to the Supreme Electoral Council, as Nicaraguan law required.

In a letter to Barbara Haig, a Carmen Group official, Carol Hallett thanked Haig for resolving Carmen Group's "shipping dilemma," i.e., the problem of how to clandestinely send supplies to UNO so as to avoid Nicaraguan taxes and keep this funding secret. Hallett wrote, "[t]hrough your insight, it seems we have solved our problem. I am currently working with Senator Bob Graham [Dem. Fl.]. His office has assured me they will see that the cargo arrives in Nicaragua."<sup>11</sup> The letter corroborates charges by Nicaraguan authorities that members of Graham's staff shuttled supplies to Managua, as one of many illicit channels set up by UNO's U.S. supporters.

### The Miami Committee

Although the Carmen Group organized UNO public relations and fund raising, this activity was presented as the work of a group of "leaders from the Nicaraguan exile community" called the "Committee for Free Elections and Democracy in Nicaragua." An internal working document circulated by the Carmen Group in September 1989 explains that "a sizable co-

8. The \$6 million figure was reported by *Newsweek* in its March 12, 1990 edition; ANN dispatch, dateline Washington, D.C., March 31, 1990 and published in *Barricada*, April 1, 1990, provide further details.

9. See ANN dispatch, dateline Washington, D.C., September 5, 1989 and published in *Barricada*, September 6, 1989.

10. Letter on Carmen Group stationery, dated October 2, 1989.

11. Letter on Carmen Group stationery from Carol Hallett to Barbara Haig, dated October 4, 1989.

## The Venezuela Connection

During the electoral campaign, offshore centers were set up in Venezuela and Costa Rica. Diverse sources, including internal documentation obtained during the campaign, indicate that numerous channels were set up from Washington and Miami via San José and Caracas. The secret flow of funds and political contacts clearly involved the CIA and NED as well as the State Department and "private" organizations. The most interesting of these is the NED-Venezuela-*La Prensa* connection.

In mid-1989, according to internal memos, NED officials met with the Venezuelan president to discuss "using a Venezuelan institute, which would be comprised of representatives from the media, business, labor and the parties, as a pass-through for NED support." An NED official explained, "this organization would probably not actually have to serve as a pass-through other than on paper."

Nicaraguan media sources said this organization is the "Rómulo Gallegos" foundation based in Caracas and run by the Venezuelan private sector. *Barricada* cited unnamed U.S. intelligence and government sources who said the amount funneled by the CIA through Venezuela during the Nicaraguan electoral process was between \$100,000 – \$200,000 per month, and that this money was part of the political funds formerly given to the Washington and Miami offices of the "Nicaraguan Resistance." According to *Newsweek* (October 9, 1989), UNO "receiv[ed] additional financial support via Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Pérez – hundreds of thousands of dollars...."

On February 2, 1989, Cristiana Chamorro, *La Prensa* managing editor and daughter of Violeta, sent a fax to NED President Carl Gershman which read, in part:

"My mother and I returned Monday from Caracas [where] we met with the people who Carlos Andres appointed to manage the Foundation.... The man who contacted us [was] Dr. Eladio Larez [President of Radio Caracas and Television RCTV].... The Foundation is going to be run by personalities from the private Venezuelan sector tied to the communications media...."

Regarding the mechanism for the functioning of the Foundation in conjunction with the National Endowment and the purchases which will be made for *La Prensa*.... Dr. Larez said that they agree to the arrangement as they have already been established.... Lope Ona will continue to make purchases and...[send] the materials via Miami-Costa Rica or via Venezuela, and that in the event the Venezuelan route runs into complications, they would seek out a Venezuelan company based in Miami, which would then appear as the one handling things...."

A copy of this fax was provided in Managua by sources close to *La Prensa*.



ordinating office, the Committee for Free Elections and Democracy in Nicaragua, will have to be developed and funded in Miami and funded for 5 months [sic].... This office will have a full time staff of 4, plus a director and outside professional services. Expected costs [will be] \$275,000."<sup>12</sup>

This "Miami Committee" was actually first conceived by the State Department in August 1988 with the objective of serving as one of several liaisons between Washington and the internal opposition in Managua.<sup>13</sup> Its structures were set up in Miami in the first half of 1989. The Committee would be presented publicly as the legal representative for UNO in the United States (the Committee registered as such with the Department of Justice), with the purpose of carrying out public relations and fund raising.

This strategy allowed the U.S. role, including that of NED and the Carmen Group, to remain undisclosed, and these activities could be presented as a "Nicaraguan initiative" rather than part of the U.S. program. Such was the farce that during her September 1989 visit to Miami, Chamorro announced the official formation of the Committee as an initiative she had undertaken.<sup>14</sup>

The Board of Directors of the Committee included its Chairman José Antonio Alvarado, a one-time Somoza diplomat at the United Nations and investment banker who had allegedly been involved in *contra* money laundering; Nadia Pallais, the wife of Luis Pallais Debayle, Somoza's cousin and closest adviser; Carlos Garcia, former Nicaraguan National Guard officer and Somocista businessman; and Nicolas Lopez, the former director of Somoza's newspaper, *La Estrella*.

A working document circulated by the Carmen Group provided strategic guidelines for the UNO electoral campaign, detailing a comprehensive strategy of political activities, psychological operations, and financial expenditures.<sup>15</sup>

In order to counter what will most certainly be intense and well financed activity on the part of the Sandinistas, the opposition's campaign must and will take advantage of every hour between now and February 25th, election day....

The population must first be provided with incentives for wanting to attend the rallies. They are therefore fed

**The language of the Carmen Group document was very similar to that found in CIA Psychological Operations (Psyops) and Civic Action manuals.**

at these events and given souvenirs of the rally which, in addition to giving them something to take home, also provide a feeling of well being in contrast to the stark poverty in which they have been living under the existing regime. This has the added advantage of

keeping the opposition ever present in their minds. Further, these people must be transported to and from the rallies.... Population mobilization and motivation requires resources for a full time organized activity by many campaign workers in the 16 geographic departments into which Nicaragua is divided.

The document also details two important phases of the campaign. Phase I was to raise the following themes among the population: "Hunger, Misery, Obligatory Draft, i.e., the *status quo* versus Change, Liberty and Employment.... Phase II will consist of telling the population why they should vote for the particular candidates fielded by the UNO. This will emphasize the following themes: The Candidate's values and personalities, Full employment for the country, Freedom of expression, Prosperity and improvement of quality of life."

A careful study of UNO's electoral campaign from September 1989 to February 25, 1990 reveals that this strategy was fully implemented. The themes outlined by the Carmen Group were precisely those themes upon which the UNO campaign was based. Moreover, the *language* of the Carmen Group document was very similar to that found in both CIA and Psychological Operations (psyops) and Pentagon Civic Action manuals.<sup>16</sup>

The strategy document budgets \$709,500 in "souvenirs" for Phase I, including UNO caps, T-shirts, plastic glasses, flags, and bumper stickers. Phase II called for an additional \$1 million for more "souvenirs" and \$1.7 million in "salaries and equipment."

The travel budget for UNO officials was \$168,000 and was used for trips to Miami and a variety of other U.S. cities. This budget also included \$320,000 for trips to Nicaragua by North American, Latin American, and European "observers." The total UNO budget drawn up in the Carmen document was \$4.3 million.

In January 1990, the Nicaraguan daily, *El Nuevo Diario* published an UNO payroll spread-sheet of one month's salaries. This document included the names of hundreds of local and national UNO activists with monthly salaries ranging from \$500 for UNO's "National Electoral Control Chief," \$250 for regional and zonal campaign heads, \$150 for district campaign chiefs, \$60 for municipal heads, and between \$50-\$60 for UNO workers. Considering that this money was paid every month beginning as early as September or October 1989, UNO paid out hundreds of thousands of dollars in salaries.

16. The CIA's "Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare" shows the importance of "unarmed propaganda" and defines it as the use of themes sensitive to the target population. This manual was used to train the *contras*.

12. This document, titled "Budgetary Needs for the Committee for Free Elections and Democracy in Nicaragua" and dated September 15, 1989, was obtained from sources in Miami connected to UNO. Although the Carmen Group circulated the document, it is not clear who actually authored it.

13. Internal NED document, August 1988. For more extensive reference to this document, including mention of the Miami-based Committee, see "U.S. Intervention in the Nicaraguan Elections," *op. cit.*, n. 3.

14. Chamorro press conference in Miami, September 15, 1989.

15. *Op. cit.*, n. 12.



Exactly how much of these funds was actually spent, or what percentage was handled by Carmen and what percentage passed through other channels, is not clear. The important point is that this spending was distinct from the \$12.5 million that Congress appropriated for NED to spend overtly on indirect campaign activities.

Carmen Group President David Carmen admitted that his group raised at least \$600,000 for UNO campaign materials.<sup>17</sup> Additional Carmen Group documents indicate that approximately \$1 million was funneled through the organization, according to Miami Committee Director José Alvarado, former *contra* Ernesto Palazio, who was later named UNO representative in Washington, D.C., raised at least \$50,000 for UNO. In addition, phone solicitations and "fund raising events" in Miami raised tens of thousands more.<sup>18</sup>

#### Secret Shipments

The Miami Committee-Carmen Group operation also involved NED. The National Republican Institute for International Affairs (NRI), one of the four NED "core groups," was apparently appointed as liaison to the Miami Committee. NRI Director Keith Schuette personally oversaw the production in Miami of UNO campaign propaganda, even though the NED charter expressly prohibited such activity.

Schuette contracted the Miami printing company, Creative Marketing Ideas, to print UNO T-shirts, bumper stickers, and other electoral paraphernalia. Creative Marketing Ideas is run by Luis Argüello, a Somocista businessman who left Nicaragua before the Revolution. "Thank you for your quick response on the printing of the T-shirts of our Nicaragua program," states an October 6, 1989 letter from Schuette to Argüello. The letter specifies that the order was for \$17,632 worth of T-shirts, printed with UNO campaign slogans.

Schuette's letter also stated, "Please advise if this price includes tax, as we are a tax-exempt organization." Thus, NED not only secretly violated its charter in these operations, but also the regulations guiding its tax-exempt status.

Senator Bob Graham's office was only one of numerous clandestine channels for UNO shipments to Nicaragua. Other freight was shipped from Miami freight companies to Costa Rica, and from there sent secretly over land into Nicaragua. Receipts and internal letters documenting these transactions indicate that the "Faith Freight Forwarding Corp." of Miami sent a 20-foot crate to Puerto Limon, Costa Rica, on December 19. The crate was shipped under the name of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Jr., who is Violeta Chamorro's son and a former member of the *contra* directorate.

According to the receipts, the crate contained, among other items, a large box sent by Creative Marketing Ideas and 25 tons worth of UNO campaign posters. It also included materials produced by American Photo Inc. in Miami such as plastic glasses, plastic bags, and plastic UNO flags—precisely the campaign materials detailed in the Carmen Group strategy document. A document sent to UNO headquarters

in Managua on December 20, 1989, by Roberto Faith from the Faith Freight Forwarding Corp., and addressed to Chamorro Jr., states:

I'm sending you a copy of 'loading Guide No. 003944' which describes the contents of the load that left on December 19 and should arrive at Puerto Limon on December 24. From there it will be taken to San Jose and sent overland to Managua. I have also sent a FAX copy of this project to Mr. Richard Beck of Atlas Electricas in Costa Rica, who will help in shipment from San Jose to Managua. My office in San Jose, which has a lot of experience, will also cooperate in this endeavor.<sup>19</sup>

#### A "Pleasant Evening with Jeane" Kirkpatrick

One of the Carmen Group's projects involved organizing a U.S. tour for Violeta Chamorro. For this project alone, the Carmen Group received a donation of \$145,000 from Republican millionaire Fred Sacher. In 1985, Sacher made a \$305,000 donation to the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty (NEPL), one of Oliver North's front groups, set up by Iran/*contra* accomplice Carl "Spitz" Channell. Sacher's donation to NEPL was deposited in one of the secret Swiss bank accounts used to purchase black market arms for the *contras*.<sup>20</sup> Following Sacher's donation to the Carmen Group, the Chamorro tour was baptized the "Sacher Project" by David Carmen.

The one-week tour was scheduled for January 1990 and involved daytime meetings with all the major print and television media on the East Coast, followed by nightly \$1000-a-plate fund raising dinners in Boston, New York, Washington, D.C., and Miami.<sup>21</sup> The tour was cancelled at the last minute, after Chamorro broke her knee. Nevertheless, the post-tour budget shows that despite the cancellation, \$95,000 of Sacher's donation was used, including \$15,000 paid to David Carmen's son, Gerald, for acting as "tour manager."

Although Violeta Chamorro could not be present, the Car-

The Carmen Group received a donation of \$145,000 from Republican millionaire Fred Sacher.

19. The fax also explains that Roberto Faith is the Chairman of the "Calderon Committee in Miami." Rafael Angel Calderon of Costa Rica's United Social Christian Party won the February elections in Costa Rica. During 1988 and 1989, his party's political foundation—the Association for the Defense of Liberty and Democracy in Costa Rica—received nearly \$500,000 from NED. The National Liberation Party of Oscar Arias denounced the funds as constituting a campaign contribution to Calderon in an effort to punish Arias for his role in the Central American peace process.

20. *Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Contras* (Washington, D.C.: The National Security Archive, 1987), p. 226.

21. Documents from the Carmen Group regarding tour planning, December 1989.

17. Author's phone interview with David Carmen, January 30, 1990.

18. Author's phone interview with José Alvarado, January 30, 1990.



## The Jefferson Foundation

The Jefferson Educational Foundation is another organization which played an integral role in promoting UNO in the U.S. and abroad. The Jefferson Foundation, an ultra-right organization connected to the fascist fringe of U.S. politics, played an important role in the Reagan administration's policy towards Central America. Among the Jefferson Foundation's board members are John Singlaub, Barry Goldwater, John Lehman, and Senators Alfonse D'Amato, Orrin Hatch, Connie Mack, and Strom Thurmond.

During the 1980s the Jefferson Educational Foundation ran a "Central America Awareness Program," which worked with the White House Office of Public Liaison and the White House Working Group on Central America, promoting anti-Sandinista propaganda and the use of "public diplomacy."

In December 1989, the Jefferson Foundation organized a series of public and private meetings in Paris on the Nicaraguan elections. According to its literature, the goal of the meetings was to "gain crucial European commitments" and "build international support for President Bush's emphasis on truly free elections...."

The Paris meetings were run by Robert R. Reilly, a member of the Jefferson Foundation, who worked with the Heritage Foundation in the late 1970s before Ronald Reagan appointed him Director of the Office for Private Sector Programs (OPSF) of the U.S. Information Agency. Despite its innocuous name, the OPSF was responsible for channeling U.S. government money into "private" organizations participating in Reagan's foreign policy, and in particular, in building a trans-Atlantic network of rightwing groups in Europe and the U.S. to coordinate the conservative agenda.

Reilly was later appointed to the White House Office of Public Liaison and given the responsibility of coordinating a propaganda campaign around alleged "Sandinista persecution of the Church in Nicaragua."

Among those invited to participate in the Paris program was UNO militant Lino Hernandez, executive director of the "Nicaraguan Human Rights Commission," an NED-funded entity. The anti-Sandinista Bishop, Pablo Antonio Vega and Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Jr. were also invited. The Jefferson Foundation also brought Jaime Daremblum, a rightwing Costa Rican columnist and professor who is noted for his anti-Sandinista editorials. Daremblum is a major Costa Rican recipient of NED funds, and sits on the boards or advisory councils of several anti-Sandinista propaganda programs funded out of Costa Rica by NED. In another example of the coordination among different U.S. groups, it is interesting to note that the Carmen Group made the travel arrangements for Lino Hernandez and Pablo Antonio Vega.

men Group organized a fund raising dinner in New York City on February 7, 1990. Twenty wealthy Republican couples donated \$5,000 per couple to attend. The dinner, held at the home of Seymour and Evie Holtzman, featured Jeane Kirkpatrick as the guest of honor. The invitations sent by David Carmen read, "these elections can be the turning point in restoring that part of Central America to Democracy and...[can] set in motion the cure for Cuba and finally end the threat that we face down there...please join us for an interesting evening with Jeane."

Among the invitees were former Reagan Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan, Sofia Casey, the widow of former CIA Director William Casey, and Holly Coors of the Coors Family, which had earlier donated millions of dollars to the *contras* and Faith Whittlesey, former Co-Director of the White House Office of Public Liaison (OPL).<sup>22</sup>

Nine days after the dinner, Kirkpatrick appeared as the keynote speaker at a conference titled "Elections in Nicaragua: Democracy or Deception" and convened by the ultra-right American Defense Institute. In her speech she described the elections as a "farce orchestrated by the communists."

During the conference, an eight-minute UNO public relations video was shown which painted Chamorro as the "Cory Aquino of Nicaragua" fighting "communism and totalitarianism." The Carmen Group paid J.R. Black \$12,000 to produce the video. Black, who runs a shadowy operation called "International Media Associates," was introduced to NED President Carl Gershman by William Geimer, the President of the Jamestown Foundation which has been linked to U.S. covert activities.<sup>23</sup> In an introductory letter to Gershman, Geimer explains that "Black proposes to produce a videotape [to] speak about the evils of communism, and to disseminate the tapes in Nicaragua prior to the February election...we will of course provide him with access to Jamestown clients."<sup>24</sup>

## Conclusion

The U.S. government's electoral intervention strategy is as equally dangerous and misguided as was its military support of the *contra* war. Unfortunately, it has proven more palatable to Congress because of its emphasis on political and psychological operations. Even more disturbing, the U.S. strategy has gone virtually unreported in the mainstream media. NED has proven to be a very effective tool for intervention—perhaps even more effective than the CIA.

Eventhough the Cold War evaporates and pressures build for a "peace dividend," Washington continues its interventionist policy abroad. Given the rise of *perestroika* in Europe, many Nicaraguans have wondered if it is not time for "Yankeestroika" in the Americas. Is it not time for the United States to democratize its relations with other countries? •

22. The Office of Public Liaison was established to promote the Reagan administration's policies among the media and the public. After Whittlesey left OPL, she became Ambassador to Switzerland—the very same year that secret Swiss accounts were set up to funnel money to the *contras* and other "Enterprise" ventures.

23. See, David Wise, *The Spy Who Got Away* (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 237; *Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene*, January 1986, p. 3.

24. Letter from William Geimer to Carl Gershman, December 4, 1990.



On the Side of Pol Pot:

# U.S. Supports Khmer Rouge

by Jack Colhoun\*

For the last eleven years the United States government, in a covert operation born of cynicism and hypocrisy, has collaborated with the genocidal Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. More specifically, Washington has covertly aided and abetted the Pol Potists' guerrilla war to overthrow the Vietnamese-backed government of Prime Minister Hun Sen, which replaced the Khmer Rouge regime.

The U.S. government's secret partnership with the Khmer Rouge grew out of the U.S. defeat in the Vietnam War. After the fall of Saigon in 1975, the U.S. — worried by the shift in the Southeast Asian balance of power — turned once again to geopolitical confrontation. It quickly formalized an anti-Vietnamese, anti-Soviet strategic alliance with China — an alliance whose disastrous effects have been most evident in Cambodia. For the U.S., playing the "China card" has meant sustaining the Khmer Rouge as a geopolitical counterweight capable of destabilizing the Hun Sen government in Cambodia and its Vietnamese allies.

When Vietnam intervened in Cambodia and drove the Pol Potists from power in January 1979, Washington took immediate steps to preserve the Khmer Rouge as a guerrilla movement. International relief agencies were pressured by the U.S. to provide humanitarian assistance to the Khmer Rouge guerrillas who fled into Thailand. For more than a decade, the Khmer Rouge have used the refugee camps they occupy as military bases to wage a *contra* war in Cambodia.

According to Linda Mason and Roger Brown, who studied the relief operations in Thailand for Cambodian refugees:<sup>1</sup>

...relief organizations supplied the Khmer Rouge resistance movement with food and medicines.... In the Fall of 1979 the Khmer Rouge were the most desperate of all the refugees who came to the Thai-Kampuchean border. Throughout 1980, however, their health rapidly improved, and relief organizations began questioning the legitimacy of feeding them. The Khmer Rouge...having regained strength...had begun actively fighting the Vietnamese. The relief organizations considered supporting the Khmer Rouge inconsistent with their humanitarian goals.... Yet Thailand, the country that hosted the relief operation, and the U.S. government, which funded the bulk of the relief operations, insisted that the Khmer Rouge be fed.

During his reign as National Security Adviser, Zbigniew

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1. Linda Mason and Roger Brown, *Rice, Rivalry and Politics: Managing Cambodian Relief* (South Bend, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 135-36.

Brzezinski played an important role in determining how the U.S. would support the Pol Pot guerrillas. Elizabeth Becker, an expert on Cambodia, recently wrote, "Brzezinski himself claims that he concocted the idea of persuading Thailand to cooperate fully with China in efforts to rebuild the Khmer Rouge.... Brzezinski said, 'I encouraged the Chinese to support Pol Pot. I encouraged the Thai to help the DK [Democratic Kampuchea]. The question was how to help the Cambodian people. Pol Pot was an abomination. We could never support him but China could.'"<sup>2</sup>

## An Unholy Alliance

The U.S. not only permitted the Khmer Rouge to use the refugee camps in Thailand as a base for its war against the new government in Phnom Penh but it also helped Prince Norodom Sihanouk and former Prime Minister Son Sann to organize their own guerrilla armies from the refugee population in the camps. These camps are an integral factor in the ability of the Khmer Rouge, the Sihanoukist National Army (ANS) and Son Sann's Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) to wage war against the Hun Sen government.

In 1979, Washington began "a small program" of support for Sihanouk's and Son Sann's guerrillas by providing "travel expenses" for the "insurgent leaders" and funds "for the upkeep of resistance camps near the Thai-Cambodian border."<sup>3</sup> In addition, since 1982, the U.S. has provided the ANS and KPNLF with covert and overt "humanitarian" and "nonlethal" military aid. By 1989, the secret nonlethal aid had grown to between \$20 million and \$24 million annually and the overt humanitarian aid had reached \$5 million. The Bush administration requested \$7 million more in humanitarian aid for 1990.<sup>4</sup>

When Congress approved the \$5 million aid package for the ANS and KPNLF in 1985, it prohibited use of the aid "...for the purpose or with the effect of promoting, sustaining or augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of the Khmer Rouge...to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Cambodia or elsewhere...."

From the beginning, U.S. aid for the ANS and KPNLF has been a complimentary source of aid for the Khmer Rouge. According to a western diplomat stationed in Southeast Asia, "...two-thirds of the arms aid to the noncommunist forces appears to come from Peking [Beijing], along with more exten-

2. Elizabeth Becker, *When The War Was Over: The Voices of Cambodia's Revolution and Its People* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 440.

3. Charles Babcock and Bob Woodward, "CIA Covertly Aiding Pro-West Cambodians," *Washington Post*, July 8, 1985.

4. Steven Erlanger, "Aid to Cambodian Non-Communists is Detailed," *New York Times*, November 16, 1989; see also, Jeremy Stone, "Secret U.S. War In Cambodia," *New York Times*, November 16, 1989.



sive aid to the communist fighters [the Khmer Rouge].... China is estimated to spend \$60 million to \$100 million yearly in aid to all factions of the anti-Vietnamese resistance."<sup>5</sup>

In 1982, under pressure from the U.S., China, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Sihanouk and Son Sann joined forces with the Khmer Rouge to form the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). The ANS and KPNLF, which were more politically respectable than the Khmer Rouge, gained military credibility from the guerrilla alliance. However, the Khmer Rouge gained considerable political legitimacy from the alliance and Khmer Rouge diplomats now represent the CGDK at the United Nations.

The CGDK receives large amounts of military aid from Singapore. When asked about the relationship between money from the U.S. and arms from Singapore, another U.S. diplomat in Southeast Asia replied, "Let's put it this way. If the U.S. supplies [the guerrilla coalition] with food, then they can spend their food money on something else."<sup>6</sup>



Credit: Associated Press

**Sichan Siv, who once represented the KPNLF, now works in the White House.**

#### Direct U.S. Aid

But there are indications of direct U.S. links to the Khmer Rouge. Former Deputy Director of the CIA, Ray Cline, visited a Khmer Rouge camp inside Cambodia in November 1980. When asked about the visit, the Thai Foreign Ministry denied that Cline had illegally crossed into Cambodian territory. However, privately, the Thai government admitted that the trip had occurred.<sup>7</sup> Cline's trip to the Pol Pot camp was originally revealed in a press statement released by Khmer Rouge diplomats at the United Nations.

Cline also went to Thailand as a representative of the Reagan-Bush transition team and briefed the Thai government on the new administration's policy toward Southeast Asia. Cline told the Thais the Reagan administration planned to "strengthen its cooperation" with Thailand and the other

5. Don Oberdorfer, "Shultz Opposes Military Aid for Guerrillas in Cambodia," *Washington Post*, July 11, 1985.

6. Dinah Lee, "Singapore Breaks into Arms Trade with Inexpensive Assault Rifles," *Washington Post*, December 15, 1982.

7. "Thais Furious at Cambodians for Disclosing Visit by Reagan Aide," *Los Angeles Times*, December 5, 1980.

ASEAN members opposed to the Phnom Penh government. There have been numerous other reports about direct links between the CIA and the Khmer Rouge. According to Jack Anderson, "[t]hrough China, the CIA is even supporting the jungle forces of the murderous Pol Pot in Cambodia."<sup>8</sup> Sihanouk himself admitted that CIA advisers were present in Khmer Rouge camps in late 1989: "Just one month ago, I received intelligence informing me that there were U.S. advisers in the Khmer Rouge camps in Thailand, notably in Site B camp.... The CIA men are teaching the Khmer Rouge human rights! The CIA wants to turn tigers into kittens!"<sup>9</sup>

By late 1989 the distinction between "direct or indirect" U.S. support for the Khmer Rouge was less clear. When CGDK forces launched an offensive in September 1989, Sihanouk's and Son Sann's armies openly cooperated with the Khmer Rouge. Moreover, by then the Khmer Rouge had infiltrated the military and political wings of the ANS and KPNLF.

Sihanouk confirmed ANS and KPNLF military collaboration with the Khmer Rouge in a radio message broadcast clandestinely in Cambodia. "I would particularly like to commend the fact that our three armies know how to cordially cooperate with one another... We assist each other in every circumstance and cooperate with one another on the battlefield of the Cambodian motherland...."<sup>10</sup> Sihanouk specifically mentioned military cooperation in battles at Battambang, Siem Reap, and Oddar Meanchey.

Evidence of increased involvement of U.S. military advisers in Cambodia has also begun to surface. A report in the London *Sunday Correspondent* noted that "American advisers are reported to have been helping train guerrillas of the non-communist Khmer resistance and may have recently gone into Cambodia with them.... Reports of increased U.S. involvement have also emerged from the northern town of Sisophon, where local officials say four westerners accompanied guerrillas in an attack on the town last month."<sup>11</sup>

Although the U.S. government denies supplying the ANS and KPNLF with military hardware, a recent report claimed that KPNLF forces had received a shipment of weapons from the U.S. including M-16s, grenade launchers, and recoilless rifles.<sup>12</sup> It has also been reported that the U.S. is providing the KPNLF with high resolution satellite photographs and "[s]everal KPNLF commanders... claim Americans were sent to train some 40 elite guerrillas in the use of sophisticated U.S.-made Dragon anti-tank missiles in a four-month course that ended last month." When the KPNLF launched a major offensive on September 30, a large number of U.S. officials were sighted in the border region, near the fighting.<sup>13</sup>

8. Jack Anderson, "CIA Gearing Up for Operations with Foreigners," August 27, 1981; see also, "America's Secret Warriors: In Business With A New Set Of Missions," *Newsweek*, October 10, 1983.

9. Sihanouk interview, *Le Figaro* (Paris), December 30, 1989.

10. Clandestine radio broadcast in Cambodia, October 11, 1989. Text is published in the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *East Asia Daily Report*, October 11, 1989, p. 31.

11. London *Sunday Correspondent*, October 15, 1989.

12. *Ibid.*

13. "KPNLF Leaders: U.S. Role Grows in Khmer Fighting," *Bangkok Post*, October 13, 1989.



Washington's link to the anti-Phnom Penh guerrilla factions was formalized in 1989 when KPNLF diplomat Sichan Siv was appointed as a deputy assistant to President George Bush. Siv's official assignment in the White House is the Public Liaison Office, where he works with different constituency groups, such as Khmer residents in the U.S. and other minority, foreign policy, youth, and education groups. Siv escaped from Cambodia in 1976 and immigrated to the U.S., where he joined the KPNLF. From 1983 to 1987, Siv served as a KPNLF representative at the United Nations as part of the CGDK delegation which was headed by Khmer Rouge diplomats.<sup>14</sup>

As part of the Bush administration, Sichan Siv is significantly involved in the formulation and conduct of U.S. policy in Cambodia. He was a "senior adviser" to the U.S. delegation attending an international conference on Cambodia held last summer in Paris, where the U.S. demanded the dismantling of the Hun Sen government and the inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in an interim four-party government. He was also the moderator of a White House briefing on Cambodia in October 1989 for Khmer residents in the U.S.

Another one of Siv's assignments has been to work as a liaison with far Right groups which provide political and material support for the KPNLF. He attended a World Anti-Communist League (WACL) conference in Dallas, Texas in September 1985 along with other anti-communist "freedom fighters" from around the world.<sup>15</sup> At the WACL conference, the KPNLF openly sought "outside training and support in intelligence and demolition."<sup>16</sup>

Siv has also worked with retired U.S. Army Brigadier General Theodore Mataxis, who heads up the North Carolina-based Committee for a Free Cambodia (CFC). Mataxis was approached by senior KPNLF generals in 1986 to set up the CFC to organize support in the U.S. for the KPNLF.

### Right Wing Support

According to the Reagan doctrine, the goal of U.S. foreign policy was to "contain Soviet expansion" by supporting counterrevolutionary groups in Angola, Nicaragua, Cambodia, etc. and, in essence, "roll back" the "Soviet empire." Many of the rightwing groups which gained prominence after Reagan's election immediately started programs to support *contras*

across the globe. The World Anti-Communist League, the Heritage Foundation, the Freedom Research Foundation, as well as many others, all pressed hard for support of the "freedom fighters."

In its 1984 policy report entitled, *Mandate for Leadership II: Continuing the Conservative Revolution*, the Heritage Foundation called on the Reagan administration to focus even more closely on these counterrevolutionary struggles and to:<sup>17</sup>

...employ paramilitary assets to weaken those communist and noncommunist regimes that may already be facing the early stages of insurgency within their borders and which threaten U.S. interests....Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam reflect such conditions, as do Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Iran and Libya.

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**In 1989, KPNLF diplomat  
Sichan Siv was appointed as a  
deputy assistant to President  
George Bush.**

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In 1984, rightwing activist/adventurer Jack Wheeler stated that "[t]here are eight anti-Soviet guerrilla wars being conducted in the third world at this moment....Sooner or later, one of

these movements is going to win....The first successful overthrow of a Soviet puppet regime may, in fact, precipitate a 'reverse domino effect,' a toppling of Soviet dominos, one after the other."<sup>18</sup>

Not surprisingly, Wheeler is a big supporter of the Cambodian *contra* movement and has openly solicited material and political support for the KPNLF. In August 1984 he wrote an article for the Moonie-owned *Washington Times* in which he said, "After spending a week with the KPNLF inside Cambodia...one is drawn inescapably to the conclusion that the KPNLF does indeed represent a real third noncommunist alternative for Cambodia....[But] the KPNLF is...running seriously low on weapons and ammunition. The lack of ammunition for rifles, rocket launchers, machine guns and mortars, is especially critical."<sup>19</sup>

Just how "private" the support Wheeler solicits for the KPNLF is open to question. Listed, along with Wheeler, on the Board of Directors of Freedom Research Foundation are Alex Alexiev and Mike Kelly. Alexiev is "with the National Security Division of the Rand Corporation...[and is] an expert on Soviet activities in the third world." Kelly was Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower Resources and Military Personnel in the early 1980s. Kelly had earlier been a legislative assistant to the rightwing Senators Bill Armstrong (Rep.-Colo.) and John Tower (Rep.-Tex.).<sup>20</sup> *Soldier of Fortune* (SOF) magazine also journeyed to Cam-

17. Stuart M. Butler, Michael Sanera, and W. Bruce Weinrod, *Mandate for Leadership II: Continuing the Conservative Revolution* (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1984), p. 268.

18. Jack Wheeler, "Robin Hood Commandos Battle Odds In Cambodia," *Washington Times*, August 10, 1984.

19. *Ibid.*

20. See also Fred Clarkson, " 'Privatizing' the War," *CovertAction Information Bulletin*, Number 22 (Fall 1984), pp. 30-31.

14. Telephone interview with author, March 21, 1990. See also, Scott Anderson and Jon Lee Anderson, *Inside the League* (New York: Dodd, Mead, & Company, 1986), p. 281.

15. Fred Clarkson, "Behind the Supply Lines," *CovertAction Information Bulletin*, Number 25 (Winter 1986).

16. Telephone interview with author, March 21, 1990. For Siv's role as a KPNLF diplomat, see Paul Pinkham, "UN Rep Works to Free Cambodia," *Pampa News* (Texas), December 29, 1985; Isabel Valde, "Khmer Official Says Cambodia Needs U.S. To Oust Vietnamese," *San Antonio Express-News*, May 14, 1986; and "Rebel Group Diplomat Seeks Cambodian Aid," (Rochester) *Times-Union*, January 22, 1986.



bodia in support of the KPNLF. In an article written after their visit to the front, SOF authors David Mills and Dale Andrade appealed for readers to contribute to the KPNLF and to send their donations to a Bangkok address. "Any private citizen who wants to give more than just moral support to help the KPNLF rebels can send money. It doesn't take much. Forty dollars will buy two uniforms, one pair of shoes, two pairs of socks, knapsack, plastic sheet and a scarf for one soldier. That's not a bad deal."<sup>21</sup>

### Ted Mataxis Rides Again

Retired Brigadier-General Ted Mataxis personifies the historic ties of the U.S. to the KPNLF. In 1971-72, Mataxis worked with General Sak Sutsakhan when he was chief of the U.S. Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT) in Phnom Penh. Mataxis's official role was to supervise the delivery of U.S. military aid to then-Cambodian Premier Lon Nol. However, Mataxis's assignment also included a covert role — overseeing the escalation of U.S. forces in Cambodia after the April 1970 U.S. invasion. Mataxis was well suited for working on covert operations in Cambodia, having trained at the Army's Strategic Intelligence School in the late 1940s.<sup>22</sup>

Despite a 1970 congressional ban on aid to the Lon Nol army, there continued to be reports of MEDT personnel working as advisers to the Cambodian military. There were also reports of U.S. helicopters providing transport for Cambodian troops as well as supplying them with ammunition during battles. The U.S. also opened a radio station at Pochentong Airport, near Phnom Penh, to "help coordinate air support for Cambodian troops."<sup>23</sup>

When Mataxis retired from the U.S. Army in 1972, he began working as a "military consultant" to the Defense Ministry of Singapore. "When I was down in Singapore I worked with them [Sak and the other Lon Nol generals] very closely. We used to do repairs on their ships and other things," Mataxis explained. "When Congress cut off money to them in 1973, they came down to see what Singapore could do to help them out. I got a team together from Singapore, and we went up to Phnom Penh. We made arrangements to buy old brass, old weapons and other stuff [to sell for profit] so they'd have money for supplies and other things."<sup>24</sup> Under U.S. law old U.S. weapons and scrap metal military equipment provided to allies is U.S. property, but there was no known official objection to Mataxis's end run around the congressional ban on

**"Any private citizen who wants to give more than just moral support to help the KPNLF rebels can send money."**

U.S. military aid to the Lon Nol generals.

Mataxis recalled when Major General Pak Son Anh (who at the time worked closely with General Sak, the military commander of the KPNLF) visited him in Washington in 1986. "They [Pak and other KPNLF officers] came to see me and asked what I could do.

They came up to my office at the Committee for a Free Afghanistan.... They asked us to set up something like that [for the KPNLF]. So I went over to see Admiral [Thomas] Moorer. I took General Pak along and asked Admiral Moorer if he could act as a Godfather for us. He said, 'Yes, you can use my name.'"<sup>25</sup> Moorer was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when Mataxis was head of the MEDT, and Mataxis's work in Cambodia was supervised by Moorer and Admiral John McCain, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Forces, 1968-72.

Mataxis spent much of 1987 setting up the Committee for a Free Cambodia (CFC). He visited General Sak in Thailand to determine the KPNLF's needs and promoted the KPNLF in the U.S. "I set it up for Pak to go to one of those American Security Council meetings [in Washington] in 1986. Then we had another one in 1987, where guerrillas from around the world came.... They'd get together and each guerrilla group would have a chance to get up and give his bit. It gave them a chance to exchange ideas and say what they were doing," Mataxis stated.<sup>26</sup> Rightwing support has been an important factor in keeping the Cambodian *contras* supplied. Even though Ted Mataxis lost in Vietnam, his war is not over.

### Conclusion

Although most people believe that the U.S. ended its intervention in Southeast Asia in 1975, it is evident from the information provided here that the U.S. continues to support repressive and non-democratic forces in the jungles of Cambodia. When asked about U.S. policy in Cambodia during an April 26, 1990 *ABC News* special, Rep. Chester Atkins (Dem.-Mass.) characterized it as "a policy of hatred."

The U.S. is directly responsible for millions of deaths in Southeast Asia over the past 30 years. Now, the U.S. government provides support to a movement condemned by the international community as genocidal.<sup>27</sup> How long must this policy of hatred continue?

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.* For Mataxis and his activities on behalf of the KPNLF, see Claudia Madeley, "Retired General Helps Cambodians," *Moore County Citizen News-Record* (North Carolina), November 6, 1986; "Speaker Tells of Impact of Afghan, Cambodian Wars," *Moore County Citizen News-Record*, June 1987.

27. Jack Colhoun, "U.S., China Push Khmer Rouge on Cambodians," (New York) *Guardian*, December 27, 1989. See also Colhoun, "Return to the Killing Fields: A Million Died Under Pol Pot — Could It Happen Again?" (New York) *Guardian*, August 16, 1989; Colhoun, "U.S. Touts Pol Pot As Key To Settlement," (New York) *Guardian*, October 11, 1989; Colhoun, "Revisiting The Cambodian Nightmare," *Now Magazine* (Toronto, Canada), January 25-31, 1990.

21. David Mills and Dale Andrade, "Hanoi Hits Hard And Holds: A New Wrinkle Along The Thai-Cambodian Border," *Soldier of Fortune*, July 1985, p. 51.

22. Anderson and Anderson, *op. cit.*, n. 14, p. 260.

23. "The War in Indochina: Instant Replay," *Newsweek*, October 18, 1971. See also Craig Whitney, "Military Gains Ground in U.S. Embassy in Cambodia," *New York Times*, September 20, 1971 and William Shawcross, *Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), pp. 198-99.

24. Telephone interview with author, March 21, 1990.



## Was the CIA Involved?

# The Bombing of Pan Am 103

by Jeff Jones\*

Pan Am 103, the jumbo jet that blew up over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988, might have passed into history as simply another example of the tragic loss of life spilling out of the Middle East conflict. But, as with other incidents of this kind, the official investigation leaves questions unanswered. Many relatives of the victims — the plane's 259 passengers, and 11 people on the ground — fear that the full truth will never be known.

By most accounts, investigators believe the crash was caused by a sophisticated bomb — with a time-delay, barometric fuse — placed on the plane by Ahmed Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), a Syrian-backed group that rejects PLO efforts to negotiate with Israel.

Flight 103 originated at Frankfurt and continued on, with another plane, from London. The bomb detonated at 7:03 p.m. If it had gone off just 10 minutes later, the Pan Am clipper would have already crossed the Scottish coast and the plane — its victims and evidence — would have vanished in the North Atlantic. Jibril has denied responsibility for the attack. But investigators believe that the PFLP-GC received a large payment from Iran — ABC News has reported \$10 million — to carry out the attack to avenge the U.S. downing of an Iranian airbus in which nearly 300 people died on July 3, 1988.

Paul Hudson, an Albany, New York lawyer, is the president of Families of Pan Am 103/Lockerbie, one of three groups made up of relatives of the victims. Paul and Eleanor Hudson's 16-year-old daughter Melina was returning home from a year of school in England when she died in the crash. "Anything that will prevent a coverup,...that will keep others from experiencing what we have, is important," Eleanor Hudson said recently. "The full truth should come out," Paul Hudson agreed. The charge of cover up does not come easily to either Eleanor or Paul. But Paul Hudson, who has followed the investigation closely, is dismayed at its progress. "It appears that the government either has the facts and is covering this up," he said, "or doesn't know all the facts and doesn't want to."

### Many Questions

Most of the initial controversy surrounding Pan Am 103 focused on the U.S. government's long standing policy of not informing the general public when an airline, an air-travel corridor or a specific flight has been threatened by terrorist attack. Pan Am 103 fit in to all of these categories. But there are many other questions percolating just beneath the surface of

the investigation:

- There were, it is now known, at least four, and, according to one unsubstantiated report, as many as eight, CIA and other U.S. intelligence agency operatives returning from Beirut, Lebanon, aboard the plane. The Lockerbie bomb crippled U.S. intelligence efforts in the Middle East. Were the intelligence operatives on 103 the bomb's target?

- A CIA team headed for Lockerbie within an hour of the crash.<sup>1</sup> At least once during the ground search, CIA investigators wore Pan Am uniforms; and according to one unrefuted allegation, CIA operatives temporarily removed a suitcase from the site that belonged to one of their agents, thereby breaking the Scottish police investigators, "chain of evidence," which could be crucial to any successful prosecutions.

- Also aboard Pan Am 103 was Bernt Carlsson, the Swedish U.N. diplomat, who had just completed negotiating the Namibian independence agreement with South Africa. He was due in New York the next day to sign the agreement.

- In October 1988, the West German Federal Police, the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), raided a suspected terrorist safe-house. During the raid, they found a bomb — hidden in a Toshiba radio — that was virtually identical to the one believed later to have brought down Pan Am 103. All but one of the 16 people arrested were soon released and several of them are now top suspects in the bombing.

- Pan Am was fined more than \$600,000 by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for lax security at its baggage-handling facility in Frankfurt. And according to the West German newsweekly *Stern*, a Pan Am security official in Frankfurt was spotted after the crash backdating a copy of a crucial FAA memo. The memo described a call placed to the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki in which the caller reportedly warned that a bomb would be smuggled onto a Pan Am aircraft flying from Frankfurt to the United States.

- The most startling and controversial charge to surface around Pan Am 103 comes from a report issued by a little-known New York City-based intelligence group called Interfor, Inc.<sup>2</sup> The company was hired by the law firm representing

1. Steven Emerson and Brian Duffy, *The Fall of PanAm 103* (New York: Putnam's, 1990), p. 41.

2. According to Daniel Aharoni, Interfor's general counsel, the 10-year-old company is engaged in "private intelligence and security" for corporate clients. From time to time, Aharoni said, Interfor conducts "overseas investigations on particular measures, including counterterrorism." Juval Aviv, the company's founder and president and a former member of Mossad, authored the controversial report.

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find out what happened. The Interfor Report was leaked to the press last fall.<sup>3</sup> Its immediate impact was to stall, indefinitely, the approximately 300 civil court cases filed against Pan Am by relatives of the victims. Interfor has charged that a rogue CIA unit in Frankfurt, seeking to make a deal for the release of U.S. hostages in Beirut, was protecting a Middle East heroin smuggling operation being run through Pan Am's Frankfurt baggage operation. The fatal bomb, according to this allegation, was placed on the plane in a suitcase substituted for one that normally would have contained contraband.

- But according to a January 1990 report on Frontline, the PBS news program, the bomb was placed on the plane at London's Heathrow Airport when a baggage handler switched suitcases belonging to CIA officer Matthew Gannon. Frontline believes the planning for the retaliatory bomb attack was already under way when the group learned that several top U.S. intelligence officers would be flying Pan Am 103 out of London's Heathrow Airport. Gannon and two other operatives, having left Beirut by separate routes, may have made a fatal error when they purchased their plane tickets over-the-counter from a travel agent in Nicosia. According to Frontline, the only piece of luggage not accounted for from the flight belonged to Gannon. Frontline's investigators believe that the intelligence officers were "a strong secondary target" and that a suitcase identical to Gannon's was switched at Heathrow.

- And according to syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, President George Bush and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher held a transatlantic phone conversation some time last year, in which they agreed that the investigation into the crash should be "limited" in order to avoid harming the two nations' intelligence communities. Thatcher has acknowledged that the conversation took place, but denied she and Bush sought to interfere with the investigation.

### The Interfor Report

The controversial Interfor Report maintains that a Frankfurt-based CIA team was protecting a heroin smuggling operation in hopes of obtaining information about U.S. hostages in Lebanon—the same hostages that sparked the Iran/contras arms-for-hostages scandal.

The report claims that the drug smuggling ring is headed by Syrian Monzer Al-Kassar, and controls at least one Pan Am baggage handler at the Frankfurt airport. The handler was responsible for switching luggage that had already been inspected with identical pieces holding contraband. A pas-

3. According to several sources, ex-CIA agent Victor Marchetti got hold of the report and gave it to Congressman James A. Traficant Jr. (Dem.-Ohio), who released parts of it to the media. Another copy of the report turned up in the hands of a West German paper affiliated with the Lyndon LaRouche network.

## The bomb was placed on the plane at London's Heathrow Airport when a baggage handler switched suitcases belonging to CIA officer Matthew Gannon.

senger accomplice would then pick up the bag upon its arrival in the U.S. Interfor admits it does not know how the bags passed through customs on arrival, but insists in its report, that "this route and method worked steadily and smoothly for a long time."

Al-Kassar is a known arms and drug smuggler who had received money from two Iran/contras

figures, Albert Hakim and Richard Secord, to buy 100 tons of small arms for the Nicaraguan contras. According to the report, he was also the go-between for a French effort in May 1988 that gained the release of French hostages in Lebanon in exchange for an arms shipment to Iran. Al-Kassar was spotted by the CIA team in Frankfurt which, knowing he had close ties to Syria's chief of intelligence, "...approached Al-Kassar and offered to allow him to continue his drug smuggling routes...if he helped arrange the release of the American hostages."

The Interfor Report says that the CIA group in Frankfurt, although it had contact with the West German BKA and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), operated to some extent as "an internal covert operation, without consistent oversight, à la Oliver North." In the days before the attack on Flight 103, the report states that Al-Kassar learned that a bomb was going to be placed on the plane by Jibril's Popular Front. On the day of the flight, a BKA surveillance agent assigned to watch baggage being loaded "...noticed that the 'drug' suitcase substituted was different" from those used in previous shipments. He phoned in a report to his superiors "saying something was very wrong."

The BKA relayed the information to the CIA unit, which reported to its control in Washington. The report alleges that "Control replied: Don't worry about it, don't stop it, let it go." The CIA in Frankfurt did nothing to prevent the plane from taking off, because the team "did not want to blow its surveillance operation and undercover penetration or to risk the Al-Kassar hostage-release operation." The report postulates that the CIA assumed—incorrectly—that West German authorities, who were also watching the flight, would intervene.

The Interfor Report also explains why a special U.S. hostage rescue team was on board Pan Am 103 when it was destroyed. According to the report, the team, led by Army Major Charles McKee, had learned that the CIA unit in Frankfurt was protecting Al-Kassar's drug pipeline. McKee reported to CIA headquarters he feared "...that [his team's] rescue [operation] and their lives would be endangered by the double-dealing."

When CIA headquarters did not respond, the McKee team decided to return home without permission. The Interfor Report states that "their plan was to bring the evidence back to the United States [of the CIA's involvement with Al-Kassar and drug dealing] ...and publicize their findings if the government covered it up." Agents connected to Al-Kassar



through Syrian intelligence saw the McKee team make their travel arrangements back to the U.S., and, according to the report, Al-Kassar informed his Frankfurt CIA protectors of McKee's plans.

Following the leak of the Interfor Report, Pan Am went before the federal judge hearing the civil suits against the airline and asked that he subpoena the CIA, FBI, DEA, and State Department in an effort to verify Interfor's findings. The government moved to quash the subpoenas on national security grounds. The Justice Department then took the case out of the hands of its local attorneys by sending a team from Washington to handle the litigation. A ruling is still pending.

#### Who Was Warned?

There is also considerable controversy surrounding a warning the U.S. government received about a possible plane bombing but never made public. A notice, reportedly based on a tip called into the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki, Finland, was posted in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and elsewhere—including electronic bulletin boards—where it could be seen by government officials.

The State Department now calls the threat a "hoax." But the FAA took it seriously enough at the time to issue one of its rare security alerts, an alert that was in effect on the day Flight 103 went down. The Pan Am jet, travelling the crowded Frankfurt-London-New York City corridor four days before Christmas, was only two-thirds full. Many relatives of the victims are convinced that this was because government employees avoided the flight.

One official who didn't avoid the flight was Bernt Carlsson, the Swedish U.N. diplomat who successfully negotiated the Namibia accord which led to free elections and a SWAPO-led government in the former South African colony. Carlsson was due at the U.N. the day after the crash to sign the agreement. "Pik" Botha, the South African Foreign Minister, had also been scheduled to fly on Pan Am 103 but he switched his reservation, avoided the flight, and was in New York for the signing.

According to Sanya Popovic, Carlsson's then fiancée, Botha acknowledged at the time that he had been advised to switch planes. Popovic believes that the U.N. also received the warnings about the flight, but that Carlsson was never informed.

The President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism issued its report—not on who was responsible for the bomb, but what, if any, changes should be made in airline security—in mid-May 1990 (see sidebar). The FBI and Scotland Yard have been cooperating with Scottish police (in whose jurisdiction the plane crashed). Their final report will be released in June 1990.

The primary reason that the PFLP-GC is suspected of planting the fatal device, has to do with the similarity between the Pan Am bomb—probably consisting of Semtex, a Czechoslovakian-made plastic explosive hidden in a Toshiba radio—and a bomb found by the BKA during an October 1988 raid on a PFLP-GC safe house in Neuss, West Germany.

That raid, carried out as part of an undercover BKA sur-

veillance operation code-named Autumn Leaves, left West German officials facing intense criticism. Of the 16 people they rounded up, all but one were quickly released from jail. And some of those released are now suspects in the Lockerbie bombing. (The West Germans were further embarrassed when, nearly three months after the Pan Am bombing, several more similar bombs turned up during a subsequent BKA search of the Neuss safe house.) There are enough apparent mistakes and lapses in the West German handling of Autumn Leaves to argue that the bungled investigation allowed the bombers to slip through police hands.



Credit: Associated Press

**Bernt Carlsson (right), U.N. Commissioner for Namibia, was killed in the PanAm 103 bombing.**

That was the impression conveyed in a recent *New York Times Magazine* story on Pan Am 103.<sup>4</sup> The article, edited from a new book, *The Fall of Pan Am 103*, by Steven Emerson and Brian Duffy, focused entirely on the West German police and neglected to mention many of the questions that have troubled reporters and families of the crash victims. The article did not even mention the presence of the CIA personnel on the plane, or describe any of the subsequent CIA actions at the crash site.

The *Times* version of the story surprised Duffy, an assistant managing editor of *U.S. News & World Report*. The book goes into "great detail" about who the CIA officers were, Duffy said. "If the book has news value, it rests in part on our conclusions on who the intelligence officers were and what they were doing." He too was surprised that the *Times* editing of the story focused solely on the West Germans.

In fact, the Emerson/Duffy book is long on speculation and

4. Steven Emerson and Brian Duffy, "Pan Am 103: The German Connection," *New York Times Magazine*, March 18, 1990. An Associated Press wire story on the *Times* article appearing in the *Las Vegas Review-Journal*, March 18, 1990 was headlined, "Book: German bungling allowed jet bombing."



## The President's Commission

The President's Commission on Airline Security and Terrorism issued its report on May 15, 1990, leaving many questions about the bombing of Pan Am 103 unanswered. But it did make a series of recommendations, including that the U.S. should be more willing to attack suspected terrorists and the states that harbor or support them. "National will and the moral courage to exercise it are the ultimate means for defeating terrorism," the Commission says.

The report calls for government officials to become more vigorous in "planning and training for preemptive or retaliatory military strikes against known terrorist enclaves in nations that harbor them." "Rhetoric," the report maintains, "is no substitute for strong, effective, action."

Threatening military action may be a cynical means for dealing with the anger of relatives of the victims. In April 1989, during a meeting with representatives of the relatives, Bush reportedly offered the unsolicited statement that if "the fingers [of guilt] point to state terrorism," there would be a retaliatory strike like the one the Reagan administration launched against Libya.

Beyond the grandstanding, the report focuses serious criticisms on the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The Commission found the FAA to be "a reactive agency—preoccupied with responses to events to the exclusion of adequate contingency planning in anticipation of future threats."

In all, the report contained more than 50 specific proposals designed to improve airline safety and thwart terrorist attacks. Some of the proposals will go to the President as recommendations for action by executive order, while others will be introduced in Congress.

And while it was not included in the Commission's report, the FAA was clearly inclined to meet at least one demand voiced by the victims' relatives: On May 10, an FAA spokesman announced that Raymond Salazar, its director of civil aviation security since 1986, would be leaving his post to become the director of the FAA's Center for Management Development in Palm Coast, Florida. An FAA spokesman claimed the move had nothing to do with criticisms arising from Pan Am 103.

According to the executive summary of the nearly 200-page Commission report, the bomb was "probably" placed aboard at Frankfurt. The summary also states that "a partially filled, unguarded baggage container... was later loaded on the flight at Heathrow." That container, according to Commission head Ann McLaughlin, sat unattended for at least half an hour. "The international criminal investigation has not yet determined precisely how the device was loaded onto the plane," the report says.

While the Commission harshly criticizes both the FAA and Pan Am, it lets the U.S. intelligence community off the hook. "The Commission's review showed that no warnings specific to Flight 103 were received by U.S. intelligence agencies from any source at anytime," it reports. And it repeats testimony presented to the Commission by the CIA claiming that the agency "did not send anyone to the [crash] site."

Indeed, an important part of the Commission's report will remain unknown. Part of the body's conclusions—apparently related to a call for more aggressive covert operations intended to prevent or respond to terrorist acts—was sent to the President in a classified letter. ●

short on conclusion. The authors do not purport to know just what happened. They believe that Khalid Jaafar, a young Arab-American from Detroit, "unwittingly" carried the bomb hidden in a bag onto the plane in Frankfurt. Who gave it to him, and why he didn't "examine" the contents, they say, "is the biggest mystery of the Lockerbie investigation."

That, however, is hardly Lockerbie's biggest mystery. For one thing, Frontline reported shortly after the Emerson/Duffy book went to press that all of Jaafar's bags had been accounted for. Whichever bag or suitcase held the bomb, had to disintegrate into fragments, thereby clearing Jaafar's name. His parents believe he became a suspect because he had the only Arabic surname on the flight list.

But the more serious questions raised in the investigation have to do with the nature of the investigation, and why so many relatives and reporters feel a fog of disinformation hangs heavy over the crash.

### The Remaining Puzzles

Is the story of Pan Am 103 that some U.S. government, U.N. officials, and foreign leaders were spared because they

had access to information indicating that the flight was threatened, while the traveling public was kept in the dark?

Is it the case that in their rush to make flight schedules and cut costs, Pan Am allowed bags that had not been properly searched to be loaded on its plane?

Is it, as Interfor maintains, that a rogue CIA operation trying to free U.S. hostages by protecting a heroin smuggling ring failed to prevent the bomb from going on board?

Is it, as Frontline suggests, that experienced U.S. intelligence operatives made fatal security mistakes? Is the CIA trying to hide the fact that it could not bring its people home from Beirut safely?

Whatever the answer may be, many relatives of the victims fear they will never know what allowed the bombing to happen or see those responsible punished. An April 1990 letter to George Bush and Margaret Thatcher, cosigned by Paul Hudson and Jim Swire, co-chairs of "U.K. Families-Flight 103," spoke of the "entirely believable published accounts [that]... both of you have decided to deliberately downplay the evidence and string out the investigation until the case can be dismissed as ancient history." ●



## Foreign Intelligence in the U.S.:

# The Marcos Network and Murder

by Dan Junas\*

On June 1, 1981, two Filipino-American union officials were gunned down with a hand-held Mac-10 automatic weapon in their union hall in Seattle, Washington's historic Pioneer Square district. Gene Viernes died on the spot, but his friend Silme Domingo lived long enough to name his assailants, members of the Filipino Tulisan Gang.

Domingo and Viernes had recently been elected on a reform slate as Secretary-Treasurer and Dispatcher, respectively, of Local 37 of the International Longshoremen Workers Union (ILWU), which represents predominantly Filipino workers in the Alaska fish canneries. Law enforcement officials assumed that the motive for the double murder was the Tulisan gang's resentment over Domingo and Viernes's efforts to reform the union's dispatch system.

Domingo and Viernes, however, had also been using their position in the union to challenge the power of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos. In fact, they had been threatening the so-called conjugal dictators far more than even Domingo and Viernes realized. Friends and family of the slain activists, who refused to believe that the murders were motivated by a simple "dispute over dispatch," immediately formed the Committee for Justice for Domingo and Viernes (CJDV). Led by Silme's sister Cynthia and Silme's and Gene's friend, attorney Michael Withey, the CJDV conducted an extensive investigation that culminated in a civil law suit against the Marcoses.

In December 1989, eight and a half years after the murders, a jury found that the Marcoses were indeed liable for the deaths of Domingo and Viernes and awarded the plaintiffs—the families of Domingo and Viernes—\$15 million.

The trial established a profound precedent in international law. For the first time, a foreign dictator was deposed, tried, and held legally liable for crimes committed while in office.

Perhaps even more profound than the legal precedent was evidence presented in the case which showed that the Philippine intelligence apparatus had operated in this country, against U.S. citizens, with the complicity of the U. S. government. The Committee for Justice demonstrated clearly how a U.S. foreign policy that disrespects human rights abroad diminishes human rights at home.

Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in the Philippines in September 1972, as a way of avoiding the constitutional provision requiring him to step down after two terms in office. A central premise of the plaintiffs' case was that the murder of Domingo and Viernes represented nothing less than an extension of the Marcos regime into the United States. For that reason, the current Foreign Minister of the Philippines, Raul

Manglapus, who was himself a target of the Marcos network in the U.S., testified by videotape about the pattern of arbitrary detention, torture, disappearances, and "salvaging," or summary execution, of those who opposed the Marcos dictatorship. The plaintiffs then presented an overwhelming body of evidence that drew a vivid connection between abuses committed by Marcos in the Philippines and those committed by his network in this country.

### *Modus Operandi*

Because the plaintiffs were attempting to prove the existence of a conspiracy, they were permitted to introduce broad-ranging evidence on the activities of the Marcos intelligence network, including material that had only an indirect bearing on the case of Domingo and Viernes. Former CIA officer Ralph McGehee, who was called as an expert witness on intelligence, testified that Marcos was indeed conducting covert operations in the United States. Like the CIA, Marcos agents often used diplomatic cover, particularly at consulates in cities with large Filipino populations, such as San Francisco, Honolulu, and Seattle. And like the CIA, the Marcoses faced the problem of laundering funds. Marcos thus established the Philippines Bank of California in San Francisco with his crony, Juan Ponce Enrile, on the board of directors.

McGehee also testified that there are four types of covert operations: political, economic, psychological, and paramilitary (which includes assassination). In the course of the trial, evidence was presented showing that the Marcos network engaged in all four types. The plaintiffs' emphasis, however, was on instances of surveillance, intimidation, harassment and assassination of anti-Marcos activists in such organizations as the Anti-Martial Law Coalition (AMLC), Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP), Friends of the Filipino People (FFP), and the Union of Democratic Filipinos (KDP), to which Domingo and Viernes belonged.

One exile, Geline Avila, who was active in the AMLC and worked closely with Domingo and Viernes, testified about her own experiences with the Marcos network. Surveillance by Marcos agents "was a way of life," and she often received anonymous phone calls telling her, "We know about your relatives in the Philippines." She also described numerous instances when Marcos agents surveilled and harassed demonstrators protesting against the Marcos regime. Cars were vandalized during the demonstrations, and in one case "body-builders" were employed to intimidate the protesters.

The plaintiffs placed special emphasis, however, on three chief targets of the Marcos network, drawing a parallel between their cases and that of Domingo and Viernes. Taken together, these four cases and the circumstances surrounding

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them help provide an overview of the rise and fall of the Marcos network.

### The Conjugal Dictators

Primitivo Mijares had been Marcos's chief censor but he broke with Marcos when he became disenchanted with Marcos's abuses. He authored a book, *The Conjugal Dictators*, which was deeply embarrassing to the Marcoses. In 1975, when Mijares was about to further embarrass the Marcoses by testifying before then-Representative Donald Fraser's Subcommittee on International Organizations, Marcos agents offered him a \$50,000 bribe not to testify. Mijares refused. Then on January 7, 1977 Mijares, who was last seen in the company of a Marcos agent, disappeared.



Silme Domingo (left) and Gene Viernes (right) with a long-time member of the Cannery Workers Union.

Although the Marcos bribery attempt presented solid evidence of an illegal attempt to interfere with a federal witness, no action was taken by U.S. authorities.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile, the Fraser Committee also heard testimony that led to the so-called "Koreagate" scandal. The Fraser Committee's investigation revealed that KCIA agents (the Korean equivalent of the CIA), as well as followers of the Rev. Sun Myung Moon's Unification Church, were also conducting illegal intelligence operations in the United States and enjoyed at least the tacit support of the U.S. covert establishment.<sup>2</sup>

In 1979 a U.S. Senate investigation focused on intelligence agencies of five countries—Iran, Chile, Taiwan, Yugoslavia, and the Philippines—conducting "systematic campaigns inside the United States to spy on, harass, and in some cases plan assassinations."<sup>3</sup> The Senate report was never released and remains classified to this day. Portions, however, were leaked to the *Washington Post* and to columnist Jack Anderson.

The *Washington Post* article noted that four of the "spy outfits [Iran, Philippines, Taiwan, and Chile] had an important common feature. All had intelligence liaison agreements with

1. Jack Anderson, *Washington Post*, August 11, 1979, p. B11.

2. *Report of the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations*, U.S. House of Representatives, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, October 31, 1978.

3. "Foreign Spy Activity Found Rampant in U.S.," *Washington Post*, August 9, 1979, p. A1.

the CIA, and they operated with a relatively free hand here [in the U.S.]. The article also noted that "the pattern of 'harassment and intimidation' of dissidents had had a 'chilling effect' on public discussion and attitudes in this country toward governments with controversial human rights records at home."<sup>4</sup>

After this illegal intelligence activity became public knowledge, the Carter administration made a mild effort to crack down. An August 15, 1979 "Eyes Only" U.S. State Department cable, from U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Richard Murphy to Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, described Murphy's effort in August 1979 to persuade Marcos to discontinue his network's activity in the U.S. Murphy "stressed [the] near disaster wrought by Koreagate to ROK-USG [Republic of Korea-U.S. government] relations," and he presented Marcos with a copy of a Jack Anderson column on Philippine agents. Marcos, Murphy reported, "sought [to] allay any concerns we might have about his authorizing physical violence by Philippine intelligence agents," although "he skirted the more slippery issues of harassment and intimidation of Filipinos in the U.S."

The cable also provided evidence that would be crucial in establishing Marcos's liability in the Domingo and Viernes case. Murphy reported that other than top Marcos security chief General Fabian Ver, "there is no other senior GOP [Government of the Philippines] official with responsibility" for the actions of the Marcos network in the United States.

### The Case of Steve Psinakis

One anti-Marcos activist who experienced harassment and intimidation at the hands of the Marcos network was Steve Psinakis. Psinakis, a Greek-born engineer, had married the daughter of Eugenio Lopez, one of the wealthiest men in the Philippines. Lopez owned a broadcast network as well as the *Manila Chronicle*, which had criticized the abuses of the Marcos regime. When Marcos declared martial law Lopez was vacationing in the United States, where he chose to remain. But in November 1972 Marcos had Lopez's son, Eugenio Jr., arrested without charges. Marcos began blackmailing the family, forcing them to desist from criticizing the martial law regime and to turn over their financial assets to Marcos cronies. In November 1974, when Marcos's demands had been met but Eugenio Jr. was not released, the family made a decision to make his case public, and Eugenio Jr. began a hunger strike.

During the period of blackmail, Psinakis, who had come to the United States from Greece when martial law was declared, was in touch with Raul Manglapus and other leaders of the anti-Marcos movement in the U.S. After the hunger strike began, Psinakis acted openly, including working with the MFP, exposing the Mijares bribery attempt and writing a column for the *Philippine News*.

The *Philippine News* was an anti-Marcos weekly published in San Francisco, and, as Psinakis testified, Marcos sought to silence it. In an example of an economic covert operation that curtailed freedom of the press in the United States, Marcos

4. *Ibid.*



agents pressured businesses that advertised in the *Philippine News* — mostly travel agents dependent on the Philippines consulate for business — to “pull their ads or suffer the consequences.”

Psinakis himself also received threatening, late-night phone calls, and in October 1979 his life was directly threatened. Shortly after a Movement for a Free Philippines convention, where new steps were taken against the Marcos dictatorship, Psinakis was driving to a restaurant in San Francisco's financial district. Two men pulled up next to him, and the man closest to him raised a gun to his temple and told him, “This is to show you how easy it is to stop your activities.”

Psinakis reported the incident to the FBI, although he expected them to take no action. Indeed, after Ronald Reagan was elected president, the FBI itself would be taking action against Psinakis.

### Reagan, Marcos, and Friendly States

The Carter administration had criticized the Marcos regime's human rights abuses in the Philippines and objected to his illegal intelligence network in the United States. Under Reagan, however, the Marcos regime enjoyed much greater freedom of action. A confidential memo, from the Embassy of the Philippines in Washington prepared after Reagan's election, noted that “human rights will not be the sole criterion in making policy determinations toward friendly states.” Instead, the Reagan administration would emphasize combating terrorism.

Marcos was quick to take advantage of this new policy line. Shortly after Reagan was elected, Marcos announced that he “would file a ‘formal protest’ with the United States government and ‘demand that action be taken’ against Filipino and American citizens in the United States,” whom Marcos claimed were responsible for the actions of urban guerrillas in Manila.<sup>5</sup>

The Philippine Embassy's memo provided an analysis that justified this action, claiming that anti-Marcos activists in the U.S. had “definitely adopted a radical change in their general policy, shifting from peaceful means to outright violence as a way of bringing about the political change they desire to effect in the Republic [of the Philippines].”

What was really changing, of course, was not the tactics of the opposition, but rather the tactics of the Reagan and Marcos administrations. In December 1980, according to a legal brief filed by Psinakis's lawyers in U.S. District Court, Imelda Marcos met with Psinakis and Marcos opposition leaders Senators Benigno Aquino (the late husband of current Philippines President Corazon Aquino) and Heherson Alvarez.

Mrs. Marcos attempted in those meetings to convince and coerce Psinakis, Aquino, and Alvarez to curtail their criticisms of the Marcos regime. She told each of them that she had received from President-elect Reagan and Vice President-elect Bush their commitment to support the martial law

regime in the Philippines, and their further specific commitment to investigate and prosecute Marcos's opponents in the United States.<sup>6</sup>

After the inaugural, according to the same brief, the Reagan administration indeed made a political decision to support the Marcos dictatorship by agreeing to investigate and prosecute Marcos's opponents in the United States. Those opponents included the late Senator Benigno Aquino, Raul Manglapus, Mr. Psinakis, and others. The United States federal investigation was fueled by so-called “evidence” supplied by Marcos to the administration in the United States. Marcos agents and United States government agents collaborated to generate, for political reasons, testimony in the United States against the leaders of the U.S.-based opposition to the Marcos dictatorship.<sup>7</sup>

In 1986, Psinakis was indicted on charges of sending explosives to the Philippines to be used in an anti-Marcos plot. The evidence used against him included remnants of detonation cord and wrappings of packages in which high explosive powder and cord had allegedly been shipped to Psinakis dated from searches supposedly made in 1981. On June 7, 1989, however, Psinakis was found innocent of all charges.<sup>8</sup>

**After the inauguration, the Reagan administration indeed made a political decision to support the Marcos dictatorship by agreeing to investigate and prosecute Marcos's opponents in the United States.**

In an effort to show the Marcos regime in its true light, Psinakis's attorneys introduced into evidence examples of Filipino state-sponsored terrorism. One of these more infamous events was the murder of Benigno Aquino. Sen. Aquino was Marcos's most serious political rival in the Philippines, and originally Marcos had him imprisoned. Later, Marcos permitted Aquino to go to the United States for medical treatment, and after he recovered, Aquino became a vocal opponent of the Marcos regime.

In early 1983 Aquino decided to return to the Philippines but he was murdered at the airport immediately after he arrived in Manila. The Philippine government commission which investigated the murder, found General Fabian Ver responsible. Ver first denied, but later admitted, that Aquino had been surveilled in the United States. The Agrava Commission found that this surveillance had played an important part in the assassination.

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*

8. Pamela A. MacLean, *Seattle Times*, June 8, 1989, p. A11.

5. James J. Brosnahan, George C. Harris, Morrison & Foerster, Attorneys for Steve E. Psinakis; Brief filed in United States District Court, Northern District of California, *United States of America, v. Steve Elias Psinakis, and Charles Avila*, May 13, 1988.



## Counterinsurgency in the Philippines: OPLAN JERICHO

by Stephen R. Shalom\*

The United States has long been involved in counter-insurgency in the Philippines. At the turn of the century, U.S. military forces waged a brutal war against Filipinos struggling to free themselves from foreign rule. Since the Philippines achieved independence in 1946, the U.S. has provided military advisers and weapons and has undertaken covert operations in support of counter-insurgency efforts against those who have challenged the *status quo*.

The first serious challenge came in the early 1950s from the Huks, a peasant-based guerrilla organization. The U.S. poured in military and economic aid, dispatched advisers who ran the Philippine counter-insurgency campaign, set up and advised Philippine intelligence services, flew clandestine bombing missions from Clark Air Force Base, and carried out an elaborate array of covert psychological warfare operations.

The Huks were eventually defeated but the continued immiseration and repression of the Philippine people fueled a new guerrilla war. The New People's Army (NPA) was at the center of this struggle. Again, the U.S. poured in military aid as well as providing counter-insurgency and "civic action" training.<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, the insurgency expanded rapidly and by 1985 the panic in Washington had grown palpable. U.S. policymakers tried to engineer a transition from the Marcos dictatorship to another pro-U.S. regime that would resist the demand for progressive social change.<sup>2</sup> The advent of Corazon Aquino threw the left into disarray as the opposition tried to decide how to relate to her presidency.

But the underlying cause of the insurgency—the truly desperate condition of the poor—was not changed by Aquino. Accordingly, the guerrilla war continued and U.S. military aid to the Philippines has increased under Aquino. Funding for CIA operations has been stepped up as well.<sup>3</sup> And, according to a report in the *New York Times*,<sup>4</sup> U.S. military advisers have been routinely accompanying Philippine troops on counterinsurgency operations.

In early 1989, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) issued a top-secret directive regarding a counterinsurgency program called OPLAN JERICHO. This document, which was leaked to the public,

provides important insight into the current counterinsurgency strategy in the Philippines.

This document reveals the crucial role of the United States in the Filipino counterinsurgency campaign. The short distribution list for the document includes the Chief of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG). U.S. officials often claim that JUSMAG is only responsible for determining Philippine weapons needs and not involved in planning operations. The document shows this claim to be false.

The document also makes reference to JUSMAG's approval of detailing 25 "social engineer specialists" to the AFP. It also mentions an agreement between JUSMAG and the Philippine Department of National Defense regarding civilian participation in counterinsurgency operations in rural areas. There is no indication whether these civilians are Filipino or American. If they are Filipino, it is astounding that JUSMAG must give its approval; if they are from the U.S., it signifies an even greater involvement in the counter-insurgency campaign.

JERICHO suggests a range of tactics to be employed against the "CTs"—communist terrorists. Deep penetration agents (DPAs) are to be used to foment conflict within the NPA leadership. In 1985, DPAs had been used to set off a round of purges among the guerrillas on the island of Mindanao. The government then gave massive publicity to the atrocities—with appropriate exaggeration and omitting the DPA role—trying to liken the NPA to the Khmer Rouge.<sup>5</sup>

OPLAN JERICHO also directs SMOs (special military operations) against leftist political activists. The document states that the "legal fronts" of the communists in the cities are to be "neutralized." No specific fronts are listed and no details are provided as to how the neutralization is to be carried out; suffice it to note that in the past the military has named many grassroots opposition groups as communist fronts and that numerous leaders of the left have been assassinated since 1986. Right wing vigilantes have been set up throughout the country—with the open support of the military and the endorsement of Aquino and the U.S. government—and have been accused of many politically motivated murders.<sup>6</sup>

Part of the mission of OPLAN JERICHO is to "undercut" the peace initiative of the National Democratic Front (NDF) and to "preempt" the NDF campaign against the U.S. military bases. These psychological warfare operations are to be used to undermine NDF efforts to settle the civil war and to thwart any nationalist attempt to eliminate foreign military bases from Philippine soil.

5. See, for example, Ross Munro, "The New Khmer Rouge," *Commentary*, December 1985.

6. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR), *Vigilantes in the Philippines: A Threat to Democratic Rule* (New York: LCHR, 1988).

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1. Walden Bello and Severina Rivera, *The Logistics of Repression and Other Essays* (Washington, D.C.: Friends of the Filipino People, 1977).

2. See Walden Bello, "Counterinsurgency's Proving Ground: Low Intensity Warfare in the Philippines," in *Low Intensity Warfare*, ed., Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh (New York: Pantheon, 1987).

3. Phil Bronstein, *San Francisco Examiner*, March 22, 1987; Ralph McGee, "Vigilante Terror: A Report on CIA Inspired Death Squads in the Philippines," *National Reporter*, Fall 1987, pp. 24-31.

4. Michael R. Gordon, *New York Times*, December 2, 1989, p. 1.



The political fallout from this assassination contributed heavily to Marcos's subsequent fall from power which in turn, led to the discovery of vital information on how the Marcos network had also arranged the murder of Domingo and Viernes.

### The Murder of U.S. Citizens

In his opening statement, defense attorney Richard Hibey told the jury that he sought neither to malign Domingo and Viernes, nor to defend the Marcos regime. He sought instead to persuade the jury that the cases of Mijares, Psinakis and Aquino were unrelated to the murder of Domingo and Viernes. The two labor leaders were, he argued, politically unimportant, for they had "labored in a smaller vineyard."

Domingo and Viernes were indeed different from Mijares, Psinakis, and Aquino in one important respect: they were United States citizens. Viernes had been raised near the small town of Wapato, Washington and Domingo in Ballard, a quiet Seattle neighborhood that epitomizes middle American values. The U.S. Constitution, of course, is supposed to protect the civil liberties of Philippine exiles as well as U.S. citizens. It was perhaps a measure, however, of Marcos's confidence in his alliance with the Reagan administration that he would be so bold as to order the murder of U.S. citizens living in the United States.

Domingo and Viernes were targeted by the Marcos network because, as the judge in the case would later conclude, they "posed a substantial threat to the Marcos regime." In addition to their labor activities, the two friends were active in the KDP and AMLC. According to Marcos intelligence reports, the KDP had been identified as early as 1976 as a formidable organization, especially adept at mobilizing community support against the Marcos dictatorship.

An affidavit filed by expert witness Bonifacio Gillego—who was himself a former Philippine intelligence agent, trained by the CIA—said that these reports reflected "an intensive intelligence interest in the KDP over a long period of time," and they were used to form the conclusion that the "KDP posed a serious threat to the internal stability of the Philippines."

Though in some respects Seattle may have been a "smaller vineyard," when Domingo and Viernes were elected to their union posts in December 1980, their potential political influence increased immeasurably. Local 37 of the ILWU is an important institution in the Filipino community. The ILWU is, moreover, a powerful international union which, if mobilized, could bring significant public pressure to bear on the Marcos regime.

It was with this in mind that Viernes travelled to the Philippines in March 1981. He met with Felixberto Olalia, head of the independent trade union organization, the KMU (May First Movement), and gathered evidence of Marcos's repression of the trade union movement in the Philippines. Vi-

**In the United States, four different Philippine intelligence agencies collected information on the anti-Marcos opposition movement in the United States.**

ernes also met with anti-Marcos activists in the youth and student movements, and travelled to zones controlled by the New People's Army.

The following month, Viernes returned to Hawaii, where he met Domingo prior to the ILWU International Convention in Honolulu. Domingo and Viernes got the convention to pass a

resolution criticizing Marcos's anti-labor decrees and authorizing an ILWU investigatory team to travel to the Philippines to investigate conditions facing working people.

Princeton Professor Richard Falk, an expert witness on international law and human rights, explained to the jury why the ILWU resolution presented a serious threat to Marcos. On the one hand, since Marcos needed to keep wages low to attract international capital, he felt vulnerable to the challenge emerging from an independent labor movement, represented by the KMU. On the other hand, Marcos was extremely sensitive to criticism of his human rights record, for if a true picture of the abuses in the Philippines became known, it could jeopardize loans from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These considerations made Domingo and Viernes, Falk testified, "precisely the kind of targets Marcos selected" for summary execution.

### Marcos Testifies

In a videotaped deposition, Marcos himself testified "that if [a] person came to the Philippines to aid the New People's Army, the first reaction of his government would have been to find out from the U.S. government what information and files they had on him." The CJDV's investigation revealed that both the FBI and the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) had investigated the KDP, so it seems likely that U.S. agencies did indeed share information on Viernes.<sup>9</sup> (The United States government was originally named in the Domingo/Viernes suit, but Judge Donald Voorhees, who preceded Rothstein on the case, ruled against including the U.S. on the grounds that there was neither evidence that the United States government was involved in the conspiracy nor that the United States government had foreknowledge of the murders.)

Marcos "further testified that the 'entire government would have surveilled a person like Viernes, who travelled to visit the NPA.' Such surveillance might have been carried out by any one of numerous intelligence organizations of the Philippine government like the Intelligence Section of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Intelligence and Security Agency, the Presidential Security Command and the National Bureau of Investigation."<sup>10</sup>

9. Withey, Michael E., Brief filed in United States District Court, Western District of Washington at Seattle, *Estate of Silme G. Domingo et al, Ferdinand Marcos, et al*, June 1, 1989.

10. Gillego, Bonifacio, Affidavit filed in United States District Court, Western District of Washington at Seattle, *Estate of Silme G. Domingo et al, v. Republic of the Philippines, et. al*, February 15, 1989; Defense Intelligence Agency Circular, July 23, 1982.



In the United States, our different Philippine intelligence agencies collected information on the anti-Marcos opposition movement in the United States. And as early as March 1981 — shortly after Reagan took office — “new, high-level and Philippine intelligence agents were selected for assignment in the United States with the mission of monitoring and ‘operating against’ anti-Marcos Philippine dissidents.”<sup>11</sup>

After the ILWU convention, two individuals in particular would “operate against” Domingo and Viernes. One was Constantine “Tony” Baruso, the President of Local 37. He, like Marcos, was born in the Ilocos region of the Philippines, and was known in the Filipino community as a staunch Marcos loyalist. And he was, according to Gillego’s testimony, also an asset of the Marcos intelligence network.



Credit: John Stamets

**Tony Baruso, implicated in Domingo and Viernes murder.**

The other was San Francisco physician, Dr. Leonilo Malabed. He was a childhood friend of Marcos’s, and he was known as “the eyes and ears of Marcos” in the United States.

Evidence pointing toward Malabed had been uncovered by Gillego after the fall of Marcos. Gillego had been appointed by President Aquino to the Presidential Commission on Good Government, which was attempting to recover the wealth Marcos had stolen from the Philippines. In that capacity, Gillego had the opportunity to review documents seized by U.S. Customs from the Marcoses after they fled the Philippines. Among those documents was a statement of expenses for the Mabuhay Corporation of San Francisco, California, which Gillego recognized as a front organization in the Marcos network. The Mabuhay Corporation provided a cover for an intelligence slush fund controlled by Malabed.

The Mabuhay statement showed an expenditure of \$15,000 on May 17, 1981, within weeks of the ILWU convention, for a “special security project.” This item coincided with a trip that Baruso had made to San Francisco. The plaintiffs argued that the \$15,000 was paid to Baruso to arrange the murder of Domingo and Viernes. Although Malabed denied participation in the murder, he “produced no credible evidence” explaining this payment.<sup>12</sup>

On May 30, Baruso met privately with Fortunato “Tony”

11. *Ibid.*

12. United States District Court, Western District of Washington at Seattle, *Estate of Silme G. Domingo, et al, v. Republic of the Philippines, et. al.*, Memorandum Decision, January 12, 1990.

Dictado and gang members Jimmy Ramil, Ben Guloy, and Teodorico Domingues (also known as Boy Pilay) went to the Local 37 union hall in Pioneer Square. Ramil, Guloy and Pilay entered the hall and shot and killed Domingo and Viernes. The murder weapon was a Mac-10 .45 caliber automatic weapon belonging to Tony Baruso.

Ramil, Guloy, and Dictado were later convicted of the murder, and Pilay, who testified at the murder trial, was himself murdered in January 1983. Baruso, curiously, was never charged. In the Domingo/Viernes trial, the plaintiffs presented evidence of Baruso’s direct involvement in the murder that was, according to the judge, “overwhelming.”<sup>13</sup> Yet the King County Prosecutor’s Office, with vastly superior resources at its disposal, simply claimed that it had lacked “sufficient evidence” to charge Baruso, suggesting that perhaps the prosecutor’s office had succumbed to outside political pressure not to pursue the case. King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng refused to be interviewed to discuss this possibility, but his spokesman denied that political considerations had played a role and said that as a result of the recent trial, Baruso’s case is being reevaluated.

In the case of Domingo and Viernes, the jury held the Marcoses liable and the judge found that Marcos agents Baruso and Malabed were liable as well. In the decision the judge concluded that the plaintiffs have provided clear, cogent and convincing evidence that the Marcoses created and controlled an intelligence operation which plotted the murders of Domingo and Viernes and that Mabuhay funds were paid to Baruso and used to perpetrate the assassination.<sup>14</sup>

It is ironic that “Mabuhay” is a Filipino toast that means “long life.” It is a further irony that within a month of the murders then-Vice President George Bush toasted Marcos, stating that: “We love your adherence to democratic principles and processes.”

Perhaps the greatest irony, however, lies in the concept of national security. In the course of their investigation, CJDV uncovered evidence that the FBI was aware of “assassination plots and/or threats of physical violence or kidnapping against members of the anti-Marcos opposition in the United States.”<sup>15</sup> Yet instead of exposing and combatting this terrorism the United States government at best looked the other way, and at worst actively collaborated in it.

“Liaison” arrangements with the foreign intelligence agencies of repressive regimes are tolerated — and kept secret — on grounds of “national security.” As a result, U.S. citizens are subject to the same kinds of heinous covert actions that U.S. intelligence agencies perpetrate in foreign countries.

In theory, the doctrine of national security is supposed to protect life and liberty. In the case of Silme Domingo and Gene Viernes, it did just the opposite.

13. United States District Court, Western District of Washington at Seattle, *Estate of Silme G. Domingo, et al, v. Republic of the Philippines, et al.*, Memorandum Decision, January 12, 1990.

14. *Ibid.*

15. Withey, Michael E., Brief filed in United States District Court, Western District of Washington at Seattle, *Estate of Silme G. Domingo et al, v. Ferdinand Marcos, et al*, June 1, 1989.



# A Pattern of U.S. Complicity

by David Kirsh\*

In 1963, the U.S. government sent 10 Special Forces personnel to El Salvador to help General José Alberto Medrano set up the Organización Democrática Nacionalista (ORDEN)—the first paramilitary death squad in that country. These Green Berets assisted in the organization and indoctrination of rural "civic" squads which gathered intelligence and carried out political assassinations in coordination with the Salvadoran military.<sup>1</sup>

Now, there is compelling evidence to show that for over 30 years, members of the U.S. military and the CIA have helped organize, train, and fund death squad activity in El Salvador.

In the last eight years, six Salvadoran military deserters have publicly acknowledged their participation in the death squads. Their stories are notable because they not only confirm suspicions that the death squads are made up of members of the Salvadoran military, but also because each one implicates U.S. personnel in death squad activity.

The term "death squad" while appropriately vivid, can be misleading because it obscures their fundamental identity. Evidence shows that "death squads" are primarily military or paramilitary units carrying out political assassinations and intimidation as part of the Salvadoran government's counterinsurgency strategy. Civilian death squads do exist but have often been comprised of off-duty soldiers financed by wealthy Salvadoran businessmen.

It is important to point out that the use of death squads has been a strategy of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. For example, the CIA's "Phoenix Program" was responsible for the "neutralization" of over 40,000 Vietnamese suspected of working with the National Liberation Front.<sup>2</sup>

Part of the U.S. counterinsurgency program was run from the Office of Public Safety (OPS). OPS was part of U.S. AID, and worked with the Defense Department and the CIA to modernize and centralize the repressive capabilities of client state police forces, including those in El Salvador.<sup>3</sup> In 1974 Congress ordered the discontinuation of OPS.

In spite of the official suspension of police assistance between 1974 and 1985, CIA and other U.S. officials worked with Salvadoran security forces throughout the restricted period to

centralize and modernize surveillance, to continue training, and to fund key players in the death squad network.<sup>4</sup>

Even though the U.S. government's police training program had been thoroughly discredited, the Reagan administration found other channels through which to reinstate police assistance for El Salvador and Honduras. Attached to this assistance is the requirement that the president certify that aid recipients do not engage in torture, political persecution, or assassination. Even so, certain members of Congress showed concern over the reinstatement of police aid to repressive regimes. In a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Senator Claiborne Pell (Dem.-Rhode Island) asked, "I was talking about cattle prods specifically. Would they be included or not?"

Undersecretary of State for Latin American Affairs Elliott Abrams replied, "Well, I would say that in my view if the police of Costa Rica, with their democratic tradition, say that for crowd control purposes they would like to have 50 shot [sic] batons, as they are called in a nonagricultural context, I would personally want to give it to them. I think that government has earned enough trust, as I think we have earned enough trust, not to be questioned, frankly, about exporting torture equipment. But I would certainly be in favor of giving it to them if they want it."<sup>5</sup>

## Death Squad Members, Testimony

César Vielman Joya Martínez, a soldier in the First Infantry Brigade's Department 2 (Intelligence), is the most recent Salvadoran to admit his involvement in death squad activity. At a November 1, 1989 press conference Joya Martínez stated that certain military units in Department 2 carried out "heavy interrogation" (a euphemism for torture) after which the victims were killed. The job of his unit was to execute people by strangulation, slitting their throats, or injecting them with poison. He admitted killing eight people and participating in many more executions. He stated that the Brigade Commander had sent written orders to carry out the killings and that the use of bullets was forbidden because they might be traced to the military.<sup>6</sup>

Joya Martínez also claims that one of the U.S. advisers working with the First Brigade sat at a desk next to his and received "all the reports from our agents on clandestine captures, interrogations...but we did not provide them with

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1. Allan Nairn, "Behind the Death Squads," *The Progressive*, May 1984. Reprints are still available from *The Progressive*.

2. Michael McClintock, *The American Connection*, Vol. I (London: Zed Press, 1985).

3. The "Interdepartmental Technical Subcommittee on Police Advisory Assistance Programs," U.S. State Department, June 11, 1962, cited in *The American Connection*, Vol. I, *op. cit.*, n. 1. "In general [the] CIA endeavors to develop the investigative techniques, and AID (Agency for International Development) [develops] the capabilities of the police to deal with the military aspects of subversion and insurgency."

4. *Op. cit.*, n. 1.


5. "The Central American Counterterrorism Act of 1985," hearing of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, November 5 and 19, 1985, p. 19.

6. "Army Deserters' Testimony Reveals U.S. Role," *Alert!*, November 1989, p. 6; David Bates, "Blood Money: assassin says he slit throats while U wrote checks," *In These Times*, November 15-21, 1989.



reports on the executions. They did not want to hear of the actual killings." U.S. advisers authorized expenses for such extras as black glass on squad vans to allow executions to take place unobserved; provided \$4,000 for the monthly budget; and conducted classes in recruiting informants and conducting intelligence reconnaissance.<sup>7</sup>

Another Salvadoran soldier, Ricardo Castro, is the first officer to come forward with information about death squad activity. Castro graduated from West Point in 1973 and was a company commander in the Salvadoran Army. He translated



Credit: Barry Thumma, Associated Press

**Ricardo Ernesto Castro, former death squad member.**

for several U.S. advisers who taught, among other subjects, interrogation techniques. Castro claims that one U.S. instructor worked out of the Sheraton Hotel (taken over briefly during the November 1989 FMLN offensive) and emphasized psychological techniques. Castro recalled a class where Salvadoran soldiers asked the adviser about an impasse in their torture sessions:

He was obviously against torture a lot of the time. He favored selective torture.... When they learned something in class, they might go back to their fort that night and practice.... I remember very distinctly some students talking about the fact that people were conking out on them...as they were administering electric shock. 'We keep giving him the electric shock, and he just doesn't respond. What can we do?'.... The American gave a broad smile and said, 'You've got to surprise him. We know this from experience. Give him a jolt. Do something that will just completely amaze him, and that should bring him out of it.'<sup>8</sup>

Castro revealed that he held monthly briefings with then-deputy CIA chief of station in El Salvador Frederic Brugger who had recruited him for intelligence work after meeting at an interrogation class. Castro also claimed to have knowledge of the perpetration of large massacres of civilians by Army Department 5.

In December 1981, he met in Morazán Province with one of the officers that the U.S. instructor had advised. "They had two towns of about 300 people each, and they were interrogating them to see what they knew. Since I...knew something about interrogations, he said he might want me to help. The Major told me that after the interrogation, they were going to kill them all." Castro was, however, reassigned and did not participate. Later, his pro-government mother told him, "You know, son, these guerrillas, they invent the wildest lies. They say that in December, 600 civilians were killed in Morazán." "Oh, shit, I was hoping I'd been dreaming it," he thought. "I later found out, they did go in and kill them after all."<sup>9</sup>

René Hurtado worked as intelligence agent for the Treasury Police, one of the three Salvadoran paramilitary forces. After a falling out with an officer, he fled to Minnesota, took refuge with a Presbyterian Church congregation, and began describing routine torture methods used by paramilitary forces. These included beatings, electric shock, suffocation, and mutilation. He described techniques such as tearing the skin from "interrogation" subjects, sticking needles into them, or beating them in such a manner that lasting internal injuries but no telltale external marks would be sustained. According to Hurtado, CIA employees and Green Berets taught some of these torture techniques to the Treasury Police in Army staff headquarters.<sup>10</sup>

General John Vessey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was particularly disturbed by the implication of the Green Berets and initiated an investigation. The investigator from the Army Criminal Investigation Division stated, "My job was to clear the Army's name and I was going to do whatever [was] necessary to do that." Hurtado refused to cooperate with the investigator on the advice of a member of Congress whom the church parishioners had called upon. When the investigator was told this by the minister, he responded, "Tell Mr. Hurtado that the Congressman has given him very costly advice. When I went to El Salvador to investigate his allegations, at the advice of the U.S. Ambassador, I did not talk to members of the Salvadoran military. If I go again and talk to the military, we don't know who will be hurt, do we?"<sup>11</sup>

Following revelations of U.S. involvement in death squad activities, the House and Senate Intelligence Committees reported on allegations of U.S. complicity in death squad activity. The Republican-dominated Senate panel confirmed that Salvadoran officials were involved, but denied any direct

9. *Ibid.*

7. "Salvadoran Killings Cited-Deserter Links U.S. Advisors to Army Unit," *Washington Post*, October 27, 1989; *op. cit.*, n. 6.

8. Allan Nairn, "Confessions of a Death Squad Officer," *The Progressive*, March 1986; *Associated Press*, February 13, 1986.

10. *Op. cit.*, n. 1; "Church-protected refugee says he raped, tortured," *Minneapolis Star and Tribune*, July 8, 1984. U.S. Special Forces and other military units are well-trained in torture techniques: see Donald Duncan, *The New Legions* (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 156-161; and "The Navy: Torture Camp," *Newsweek*, March 22, 1976.

11. Allan Nairn, "Assault on Sanctuary," *The Progressive*, August 1985.



U.S. role, keeping certain portions of its report classified.<sup>12</sup> The House Committee stated that, "U.S. intelligence agencies have not conducted any of their activities in such a way as to directly encourage or support death-squad activities." Rep. James Shannon (Dem.-Mass.), who requested the inquiry, commented that the report was "certainly not as conclusive as the committee makes it sound."<sup>13</sup>

#### Varelli, Carranza, Montano, and others

Frank Varelli is the son of a former Salvadoran Minister of Defense and National Police commander. When Varelli's family came to the U.S. in 1980, Varelli started working as an FBI informant. Years later, he publicly revealed his role in FBI covert operations against domestic organizations opposing Reagan's Central American policy. He has also asserted that the Salvadoran National Guard gave him death lists which he compared to lists of Salvadorans in the U.S. awaiting deportation back to El Salvador. Varelli believes some may have been killed on their return to El Salvador. He reported these contacts with the National Guard to the FBI.<sup>14</sup>

Former Colonel Roberto Santivanez claimed that the then-chief of the Salvadoran Treasury Police, Nicolas Carranza, was the officer most active with the death squads.<sup>15</sup> Colonel Carranza is also alleged to have received \$90,000 annually from the CIA.<sup>16</sup> Carranza has confirmed the close working relationship of the paramilitary forces with U.S. intelligence. "[They] have collaborated with us in a certain technical manner, providing us with advice. They receive information from everywhere in the world, and they have sophisticated equipment that enables them to better inform or at least confirm the information we have. It's very helpful."<sup>17</sup>

Carlos Antonio Gómez Montano was a paratrooper stationed at Ilopango Air Force Base. He claimed to have seen eight Green Beret advisers watching two "torture classes" during which a 17-year-old boy and a 13-year-old girl were tortured. Montano claimed that his unit and the Green Berets were joined by Salvadoran Air Force Commander Rafael Bustillo and other Salvadoran officers during these two sessions in January 1981. A Salvadoran officer told the assembled soldiers, "[watching] will make you feel more like a man."<sup>18</sup>

#### Montano claims to have seen eight Green Beret advisers watching two "torture classes."

Above are the accounts of the death squad deserters. Non-military sources have also reported the participation of U.S. personnel. For example, another (highly-placed anonymous civilian) source maintained that Armed Forces General Staff Departments 2 and 5 (organized with help from U.S. Army Colonel David Rodríguez, a

Cuban-American) used tortures such as beating, burning and electric shock.<sup>19</sup> U.S. involvement has also been asserted in sworn accounts by some victims of torture. José Rubén Carrillo Cubas, a student, gave testimony that during his detention by the Long Distance Reconnaissance Patrol (PRAL) in 1986, a U.S. Army Major tortured him by applying electric shocks to his back and ears.<sup>20</sup>

Various sources have reported the use of U.S.-manufactured torture equipment. René Hurtado, for example, explained, "There are some very sophisticated methods...of torture.....[like the machine] that looks like a radio, like a transformer; it's about 15 centimeters across, with connecting wires. It says General Electric on it...."<sup>21</sup>

Many other documented accounts of brutality by U.S.-trained and advised military units exist. Indeed, the elite Atlacatl Battalion has been implicated in several massacres over the past ten years<sup>22</sup> and members of the battalion have been indicted for the November slayings of the six Jesuit priests and two women.

It is widely accepted, in the mainstream media and among human rights organizations, that the Salvadoran government is responsible for most of the 70,000 deaths which are the result of ten years of civil war.<sup>23</sup> The debate, however, has dwelled on whether the death squads are strictly renegade military factions or a part of the larger apparatus. The evidence indicates that the death squads are simply components of the Salvadoran military. And that their activities are not only common knowledge to U.S. agencies,<sup>24</sup> but that U.S. personnel have been integral in organizing these units and continue to support their daily functioning. ●

19. *Christian Science Monitor*, *op. cit.*, n. 15.

20. "Torture in El Salvador," CDHES (the Commission for Human Rights in El Salvador), September 1986. The PRAL has received assistance from CIA officer Felix Rodríguez, good friend of George Bush and Donald Gregg, *Z Magazine*, December 1989, p. 57.

21. *Op. cit.*, n. 1; also see Michael Klare and Cynthia Arnson, *Supplying Repression* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981), p. 6, about the U.S. supplying torture equipment.

22. "The Central American Counterterrorism Act of 1985," House of Representatives, hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, October 24 and November 19, 1985, p. 165. This is the same Atlacatl Battalion referred to in 1985, by then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Nestor Sanchez as, "The unit that has received the most intensive U.S. training...[and] conducts itself with the populace in such a way that it gains their support."

23. Lindsey Gruson, "Salvador Army Is Said to Seize Rebel Positions," *New York Times*, November 16, 1989.

24. House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing, *op. cit.*, n. 22, pp. 66-73; "Exiles Linked to Salvador Death Squads; Ex-Envoy Says Miami-Based Refugees Direct and Finance Groups," *Los Angeles Times*, February 7, 1984; "U.S. on trial- A class-action suit cross-examines the administration's entire policy on El Salvador," *In These Times*, February 18-24, 1987.

12. "Officials in El Salvador Linked to Death Squads," *Associated Press*, October 12, 1984.

13. Robert Parry, "Panel reports CIA did not support death squads," *Associated Press*, January 14, 1985.

14. Carlos Norman, "Frank Varelli & the FBI's Infiltration of CISPES," *Our Right to Know* (publication of the Fund for Open Information and Accountability), Spring/Summer 1987; *Los Angeles Times*, February 21, 1987.

15. Dennis Volman, "Salvador death squads, a CIA connection?" *Christian Science Monitor*, May 8, 1984. Santivanez was cited as the (at the time) anonymous military source for the article.

16. *New York Times*, March 22, 1984. Colonel Carranza's CIA salary was confirmed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

17. *Op. cit.*, n. 1.

18. Raymond Bonner, "U.S. Advisers Saw 'Torture Class,' Salvadoran Says," *New York Times*, January 11, 1982.



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# Gangsters, Goons, and Guidance Systems: Taiwan Government Agents in the U.S.

by Marc J. Cohen\*

On January 16, 1985, the Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan announced the arrest of three officials of its own Defense Intelligence Bureau in connection with the murder three months earlier of Henry Liu at his home in Daly City, California.<sup>1</sup> Liu, a Chinese-born U.S. citizen, had lived in Taiwan from 1949 to 1967, and was a longtime critic of the Nationalists.<sup>2</sup>

Eventually, courts in Taiwan convicted all three intelligence officers, including Vice-Admiral Wang Hsi-ling, the director of the Bureau, of murder. However, the Taiwan government insists to this day that Admiral Wang and his associates acted on their own in contracting with gangsters to eliminate Liu.<sup>3</sup> The Nationalists' extensive past use of the Intelligence Bureau to do away with overseas critics makes this claim extremely difficult to accept.<sup>4</sup>

Whatever the role of higher officials in the Liu murder, it was definitely not an isolated incident. Only three years earlier, Chen Wen-chen, a professor at Carnegie-Mellon University in Pittsburgh and a permanent resident of the U.S., died under mysterious circumstances during a visit home to Taiwan. The day before, he had undergone a lengthy interrogation by Taiwan's secret police about his activities in the U.S. in support of legal opposition groups in Taiwan. An independent autopsy strongly suggested that Chen had been tortured.

During a congressional inquiry into this affair, witnesses presented testimony about a network of Taiwan government agents operating in the United States, conducting surveillance of Taiwanese students at U.S. universities, infiltrating Taiwanese-American community organizations, and threatening reprisals such as loss of passports, forced exile, imprisonment back in Taiwan, or actions against family members on the island. The agents were said to have had a chilling impact in-

deed upon freedom of expression among Taiwanese in the U.S., including those who have gained U.S. citizenship.<sup>5</sup>

As a result of the apparent role of such campus spies in Chen's death, Congressman Stephen J. Solarz (Dem-New-York), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, sponsored legislation denying arms sales to "any country determined by the President to be engaged in a consistent pattern of acts of harassment or intimidation directed against individuals in the United States." Given the importance of the U.S. to Taiwan as an arms supplier and diplomatic patron (despite the absence of formal relations), Solarz believed that the legislation would serve as a strong deterrent.<sup>6</sup>

The Liu murder cast considerable doubt upon the law's effectiveness. On the other hand, the latter killing led to a serious deterioration in U.S.-Taiwan relations over the course of 1985. This article will review the history of the problem and examine the ongoing Taiwan intelligence operation in the U.S.

## Background

The Kuomintang (KMT, or Chinese Nationalist Party) gained control of Taiwan following World War II. Since 1949, when the top KMT leadership fled to Taiwan from mainland China, it has maintained a one-party authoritarian state, ruling under martial law. In July 1987, the KMT lifted martial law but has continued to place restrictions on the exercise of civil and political rights. An extensive network of secret police, party cadres, informal "patriotic organizations," and freelance enforcers bolster the KMT's grip on power.<sup>7</sup>

Since 1965, large numbers of Taiwanese have immigrated to the U.S. in pursuit of economic and educational opportunities. Though many overseas Taiwanese have eschewed political activity, from the late 1940s on, there have been expatriate groups which campaigned for human rights and political change on the island. From the beginning, there was evidence that KMT agents infiltrated these organizations.<sup>8</sup>

Today, according to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, more than 93% of the Taiwanese students enrolled overseas

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1. *Taiwan Communique*, No. 18, February 8, 1985, p. 3. This periodical is published in The Hague by the International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan.

2. For Liu's biography, see *The Murder of Henry Liu*, Hearings and Markup Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Ninth Congress, February 7; March 21; April 3, 1985 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 46-47 (Prepared Statement of Helen Liu).

3. *Taiwan Communique*, No. 20, June 18, 1985, pp. 5-8; *Taiwan Communique*, No. 34, May 28, 1988, p. 13; "60 Minutes" segment on the Liu murder, broadcast March 3, 1985.

4. I am grateful to a former Taiwan government operative now living in the U.S. for information on this subject.

5. See *Taiwan Agents in America and the Death of Prof. Chen Wen-chen*, Hearings Before the Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on Human Rights and International Organizations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Seventh Congress, First Session, July 30 and October 6, 1981 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982).

6. *Ibid.*

7. For more detail, see Marc J. Cohen, *Taiwan at the Crossroads: Human Rights, Political Development, and Social Change on the Beautiful Island* (Washington, D.C.: Asia Resource Center, 1988), Chapter 2; Sterling Seagrave, *The Soong Dynasty* (New York: Harper and Row, 1985); Richard C. Kagan, "Martial Law in Taiwan," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 14:3 (July-September 1982), pp. 51-52.

8. See Douglas Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California, 1970).



study in the U.S.<sup>9</sup> They form the second largest group of foreign students in this country, after those from mainland China, with some 27,000 pursuing degrees in the U.S.<sup>10</sup>

As the number of students from Taiwan in the U.S. has increased, so have reports about acts of intimidation by KMT campus agents, and reprisals taken against the students by the Taiwan authorities based on the reports of those agents. For example, in 1964, a Taiwanese Ph.D. candidate at Rice University, George T. Chang, wrote an op-ed piece criticizing the lack of democracy in his homeland. The Taiwan regime, after learning of the article, cancelled his passport.<sup>11</sup>

Some students have returned to Taiwan to face "sedition" charges and long terms in prison. Chen Yu-shi, a student at the University of Hawaii's East-West Center in the 1960s, was said by campus agents to have participated in protests against U.S. military involvement in Indochina, to have "read materials by Mao Tse-tung," and to have submitted articles to a Japanese newspaper. In 1967, as a result of these reports on his exercise of his First Amendment rights, the Taiwan authorities refused to renew Chen's passport. He then went to Japan, but was deported back to Taiwan the following year (despite his well-founded fear of persecution). A court martial sentenced him to seven years in prison for "sedition."<sup>12</sup>

Similarly, Rita T. Yeh, while studying at the University of Minnesota in the mid-1970s, joined a Taiwanese student cultural group, despite warnings from campus KMT agents not to. When she did not heed these warnings, they subjected her to sexual harassment and in 1980, following her return to Taiwan, she was sentenced to 14 years in prison for "working and doing propaganda for the People's Republic of China."<sup>13</sup>

There have also been reports of surveillance, intimidation, verbal and physical harassment, and disruption of peaceful activities by KMT agents at MIT, and the Universities of California-Berkeley, Georgia, Oklahoma, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Kansas, and Chicago, as well as at campuses of the State University of New York and Columbia, Iowa State, Cornell, Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, and Brandeis Universities.<sup>14</sup>

A classified 1978 study by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff (portions of which have been leaked to the press) revealed a network of as many as 25 full-time campus agents around the U.S. who received a salary and car; this did not include an even larger web of part-time informants and members of campus KMT cells.<sup>15</sup>

9. Jonathan Moore, "The New Word on Campus: Flexibility," *Far East Economic Review*, September 15, 1988, p. 70.

10. Data on numbers of Taiwanese students in the U.S. provided by the American Institute in Taiwan (the U.S. interests section in Taipei).

11. Personal communication from Chang.

12. "Taiwan Agents in America," *op. cit.*, n. 5, pp. 40, 43; Don Luce and Roger Rumpf, *Martial Law in Taiwan* (Washington, D.C. and New York: Resource Center and Formosan Association for Human Rights, 1985), p. 3.

13. Luce and Rumpf, *ibid.*, p. 22; "Taiwan Agents in America," *op. cit.*, n. 5, pp. 15-16, 41, 43; personal communication from former students at University of Minnesota knowledgeable about the Yeh case.

14. Luce and Rumpf, *op. cit.*, n. 12, pp. 21-23; "The Murder of Henry Liu," *op. cit.*, n. 2, p. 132.

15. Luce and Rumpf, *op. cit.*, n. 12, p. 21; "Taiwan Agents in America," *op. cit.*, n. 5, pp. 8-19 (prepared statement of Congressperson Jim Leach, D-Iowa).

campuses. KMT agents have threatened to keep overseas Taiwanese who engage in legal and peaceful anti-KMT activities from obtaining permission to return home; even citizens must obtain visas to enter the island.<sup>16</sup>

There is also evidence that KMT agents in the U.S. engage in more traditional kinds of espionage activities. As Taiwan's diplomatic isolation has grown—culminating in U.S. "de-recognition" in favor of Peking in 1979—the government has worked to assure its access to arms supplies and technology. The Senate Committee staff report notes that in 1974, the FBI broke up a plan by KMT intelligence agents, working with Chinatown businessmen and gangsters in San Francisco, to smuggle torpedoes to Taiwan. There have also been numerous reports of Taiwan agents obtaining classified diplomatic and military reports from the U.S. government.<sup>17</sup>

### Impact of the Liu Murder

The Liu murder demonstrated that the Solarz amendment had little effect because the Reagan administration was unwilling to invoke it. Congressman Norman Y. Mineta (Dem.-Calif.), called for a cutoff of arms sales to Taiwan at a congressional inquiry into the killing. However when Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Brown was testifying about what he called "an outrageous, heinous murder," the Reagan administration was selling the KMT regime tens of millions of dollars worth of arms.<sup>18</sup> And—as the Iran/contras scandal later showed—on February 6, 1985, the day before Brown's testimony, Oliver North and Robert McFarlane talked about the possibility of a KMT contribution to the Nicaraguan *contras*.<sup>19</sup>

Indeed, the administration seemed to view the Taiwan authorities' embarrassment over the Liu slaying primarily as a tool for strong-arming them on unrelated matters. Though the only clear evidence is the timing, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the Taiwan authorities gave \$2 million to the *contras* in the fall of 1985 because they felt pressured to restore good relations with the U.S.<sup>20</sup> It also is hard to believe it is merely coincidental that at about the same time, the Taiwan government finally bowed to U.S. pressure to revalue its currency. And, there is some indication that the Taiwan authorities played a role in late 1985 in revealing that a long-time CIA translator was a spy for the People's Republic of China (PRC).<sup>21</sup>

16. Luce and Rumpf, *op. cit.*, n. 12, pp. 21, 25; Cohen, p. 296.

17. *The Washington Post*, October 18, 1984 and January 24, 1985; on Taiwan's arms industry, see Robert Karniol, "New Arms for Old," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 30, 1987, p. 15.

18. "The Murder of Henry Liu," *op. cit.*, n. 2, pp. 12, 20; Luce and Rumpf, *op. cit.*, n. 12, p. 24.

19. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran/contras Affair* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 45. Numerous press accounts have revealed that the country mentioned in the report as, "Country 3," is Taiwan.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45, 63.

21. On currency revaluation and its negative consequences for Taiwanese, see Cohen, *op. cit.*, n. 7, pp. 90, 95, 266; on the Chinese spy in the CIA, Larry Wu-tai Chin, and the possible Taiwan role, see *The Washington Post*, November 23, 1985 and September 5, 1986.



According to Michael Glennon, who participated in the 1978 Senate committee study, it is precisely because U.S. intelligence agencies cooperate with foreign intelligence services which harass and intimidate persons in the U.S. that administrations of both parties have done little to prevent these practices. The agents' activities violate civil rights and, in virtually all instances, laws on foreign agents registration. Glennon suggests that putting the burden on the Executive to demonstrate that a government is *not* engaging in intimidation and harassment before any arms sales could occur would offer a greater deterrent.<sup>22</sup>

However, in 1981, Solarz was unable to get this more stringent approach passed,<sup>23</sup> and subsequent experience with Presidential certifications of El Salvador's human rights progress casts doubts on the value of such a process.

### KMT Agents' Activities Since the Liu Murder

The Reagan administration's cavalier attitude meant continuing free rein for KMT agents operating in the U.S. In September 1985, while visiting Taiwan, KMT authorities arrested Ms. Lee Ya-ping, the publisher of a Los Angeles-based Chinese language newspaper, for allegedly running articles favorable to the PRC.<sup>24</sup> Surprisingly, the U.S. State Department called this KMT effort to repeal the First Amendment "an act of intimidation and harassment against a person in the United States." The clear threat to suspend arms sales led to Lee's release into the "protective guidance" of her family.<sup>25</sup>

Unfortunately, the Reagan administration was not willing in any other instance to use its leverage to protect civil liberties in the U.S. from KMT interference or to protest human rights abuses in Taiwan. There is considerable speculation that the State Department acted so swiftly in Lee's case because she is a member of a KMT faction that has had considerable contact with the PRC, and the Peking authorities appealed on her behalf.<sup>26</sup>

Moreover, even this uncharacteristically sharp U.S. response failed to deter further activities by KMT agents:

In 1983, two Taiwanese students who had studied at North Carolina State University were convicted under an obscure "false advertising" statute for putting up posters alleging that another student was a KMT spy. One of the pair, Kuo Pei-hung, also had his Taiwan passport suspended. Kuo, an outspoken critic of the KMT, was himself, by his own admission, a former campus spy and KMT youth leader.

Three years later, a North Carolina state employee received a report from a KMT agent on the campus, accusing several students of working with Kuo on an anti-KMT newspaper. The report had been sent to an incorrect address in New York, with the state employee's return address on it. The

author of the report admitted writing it, but denied that he was a KMT agent. However, he could not explain why he was sending information on Taiwanese students to a "friend in New York." According to Kuo, who said that the other students did not work on his newspaper, the alleged agent was trying to fill an information quota.<sup>27</sup>

In March 1985, Taiwanese-American churches held a consultation in California with representatives of U.S. denominations and the Taiwanese Presbyterian Church, which has often challenged the KMT's authoritarian practices. One pastor, upon returning home, found that a member of his congregation was extremely inquisitive about his trip. Upon pressing the church member to explain this curiosity, the minister learned that this member of his flock was in fact a KMT spy charged with keeping tabs on his activities.

In 1987, Annette Lu, a former political prisoner from Taiwan then living in Boston, attended a number of overseas



Credit: Asia Resource Center

**Professor Wen-chen just prior to his mysterious death.**

Taiwanese and Amnesty International gatherings in Europe. A person identifying himself as an agent of the Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Justice (Taiwan's FBI) suggested to Lu's relatives in Taiwan that she should not undertake this trip. Although the trip occurred without incident after protests from the U.S. and Europe, KMT agents in the U.S. never-the-less sent information about Lu's travels to Taipei.

In 1987, KMT agents told officials at an Oklahoma university that Huang Hsin-chieh, a former Taiwanese political prisoner scheduled to give a talk at the university, was a "terrorist." Huang had to move his talk from the campus to a church, though a university spokesperson insisted that this was only because the speech had not been arranged through the proper channels.

27. "N.C. State Students From Taiwan Harassed and Have Death Threats," *The NC Landmark Limited*, January 27-February 2, 1983; *The [NC State] Technician* April 25, 1986; edited translation of an interview with Kuo appearing in *Freedom Era* (Taipei, 1988 or 1989). Kuo later became President of the U.S. Chapter of World United Formosans for Independence, an anti-KMT group. Although still "blacklisted" from going back to Taiwan (despite his continuing Taiwan citizenship), Kuo secretly entered Taiwan and staged a political rally last year. See *Taiwan Communique*, No. 43, January 1990, pp. 4-5.

22. "The Murder of Henry Liu," *op. cit.*, n. 2, pp. 84-88 (prepared statement of Glennon).

23. "Taiwan Agents in America," *op. cit.*, n. 5, p. 53.

24. Much of the material in this section is based on accounts the author has received from people involved in, or with reliable direct knowledge of, the circumstances. For obvious reasons, they have asked me not to reveal their identities.

25. *Taiwan Communique*, No. 22, October 28, 1985, pp. 10-12.

26. *Ibid.*; Cohen, *op. cit.*, n. 7, p. 266.



In the first instance of the U.S. government arresting an alleged Taiwan agent, it was announced in February 1988 that Douglas S. Tsou, a translator working in the Houston field office of the FBI, had been charged with passing "counterespionage" documents to the Houston branch of Taiwan's unofficial U.S. "interests section."<sup>28</sup>

Also in the late 1980s, a graduate student from Taiwan informed a Taiwanese-American professor, who is a well-known critic of the Taiwan authorities, that the KMT had assigned the student to monitor the professor's political activities. In retaliation for this confession, the Taipei government cancelled the student's passport, and his relatives in Taiwan warned him he would face imprisonment if he returned home.

In September 1989, the Taiwan authorities arrested Hsu Hsin-liang, a one-time opposition leader whom they had barred from returning home for over a decade, as he attempted to sneak onto the island *via* a fishing boat. The authorities charged him with "sedition," the indictment made detailed reference to Hsu's writings while in the United States, some of which called for the overthrow of the KMT regime. However, the KMT was unable to present any evidence to support these charges.

On October 20, the U.S. State Department issued a statement expressing "concern" that Hsu was being prosecuted for exercising his First Amendment rights and called the "monitoring of political expression in the United States by foreign security forces" a "disturbing issue." Unfortunately, this statement was much weaker than that issued in response to Lee Ya-ping's arrest. Hsu received a 10-year prison sentence (with three years and four months suspended) on December 23 of last year.<sup>29</sup>

On January 23, 1990, a federal grand jury indicted TRT International, of Ashland, Massachusetts, and three individuals for conspiracy and illegal exports of missile guidance parts to Taiwan. Rudy Yu-jen Tsai, a company Vice President, David Rosen, a former TRT officer, and Tommy Tsai, of Framingham, Massachusetts, were charged with buying parts used in the guidance systems of Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and Maverick air-to-surface missiles and exporting them to Taiwan without State Department approval. The exact relationship of TRT to the Taiwan government is not known but money must certainly have been a motivating factor if the allegations in the indictment are true. Nevertheless, this incident bears a suspicious resemblance to the 1974 torpedoes scam.<sup>30</sup>

## Conclusion

U.S. policy-makers have failed to enforce the laws and im-

**U.S. policy-makers have failed to enforce the laws and impose sanctions on Taiwan for the activities of its agents in this country.**

pose sanctions on Taiwan for the activities of its agents in this country because these officials regard other aspects of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship as more important than the civil rights and liberties of people in the United States. Despite this depressing conclusion, there have been a number of positive developments.

First, a U.S. Court of Appeals overturned a District Judge's decision dismissing a lawsuit by

Henry Liu's widow against the Taiwan authorities. The lower court ruled that under the "act of state" doctrine, it was bound to accept the Taiwan courts' finding that Admiral Wang and the others had not acted on behalf of their government. The appellate panel argued that Admiral Wang's actions were taken within the scope of his official duties, and ordered the District Court to hear the suit on its merits.<sup>31</sup>

Litigation has numerous limitations as a means of deterring the kinds of activities the KMT agents have engaged in and the Liu case judge is undoubtedly not the only one who will be reluctant to take on "friendly governments." Nevertheless, the appeals court decision, if upheld, may well be another landmark application of international human rights standards to U.S. domestic laws like *Filartiga v. Pena Irala*.<sup>32</sup>

Also, since 1986, Taiwanese on the island have joined their brethren in Korea and the Philippines in demonstrating that "people power" can challenge an authoritarian regime. Frequent mass protests, involving people from all walks of life, have won a more open society and greater government respect for political rights, although the people of Taiwan still do not enjoy a democratic form of government.<sup>33</sup>

Overseas Taiwanese, too, are fighting repression by refusing to let KMT agents intimidate them. Taiwanese students around the U.S. are becoming increasingly bold in their willingness to discuss political developments at home, as well as in China. Most impressively, overseas Taiwanese have begun fighting the "blacklist" by simply finding surreptitious ways to get back to Taiwan.<sup>34</sup> While this latter strategy is of course not without risks, as Hsu Hsin-liang discovered, the stepped up resistance by Taiwanese, at home and abroad, to KMT police state methods is ultimately the most promising antidote to the Taiwan government spy network in the United States. ●

31. *The New York Times*, December 31, 1989.

32. In that case, a federal court ruled that a Paraguayan torture victim could sue his torturer under an 18th century statute because they were both in the U.S. at the time; *Filartiga v. Pen Irala*, 630 F.2d 876 (1980).

33. See Cohen, *op. cit.*, n. 7, for details of political changes in Taiwan. It should be noted that the KMT continues to claim it is the legitimate government of China, and maintains seats in the parliament representing the mainland. These are filled by persons elected there in 1947, and account for some 80% of the total. Thus, even if the opposition won all of the elected "Taiwan area seats," the KMT would continue to control a substantial majority in the legislature. The Nationalists say they will hold a general election once they have "recovered the mainland from the Communist bandits."

34. *Taiwan Communique* No. 35, September 1988, pp. 14-18; No. 41, September 1989, pp. 12-13; No. 42, November 1989, pp. 14, 17-19; No. 43, pp. 19-21.

28. *The Washington Post*, February 10, 1988.

29. *Taiwan Communique*, No. 43, pp. 20-21; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Press Guidance, October 20, 1989.

30. Associated Press report of January 23, 1990.



# The History of Operation CHAOS

by Verne Lyon\*

For over fifteen years, the CIA, with assistance from numerous government agencies, conducted a massive illegal domestic covert operation called Operation CHAOS. It was one of the largest and most pervasive domestic surveillance programs in the history of this country. Throughout the duration of CHAOS, the CIA spied on thousands of U.S. citizens. The CIA went to great lengths to conceal this operation from the public while every president from Eisenhower to Nixon exploited CHAOS for his own political ends.

One can trace the beginnings of Operation CHAOS to 1959 when Eisenhower used the CIA to "sound out" the exiles who were fleeing Cuba after the triumph of Fidel Castro's revolution. Most were wealthy educated professionals looking for a sympathetic ear in the United States. The CIA sought contacts in the exile community and began to recruit many of them for future use against Castro. This U.S.-based recruiting operation was arguably illegal, although Eisenhower forced FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to accept it as a legitimate CIA function. Congress and the public showed no interest in who was recruiting whom.

The CIA's Office of Security was monitoring other groups at this time and had recruited agents within different émigré organizations.<sup>1</sup> The CIA considered this a normal extension of its authorized infiltration of dissident groups abroad even though the activity was taking place within the U.S. Increased use of the CIA's contacts and agents among the Cuban exiles became commonplace until mass, open recruitment of mercenaries for what was to be the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion was no longer a secret in southern Florida. It was no secret to Fidel Castro either, as we later found out.

This activity led the CIA to establish proprietary companies, fronts, and covers for its domestic operations. So widespread did they become that President Johnson allowed the then CIA Director, John McCone, to create in 1964 a new super-secret branch called the Domestic Operations Division (DOD), the very title of which mocked the explicit intent of Congress to prohibit CIA operations inside the U.S.<sup>2</sup> This disdain for Congress permeated the upper echelons of the CIA. Congress could not hinder or regulate something it did not know about, and neither the President nor the Director of the CIA was about to tell them. Neither was J. Edgar Hoover, even though he was generally aware that the CIA was moving in on what was supposed to be exclusive FBI turf.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Robert L. Borosage and John Marks, eds., *The CIA File* (New York: Grossman, 1976), p. 97.

2. Morton H. Halperin, et al., eds., *The Lawless State* (New York: Penguin, 1976), p. 138.

3. *Ibid.*

In the classified document creating the DOD, the scope of its activities were to "exercise centralized responsibility for the direction, support, and coordination of clandestine operational activities within the United States...." One of those was burglarizing foreign diplomatic sites at the request of the National Security Agency (NSA). The CIA also expanded the role of its "quasi-legal" Domestic Contact Service (DCS), an operation designed to brief and debrief selected American citizens who had traveled abroad in sensitive areas of intelligence interest. Because the interviews took place in airports between the aircraft and customs and immigration control, the operations were not technically considered domestic. The DCS also helped with travel control by monitoring the arrivals and departures of U.S. nationals and foreigners. In addition, the CIA reached out to former agents, officers, contacts, and friends to help it run its many fronts, covers, and phony corporations. This "old boy network" provided the CIA with trusted people to carry out its illegal domestic activities.

### The Justification

With the DCS, the DOD, the old boy network, and the CIA Office of Security operating without congressional oversight or public knowledge, all that was needed to bring it together was a perceived threat to the national security and a presidential directive unleashing the dogs. That happened in 1965 when President Johnson instructed McCone to provide an independent analysis of the growing problem of student protest against the war in Vietnam. Prior to this, Johnson had to rely on information provided by the FBI, intelligence that he perceived to be slanted by Hoover's personal views, which often ignored the facts. Because Hoover insisted that international communism was manipulating student protest, Johnson ordered the CIA to confirm or deny his allegations. All the pieces now came together.

To achieve the intelligence being asked for by the President, the CIA's Office of Security, the Counter-Intelligence division, and the newly created DOD turned to the old boy network for help. Many were old Office of Strategic Services people who had achieved positions of prominence in the business, labor, banking, and academic communities. In the academic arena, the CIA sought their own set of "eyes and ears" on many major college and university campuses. The FBI was already actively collecting domestic intelligence in the same academic settings.<sup>4</sup> The difference between the intelligence being gathered was like night and day. The FBI Special Agents and their informers were looking for information that would prove Hoover's theory. The CIA wanted to be more objective.

4. *Organizing Notes*, April 1982 (Vol. 6, No. 3), p. 6.




In April 1965, Johnson appointed Vice-Admiral William Raborn CIA Director (DCI, or Director of Central Intelligence) and Richard Helms Deputy Director. Since Raborn's days at the helm of the CIA seemed numbered from the outset, he never really became involved in the nuts and bolts of domestic operations; that was left to Helms, a career intelligence officer who had come up through the ranks — he had been Deputy Director for Plans (DDP) since 1962 and Deputy DCI from 1965-66 — and who could be trusted. Helms became DCI in June 1966. As Deputy Director, he had allowed the CIA slowly to expand its domestic intelligence operations and understood his orders from President Johnson were to collect intelligence on college and university campuses with no governing guidelines other than "don't get caught." Helms now had a free hand to implement Johnson's orders and, by August 1967, the illegal collection of domestic intelligence had become so large and widespread that he was forced to create a Special Operations Group (SOG). The SOG was imbedded in the DDP's counterintelligence division and provided, data on the U.S. peace movement to the Office of Current Intelligence on a regular basis.<sup>5</sup>

As campus antiwar protest activity spread across the nation, the CIA reacted by implementing two new domestic operations. The first, Project RESISTANCE, was designed to provide security to CIA recruiters on college campuses.<sup>6</sup> Under this program, the CIA sought active cooperation from college administrators, campus security, and local police to help identify antiwar activists, political dissidents, and "radicals." Eventually information was provided to all government recruiters on college campuses and directly to the super-secret DOD on thousands of students and dozens of groups. The CIA's Office of Security also created Project MERRIMAC, to provide warnings about demonstrations being carried out against CIA facilities or personnel in the Washington area.<sup>7</sup>

Under both Projects, the CIA infiltrated agents into domestic groups of all types and activities. It used its contacts with local police departments and their intelligence units to pick up its "police skills" and began in earnest to pull off burglaries, illegal entries, use of explosives, criminal frame-ups, shared interrogations, and disinformation. CIA teams purchased sophisticated equipment for many starved police departments and in return got to see arrest records, suspect lists, and intelligence reports. Many large police departments, in conjunction with the CIA, carried out illegal, warrantless searches of private properties, to provide intelligence for a report requested by President Johnson and later entitled "Restless Youth."<sup>8</sup>

SOG was being directed by Richard Ober, a CIA person with an established record of domestic intelligence operations in academia.<sup>9</sup> When *Ramparts* magazine disclosed the relationship between the National Student Association and the



Credit: Associated Press

**Richard Helms, as Director of Central Intelligence, developed CHAOS into a massive surveillance operation.**

CIA in early 1967, Ober was assigned to investigate the magazine's staff members, their friends, and possible connections with foreign intelligence agencies.<sup>10</sup>

In July 1968, Helms decided to consolidate all CIA domestic intelligence operations under one program and title. The new operation was called CHAOS and Ober was in charge.<sup>11</sup> Its activities greatly expanded from then on — at the urging not only of President Johnson, but also his main advisers Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow. Both men were convinced that Hoover was right and foreign intelligence agencies were involved in antiwar protests in the U.S. Johnson was not convinced and wanted the CIA's intelligence in order to compare it with that provided by the FBI.

### The Nixon Administration

After Richard Nixon took office in January 1969, Helms continued operations with the assurance that nothing would ever be leaked to the public. But he began to face pressure from two opposing factions within the CIA community. One wanted to expand domestic operations even more, while the other reminded him that Operation CHAOS and similar activities were well "over the line" of illegality and outside the CIA's charter. To put a damper on this internal dissent, Helms ordered Ober to stop discussing these activities with his direct boss in counterintelligence, James Jesus Angleton. The internal protests continued, however, as White House aide and staunch anti-communist Tom Charles Huston, pressed for ever increasing domestic operations.

Huston was eager to expand Operation CHAOS to include overseas agents and to "share" intelligence with the FBI's intelligence division, directed by William Sullivan. There were more than 50 CHAOS agents now, many receiving several weeks of assignment and training in overseas positions to establish their covers as radicals.<sup>12</sup> Once they returned to the

5. Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets* (New York: Knopf, 1979), p. 246.

6. *Op. cit.*, n. 2, p. 145.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 146.

8. *Op. cit.*, n. 5, p. 245.

9. *Op. cit.*, n. 2, pp. 148-49.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 148.

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Op. cit.*, n. 2, p. 150.



U.S. and enrolled in colleges and universities, they had the proper "credentials."

In June 1970 Nixon met with Hoover, Helms, NSA Director Admiral Noel Gaylor, and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) representative Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett and told them he wanted a coordinated and concentrated effort against domestic dissenters. To do that, he was creating the Inter-agency Committee on Intelligence (ICI), chaired by Hoover. The first ICI report, in late June, recommended new efforts in "black bag operations," wiretapping, and a mail-opening program. In late July 1970, Huston told the members of the ICI that their recommendations had been accepted by the White House.<sup>13</sup>

John Dean replaced Tom Huston as White House aide in charge of domestic intelligence, and at his urging, a Justice Department group, the Intelligence Evaluation Committee,

13. *Op. cit.*, n. 5, p. 248.

was established to study domestic groups, over Hoover's protest. Deteriorating relations between the FBI and the other intelligence agencies, especially the CIA, caused Hoover to fire William Sullivan. At that time, Sullivan was the liaison officer between the FBI and the other intelligence agencies and he strongly favored the expansion of domestic operations.

### Second Thoughts

Even Helms began to have second thoughts about how large CHAOS had grown, but Nixon made it clear to him that the CIA was a presidential tool he wanted at his disposal. Helms got the message, yet he also understood the growing uneasiness in other government circles. In 1972, the CIA's Inspector General wrote a report that expressed concern about Operation CHAOS in the following way: "...we also encountered general concern over what appeared to be a monitoring of the political views and activities of Americans not known to be or suspected of being involved in espionage.... Stations

## Campus Surveillance

The unleashing of the CIA and my concerns about the escalating war in Southeast Asia crossed paths on the Iowa State University campus in the fall of 1965. I do not know why I was chosen for recruitment, or by whom; only the CIA's old boy network on campus knows what criteria were used, what psychological profile was followed, and what future need of the CIA went into the initial selection process.

There were no posters, no ads in local or campus newspapers, nor any notice in the college placement office. The CIA came purporting to be representatives of legitimate business concerns that would normally conduct job interviews on campus. The only advance notice of the "interview" was a letter on what appeared to be real company letterhead saying that such-and-such company was interested in offering you a job. Only after accepting the interview and signing several documents stating you would never reveal anything about the exclusive job offer being made would the interviewers tell you whom they really represented. By then you were trapped into eternal secrecy even if you declined their offer. You could not even approach the university's administration or placement office to complain about the deception.

For the student or faculty member who accepted the CIA's offer to spy, the payments offered were tailored to the individual. In some cases it was only money; in others it may have been a guaranteed draft deferment, research assistance grants, a future career with the CIA, patriotism, duty, or any combination. Short on money, plus wanting to serve my country without being sent to stop a bullet in a rice paddy halfway around the world, I listened intently to their pitch. I was hooked with an offer of an undeclared \$300 cash in an envelope each month plus a guaranteed draft deferment and an offer of a bright future with the Company.

In exchange, I was asked to do several things while

admonished to maintain absolute secrecy about my intelligence gathering activities, the CIA, and any working relationship between us. I was persuaded to believe that the nation was facing a major crisis because of the student unrest and ensuing protests and that even though such activities were permitted in our "free" country, we should not allow foreigners and/or communists to pull the strings if they were involved.

My campus missions included monitoring selected students; obtaining printed materials from student protest groups, including membership and donor lists and programs of planned actions and protests; gathering information on the private sexual activities of selected students or faculty, and on the student visa status of selected foreign students; and learning the identities of visiting "travelling agitators" from other colleges and universities.

Ethnic and racial groups were watched as well as student radical movements. No guidelines were given that differentiated between what was legitimate protest and what constituted a perceived threat to national security. This allowed the CIA to expand its domestic surveillance to cover draft resistance organizations, military deserters, non-mainstream newspapers and publications, most Black militant groups, and U.S. citizens travelling abroad. Most domestic political activity was also covered if it showed any sign of differing from the "American tradition."

My entire senior year found me caught up in this illegal domestic covert operation. It changed my personality, my political point of view, and my way of thinking about the structure and role of the different branches of our federal government, and it taught me to what lengths the government would go to hide illegal wrongdoings under the cloak of national security.



were asked to report on the whereabouts and activities of prominent persons... whose comings and goings were not only in the public domain, but for whom allegations of subversion seemed sufficiently nebulous to raise renewed doubts as to the nature and legitimacy of the CHAOS program."<sup>14</sup>

Helms was being squeezed by White House demands to expand Operation CHAOS and the fear that the whole question of domestic operations was going to become public knowledge, as Hoover feared. Helms found himself constantly shoring up one lie with another and then another. He found himself deceiving Congress and lying to the public as well as CIA employees. In March 1971, a group of young CIA executives known as the Management Advisory Group (MAG) protested Operation CHAOS and similar domestic operations by issuing a statement saying, "MAG opposes any Agency activity which could be construed as targeted against any person who enjoys the protection of the U.S. Constitution... whether or not he resides in the United States."<sup>15</sup>

Helms of course denied the CIA was involved in domestic operations, or using basic American institutions such as the Peace Corps, the business community, or the media as covers for CIA operations. Just a few years later, Oswald Johnston of the *Washington Star* reported that over 35 American journalists, some full-time, some free-lance, and some major media correspondents were on the CIA payroll. And in 1974 the CIA admitted that over two hundred CIA agents were operating overseas posing as businessmen.<sup>16</sup>

### The Collapse of the House of Cards

The web of deception, misinformation, lies, and illegal domestic activities began to unravel with speed in the summer of 1972 when Howard Osborn, then Chief of Security for the CIA, informed Helms that two former CIA officers, E. Howard Hunt and James McCord, were involved in a burglary at the Watergate complex in Washington, D.C. The house of cards was about to come crashing down and Helms now wanted to salvage what he could and distance himself from not only Watergate but also the domestic operations. He appointed CIA Executive Director William Colby to handle any investigations into the Agency's domestic operations and began to prepare for the inevitable.

Helms was called to Camp David by President Nixon and subsequently fired. His replacement was James Schlesinger (who would last but a few months). Schlesinger would be replaced in July 1973 by Colby, and Helms would become U.S. Ambassador to Iran to get him as far away as possible. In an effort at damage control, Colby decided that Operation CHAOS and Project RESISTANCE should be terminated.

In 1975 the CIA underwent public investigation and scrutiny by both the Church and Rockefeller committees. These investigations revealed considerable evidence showing that the CIA had carried out its activities with a tremendous disregard for the law, both in the U.S. and abroad.

14. *Op. cit.*, n. 2, p. 153.

15. Center for National Security Studies report, *Operation Chaos* (Washington, D.C.: 1979), p.11.

16. *Op. cit.*, n. 1, pp. 101-02, 106.

During the life of Operation CHAOS, the CIA had compiled personality files on over 13,000 individuals — including more than 7,000 U.S. citizens — as well as files on over 1,000 domestic groups.<sup>17</sup>

The CIA had shared information on more than 300,000 persons with different law enforcement agencies including the DIA and FBI. It had spied on, burglarized, intimidated, misinformed, lied to, deceived, and carried out criminal acts against thousands of citizens of the United States. It had placed itself above the law, above the Constitution, and in contempt of international diplomacy and the United States Congress. It had violated its charter and had contributed either directly or indirectly to the resignation of a President of the United States. It had tainted itself beyond hope.

Of all this, the CIA's blatant contempt for the rights of individuals was the worst. This record of deceit and illegality, implored Congress as well as the President to take extreme measures to control the Agency's activities. However, except for a few cosmetic changes made for public consumption — such as the Congressional intelligence oversight committee — nothing has been done to control the CIA. In fact, subsequent administrations have chosen to use the CIA for domestic operations as well. These renewed domestic operations began with Gerald Ford, were briefly limited by Jimmy Carter, and then extended dramatically by Ronald Reagan.

Any hope of curbing these illegal activities is scant. Recently, George Bush and current DCI William Webster announced for a the need to again target political enemies of the U.S. for assassination. It is ironic that Webster, a former Federal Judge, would chose to ignore the limits and constraints placed on the government by the Constitution. During his tenure as Director of the FBI, the bureau was once again involved in the infiltration of groups practicing their constitutional right to dissent against U.S. government policies. Once again, the FBI compiled thousands of files on individuals protesting Reagan's war against Nicaragua and support for the genocidal Salvadoran military. Now, Webster is in a position of perhaps even greater power and, without doubt, would have no qualms about abusing it.

### Conclusion

Given the power granted to the office of the presidency and the unaccountability of the intelligence agencies, widespread illegal domestic operations are certain. We as a people should remember history and not repeat it. It is therefore essential that the CIA be reorganized and stripped of its covert operations capability. Effective congressional oversight is also an important condition for ending the misuse of the intelligence apparatus that has plagued every U.S. administration since the formation of the CIA.

A great deal is at risk — our personal freedoms as well as the viability of this society. The CIA must be put in its place. Should we demand or allow anything less, we will remain vulnerable to these abuses and face the risk of decaying into a lawless state destined to self-destruction.

17. *Op. cit.*, n. 2, p. 153.



## South African Death Squads

Late last year former security policeman Butana Almond Nofamela, who was sentenced to death for the murder of a farmer, believed that speaking about his involvement with South African death squads might save him from execution.

His former police colleagues tried to persuade Nofamela to remain silent, but in November 1989 he decided to talk. Nofamela said he had committed numerous murders at the behest of his police commanders, the most infamous being the 1981 assassination of well-known African National Congress (ANC) lawyer, Griffiths Mxenge. He told his lawyer and a commission of inquiry, in graphic detail, how Mxenge was kidnapped and then stabbed to death.<sup>1</sup>

The disclosures by Nofamela have dispelled any doubts that certain killings in South Africa were the responsibility of independent far right-wingers in the security apparatus—in fact death squads have now been shown to be a direct part of that apparatus.

Nofamela's death row revelations were followed by those of his immediate superior officer, Captain Johannes Dirk Coetzee, and another colleague, David "Spyker" Tshikalanga. After Nofamela's confessions both men fled the country and told their stories to the Afrikaans language newspaper *Vrye Weekblad*.

Later Coetzee did the unthinkable for an Afrikaaner security policeman—he joined the ANC liberation movement—the prime enemy and target of the hit squads. He was followed by his colleague, "Spyker" Tshikalanga and 12 other members of the death squads.

Though Almond Nofamela implicated 17 policemen, the squad which he and Captain Coetzee described was only one of many. Coetzee participated in the hit squad for 15 years, convinced that the murders the group committed would never be proven. "Once you have been pulled into the spider's web, it is difficult to get out, especially when it does its executions so cleanly that it leaves no evidence," he said.<sup>2</sup>

"The responsibility for the death squads goes right to the top," Coetzee said.<sup>3</sup> In an affidavit presented to a government inquiry into the hit squad allegations, Coetzee named all past and present members of the State Security Council as co-conspirators. The State Security Council was the power behind the cabinet until the accession of F.W. de Klerk to the Presidency.<sup>4</sup>

In particular, he named the former Law and Order Minister Louis Le Grange, now speaker of parliament, and

General Johan Coetzee (no relation), the former chief of police, now retired, as the relevant authorities during the time he was most active.

Coetzee also maintains that in 1982, South African government officials carried out the bombing of the ANC office in London, using a device smuggled into Britain through the diplomatic pouch.<sup>5</sup>

The existence of death squads such as those described by Coetzee should not have been such a surprise. Late last year Mervyn Malan, a defector from the South African Defense Force (SADF), who said that he was a family relation of Defense Minister, General Magnus Malan, claimed the SADF was involved in attacks on anti-apartheid activists inside and outside South Africa.<sup>6</sup>

Malan also said, in an interview with the Dutch Anti-Apartheid Movement in December 1989, that an official in the British Home Affairs Ministry had provided South African soldiers with British passports.

From 1983 to 1985 Mervyn Malan was the leader of a special unit in the South African Army, known as the "special forces reconnaissance command." He said he took part in actions against SWAPO in Namibia and Angola and that special units of the South African Army, dressed as civilians, conducted attacks on activists in South Africa's black townships.

Outside South African borders the army was involved in kidnapping and assassinating exiled ANC members. Commanders of these special units were trained in Israel, Malan said.

The death squads used several different methods in their assassination attempts. Almond Nofamela described how knives, poison, bombs, bullets and kidnapping were used in the secret war against anti-apartheid activists.<sup>7</sup>

Parcel bombs were sent in the front-line states of Mozambique, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Angola. In Swaziland and in Mozambique, death squads have kidnapped and shot people, while in Lesotho their methods included the use of parcel bombs, raids, and individual assassinations.<sup>8</sup>

Last year Reverend Frank Chikane, General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches, claimed that there had been an attempt to poison him by contaminating his clothing. Shortly thereafter, members of a military hit squad admitted trying to tamper with his luggage.<sup>9</sup> The newspaper *Vrye*

5. *Op. cit.*, n. 3.

6. *New Nation*, December 1, 1989; *Weekly Mail*, December 1, 1989.

7. *Op. cit.*, n. 1.

8. For the Zimbabwe cases see (London) *Times*, June 10, 1989. For the Lesotho hit-squads see *Sunday Star*, September 14, 1986.

9. *South*, June 15, 1989; (London) *Guardian*, August 30, 1989; *The Citizen*, March 6, 1990.

1. *The Citizen*, March 8, 1990.

2. *SouthScan*, Vol. 5/5, February 9, 1990.


3. Andrew Meldrum, "Pretoria Leaders Linked to Killings," *New York Times*, March 1, 1990.

4. *Sunday Tribune*, February 4, 1990.



*Weekblad* claimed that the poison had been prepared by the head of the police forensic department. The newspaper then had to contest a legal claim for 1 million Rand in damages.<sup>10</sup>

Evidence has been presented on plans to replace the heart pills of Nelson Mandela's lawyer with tablets designed to induce a heart attack. Operation *Apie* (Afrikaans for ape) planned to send a baboon fetus to Archbishop Desmond M. Tutu.<sup>11</sup>



Credit: Associated Press

**Johannes Dirk Coetzee, former death squad commander.**

### Development of the Hit Squads

Death squad assassinations have a long history in South Africa — anti-apartheid academic Richard Turner was shot in 1978 — but they reached their peak during the 1984-87 rebellion which brought the state of emergency and put troops into the black townships for the first time.

The rise of the hit squads coincided with the development of an alliance between former President P.W. Botha and the South African military. It was based on the so-called "Total Onslaught" philosophy.<sup>12</sup>

According to this doctrine, developed in the mid 1970s, the security forces should develop a "total response" to counter the "total onslaught" by the forces of the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP).

In March 1987, Major General Charles Lloyd, chairman of the State Security Council, spoke of the need to "eliminate the revolutionaries" in the townships. The ranks of the "enemy" were small, he said, and had to be identified specifically. The security forces should not eliminate non-revolutionary members of the community "by accident."<sup>13</sup>

While speaking at the Pretoria University Institute for Strategic Studies in 1988, General Malan justified the covert campaign by saying that, "unconventional methods" were needed to achieve South Africa's aims. "Like others we do not talk about them," he added.

During the rebellion of 1984-87 the South African military

10. *Star*, December 19, 1989.

11. John Burns, "Cape Town Death-Squad Inquiry Opens," *New York Times*, March 6, 1990.

12. Gavin Cawthra, *Brutal Force: The Apartheid War Machine* (London: International Defence and Aid Fund, 1986).

13. *SouthScan*, January 13, 1988.

and police began to work in total cooperation. Joint Management Committees were set up in every township and rural community. These local committees reported to a regional committee, which in turn reported to the National Security Management System (NSMS). The committees and the NSMS coordinated all aspects of the civil administration. The NSMS was controlled by the State Security Council. From this dominant position the State Security Council could completely regulate the civilian administrations. Under the auspices of the Joint Management Committees, troops were brought in to police the townships.<sup>14</sup>

### Police Squads

The Coetzee police squad was directly linked to Security Branch C1 operating out of COMPOL, the police headquarters in Pretoria. Its operations followed a clear pattern of political direction, specifically targeting political or trade union activists.

The Commissioner of Police was the responsible senior official of Coetzee's squad operations, and his superior was the Minister of Law and Order, who sat on the State Security Council and in the Cabinet.

The police squads were based in Pretoria, Cape Town, East London, Durban, Piet Retief (a town used as a base for incursions into Swaziland), at the Electricity Supply Commission (Eskom) station near Milman,<sup>15</sup> and near Kuruman, at a farm called Vlakplaas and at another one called Daisy.

From Vlakplaas, East London, and Cape Town, the death squads used ANC defectors in the guerrilla war. The police found that as the guerrilla war intensified in the early 1980s, they were able to turn some of the ANC's cadres and began seeking a role for them. The "Askaris" (guerrilla defectors) also worked with a "terrorism detection unit" in Cape Town.

The police squads also had dealings with foreign agents. State Security Council member, Craig Williamson acted as liaison between the foreign agents and the death squads. In the 1970s Williamson infiltrated the International University Exchange Fund, which had close links with the anti-apartheid liberation movement. He is now seeking to build an image in South Africa as a reform-minded politician, and his connection with the police squads is proving an embarrassment.

According to evidence from an internal South African Police Departmental inquiry, conducted in 1985, Williamson and Dirk Coetzee had a "close relationship." Williamson spoke of a "close rapport" between them.<sup>16</sup>

### Military Squads

The military death squads came under the command of the CCB (Civil Cooperation Bureau). The CCB charter defined its hit squads — in operation since April 1986 — as a covert unit independent of existing state intelligence and covert structures, charged with gathering intelligence and acting against

14. *SouthScan*, Vol. 1/2, September 23, 1986.

15. Sites such as this were designated strategic points in the National Security Management System.

16. The inquiry indicted Coetzee for illicit foreign currency dealings, a charge which he has subsequently admitted. *Op. cit.*, n. 2.



... ultra-secret group within the SADF  
... South Africa and across its borders.  
... General Janne Goldenhuys, informed  
... the unit's annual budget was 28 mil-  
... subsidized cars,  
... and logistical support from other

... opted to  
... among ex-  
... the South African Mur-  
... a unit with  
... and  
... network of in-  
... throughout southern Africa.

... they had a sudden addition to their  
... squads of former Rhodesian spe-  
... and foreign mercenaries. These men  
... with the means and the extra expertise  
... to the enemy.

... strong indications that some of the hit  
... involved in the Rhodesian war had connec-  
... which has specialized in cross-border opera-  
... the ANC warned of Mossad-style  
... being carried out against it.<sup>19</sup>

... command controlling the activities of the  
... military unit involved a number of generals and  
... to the office of Defense Minister Magnus Malan.  
... that he had heard of CCB's death squad  
... in November 1989, though this was contradicted  
... in statements to the official commission.<sup>20</sup>  
... have shown that, far from being solely an in-  
... operation, the CCB was used for politi-  
... including murder. It was funded by secret  
... millions of Rands to cover salaries, ex-  
... and over which there was little con-  
... control.

... the CCB was officially acknowledged by  
... the SADF in March 1990. The admission came after the ar-  
... on suspicion of killing anti-apartheid ac-  
... Anton Lubowski and David Webster.

... was a member of SWAPO's Central Com-  
... On September 12, 1989, he was assassinated in front  
... of his home in Namibia.

... to deflect this unwanted attention Defense  
... Minister Malan, a hardline opponent of President de Klerk,  
... the media and the investigation into  
... murder. Malan claimed, quite suddenly, that his  
... would have had no reason to kill Lubowski since he had

been a military intelligence agent for the South Africans.<sup>22</sup>

David Webster, an academic and human rights activist, was  
gunned down outside his Johannesburg home on May 1, 1989.  
He had been working on an analysis of the South African hit  
squad and had uncovered clandestine links between the  
Mozambique National Resistance and the South African  
Army in northern Natal province.<sup>23</sup>

Malan issued a lengthy state-  
ment firmly denying he had issued  
orders for Webster and Lubowski  
to be killed.<sup>24</sup>

#### Commission of Inquiry

For some time pressure for ac-  
tion against hit squads has been in-  
tensifying, catalyzed by demands  
for an independent inquiry into the

murders of Webster and Lubowski.

In the furor surrounding the Nofamela and Coetzee con-  
fessions, the "reform" government of President F.W. de Klerk  
agreed to hold an internal inquiry. Then, as pressure in-  
creased, Judge Louis Harms was appointed to conduct an in-  
dependent judicial inquiry into the allegations of killings.

The South African government presented a list of 71 un-  
solved killings to the Harms Commission. This list did not in-  
clude cases from outside South Africa, yet it did cite more than  
just state-sponsored assassinations.<sup>25</sup> It includes ANC opera-  
tions, either involving the killing of informers or state wit-  
nesses, or land-mine and grenade explosions.

This decision appears to have been taken to placate those  
police and military officers already deeply concerned at the  
rapid volte-face of the de Klerk government. There has been  
much dissent among the ranks of the police and military over  
the unbanning in early February 1990 of their arch-enemies,  
the ANC and the SACP.

Similarly the decision to exclude the foreign operations of  
the hit squads was an attempt to prevent this issue from be-  
coming diplomatically embarrassing at a sensitive moment in  
Pretoria's relations with the outside world.

Because of the narrowness of the Harms Commission brief  
it will not include: the killing of the academic and journalist  
Ruth First in Maputo, Mozambique in August 1982; the at-  
tempted assassination of Albie Sachs in Maputo in 1988; the  
assassination of ANC representative Joe Gqabi in Harare,  
Zimbabwe in August 1981; the killing of Jeannette Schoon in  
Lubango, Angola in 1984; the killing of Dulcie September,  
ANC representative in Paris in March 1988; the bomb blast at  
the London ANC office in the early 1980s; the Shifidi killing  
in Namibia; in addition to numerous other bombings and as-  
sassinations in Harare, Lusaka, Gaborone and Maseru.<sup>26</sup>

22. South African Press Association (SAPA), March 7, 1990.  
23. Sowetan, June 12, 1989; New York Times, March 1, 1990.

24. The Citizen, February 20, 1990; (London) Guardian, February 21,  
1990.

25. This list was presented to the Harms Commission by the Attorney  
General of the Orange Free State Province.


26. Star, November 22, 1989.

17. The Citizen, March 7, 1990.  
18. Sowetan, Feb 28, March 2, 1990.  
19. Sowetan, Feb 14, July 23, 1987.  
20. Sowetan, March 18, 1990.  
21. CNA 199, p. 18.



The Commission will also not examine the case of Swedish national Heine Human, who was reportedly employed by a South African police unit known as A1. Human was alleged to have been involved in the unsolved 1988 assassination of Dulcie September. Human fled South Africa in December 1989 and is now in the hands of ANC intelligence personnel.<sup>27</sup>

Nor will it look at the direct link which has been established between Pretoria and the 1982 bombing of the ANC's London office. British national and former A1 agent Peter Casselton — jailed in 1982 for burglary and now in South Africa with Interpol searching for him — has acknowledged that he was an A1 agent and that he had been responsible for operations in London.<sup>28</sup>



Credit: Impact Visuals

SWAPO member Anton Lubowski was murdered by South African death squads.

### Conclusion

President F.W. de Klerk recognized the need to diminish some of the power of the security apparatus, as well as the need to acquire levers of control over some of his military generals who are deeply uneasy about the course he is following.

Although de Klerk has already indicated that he will not react to "trial by media," once the Harms Commission's findings are in, he will most likely fire those generals implicated in the scandal. Or possibly, he will hold the threat of a broader-ranging investigation over their heads as a guarantee of their future loyalty.

de Klerk already has enough evidence to dismiss Defense Minister Magnus Malan, something he has wanted to do for several months. Many believed Malan's career was effectively over before Harms began hearing evidence. But if de Klerk has found a means of reining in his military generals, the same may not be true of their police counterparts.

It appears that the men behind the police death squads have stuck to the requirements for illegal and covert activities: plausible deniability and cut-outs. As yet there is little evidence linking the current roster of police colonels and generals to the Section C hit squads. It seems certain that knowledge of the hit squads went right to the top. A document

which indicates that the State Security Council and senior ministers were aware of death squad activity was cited in the South African press in December 1989.<sup>29</sup>

Foreign Minister Roelof "Pik" Botha has specifically been accused in the media of knowing about the regional operations of the hit squads — something he strongly denies.<sup>30</sup> Craig Williamson is taking damage-limitation action by admitting that he knew about raids outside the country, but not about death squad killings.<sup>31</sup>

The international focus on police and military hit squad activities has been intense, yet in late April and May 1990 more assassinations and attempted killings took place. A Pan-African Congress member and his family were murdered in Botswana and an Anglican priest with links to the ANC was badly injured by a bomb in Harare, Zimbabwe.<sup>32</sup>

The operations of other squads inside the country are also coming to light. There is now evidence that the Johannesburg City Council operated a spy ring. Allegations were exposed at another government inquiry that its employees worked with Military Intelligence to commit illegal acts of violence, including the burning down of an alleged ANC house in a suburb of Johannesburg.<sup>33</sup>

An average of 11 South African police are now resigning every day and morale is at an all-time low. These police have played a key role in the repression that has propped up *apartheid*, and many are extremely worried about their future once the system is abolished. But it is clear that neither security apparatus responsible for the death squad activities has been restructured or shut down.

de Klerk may now have achieved two prime objectives; to improve control of his restive security apparatus, and to have pawns with which to bargain with the ANC, trading police hitmen against guerrillas. But anti-*apartheid* activists fear that with or without overt official approval, the squads will continue to operate.

29. *Interpress*, December 15, 1989.

30. *Business Day*, April 5, 1990.

31. *Ibid.*

32. *SouthScan*, Vol. 5/17, May 4, 1990.

33. *SAPA*, April 30, 1990.

### Correction:

In issue Number 33 we inadvertently dropped the last line of the article "Elections Under State Terror," by Terry Allen and Edward Herman. The last sentence should read:

The legitimized government may also kill its citizens freely, if it avoids murdering and mutilating notables, in which case the press may raise questions about whether the "elected government" really "controls" the people who kill.

We would like to apologize both to the authors and to our readers for this omission.

27. *Vrye Weekblad*, January 1990.

28. *Vrye Weekblad*, January 12, 1990.



# CovertAction

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